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MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: MARXIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOME IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

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ABSTRACT

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This chapter aims to how Marx's ideas and subsequent Marxist-inspired scholarship have contributed to the analysis of the various forms of work organization. It summarizes Marx's basic philosophy, theory of history, and critique of political economy; it distinguishes more critical and more optimistic variants of Marxist theory; and it then shows how these ideas have been used in the analysis of key organizational forms, contrasting Marxist versus non-Marxist approaches and critical versus optimistic versions of Marxism.

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Keywords: Marxism; dialectical materialism; historical materialism; organization form.

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INTRODUCTION

3 It is hardly obvious that Karl Marx, a philosopher, economist, and
 5 revolutionary activist who died a century and a quarter ago, should have
 7 much relevance to organization studies today. Surely, the skeptic says, too
 9 many important features of contemporary organizations postdate Marx. On
 11 closer inspection, however, it is clear that organizations today share many
 13 fundamental features with those Marx saw emerging in his time. In
 15 particular, we still live with a basically capitalist form of society and
 17 enterprise. Even so, the skeptic retorts, social science has surely advanced
 19 since Marx. Here too, the skeptic is off the mark: social sciences find
 21 continuous nourishment in their classics (Alexander, 1987), and Marx figures
 23 prominently among the classics that continue to inform both social science in
 25 general and organization studies in particular (Adler, 2009b; Marens, 2009).

15 Since Marx's time, the general matrix of Marxist theory has not remained
 17 fixed in doctrinaire rigidity: numerous variants of the basic theory have
 19 emerged (Anderson, 1979; Burawoy, 1990). This chapter's goal, however, is
 21 to highlight the most basic and enduring of Marx's insights, and to show
 23 how they have contributed to the analysis of the various forms of work
 25 organization.¹

21 The following sections discuss, in turn, Marx's basic theory, Marxist contri-
 23 butions to our understanding of organization forms, and finally Marxism's
 25 critics. My survey is limited to English-language publications and focuses on
 27 organization studies construed rather narrowly, ignoring Marxist work in
 29 contiguous fields of research such as accounting (on Marxist-related work
 31 here, see, e.g., Bryer, 1999; Tinker, 1999) or marketing (Lee & Murray, 1995).

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MARXISM: KEY IDEAS

31 Marx's ideas can be grouped under three headings: philosophy ("dialectical
 33 materialism"), history ("historical materialism"), and economics ("critique
 35 of political economy"). The following sections review them briefly in turn.

35

Dialectical Materialism

37

39 Reading Marx is sometimes exhilarating – his prose can be very compelling,
 especially as polemic, but contemporary readers can also find long passages
 excruciatingly opaque. This opacity is often the effect of Marx's commitment

1 to dialectics as form of reasoning and presentation. The dialectical form is
disconcerting to the unfamiliar reader, but it is rewarding once its
3 assumptions are understood (see Ollman, 2003 for a particularly clear
exposition of Marxist dialectics).

5 Marx inherited and adapted the dialectical approach from Hegel. Hegel
saw history as the progressive emergence of the Spirit (German: *Geist*), which
7 can be understood either as the God's essence of the universe or as
humanity's understanding of itself. The Spirit evolves as a function of the
9 contradictions among the key ideas governing successive periods (*Zeitgeists*):
a thesis provokes the emergence of an antithesis, and the conflict between
11 them eventually yields a synthesis. This synthesis abolishes the thesis and
antithesis, but also conserves what was valid about them.

13 The notion that the objective world embodies contradictions is rather
foreign to the Anglo-American intellectual tradition: we often assume that
15 contradictions obtain only between logical propositions, not between real
things. However, this dialectical approach provides a fruitful heuristic device
17 for characterizing the development of systems over time, especially social
systems. Marx retained the "rational core" of Hegel's dialectics, but turned it
19 on its head, arguing that it is contradictions in the real world of human
interaction that explain the evolution of ideas rather than vice versa.

21 This mode of reasoning is visible right from the start of Marx's magnum
opus, *Capital*. Here Marx argues that the "germ" of capitalism – the inner
23 core whose unfolding contradictions explain capitalist development – is the
"commodity." Marx uses this term to refer to any product or service
25 produced for sale rather than for direct use. Commodities embody a
contradictory unity of use-value and exchange-value. *Unity* because each pole
27 of this contradiction *presupposes* the other: for the product to be created in
the first place, the producer must believe it has exchange-value – power for the
29 seller to command a determinate amount of money or goods in exchange; and
to generate this exchange-value for the seller, the product must have use-value
31 – usefulness to the purchaser. *Contradictory unity* because the two poles
oppose each other: their disjointedness can put them in conflict with each
33 other, and this in at least two ways. First, the producer anticipates the
exchange-value of the product, but does not know until she reaches the
35 market if this hope will be realized or if, on the contrary, the use-values that
were consumed in producing the commodity will be wasted: pursuit of
37 exchange-value can destroy use-value, for example, new houses that cannot
be sold even at the builder's cost and automobiles that must be sold at a loss
39 to move them off the lot. Second, when production is oriented to exchange-
value, there are many socially important use-values that will remain unmet,

1 for example, clean environment, health care for all, and food and shelter for
the hungry. This real contradiction embedded in the commodity form shapes
3 both the structure and the historical trajectory of capitalism in multiple ways,
of which I will discuss a few below.

5 The notion of real contradiction has reappeared in mainstream organiza-
tion studies as a kind of “paradox” (Lewis, 2000; Poole & van de Ven, 1989).
7 The Marxian version locates the conflict that is at the heart of paradox in the
real world, whereas many others use the notion of paradox to refer exclusively
9 to theoretical conflicts created by inadequacies in our theories about the
world. We should note in passing that among Marxists there is some debate
11 as to whether the concept of real contradiction is of much use, or even
preserves validity, in the study of the natural domain as compared to the
13 social domain. Ollman (2003) offers a nuanced assessment, suggesting that the
dialectical form of causality subsumes more “common sense” forms of
15 causality as special cases, and that the dialectical form has proven powerful in
analyzing social structures, most notably capitalism, but has proven less
17 unhelpful in the natural sciences.

In his ontological commitments, Marx’s dialectical materialism puts him in
19 opposition both to “vulgar” materialism, which accords ideas no causal
efficacy, and to “idealism,” which sees the world as driven entirely by ideas or,
21 in the extreme versions, as composed only of ideas. Marx’s view is more
consistent with “critical realism” as developed by Bhaskar (1975) and others
23 (Brown, Fleetwood, & Roberts, 2002; Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 2004). Marx
distinguishes between the knowledge that we have of the world and the
25 knowledge-independent world around us. While all knowledge is provisional,
the aim of science, including social science, is to discern the underlying forces
27 that give shape to this latter, knowledge-independent world. These forces may
not be immediately visible in the empirical world around us, but that fact does
29 not negate their reality: invisible gravity explains the apple’s visible fall from
the tree; the real contradictions hidden within the commodity form contribute
31 to the persistence of economic cycles and crises. Science should aim to offer
an account of the mechanisms that generate the more visible, empirical
33 manifestations of these underlying forces. Marx thus has a “stratified”
ontology, in which scientific explanation follows a path that ascends from the
35 abstract, deepest, less visible structures to the visible, concrete, empirically
observed world. In this, Marx is radically opposed to empiricism, which sees
37 science as limited to discerning patterns in the visible world. And he is no less
radically opposed to strong forms of social constructivism common in the
39 discursive universe of postmodernism, for which the very pursuit of objective
knowledge is illusory if not worse.

1 Notwithstanding Marxism's rejection of strong social constructivism,
2 dialectical materialism embraces the social nature of knowledge. Mainstream
3 management scholars often contend that politics should not enter into
4 processes of knowledge creation: they believe that value-neutral objectivity is
5 the hallmark of proper scientific work and that advocacy would undermine
6 that objectivity. Marx argues that there are no facts without theories: our
7 access to the knowledge-independent world is always mediated by our existing
8 concepts, and in a class-divided society, these mediating concepts are shaped
9 (at least in part, and even if only unconsciously) by political value
10 considerations. To adopt the standpoint of the dominant elite inevitably
11 encourages the development of theories that legitimize and naturalize the
12 status quo: such theories cannot penetrate deeply into the structures that give
13 rise to this domination. The Marxist argument is that the view "from below"
14 has greater potential to generate more complete and more objective knowledge
15 – knowledge that raises consciousness about exploitation and helps movement
16 toward emancipation. This idea has been taken up and generalized by feminist
17 scholars: as Harding puts it, research should begin with the concrete
18 circumstances and lived experiences of the "systematically oppressed, exploited
19 and dominated, those who have fewer interests in ignorance about how the
20 social order actually works" (1991, p. 150). In a social world of exploitation
21 and domination, we can learn more about deep structures and that they can be
22 changed by adopting the standpoints of the subaltern (see also Adler &
23 Jermier, 2005; Harding, 2004; Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005).

25

Historical Materialism

27

28 In *The German Ideology* (originally published in 1845), Marx and his lifelong
29 collaborator Engels mark their distance from Hegel and the Young Hegelians.
30 They advance three main ideas. First, human action is constrained and
31 enabled by its historically specific conditions: generic transhistorical theorizing
32 is therefore a poor foundation for social science. Second, the ideas we work
33 with, including abstract theoretical ones, are conditioned by our own historical
34 context. And finally, because people must produce in order to live, the sphere
35 of production is primary relative to the sphere of thought and culture. While
36 the last of these ideas, expressing Marx's materialism, is eternally unfashion-
37 able in intellectual circles, it does have counterparts in several streams of non-
38 Marxist social science. The second idea is less common. And the first contrasts
39 strikingly with most contemporary social science, where theory is considered
40 more advanced precisely to the degree that it is based on ostensibly timeless

1 features of human nature, of dyadic interaction, or of larger collectivities.
Marx begins with the opposite assumption because he sees human nature as
3 largely socially determined and therefore relatively plastic.

The *Communist Manifesto* (originally 1848), the Preface to the *Contribution
5 to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), the *Grundrisse* (1857), and *Capital*
(1867) further articulate Marx's historical materialism. (See Cohen (1978) for a
7 particularly clear exposition of historical materialism.) If production is primary
and if human production is by nature collective rather than individual, then the
9 most basic structure of society is its "mode of production." (Concrete societies
often embody residues of earlier modes alongside their dominant mode: for
11 example, capitalism is dominant in India today, but coexists with feudalism.)
Modes of production are defined by two sets of relations. "Forces of
13 production" are humanity's relations with the natural world, composed of
material "means of production" (equipment, technology, raw materials) and
15 human productive capacities (skills, etc.). "Relations of production" define the
distribution across social categories ("classes") of rights to ownership and
17 control over these means of production. In the capitalist mode of production,
for example, capitalists own the means of production and compete in product
19 markets to sell their commodities, and workers own nothing but their labor
power and compete in the labor market to earn a wage. On top of this "base"
21 of forces and relations of production sits a "superstructure" of culture,
religion, law, and government. This superstructure is the means by which the
23 ruling class maintains its domination and attempts to moderate its internal
conflicts. Marx's materialism leads him to see causality flowing mainly upward,
25 from forces to relations of production, and from base to superstructure, but he
acknowledges the importance too of downward causal paths, especially in
27 shorter term and for more localized settings.

Marx is famous for the *Communist Manifesto's* assertion that "The
29 history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." There
is little specifically Marxist about a perspective on history that highlights
31 conflict and struggle: Marxism is distinctive in (a) privileging class conflict
where much non-Marxist history devotes more attention to international
33 and intraclass conflict among factions within the ruling class, (b) seeing this
class conflict as taking different forms depending on the structure of the
35 prevailing relations of production, and (c) seeing the direction and scope of
this conflict as shaped by the real contradiction between the relations and
37 forces of production.

The broad sweep of human history can be understood as the dialectical
39 progression of successively more productive modes of production. In the
European region, this progression was from primitive communism to

1 slavery, feudalism, and then capitalism. This progression is dialectical
insofar as the emergence of a new structure is the result of the internal
3 contradictions of the old. Class struggle between the exploiting and
exploited classes is the *motor* of this progression; its overall *direction* is set
5 by the vector of advancing forces of production. When the prevailing
relations of production are no longer able to support the further advance of
7 the forces of production, class conflict intensifies and the old class structure
is eventually overthrown, allowing a new mode of production to emerge in
9 which human productivity can develop further.

Capitalism is distinctive in this sequence of modes of production because
11 its characteristic relations of production greatly intensify pressures to
develop the forces of production. In comparison, all previous modes are far
13 less technologically dynamic. This dynamism prompts Marx to predict as
inevitable the emergence of a new form of society – communism – that
15 would transcend the contradictions of capitalist society, preserving the
positive historical achievements of capitalism (such as advanced technology
17 and freeing the individual from the shackles of ascribed status), while
abolishing private property in the means of production and freeing society
19 from the anarchy of market-coordinated, profit-driven production.

21

Critique of Political Economy

23

Capitalism as a mode of production emerges from small-scale commodity
25 production when labor too becomes a commodity. This happens through a
process of violent dispossession that deprives workers of alternative ways to
27 access consumption or production resources, and that thus forces workers to
exchange their capacity to work for a wage as if this capacity too were a
commodity produced for sale on a market. Capitalist relations of production
29 are therefore defined by two more specific relations: a relation of competition
among commodity-producing enterprises and the wage relation subordinat-
31 ing workers to managerial authority in the enterprises that employ them.

Marx's analysis of the capitalist economy takes the form of a "critique of
33 political economy." Consistent with the philosophical premises discussed
above, Marx argues that the economic base of capitalist society engenders a
35 distinctive set of ideas about itself – a spontaneously generated ideology that
he calls the "fetishism of commodities." This ideology imputes causal
37 powers to commodities and to their money equivalents, when commodities
and money are in reality mere manifestations of underlying human activity.
39 To give an everyday example: we often say that "the market" obliges a firm

1 to cut production schedules and lay off workers. Marx argues that this
2 locution makes a fetish of the market in the following sense: in capitalist
3 society, we are alienated from each other; instead of collectively planning
4 our production, we have put into place an anonymous mechanism – “the
5 market” – which now constrains production and employment decisions; it is
6 true that individual capitalists must submit to this mechanism, but behind
7 the mechanism and explaining its apparent causal power lies the structure of
8 capitalist relations of production. This fetishism is not merely a subjective
9 illusion or error, but a (false) understanding of ourselves that is engendered
10 by the social structure itself. A serious scientific account of the capitalist
11 economy must penetrate below the level of surface appearance – where the
12 market appears as a self-equilibrating and self-perpetuating mechanism – to
13 reveal the historically contingent character of this capitalist social structure.
14 It must therefore take the form of a critique of this spontaneous ideology.
15 And this critique must encompass the more theoretically elaborated form of
16 this ideology known in Marx’s time as “political economy” and today as
17 “economics.” (See Foley (1986, 2006) for a particularly clear exposition of
18 Marx’s economic views.)

19 Marx builds on and critiques classical political economists such as
20 Ricardo. He follows Ricardo in arguing that tastes, supply, and demand do
21 not determine the price of a commodity (as argued current economic
22 theory), but only influence its fluctuation around an objectively determined
23 value. This value is determined by the socially necessary labor time invested
24 in the product’s production. Note that, contrary to a popular misconception,
25 this “labor theory of value” is not a normative theory but an analytic
26 one: Marx is not arguing that value *should* be based on labor input; on the
27 contrary, he is adamant that use-values typically also require a host of
28 nonlabor contributions; his theory aims to explain how exchange-value
29 works as the principle governing capitalist exchange.

30 Marx develops his theory of the capitalist economy on the simplifying
31 assumption that all products exchange at their values. (Marx goes on later to
32 explain how prices also reflect different industries’ capital intensities, and
33 how innovation allows producers to derive temporary “super profits.”) If all
34 products exchange at their values, we are immediately confronted with a
35 puzzle: where do profits come from?² This puzzle was the stumbling block for
36 all prior theories of political economy, including Ricardo’s. To understand
37 profit, Marx argues, we need to find a commodity that somehow creates
38 value even as it is being used up. This special commodity is labor power.
39 Firms pay workers a wage in exchange for the use of their ability to work –
40 their labor power. In principle if not always in practice, firms pay workers the

1 value of this service, which is determined, as is the cost of any commodity, by
2 the socially necessary labor time required to produce it, which is expressed in
3 the cost of the daily consumption required for workers and their families as
4 well as in their expenses for training and education. The employment
5 contract specifies that in exchange for this wage, workers will make available
6 their labor services for a specified period. The gap between the value of labor
7 power (the part of the working day necessary to cover the worker's wage, say
8 four hours) and value produced by the expenditure of labor power (the
9 product is sold on the market at a price that reflects the full eight hours work
10 in the day – abstracting for now from the role of nonlabor costs) is a measure
11 of exploitation. Given the level of productivity attained by the forces of
12 production in the capitalist phase of historical evolution, it only takes a few
13 hours in the working day for workers to produce the equivalent of their
14 wages (“necessary labor time”), and employers can appropriate the value
15 produced in the rest of the working day (“surplus labor” and thus “surplus
16 value”) with which to pay both the nonlabor inputs and investors' profit.

17 Note that Marx characterizes these relations of production as “exploita-
18 tion” not because the worker does not receive the wages representing the full
19 value of the day's labor: on the contrary, Marx celebrates the great progress
20 in productivity that allows for the creation of surplus, just as he honors the
21 need to reinvest that surplus. He sees this as exploitation because control
22 over the surplus is in the hands of the capitalist, not the whole collectivity.
23 And even if an individual capitalist were inclined to share control (indeed,
24 even if the firm is run as a workers' cooperative), the implacable constraint of
25 market competition on product, labor, and capital markets obliges the firm
26 to pursue every avenue for maximizing surplus – without regard to workers'
27 welfare – and to redirect this surplus to areas with greatest profit potential –
28 without regard to social utility. In Marx's account, exploitation is not an
29 exceptional state of affairs, a departure from the norms of competitive
30 market relations, but on the contrary, a fundamental, defining feature of the
31 capitalist form of production even in its more competitive forms.

The distinction between labor and labor power was, according to Marx,
33 his great discovery. The resulting theory of the origin of capitalist profit is
34 rather straightforward and intuitive. But to reach this insight, we need to
35 penetrate the fetishism of commodities, and in particular to see the
36 distinctive social relation hidden behind the commodity labor power: we
37 need to recognize that in order for labor power to present itself as a
38 commodity on a labor market, masses of people have been deprived of any
39 alternative access to consumption or production goods, and have been
40 forced to sell their creative powers in exchange for wage by subordinating

1 themselves to the alien authority of the capitalist. Alienation in Marx's
 3 theory – unlike most of the sociology that cites him – is thus not just a
 subjective state of mind, but first and foremost an objective feature of the
 social structure.

5 Marx identifies two generic strategies for increasing surplus value. First,
 firms can extend and intensify the working day and can force more members of
 7 each family into the labor force. This generates what Marx calls the “absolute”
 form of surplus value. Second, employers can respond to competitive pressures
 9 by technological and organizational innovations that reduce necessary labor
 time. This generates the “relative” form of surplus value.

11 When capitalism first establishes itself, firms usually leave the technology
 of production unchanged, and exploitation takes the form of increasing
 13 absolute surplus value. The resulting contrast in hours and intensity of work
 between traditional village life and early factory life has been documented in
 15 numerous scholarly and literary accounts (Thompson, 1963). This is what
 Marx (1977, appendix) calls the *formal subordination of labor to capital*: it is
 17 merely formal because the underlying labor process is as yet unchanged, still
 relying on traditional techniques. As capitalism consolidates, the negative
 19 social externalities of excessive working hours and child labor prompt
 political action by both workers and enlightened capitalists, resulting in new
 21 laws and regulations. These restrictions increase incentives for firms to
 accelerate technological innovation, and as a result, relative surplus value
 23 becomes progressively more important, and we see the emergence of the *real*
subordination of labor to capital as the labor process itself is progressively
 25 reshaped by the introduction of new production techniques.

This shift represents the historical unfolding of the basic contradiction of
 27 the capitalist *production process*, a contradiction which itself reflects the
 contradiction between two poles of the commodity form. On the one hand,
 29 the production process is a *labor process*, in which use-values in the form of
 work skills and effort, tools, and materials are combined to create new use-
 31 values. On the other hand, and simultaneously, it is a *valorization process*
 in which these use-values appear in the form of exchange-values – monetary
 33 wages, inventory costs, and capital investment – that are combined to create
 money profit (see Bottomore, 1991, pp. 267–270; Marx, 1977, appendix;
 35 Thompson, 1989).

Marx summarizes the real contradiction between the labor process and
 37 the valorization process as follows:

39 If capitalist direction [of work] is thus twofold in content, owing to the twofold nature of
 the process of production which has to be directed – on the one hand a social labor

1 process for the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital's process of
valorization – in form it is purely despotic. (1977, p. 450)

3
5 The more conventional reading of Marx interprets this passage to mean
that the technical imperatives of the labor process are subsumed or displaced
7 by the social imperatives of valorization. The dialectical reading recalls that in
Marx's Hegelian discourse, content (here: the social labor process) and form
(the valorization process) can be in a relation of real contradiction with each
9 other. (The real contradiction between form and content, appearance and
essence, is a common theme in Marx's work. Geras (1971) explains the pitfalls
11 of interpreting socially contingent forms as the true substance as well as the
pitfalls of the converse illusion of seeing forms as a mere illusion.) On the one
13 hand, valorization pressures drive capitalists to upgrade the capabilities of the
labor process by "socializing" the labor process, by integrating a widening
15 spectrum of specialized skills into the "collective worker" – the community of
more or less specialized workers as well as technical and managerial staff,
17 cooperating to produce use-values. But, on the other hand, these same
valorization pressures simultaneously drive capitalists to intensify their
19 exploitation of employees in order to expand the capital invested in their
firm, and this pressure breaks the collaborative fabric required for the
21 effective functioning of the collective worker. The contradictions of capitalism
do not disappear with the shift from absolute to relative surplus value and
23 from formal to real subordination – they deepen as socialization progresses.

Marx's analysis was not limited to the production process. Marx was one
25 of the precursors of national accounting in his study of the distribution of
economic activity between producer goods and consumer goods industries,
27 and between sectors that produce new value and those that merely
redistribute a fraction of that already created value (personal services,
29 financial services, advertising and sales, real estate). He argued that
competition between capitalists tends over the long period toward oligopoly.
31 In his more mature writing, he argued that workers' real wages would
probably rise over the longer term. He argued that cyclical crises are an
33 inevitable feature of capitalist development, periodically throwing masses of
workers into misery and destroying productive capacities. He saw
35 environmental crises too as inevitable in such a system. He argued that
imperatives of the capital accumulation process would drive the capitalist
37 system to expand imperialistically, becoming increasingly global and
creating interimperialist rivalries, wars, and massive social disruption, but
39 also driving important positive changes for the working populations of the
dominated countries as they are drawn out of precapitalist forms of

1 despotism. He showed that capitalist development requires and stimulates
 2 the emergence of increasingly sophisticated credit and financial markets –
 3 and thereby multiplies opportunities for fraud (on the contemporary
 4 relevance of Marx’s analysis of finance, see Marens, 2009).

5 Marx predicted – accurately – that as capitalism develops, government
 6 would play an increasingly important role in both directly assuring key
 7 services such as education and infrastructure and regulating the private
 8 sector. He was, however, skeptical that any degree of formal political
 9 democracy could change the fact that in a class-divided society, government,
 10 like the rest of the superstructure, reflects and reinforces the power asymmetry
 11 that defines the basic relations of production.

13 THE SCOPE OF MARXIST THEORY

15 By comparison with other social theories, Marxism has several attractive
 16 features. First, it offers a broad historical perspective. For those anxious to
 17 understand how a better world might be possible, it is important to
 18 understand the historical specificity of capitalism and its distinctive forms of
 19 organization so as to highlight the implausibility of the notion (as advanced
 20 by, e.g., Fukuyama, 1992) that capitalism could be the “end of history.”

21 Second, Marxist theory offers depth in its analysis of social life. It reveals
 22 the role of the social relations at the heart of the economic process. It has a
 23 rich conception of power that includes the possibility of “false consciousness”
 24 (Lukes, 2005): this concept may be slippery, but no serious discussion of
 25 power can ignore the corresponding reality. It has a rich theory of psychology
 26 (Cole, 1996; Sève, 1978).

27 Third, Marxist theory does not deny the importance of the sphere of ideas
 28 and culture, but renders changes in this sphere more intelligible by
 29 highlighting their connections to changes in the material base of society.
 30 No critical point of view on society can be insensitive to the power of
 31 material interests in shaping discourse (as argued by, e.g., Eagleton, 1991).

32 Finally, for scholars in organization studies, Marxist theory has the
 33 considerable advantage of embedding the analysis of organizations in a
 34 theory of the broader structures of society. It thus draws our attention, for
 35 example, to the possibility that the promising advances at the “leading edge”
 36 of capitalist development may coexist with – or even presuppose – the
 37 superexploitation of those at the lagging edge (e.g., Thompson, 2003).

38 Nevertheless, Marxist approaches to organization studies face major
 39 hurdles. One hurdle stands out as particularly difficult: Marxists’ difficulty

1 in acknowledging real progress under capitalism. Marxist scholarship is
2 partisan: it is constantly seeking to highlight the problems of capitalism and
3 to show why these problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved without
4 fundamental change in social structure. This partisanship tends to blind
5 Marxists to the progressive effects of capitalist development.

6 Marx himself was eloquent on these progressive effects. Capitalism
7 accelerates productivity growth, which tend to bring higher material
8 standards of living to working people and not only to the ruling class. It
9 accelerates technological changes that facilitate travel and communication:
10 these technologies bring people closer in their social lives and facilitate their
11 struggles for emancipation. The imperialist expansion of capitalism pulls
12 masses of people out of precapitalist exploitation into capitalist exploitation:
13 for a young person drawn out of feudalistic exploitation in rural Pakistan into
14 a factory, even a sweatshop, in Islamabad, that represents a considerable
15 expansion of freedom. This imperialist expansion breaks down narrow
16 regional, ethnic, and national boundaries, and as a result people around the
17 globe come to recognize more of their common humanity. As women are
18 drawn into the wage-earning workforce, they are progressively pulled out of
19 the bonds of patriarchal family dependence: this trend is encouraged by the
20 commodification of functions such a food production and by the direct
21 socialization of other functions such as health care and child education. As
22 capitalist industry becomes more automated, it needs more educated workers,
23 and as a result, average education levels rise, and with this rise, workers
24 develop a broader understanding of the world and they master tools for
25 changing that world.

26 Most of these progressive effects are due to what I referred to above as the
27 socialization of production. This socialization makes capitalist relations of
28 production increasingly obsolete and precarious: obsolete because productiv-
29 ity advances are increasingly a function of collaboration rather than
30 competition and exploitation, and precarious because working people
31 become increasingly better equipped to take over the leading role in society
32 from individual capitalists and from the blind mechanism of the market. This
33 analysis motivates Marx's optimism that the passage from capitalism to a
34 superior mode of production is inevitable, even if this passage proves to be a
35 long time coming and even if the path to the emergence of this new mode of
36 production is arduous.

37 This socialization tendency is in a relation of real contradiction with the
38 valorization imperative that characterizes capitalist production. Valorization
39 both stimulates and retards socialization. Focusing on the latter, retarding
effect, many Marxists argue – with considerable merit – that the positive

1 effects of capitalist development are often chimerical. Where these positive
 3 effects have more substance and durability, Marxists often ignore them,
 5 asserting – accurately enough – that they already receive far too much
 7 attention from capitalism’s apologists. Where they pay attention to these
 9 positive effects, Marxists often denounce their unevenness – which is indeed
 11 scandalous – without acknowledging that the aggregate effects are progressive.

13 The credibility of Marxist theory, the plausibility of Marx’s optimism,
 15 and the effectiveness of Marxist partisanship are impaired unless Marxism
 17 can account for capitalism’s positive effects, and unless it can show that
 19 these positive effects do not undermine the central Marxist thesis that
 21 capitalism’s basic contradictions cannot be remedied without replacing
 capitalism with a superior form of society. The challenge for Marxist social
 theory is therefore to “walk on both legs” – the optimistic leg reflecting
 socialization’s progress and the critical leg reflecting the enduring limits
 posed to socialization by valorization constraints. The concept of real
 contradiction helps Marxists meet this challenge – to acknowledge
 capitalism’s progressive effects while maintaining and continually renewing
 Marxism’s critical side. However, in the history of Marxism, there is an
 enduring tension between those who emphasize its critical side and those
 who emphasize its optimistic side.

23 **MARXIST PERSPECTIVES ON SOME** 25 **ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS**

27 This section reviews contributions by Marxists to the analysis of some key
 29 organizational forms. Space limitations preclude a comprehensive or
 31 detailed review, but within each subsection I identify the main arguments
 and distinguishing features of Marxist versus non-Marxist approaches and
 of critical versus optimistic versions of Marxism.

33 *The Historical Imperative*

35 Marxist theory encourages organizational studies to put contemporary
 37 organizational forms into historical context. As discussed above, Marx
 analyzed the transition in forms of organization from handicraft to
 manufacture to large-scale industry and toward automation, and underlying
 this transition, Marx identified the shift from absolute to relative surplus
 39 value. His analyses of these various configurations have proven inspirational
 to many scholars in analyzing the evolution of forms of organization.

1 More recent Marxist-inspired work in organization studies has built on
this foundation, focusing on mutations in the nature of management
3 control. Edwards (1979a) summarizes the main trajectory in the United
States as a path from simple control, to technical control, to bureaucratic
5 control. In Edwards' account, simple and technical control correspond,
respectively, to Marx's absolute and relative surplus value, and the
7 bureaucratic form is a more elaborate regime of relative surplus value that
emerges in response to challenges to the legitimacy of technical control by
9 dividing workers against each other and adding a normative layer. Others
(e.g., Barker, 1993; Simpson, 1985) argue that bureaucratic control is
11 increasingly being replaced by more internalized forms of control.

Edwards and most other critical Marxists present this sequence as one that
13 consolidates ever-greater management control. In a more optimistic Marxist
vein, Hirschhorn (1984) and Adler (2001) argue that over the last century or
15 so, evolving forms of management control have become progressively more
socialized, encompassing a progressively broader range of human capacities
17 and of business activities. Building on Barley and Kunda's (1992) study of
management journals that revealed alternating periods of focus on normative
19 and rational controls, Adler (2003) argues that normative controls in the
form of "industrial betterment" that began emerging in the 1880s relied on
21 relatively primitive psychological mechanisms compared to the sophistica-
tion and subtlety of the personal and interpersonal processes invoked by the
23 "human relations" approaches that emerged in the 1920s, and even more so
compared to the "organization culture" approaches that emerged in the
25 1980s. Rational controls in the form of Taylor's scientific management that
emerged in the first decade of the 20th century focused on individual
27 workstations and their interrelations, and since then rational controls have
progressively enlarged the sphere of activities under conscious control (rather
29 than ex post market coordination) to encompass entire, complex, internally
differentiated organizations under the doctrine of "systems rationalization,"
31 and then beyond the firm to suppliers and customers in the more recent
period of outsourcing and business process reengineering.

33

35

Bureaucracy

37 Bureaucracy plays a key role in this historical trajectory, and any discussion
of bureaucracy must contend with Weber's (1978) classic account. Main-
39 stream sociology interprets Weber's analysis of bureaucracy in two main
ways. More conservative theorists read Weber as celebrating the efficiency

1 of this form of organization. More critically oriented theorists highlight
 3 Weber's discussion of bureaucracy as a form of domination legitimated by
 5 appeals to instrumental efficiency: they critique Parsons' translation and
 7 interpretation of Weber on bureaucracy, arguing that *Herrschaft* should be
 9 understood as domination, not leadership or authority (Weiss, 1983).
 11 Recent organization theory has highlighted the noneconomic factors that
 13 encourage the diffusion of bureaucracy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); this has
 15 become part of a broad culturalist turn of neoinstitutionalism.

9 Relative to these approaches, the Marxist tradition has been more alert to
 the specific role of bureaucracy in capitalist production. In Wright's (1974) **AU :2**
 11 critical Marxist account, bureaucracy is prevalent not because of its efficiency
 but because it is effective as a form of domination appropriate to exploitative
 13 capitalist production relations (see also Clawson, 1980; Edwards, 1979b;
 Marglin, 1974). In the optimistic Marxist account, bureaucracy has a dual
 15 nature: as part of the forces of production, it is a powerful social organizing
 technology that enables the effective functioning of the collective worker; as
 17 part of the relations of production, it is a coercive mechanism of exploitation;
 since bureaucracy embodies this real contradiction, the experience of
 19 bureaucracy is typically ambivalent (Adler, 2006).

The growing complexity and size of firms along with their progressive
 21 bureaucratization has meant considerable growth in the number of
 managers. On the Marxist account, managers play a contradictory role: on
 23 the one hand, they are agents of capitalist exploitation, and on the other,
 they are coordinators of a complex division of labor and part of the collective
 25 worker. Depending on their position in the hierarchy, one or other aspect
 will be more important; but Marxist theory highlights the extent to which all
 27 managers are agents of valorization. On the critical Marxist account, the
 growth of the management category represents a tendency to ever-more
 29 comprehensive management control over workers (Gordon, 1996). Optimis-
 tic Marxists suggest that we should also consider the socialization implied by
 31 this growth in coordinating capability. Van der Pijl (2004) draws an
 optimistic Marxist portrait of the senior managers in the private and public
 33 sectors of global capitalism, and the dual pressures they are under, as agents
 of both socialization and exploitation.

35 A key issue in the study of bureaucratic forms has been the role of
 bureaucracy under socialism. Weber was pessimistic concerning the
 37 emancipatory potential of socialism, fearing it would necessarily rely on
 bureaucracy to an even greater extent than capitalism does, and that socialism
 39 would therefore engender even greater alienation. According to Lenin, the
 organization of socialist production would require bureaucratically structured

1 administration, not only because a suitably redesigned bureaucratic form
2 would support democratic administration, but also because in the prelimin-
3 ary, socialist phase of the transition to full communism, class struggle would
4 continue, and bureaucratic structuring would allow the socialist regime to
5 control its enemies and avoid production sabotage. To make this instrument
6 more suited to new, revolutionary ends, Lenin, like Marx, took inspiration
7 from the Paris Commune of 1871, and recommended that the tasks of
8 government and bureaucratic administration be simplified so that they can be
9 performed by every literate person rather than only by specialized
10 functionaries, that officials be elected and recallable, and that they be paid
11 wages comparable to other workers. Hearn (1978) argues that Maoist cultural
12 revolution sought to create a form of bureaucracy that avoided the risks of
13 technocratic domination by a combination of “politics in command” and the
14 “mass line” – a set of processes that empowered lower-level functionaries and
15 the citizenry at large (“the masses”) in their relations with the bureaucracy.
16 More recently, a new round of reflection on these issues has been stimulated
17 by a series of volumes edited by Wright as the “real utopias project” ([http://](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm)
18 www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm). This project has some strong
19 Marxist roots and addresses in a far more nuanced way the role of
20 bureaucracy in a superior form of social organization.

21

22 *Taylorism and Scientific Management*

23
24
25 A vast literature has grown up around the history of scientific management,
26 its effects in specific organizations and its diffusion within US manufacturing
27 (Nelson, 1980, 1992), its transfer overseas (Guillen, 1994), and its use in the
28 public sector (Schachter, 1989). Taylorism is often vilified in mainstream
29 organization studies for its dehumanizing effects. The Marxist approach has
30 seen Taylorism as more than a (possibly ill-conceived) management
31 technique: Braverman (1974) argues that Frederick Taylor’s scientific
32 management provides the template for capitalists’ exploitation of labor; it
33 is management’s program of real subordination made explicit.

34 If, in the critical Marxist analysis, Taylorism is an offensive against
35 workers, the optimistic Marxist view starts with empirical observations such
36 as those by Nelson (1980) and Kelly (1982), who show that Taylor’s
37 scientific management brought improvements in pay and conditions for
38 many workers. Jacoby (1985) documents the rapprochement between the
39 scientific management movement and the labor movement after World War
40 I. Nyland (1998) discusses the strong leftist leanings of many of the key

1 figures in the movement. Adler (1995) thus argues that scientific manage-
 3 ment represents a step toward greater socialization, since it created tools for
 5 designing work processes – tools that are neither the privately held tacit
 know-how of craft workers nor assertions of arbitrary power by foremen,
 but engineering models subject to verification and challenge by workers.

7 9 *Lean Production*

11 Lean production has given rise to a sizable literature, some of it Marxist in
 inspiration (Babson, 1995a, 1995b; Elger & Smith, 1994, 2005; Smith, 2000).
 13 Much Marxist analysis has focused on lean production's intensification of
 work effort, through eliminating unproductive pores in the work-day and
 15 further rationalizing workers' movements. It is seen as an extension of
 Taylor's scientific management. Quality circles are often a part of the lean
 production model, and these have been subjected to Marxist critique as
 17 manipulative efforts (Grenier, 1988).

19 Optimistic Marxists add that lean production makes some important steps
 toward socialization. Teamwork has been systematized, as have relations
 between teams (Delbridge, Lowe, & Oliver, 2000). Lean production brings
 21 under planful control upstream (supplier) and downstream (customer)
 relations. Workers typically get more training in the logic of the production
 23 system and in systematic improvement techniques (Adler, 2007; Kenney &
 Florida, 1993). Lean production, in this perspective, is a nice illustration of
 25 how contradictions deepen with capitalism's advance, in particular the
 contradiction involved in the firm's need for workers who are simultaneously
 27 dependable and disposable (Hyman, 1987).

29 31 *Knowledge Management*

33 Knowledge management has recently become a popular theme in manage-
 ment literature. Marxist scholars have insisted that in reality very few
 35 knowledge workers can produce anything of economic value without access
 to means of production controlled by others, that only few occupations
 allow employees to use much of their knowledge, and that relatively few
 37 organizations invest substantially in employee learning. For the main part,
 contemporary management is a direct descendant of scientific management
 39 in its effort to ensure that the key repositories of knowledge come under
 greater management control, even at the cost of productive efficiency. Some

1 proponents of knowledge management decry this shortsightedness (Brown
& Duguid, 1991, 2000; Davenport & Prusak, 1998), but few organizations
3 appear willing to endow the collective worker with enough self-direction to
develop comprehensive working knowledge (Jaros, 2004; Prichard, Hull,
5 Chumer, & Willmott, 2000).

Optimistic Marxists are more enthusiastic about even modest steps by
7 management toward recognizing the power of knowledge. They see the real,
albeit modest, growth in knowledge intensity of jobs as the embodiment of
9 Marx's prognosis of an increasingly "social individual" (Adler, 2001). In
this, the optimistic strand builds on the assumption that all work, even the
11 most routine, involves at least some knowledge: this may be tacit (Kusterer,
1978), but it is often collective (Spender, 1996). Lave and Wenger's work on
13 the concept of "community of practice" (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger,
1998) has helped bring Marxist ideas to a wider audience, most notably the
15 community of practice as the collective worker, and practice itself as the
primary locus of knowledge.

17

19

Professions and Professional Firms

21 There is considerable debate in both sociology and organization studies over
whether the professions are destined to strengthen or weaken as capitalism
23 advances. The stakes for the credibility of Marxist theory are high: Marx
argued that the traditional middle class of small business would be destroyed
25 by capitalist development, but acknowledged that new middle-class positions
were constantly being formed as capitalist development created the need for
27 more technical and management experts. If this latter trend were to
predominate, and if these new categories formed a distinct new middle class,
29 and if this new class developed interests distinct from and opposed to the
working-class's interests, then Marx's basic argument about the future of
31 capitalism would be seriously challenged (Boreham, 1983; Carchedi, 1977;
Derber, 1983; Derber, Schwartz, & Magrass, 1990b; Johnson, 1977; Larson,
33 1980; Meiskins & Smith, 1996; Walker, 1979; Whalley, 1986; Wright,
Costello, Hachen, & Sprague, 1982).

35 The growth of such a new class has been predicted by many observers.
Bell (1973), for example, argued that professions will gradually supersede
37 corporations as the dominant organizing principle in society. Against this
professionalization thesis, other observers point out that professionals
39 themselves have been dragged under the capitalist juggernaut. Some, such as
Haug (1973) and Rothman (1984), see a process of *deprofessionalization* due

1 to increasing market rivalry between professions, the diffusion of expertise,
 3 and rising levels of public education and skepticism toward experts. Others
 5 (e.g., Derber, Schwartz, & Magrass, 1990a; McKinlay & Stoeckle, 1988)
 7 argue a more explicitly Marxist *proletarianization* position that highlights
 9 professionals' progressive subordination to hierarchical and market
 rationality. Yet others follow Freidson's diagnosis (1984) that there is little
 empirical support for the idea that professionalism's distinctive features
 have eroded, but there is much evidence that regulation within professions
 has become more rationalized and formalized.

11 Adler, Kwon, and Heckscher (2008) argue that capitalist development does
 13 indeed challenge the professions: the traditional "liberal" independent
 15 professional and their small-scale partnerships are being replaced by more
 17 hierarchically organized large-scale organizations. However, in an optimistic
 19 Marxist register, they also argue that professional work still requires a
 strong professional community – the effective production of these complex
 use-values requires a robust collective worker – and that the nature of this
 professional community is evolving toward a new, more advanced form that
 Marx might celebrate as prefiguring communism's "free association of
 producers."

21

Contingent Work

23

25 Marxist theory offers some useful lenses for studying the proliferation of
 27 "nonstandard" employment arrangements – part-time, interim, and
 29 contract work, the growing instability of regular employment, and the
 trend toward outsourcing (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000; Osterman,
 2000; Rogers, 1995; Smith, 1998, 2001). Empirical analysis reveals that
 contingent work has different effects and meanings for different workers: for
 some, it amounts to semi-unemployment, and for others, it is a well-
 established niche in specialized labor market (Barley & Kunda, 2004).

33 Critical Marxists have shown how these new forms of work fragment
 35 existing collectivities. They undermine – often deliberately – the modest
 countervailing powers that some workers have managed to establish; they are
 37 particularly effective against unions. The loss of permanent status inflicts
 economic and psychological costs. From the optimistic Marxist point of view,
 39 contingent work appears to be in some cases a reflection of the deepening
 social division of labor, as activities are aggregated to form into new
 industries (e.g., engineering, food, or janitorial services). While economic
 insecurity is often a source of real anxiety and suffering, in some cases, the

1 ability to exercise choice in assignments is experienced as real freedom. This
2 kind of flexibility has some positive progressive content, even if it takes an
3 exploitative form.

5

7

Network Organization

9 Marxists have, since Marx, predicted growing concentration and centraliza-
10 tion in industry, and therefore a tendency toward the domination of
11 industries by large, bureaucratized oligopolistic firms (Baran & Sweezy,
12 1966). In this, they have been joined by writers from other, non-Marxist
13 starting points, such as Galbraith (1967) and Schumpeter (1942). The rise of
14 the “network” form – linking smaller, more focused firms in highly
15 adaptable customer–supplier relationships – therefore represents a challenge
16 to conventional thinking. Looking within organizations too, many
17 observers argue that stable bureaucratic structures are giving way to flexible
18 internal networks.

19 Marxists have responded to this challenge in two main ways. Critical
20 Marxists have focused on the power asymmetries prevalent in these
21 networks, arguing that in practice these networks are neither idealized
22 markets of voluntary exchange between equals nor warm solidaristic
23 relationships between peers, but instead structures of domination (Fields,
24 2004; Harrison, 1997). Optimistic Marxists have argued that these networks,
25 insofar as their distinctive mechanism is trust rather than competition or
26 authority, represent a genuine, if partial, socialization of capitalist relations
27 of production (Adler, 2001). Engeström (2008) uses Marxist “cultural–
28 historical activity theory” to explore the “knotworking” involved in
29 continuously negotiating the cross-organization collaborations that mark
30 the network form.

31

33

Families and Households

35 The family is also an organizational form undergoing considerable change.
36 The rise of single-parent households and the increasing involvement of
37 women in the wage-earning workforce have deeply transformed the family.
38 Calás and Smircich (2006) outline a broad spectrum of feminist approaches
39 to organization studies. Their discussion of “socialist feminism” summarizes
some of the key debates and insights associated with the Marxist tradition

1 within feminism. (The earlier literature is reviewed by Thompson (1989),
 2 Hartmann (1981), and Vogel (2008).)

3 A key contribution of feminist work to the Marxist project has been to
 4 challenge simplistic accounts of the relation between the realms of
 5 production and those of reproduction. Feminists have argued that the
 6 production process presupposes a reproduction process, that women and
 7 men play different roles in these two processes, and that these differences are
 8 interrelated. This interrelation is important for understanding not only the
 9 structures of family and nonwork life but also the role of gender within
 10 production relations (Acker, 2000; Acker & Van Houten, 1974; Cockburn,
 11 1991; Game & Pringle, 1984; Kanter, 1977; Reskin & Ross, 1992; Smith,
 12 2002; Wajcman, 1998). Within this broad field, feminist work has had a
 13 particularly fruitful dialogue with Marxism in the study of technology and
 14 the organization of both wage work and domestic work (Wajcman, 2004).

15
 16
 17 *And Many More ...*

18 To the various organizational forms reviewed briefly in the above sections, AU:5
 19 numerous others could be added that space limitations preclude me from
 20 discussing: multidivisional, multinational, and conglomerate types of
 21 corporations; unions (craft, industrial, associational, partnerships with
 22 management); government agencies; political parties (electoral, network
 23 form); military organizations; volunteer organizations; open-source software
 24 communities; churches; mission-based organizations; cooperatives; feudal
 25 organizations; slavery-based organizations; prisons; etc. In most of these,
 26 Marxist ideas have had some impact, and in some areas, substantial.

27
 28
 29 **MARXISM'S CRITICS**

30
 31 Criticisms of Marxism come in many variants. Some criticisms are hastily
 32 dismissive. Buss (1993), for example, assumes that Marxist theory stands or
 33 falls by the record of the former socialist countries, and asserts that so many
 34 other theorists have decided it is wrong that it must be wrong. Donaldson
 35 (1985) is surely correct that much of what passes for Marxist organization
 36 studies is indistinguishable from left Weberianism, but he is surely wrong
 37 when he asserts that because Marxism is mainly concerned with broader
 38 social structures and history, it can have nothing to say about the specific
 39 issues at the organization level.

1 The more substantive criticisms attack on a variety of fronts. An important
2 current of criticism argues against Marxist theory's focus on class as a
3 collective actor in history, and in favor of methodological individualism.
4 There is no denying the attraction of deriving generalizable results from
5 parsimonious assumptions about individuals. Recent years have even seen the
6 emergence (then disappearance) of a small school of rational choice Marxists.
7 Two problems arise for methodological individualism. First, in order to make
8 the mathematics of aggregation work, these assumptions about human nature
9 must be extremely simplistic and unrealistic. Second, there is no good
10 theoretical reason to privilege the microlevel over the aggregate levels because
11 causality goes both up from the individual and down from the collectivity:
12 evolutionary biologists have made a strong case for the survival advantages of
13 solidaristic altruism.

14 Marx's materialism is a common point of attack. Many scholars want to
15 accord ideas and culture primacy. Adler and Borys (1993) argue that this is a
16 debate that can be usefully joined, since the Marxist argument for
17 materialism concerns primarily the longer-term and larger-scale transforma-
18 tions. On the Marxist view, local and short-term phenomena may well be
19 primarily caused by "superstructural" factors, even as these factors are
20 shaped by material ones over the broader spaces and the longer term.
21 Discourse thus plays an important role in social change, but it is itself
22 materially conditioned (see also Cloud, 1994, 2001).

23 Marxism is often criticized as a deterministic theory. The criticism is hard
24 to evaluate, since Marx offers no specific time frame for any predictions
25 (Desai, 2002). Moreover, Marx's predictions themselves are rather soft: they
26 are formulated as trends, and are usually stated along with counteracting
27 forces. At root, this criticism seems to be directed against any theory that
28 prioritizes structure over agency as an explanatory principle. Against this
29 criticism, Marxists respond simply that people make history, but not under
30 conditions of their own choosing; that those conditions limit the options
31 open and resources available for action; and that as a result, although
32 agency may be a powerful explanatory axis for local outcomes of small
33 groups, it simply cannot provide an explanation for broad historical trends.

34 More specifically, Marxism is often attacked for its technological
35 determinism. Critical Marxists shy well clear of technological determinism,
36 focusing on the role of class interests in shaping technology's trajectory
37 (Noble, 1984). Optimistic Marxists by contrast embrace a form of
38 technological determinism (Adler, 1989): they allow that capitalist relations
39 of production accelerate the rate of technological change and that they
40 encourage some directions of technology development at the expense of

1 others, but they argue that there is a transhistorical, “anthropological”
imperative driving the development of technologies that improve the
3 productivity of labor, and that no ruling class has a durable interest in
fostering the sustained regression of productivity. They argue that the
5 natural world powerfully constrains the vectors of technological innovation
that can satisfy this imperative, and they thus reject the “strong social
7 constructionist” thesis that would explain technology’s overall direction of
development by reference to social structures alone.

9 Many feminists, students of race and ethnicity, and other sociologists who
study organizations more empirically find that at this level of analysis
11 identities and projects are more powerful than class structure in explaining
change. They are surely correct to criticize doctrinaire Marxists who refuse
13 to accord nonclass dimensions of structure any relevance, but this leaves
entirely open the question of the relative importance of these nonclass
15 factors in determining the broader, longer-term sweep of history.

Some critics engage this latter debate and argue that social class as Marx
17 analyzed it has receded in importance as a dimension of social structure.
These critics argue that the emergence of the “new social movements” reflects
19 a deep transformation of capitalism. Clearly we need good theories of social
movements, and clearly Marxism offers only a modestly useful starting point
21 for such theory. However, it is not clear that these social movements will
assume ever-greater importance relative to the class dimensions of social
23 identification and social conflict. Major surges in worker militancy, whether
in the 1930s or 1960s, were preceded by predictions quite as confident as
25 those we have heard in recent years that class conflict had permanently
disappeared.

27 Ritzer and Schubert (1991) argue that there has been a progressive
divorce of various post-Marxisms from Marxist thought. The Nietzschean
29 mood has set many scholars to a deep skepticism concerning any “laws of
history” such as Marx advances, and Nietzschean poststructuralism has
31 joined forces with a wide range of mainstream theories to assert a greater
role for contingency and path dependence in history. This debate is hard to
33 join: it is difficult to see how dialogue can bridge such different theoretical
tastes. On the other hand however, this divorce may be a generational
35 phenomenon: the first generation of post-Marxists sought to define their
distinctiveness by attacking Marxism, while scholars today appear more
37 eager to find some common ground, whether it be between Marxism and
postcolonialism (e.g., Frenkel & Shenhav, 2003, 2006; Prasad, 2003),
39 Foucault and Frankfurt School critical theory (Willmott, 2003), and
Foucault and Marxist labor process ideas (e.g., Sewell, 1998).

1 **IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION**

3 The relevance of Marx for organization studies appears to wax and wane in **AU :6**
inverse proportion to the apparent durability of the capitalist order. With
5 rise of worker militancy in the advanced capitalist world and the surge of
national liberation movements in the Third World in the 1960s, a generation
7 of scholars emerged for whom Marx’s ideas constituted the basic intellectual
matrix. With the waning of the workers’ and national liberation movements
9 since the 1970s and the demise of the socialist bloc since the 1990s, Marxism
lost much of its appeal for scholars in organization studies as in other fields.
11 More recently, as the capitalist order came under threat from new waves of
worker mobilization and from financial crises originating in the United
13 States and the United Kingdom, Marx reappears on the agenda. The future
of Marxist organization studies appears bright.

15
17 **NOTES**

19 1. This chapter is complementary to Adler (2009a). It shares a similar overall
structure, but focuses on philosophy and forms of organization rather than on topics
in organization theory.

21 2. Current economic theory assumes that tastes, supply, and demand determine
price; that at equilibrium all “factors of production” are paid a price reflecting their
23 marginal productivity; that this is true too of capital; and that profit is therefore
determined by the marginal productivity of capital. While this understanding of profit
25 sounds plausible at a microeconomic level, it has proven to be entirely wrongheaded
at the aggregate, macroeconomic level – indeed, it is a nice example of fetishism. A
27 famous debate in the 1960s between Marxist-inspired economists at Cambridge, UK,
led by Joan Robinson, and mainstream economists in Cambridge, MA, led by Paul
Samuelson, ended in the victory of the former, acknowledged by the latter, in arguing
29 that the profit rate could not be derived from any such supply and demand process,
but was itself a function of the aggregate rate of exploitation. Graduate economics
31 education today simply ignores the whole issue, and proceeds oblivious to the
resulting incoherence of the neoclassical synthesis (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003).

33
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39 Mick Rowlinson, Paul Thompson, and Matt Vidal, even if there is much
with which they still disagree.

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