

Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor?

New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh

Jonathan Morduch

*Department of Economics and HIID
Harvard University*

*and Hoover Institution
Stanford University*

First complete draft: 2/26/98

Comments welcome

June 27, 1998

This paper builds on conversations with Anne Case, Angus Deaton, Esther Duflo, Paul Gertler, Guido Imbens, Anjini Kochar, Margaret Madajewicz, Dick Meyer, and, especially, Mark Pitt. I have also benefitted from conversations with Grameen Bank and BRAC staff in June 1997 and from comments at seminars at Stanford University, UC-Berkeley, the University of Washington, and RAND. Aimee Chin provided critical insights and excellent research assistance. I am particularly grateful to Shahid Khandker, the World Bank, and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies for making their household-level data set accessible. The paper was completed while I was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the individuals or institutions above. All views and errors are mine only.

Abstract

The microfinance movement has built on innovations in financial intermediation that reduce the costs and risks of lending to poor households. Replications of the movement's flagship, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, have now spread around the world. While programs aim to bring social and economic benefits to clients, few attempts have been made to quantify benefits rigorously. This paper draws on a new cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households, some of which are served by the Grameen Bank and two similar programs, and some of which have no access to programs. Households that are eligible to borrow and have access to the programs do not have notably higher consumption levels than control households, and, for the most part, their children are no more likely to be in school. Men also tend to work harder, and women less. More favorably, relative to controls, households eligible for programs have substantially (and significantly) lower variation in consumption and labor supply across seasons. The most important potential impacts are thus associated with the reduction of vulnerability, not of poverty *per se*. The consumption-smoothing appears to be driven largely by income-smoothing, not by borrowing and lending.

The evaluation holds lessons for studies of other programs in low-income countries. While it is common to use fixed effects estimators to control for unobservable variables correlated with the placement of programs, using fixed effects estimators can exacerbate biases when, as here, programs target their programs to specific populations within larger communities.

Key words: microfinance, project evaluation, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh

Address for correspondence:

Jonathan Morduch
Hoover Institution L217
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
(650) 725-8557

jmorduch@harvard.edu

1. Introduction

Microfinance has captured the imaginations of many people working to reduce poverty. The premise is simple. Rather than giving handouts to poor households, microfinance programs offer small loans to foster small-scale entrepreneurial activities. Such credit would otherwise not be available -- or would be only available at the very high interest rates charged by moneylenders (who often charge as much as 10% per month). Moneylenders operate with little competition since potential entrants quickly find that costs and risks are high -- and borrowers are usually unable to offer standard forms of collateral, if any at all (Rashid and Townsend, 1993).

However, the emerging microfinance movement demonstrates institutional innovations that appear to greatly reduce the risk and cost of providing financial services to poor households. Innovations include contracts that give borrowers incentives to exclude bad credit risks and monitor other borrowers' activities, schedules of loans that increase over time conditional on successful performance, and weekly or semi-weekly loan repayment requirements (Morduch, 1997). The movement is now global, and leaders at the World Bank, United Nations, and other international organizations have joined in pushing to reach 100 million households around the world by the year 2005 (Microfinance Summit, 1997). The movement has also generated considerable support in the U.S. (including the high-profile support of Hillary Rodham Clinton; Buntin, 1997), and small-scale programs now operate in 300 U.S. sites (*Economist*, 1997). The *New York Times* (1997) has celebrated this "much-needed revolution in anti-poverty programs" and called for enhanced support.

But how great is the ultimate impact on poor households? While strong claims are made

for the ability of microfinance to reduce poverty, only a handful of studies use sizeable samples and appropriate treatment/control frameworks to answer the question. The present study investigates a 1991-92 cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households in Bangladesh served by microfinance programs of the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). The sample also includes a control group of households in areas not served by any microfinance programs. The three lending programs considered here together serve over four million poor clients in Bangladesh, but their role is much broader. The Grameen Bank is the flagship of the international microfinance movement, and its model has now been replicated on four continents, including sites in the United States as varied as rural Arkansas and inner-city Chicago.

Simple estimates of impacts show clear achievements. For example, if households served by the Grameen Bank are ordered by the amounts they have borrowed from the program, the top quarter enjoys 15% higher consumption per capita than households in the bottom quarter. In addition, 62% of the school-age sons of Grameen Bank borrowers are enrolled in school versus 34% of the sons of eligible households that do not borrow. For daughters, the Grameen advantage is 55% versus 40%.

These simple comparisons appear to be driven entirely by selection biases, however. Once appropriate comparisons with control groups are made, access to the three microfinance programs does not yield meaningful increases in per capita consumption, the education of sons, nor the education of daughters. If anything, the levels are slightly lower than for control groups. The results are surprising and contradict frequent claims made about the programs in international discussions of microfinance.

Access to the programs does, however, appear to aid the diversification of labor supply across seasons. In turn, access is associated with a reduction in the variability of consumption across seasons. Thus, while the programs may not increase consumption on average, they may offer households ways to smooth consumption through smoothing income. In pointing to impacts on vulnerability, the results highlight an advantage that is seldom considered in the emerging microfinance literature (an exception is Pitt and Khandker, 1998b). These benefits should be judged against the tens of millions of dollars that have supported the programs.

The results also demonstrate how misleading simple performance indicators can be, and they hold lessons for evaluations of similar public health and other social programs in low-income countries.¹ As here, such programs are often limited to particular regions and particular target groups, typically poor households. Unlike in wealthier countries, income-based means tests are almost never used. Instead, for example, the microfinance programs in rural Bangladesh focus on the “functionally landless” -- implemented as a rule barring lending to households owning over a half acre of cultivable land.

The program rule can be the basis of a plausible econometric strategy if the eligibility requirement is strictly enforced and built around a feature that is exogenous to the household. Then, clean impacts can be gauged by comparing the status of households clustered just below the arbitrary dividing line to households clustered just above. This approach is a form of regression discontinuity design (Campbell, 1969), and the insights provide the basis of Pitt and Khandker’s

¹Simple evaluations are subject to multiple selection biases: self-selection into the programs by the most able, non-random program placement, and endogenous determination of the intensity of participation (e.g., the size of loans in microfinance). The typical problem stems from the near impossibility of finding good instrumental variables.

work (1998a and 1998b; they use the same data as used here).

But the idea can not be implemented reliably in this sample. The data demonstrate frequent violations of the rules. For example, 30% of Grameen borrowers own more land than the half-acre cut-off, with landholdings as large as fourteen acres. Among households labeled in the survey as “eligible” to borrow and with access to programs, the fraction of borrowers is nearly twice as high for those holding over half an acre versus those below (63% versus 34% for the three programs combined; The first two rows of Table 1 give figures disaggregated by program). Counter to historical observations suggesting an absence of land markets in South Asia, there is also substantial evidence of land sales. The data show that nearly one eighth of borrowers purchased substantial amounts of land in the six years prior to the survey.²

The approach below instead exploits the treatment/control aspect of the data through comparisons across villages. The groups in villages not served by programs were sampled with strict adherence to the half acre rule, however, and the asymmetry with groups in program villages creates problems here as well. A solution is to turn the sampling strategy on its head. While the sample was designed so that the control groups are comparable to the “treated” groups, the rule violations require that the treatment groups be redefined in order to bring them into conformity with the controls.

An additional concern is given by non-random program placement. Upward biases arise when programs choose regions that are already doing well, and downward biases arise when programs favor disadvantaged areas. The typical response to the problem is to estimate impacts

²Data on landholdings before participation are thus required in order to gauge the robustness of comparisons. The bottom four rows of Table 1, however, suggest that the results will not change dramatically on this score.

while including region-level fixed effects or their equivalent (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998a).

Counter to frequent assertion, however, this is not a panacea for addressing non-random program placement. Indeed, including region-level fixed effects can exacerbate bias when program placement is predicated on unobserved qualities particular to target populations. The data suggest that this is often the case. But, with the exception of the results on reduced variability and labor supply, the main qualitative results are robust both with and without controls for village-level unobservables.

The next sections below describe the data set, methodology, and results. Findings are then related to those using Pitt and Khandker's (1998a) "weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood - limited information maximum likelihood - fixed effects" (WESML-LIML-FE) approach. Pitt and Khandker, who were both involved in the data collection, use regression discontinuity design to estimate marginal impacts rather than the average impacts described here. They find positive impacts on household consumption and negative impacts on male labor supply, in contrast to the findings below. Moreover, their results suggest that lending to women may bring larger social benefits than lending to men, a result that they interpret within the context of a model of intrahousehold allocation. But since women on average receive smaller loans than men, in principle the finding may reflect diminishing marginal returns to capital rather than the position of women within households. Their general approach is recast as an instrumental variables problem that helps clarify necessary identifying restrictions and illustrates broader methodological differences.

2. Empirical Strategy and data

The survey was collected by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies in collaboration with the World Bank. The survey covers 87 villages and was completed in 1991-92. Villages in 5 subdistricts in the sample are not served by any of the three programs, while villages in the remaining 24 subdistricts are. Villages in both types of subdistrict were chosen randomly from a village census and microfinance program lists, respectively. Just over 20 households were surveyed per village, yielding useable data on 1798 households, 1538 of which are eligible to participate and have access to programs. Within the latter group, 905 participate. With few exceptions, only one program operates in any given village, and households must be resident to be eligible to borrow.

Data on outcomes were collected at three points during 1991-92 to capture seasonal variations in household circumstances. The data were collected following the harvests of the three main rice seasons, *Aman* (December/January), *Boro* (April/May) and *Aus* (July/August). *Aman* is the main rice harvest and *Aus* is considered the “hungry season” (Pitt and Khandker, 1998b).

The data set can be divided into five different types of households, represented in Figure 1 for a typical village with a program and one without. The eligibility rule is meant to exclude households with more than half an acre of land from participating. This includes group A in village 1 and group B in village 2; the latter group would be eligible to borrow if a program was available.

Groups C and D are eligible to borrow, but only those in group D in fact participate. Since they are self-selected (or selected by loan officers), households in group D cannot be simply

compared to households in group C or in group E without introducing the possibility of bias. According to Hashemi (1997) nearly half of all non-participants in a region served by Grameen and BRAC indicated that they did not borrow for fear that they would not generate high enough returns to be able to repay loans. They thus self-select out of the pool of participants, and comparisons of borrowers versus non-borrowers will be biased upward.

A more promising comparison is between all households in groups C and D versus those in group E. Under the assumption that landholding is exogenous, membership in either C or D or in E is not affected by self-selection, and differences in outcomes should reflect the presence of the program in village 1. The focus is thus on measuring the impact of eligibility rather than participation, just as researchers, for example, estimate the impact of a population's "exposure" to health clinics, rather than the impact of their actual usage.

Estimates of the impact on participants (and impact per taka borrowed) can be recovered under the assumption that there are no spillovers from program clients to non-participants. With no spillovers, the average impact per participant is calculated by dividing the impact per eligible household by the proportion of eligible households that participate.³ Similarly, the average impact per unit borrowed is calculated by dividing through again by the average loan size, yielding a Wald estimate of the impact.

In *Aman* season, for example, the average logarithm of consumption per capita in the

³Non-participants are affected through demonstration effects, enhanced competition in credit supply, and increased demand for labor and goods. Positive spillovers to eligible villagers that choose not to participate can exaggerate impacts on borrowers, but spillovers are not an issue if concern is just with the impact of eligibility. When eligible non-borrowers get positive spillovers, the calculation here attributes those impacts fully to impacts on borrowers, biasing upward measured impacts. Similarly, negative spillovers will diminish measured average impacts.

previous week for eligible Grameen households was 4.30, while log consumption was 4.20 for “eligible” households in villages without programs (an 11% difference). As described above, however, the programs are lax in following their eligibility rules. When strict, *de jure* definitions of eligibility are used instead of *de facto* practice, the advantage falls to 4.24 versus 4.20, a 4% difference. Assuming away spillovers, this is approximately an 11% increase per borrower, and an elasticity with respect to the value of cumulative borrowing of about 0.004.

Controlling for non-random program placement

The comparison above, however, may reflect general differences across villages. Assuming that spillovers are minor (from D to groups A or C), outcomes for the combined groups C and D can be compared to outcomes in group A, while a similar comparison can be made for group E relative to B in village 2. These within-village differences can then be compared across the two villages, yielding a refined estimate of the average impact of eligibility. The difference in log consumption using *de facto* classifications is -0.41 in Grameen villages and -0.28 in control villages. Relative to wealthier households, eligible household in Grameen villages fare about 14% worse than those in control villages. The comparisons reverses the advantage to being eligible for Grameen programs.

When the sample is instead divided by the strict, *de jure* eligibility criterion, the disadvantage deepens. The difference within Grameen villages is now -0.48 versus -0.28 in the control villages, a disadvantage of about 22%. Generalizing the approach to control for relevant household characteristics and village-level fixed effects in a regression framework leads to similar

qualitative results.⁴

But a simple illustration below shows that if programs locate on the basis of qualities specific only to target groups, employing of the fixed effects may not be an improvement. It will not remove all biases due to non-random program placement -- and could exacerbate bias by setting up the wrong benchmark by which to measure program performance. The problem arises since the programs explicitly limit their attention to just functionally landless households. Thus, the critical unobservables will be those specific to target groups within villages, not just unobservables that affect all villagers equally. As a consequence, straight differences restricted to target samples may be more revealing than differences-in-differences using the full sample.

Consider the regression equivalent of the difference-in-difference method. Outcome Y for household i in village v can be described by the linear relationship:

$$Y_{iv} = a_1(e_{iv}b_v) + a_2e_{iv} + \sum_{v=1}^V g_v d_v + \sum_{k=3}^{K+3} a_k X_{ivk} + e_{iv}, \quad (1)$$

where e gives “eligibility status” (irrespective of whether a program is in fact available), b gives program availability in the village, the K X ’s control for household characteristics, the d_v are a set of village-level dummy variables, and e_{iv} is an idiosyncratic error term with mean zero. The coefficient a_1 gives the difference-in-difference, the impact over and above both the village mean and the fact of being “eligible”. (In the application below, this coefficient is disaggregated by program to account for heterogeneous impacts.)

⁴The fact that wealthier households in each village are barred from participating makes it possible to employ village-level fixed effects to control for village-level unobservables in the cross-section – while still identifying average impacts of program access. The feature provides an econometric advantage over evaluations of programs open to everyone in a given region (in which case, longitudinal data are required in order to control for village-level unobservables.)

For expositional clarity, the X 's can be ignored. If equation (1) characterizes the process that actually generates the data, all is well and good. But instead imagine that the unobservables vary by target group and location such that:

$$Y_{iv} = a_1(e_{iv}b_v) + a_2e_{iv} + m + e_{iv} \quad \text{if } e_{iv} = 1 \text{ and } b_v = 1,$$

$$Y_{iv} = a_1(e_{iv}b_v) + a_2e_{iv} + n + e_{iv} \quad \text{if } e_{iv} = 0 \text{ and } b_v = 1,$$

$$Y_{iv} = a_1(e_{iv}b_v) + a_2e_{iv} + p + e_{iv} \quad \text{if } e_{iv} = 1 \text{ and } b_v = 0,$$

$$Y_{iv} = a_1(e_{iv}b_v) + a_2e_{iv} + q + e_{iv} \quad \text{if } e_{iv} = 0 \text{ and } b_v = 0.$$

The unobservables will simply difference out when estimating using village-level fixed effects if $m = n$ and $p = q$. The estimate of a_1 will then be unbiased.

There is nothing beyond convenience to support the assumption that the unobservables take that pattern. It is more likely that the roles of unobservables vary systematically within villages. It would not be surprising to find, for example, that functionally landless households in different villages have as much or more in common (in terms of unobservables) than rich and poor household in the same villages. The issue hinges not just on whether households are exposed to the same environment. The crux is the way that the environment translates into elements of outcome equations.

Consider the case in which $m = p = q = 0$, while $n > 0$. Across villages, the “eligible” households look reasonably similar *ex ante*, but wealthier households in program villages have unobservably better outcomes than others. Comparing outcomes of just the eligible households in different villages will yield unbiased estimates of impacts (i.e., just looking at differences).

But estimating equation (1), the difference-in-difference, will yield impacts with

downward biases. This can be seen most easily by assuming that $a_2 = 0$ and allowing m to be non-zero. Estimating with village-level fixed effects yields an estimated impact $\hat{a}_1 = a_1 - (n - m)$.

The bias will be negative when $n > m$. The sign on the coefficient can flip when the magnitude of the unobservables for wealthy households is sufficiently larger than the unobservables for the functionally landless -- and there is no reason to see this as a remote possibility given the degree of polarization often evident in villages.

Given ignorance about the nature of unobservables, the best course is to consider both the differences and differences-in-differences without prejudice. It turns out that, for the most part, the qualitative results below are consistent across specifications. Appendix Table 2 gives averages of selected village-level characteristics for the treatment and control groups, and almost all are within similar ranges.⁵

⁵An additional tension with the difference-in-difference estimates arises because no participating households are included in the sample of ineligible villagers, even though some have landholdings equal to (or greater than) those in the sample of ineligibles -- raising the question about whether households with over half an acre were truly sampled randomly. Another source of bias is due to positive spillovers to ineligible households within program villages. The spillovers show up as increases in the overall welfare of the village. These impacts will be removed by taking differences-in-differences or by including village-level fixed effects in regression analyses. In that case, these positive spillovers diminish the measured average impact of the programs (Pitt and Khandker, 1998a), but they are unlikely to have qualitative impacts.

Using longitudinal data will not necessarily eliminate the concerns here. With longitudinal data, comparisons can be restricted to the same households at different points in time, and unobserved household-level fixed factors that determine levels of outcomes can be differenced out. However, this is not a panacea since unobservables correlated with changes in outcomes remain. Imagine an individual deciding whether or not to apply for a loan. Their choice will rest ultimately with the potential income gain versus the cost of the loan. Since income growth will be driven partly by unobserved variables, correlations remain between unobservables and *changes* in outcomes before and after borrowing. In principle, evaluating first-differences of the data could exacerbate bias since "true" variation may diminish relative to the impact of the unobservables. The sorts of concerns above will thus arise in evaluations using either cross-sectional or longitudinal data.

3. Identifying assumptions: mistargeting

The key to the regression discontinuity design strategy is the exogeneity of landholdings, and the implementation of the eligibility cut-off at a half acre, resting on the assumption that land sales seldom occur. The assumptions can be checked, since the data set contains all land transactions between December 1986 and 1992 for borrowers in the programs.

These records show considerable market activity for land, with purchases far outweighing sales. The record of purchases undermines the received wisdom that in South Asia landholdings can be taken as exogenous -- mainly acquired by gift or inheritance (e.g., Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986).

Moreover, Table 2 shows considerable mistargeting: overall, 20-30% of borrowers are over the mandated land cut-off. This evidence is similar to that found in a recent survey of BRAC participants by Zaman (1997; he finds that 28% of households are mistargeted), but it is considerably higher than previous evidence on Grameen. For example, Hashemi (1997, p. 44) reports on a survey that found that 5.6% of participant households were mistargeted in 1982 and 4.2% in 1985. Much changed, though, between 1985 and 1991: Grameen expanded nearly seven times, from covering 3,666 villages to covering 25,248 (Grameen Bank, 1993), so the expansion of mistargeted households is far less surprising.

Figures 2 and 3 show these relationships graphically, using a nearest neighbor non-parametric estimator of eligibility status (*de facto*) run on landholdings (with a bandwidth of 25 neighbors). The sample is restricted to households with less than 3 acres in program villages. Figure 2 shows clearly that 0.5 acre is a focal point in the data. But while there is a steep decline in the probability of eligibility after 0.5 acre, the probability hovers above 0.20 through most of




Fig 2. Probability of Eligibility, nn = 25




Fig 3. Probability of Borrowing

the sample, indicating the broad extent of mistargeting.

More strikingly, Figure 3 shows no substantial decline in the probability of borrowing at 0.5 acre. If anything, there is a temporary increase. The lack of discontinuity suggests while regression-discontinuity design should work in principle, the lax implementation of the program rules undermines the application here.

Particular problems arise since looseness in applying the rule is likely linked to unobserved borrower quality. It would be natural, for example, for loan officers to bend the rules for particularly promising potential borrowers, but not for others. While the data lack retrospective landholdings for non-participants, the final column of Table 2 shows that the mis-targeting is not just due to land accumulation after becoming a borrower. There is considerable mis-targeting on the basis of initial holdings as well. (One decimal equals 1/100 acre.)⁶

The mistargeting also creates problems when comparing differences across villages. Unlike in program villages, the “eligible” in control villages were chosen by the survey team strictly on the basis of having total land holdings below 0.5 acre. Many are just at 0.5 acre or very slightly below, but, as Table 2 shows, none are above. This asymmetry creates the problems of comparability.

Table 3 shows that the asymmetry is often dramatic, with the largest landowner among Grameen participants holding nearly 14 acres, slightly more than the largest “ineligible” land

⁶The mistargeting could be explained simply by the exact nature of the eligibility rule, which is generally taken to refer just to cultivated land, not to all land. However, data on cultivated land are available, and it does not change the picture much. According to Hossein (1988, p. 25), after 1983, “a person from a household that owns less than 0.5 acre of cultivated land, or assets with a value equivalent to less than 1.0 acre of medium-quality land, is eligible to receive a loan.” Prior to 1983, the cut-off had been 0.4 acre.

owner in Grameen villages.⁷ The average landholding for mistargeted households is about 1½ acres. Table 3 also shows that average landholdings for program villages and controls are similar for those households holding less than 0.5 acre.

Table 4 shows patterns of accumulation by program participants: 883 of the 905 participants have land, and 191 added more land while 21 reduced landholdings. The accumulation was not minor. For the 22% with positive accumulations, the ratio of the average increase to average initial landholding is 59%. On the other hand, just 2% of participating households in the sample reduced landholdings. This calms the fear that some households are disposing of land to satisfy the eligibility criterion, but it is only partly helpful since the result likely stems from laxness in the criterion's implementation.

In general, households that have less land are buying homestead land and land containing ponds, orchards, and bamboo groves, as well as land for cultivation. This is seen in Table 5. Most of the land acquisitions come through inheritance or purchase, with gifts, dowry, and other sources playing negligible roles. Inheritance and purchase account for roughly equal shares of transactions, running counter to the “stylized fact” that nearly all of the action is from bequests.⁸

Since land data are available, it is possible to impose the 0.5 acre rule on the program households and exclude the group that is cut off (and re-weight accordingly). The fact that there

⁷The largest initial landholding by Grameen borrowers was 5.72 acres. Pitt and Khandker exclude 41 ineligible households with greater than 5 acres of land to aid comparability, but they do not exclude program participants on the basis of landholdings. Eight participants hold over five acres.

⁸One concern in a regression framework is that landholdings may absorb some of the impact of microfinance. One way to address this problem is to instrument for current landholdings with initial landholdings. However, preliminary investigation suggests that doing so reduces precision and pushes measured credit impacts even further downward.

is only data on initial landholdings for participants, coupled with the data showing accumulation, poses a potential problem. Take two households, one that participates in a credit program, the other from a control village. They both start with 0.3 acre. If the former is successful in borrowing, they may choose to double their landholdings, forcing their removal from the re-defined treatment group and biasing impacts downward if measured on the basis of current landholdings. But the opposite could be the case if the control households accumulate relatively more quickly. Defining groups based only on 1991-92 land data will generally be less favorable for finding impacts than using the initial land data for participants. In using the latter data here, the comparisons give the programs a slight edge, but not one that matters decisively.

4. Results

Tables 6 through 11 give simple difference of outcomes for control and treatment groups. Interpretations of the results hinge on exploiting randomization in the survey design, coupled with the proposition that there should be no bias due to the endogeneity of participation when considering a strict, *de jure* notion of eligibility and considering the impact of access to programs, rather than participation itself.

But it is useful to consider differences between borrowers and non-borrowers as well, bearing in mind the selection problem. These comparisons are given in Table 12. The differences-in-differences can also be extended to allow for covariates. These include the logarithm of landholdings; an eligibility status indicator; sex, age, and education of household head; maximum adult female/male education levels; indicators for absent male/female/spouse of head; and the number of relatives of the head and spouse that hold land. In addition, a set of

village level characteristics helps to control for non-random program placement (see Appendix Table 2). Table 13 gives three sets of results for each dependent variable. The first set pertains to a sample restricted to “functionally landless” households holding less than half an acre -- paralleling the differences shown in earlier tables. The second adds village-level variables, and best compares “like with like” by restricting the sample but allowing for village-level differences. And the third pertains to the full sample. In the latter, village-level fixed effects are included -- paralleling the differences-in-differences approach.

Table 6 gives impacts on per capita household consumption in the week prior to each of the three survey rounds (total consumption excluding net savings).⁹ The logarithm of the three seasonal measures is averaged to yield a measure of the average logarithm of consumption across the year. Alternative specifications that replace per capita consumption with consumption per adult equivalent differ little.

The top left panel of Table 6 gives weighted averages for groups by official *de facto* eligibility status and location (i.e., using the codings taken from the survey that include the mistargeted households). The three columns on the right give outcomes in Grameen, BRAC, and BRDB villages, respectively, as absolute differences of the outcome in the control villages. The bottom row gives differences between the first row and second. The three cells in the lower right corner give differences-in-differences: impacts on eligible households relative to the levels of ineligible fellow villagers and relative to the controls.

Putting the bottom row figures into percentage terms shows that on average the eligible groups consume 31% - 52% less than the level of non-eligible groups in like villages. The

⁹Data inconsistencies precluded investigating asset accumulation of women, another important indicator.

difference-in-difference with respect to Grameen villages is zero: there is no discernible impact on log consumption relative to the controls. The difference-in-difference in BRAC villages is similarly small (-2%), and for BRDB, the difference is -15%. None of these measures are statistically significant at conventional levels, however.

The difference-in-differences are pushed down when the non-eligible group does disproportionately well, and this appears to be the story here. Looking at the right-most columns shows that eligible households in BRDB villages consume 6% less on average than eligible control households. The reason for BRDB's particularly poor showing in the difference-in-difference is due to the fact that, at the same time, the non-eligible households consume 8% more than the relevant control group, yielding the difference-in-difference of about 15%.

Table 7 shows the role that mistargeting plays. Using groupings based strictly on having landholdings less than 0.5 acre removes the impact of the mistargeted households (weights are recalculated accordingly). Households in Grameen Bank villages, where the mistargeting was greatest, now have net consumption levels 7% below the controls according to the difference-in-difference (rather than zero difference). Similarly, they consume 7% less than the controls when comparisons are kept just to the simple difference across households with less than 0.5 acre. In contrast to the results above, this latter difference is statistically significant with 95% confidence. The BRDB difference is also 7% below the level of the controls — and 19% below in the difference-in-differences (and both are statistically significant). The BRAC difference-in-difference is 6% below the controls, but not statistically significant. The results are echoed in the first row of Table 13, where the point estimates are negative but not statistically significant.

These simple comparisons show that households eligible for microfinance participation

consume no more than similar households without access to programs. If the results are correct, why do households participate? Table 8 shows that households may benefit from risk reduction. The table does the same exercise as above with the average variance of the logarithm of per capita household consumption, measured across the three seasons by household. The variance of the log provides a simple measure of consumption variability from season to season. It weighs periods of unusually low consumption more than unusually high consumption, in accord with common notions of vulnerability. (All tables below report differences based on *de jure* classifications.)

The results here show that the households served by the microfinance programs all do substantially better than control households in this respect. While the average levels of consumption are lower, this table shows compensation via lower variability as well. The difference-in-difference indicates a reduction of 47% for eligible Grameen households, 54% for eligible BRAC households, and 51% for eligible BRDB households. The results are all statistically significant at the 95% level (the 94% level for eligible BRAC households).

The relative reductions are dramatic. But they are driven mostly by the comparisons to the ineligible households in villages with programs, and the simple differences yield reductions of just 11 - 17% (echoed again in Table 13). The patterns stem from the fact that seasonal variability is similar across landholding groups in the control villages, but relative variability is much higher for the wealthier households in the villages with programs — a result that is surprising given that they are likely better able to smooth consumption through borrowing and saving.

However, Table 9 suggests that most of the variability in consumption is reduced via income smoothing, not consumption smoothing. Again, the non-eligible households within program villages have much more variable levels than the eligible households. For them, the

variance of log labor is 44 - 79% higher than the controls, while for eligible households, the variance is 3 - 13% lower. The difference-in-difference combines to show sharply lower relative variances (39 - 46% lower). The t-statistics are relatively high, but not above standard confidence levels; however, the differences-in-differences become significant at the 90% level once covariates are added. The straight differences for Grameen in Table 13 yield point estimates that are not much smaller.

Table 9 also provides information on average labor supply per adult. Eligible Grameen households have 7% higher average labor supply than the controls, while BRAC households have 7% lower averages, with the former being significant. The differences-in-differences wash out these results, yielding only large and significant results for BRDB households. On average, eligible adults work 31% more than the relevant comparison group. Again, these qualitative results carry through when covariates are added to Table 13.

Table 10 considers labor supply of men and women. The differences between program villages and controls show that men and women work more in the program villages relative to the controls (with the exception of women in BRAC villages). The results are robust for men in the difference-in-differences: they appear to work disproportionately much. However, the results for women are reversed once allowances are made via comparisons with wealthier villagers. The net labor supply of women in Grameen villages is 56% of that of the controls. For women in BRAC villages, the net labor supply impact is 70% of the controls. Once covariates are considered, the BRAC difference-in-difference for female labor supply becomes statistically significant at the 90% level.

The final issue is impacts on education. A key thrust of the programs is to promote health

and education in addition to good businesses. Promoting the education of daughters is highlighted in particular. On the face of it, the programs are very successful. In Grameen villages, 62% of the sons (age 5 to 17) of borrowers are in school versus just 34% of the sons of non-borrowers. Similarly, 55% of borrowers' daughters are enrolled versus 41% for non-borrowers' daughters. (Table 12 shows similar numbers for the sample restricted to households with less than half an acre.

However, the differences-in-differences in Table 11 show that all children in program areas fare worse than those in controls, with the exception of sons born of poor households in Grameen villages.¹⁰ The pure differences show that some in functionally landless households in villages served by BRAC are more likely to be enrolled relative to children from other areas, but this is also true for children in better-off households where BRAC operates. Adding covariates in Table 13 does not change the basic story. The middle three columns show that the education of daughters is notably lower for eligible households in program villages versus control villages. Relative to the controls, there is no obvious success story here.

5. Interpretations and robustness

The results in the bottom two panels of Table 12 are close to what might be expected if self-selection is key – or if spillovers are small and the programs make a large difference in the lives of their clients. Those two panels show that the children of borrowers are substantially more likely to be in school compared to the children of non-borrowers.

¹⁰These results are very similar to those found by Chase (1997) in an independent study that used the World Bank/BIDS data set.

The table also gives results that would not be expected based on simple self-selection stories. For example, the log of consumption per capita and its variance are very close for borrower and non-borrower households in BRAC and Grameen villages. Slightly larger differences are seen for the labor variables, but the differences here are markedly smaller than the differences with non-eligible households.

Surprisingly, the variance of log consumption is higher for BRDB borrowers than non-borrowers in BRDB villages. But the finding reinforces the assertion that consumption smoothing is driven by income smoothing – since a similar relationship holds for the variance of log labor in BRDB villages.

The results in Table 13 are qualitatively very similar to the simple differences described above. As mentioned before, the education results, especially for daughters, are now murkier. The gender-specific labor supply results are also more mixed now.

Overall, the key findings are strengthened, however: eligibility to participate in the programs is associated with large decreases in the variability of consumption and labor supply. The differences-in-differences for labor-smoothing are now measured with greater statistical precision. As above, the results on reduced variability stem entirely from the differences-in-differences; the simple differences show no real advantages to microfinance eligibility. The extent to which this is a robust finding depends on the extent to which the higher variability levels for non-eligible households in program villages represent the norms for those villages. That issue can only be resolved with longitudinal data. Also as above, positive impacts on consumption remain elusive.

6. Comparisons to previous work

The results obtained above contrast with those found using Pitt and Khandker's (1998a) WESML-LIML-FE approach. They find positive marginal impacts on consumption and male schooling, and negative marginal impacts on labor supply. The labor supply results can be reconciled. The female labor supply results here are also negative, and the average impacts found here for males may be positive but declining. But the negative average impacts on consumption are not easily reconciled with positive marginal impacts.

Instrumental variables approaches

The difference-in-difference strategy shares elements with a simple instrumental variables approach, and it is helpful to draw the parallels in order to compare the main results here with those in previous work. The strategy can be seen in relation to the groups in Figure 1. The idea is to use membership in group C or D (which is arguably exogenous) as an instrument for membership in group D only. The instrument is thus whether a household both lives in an area served by a program and holds a half acre or less. Identification rests on there being no direct impact of the interacted term on impacts of interest (once landholdings and location are controlled for independently). The econometric specification also allows controls for a broad range of covariates and village-level fixed effects (akin to using A and B as reference groups).

Figure 1 gives the notation that is used below. The indicator $b = 1$ if there is a microfinance bank available, $e = 1$ if the household is eligible (or would be), and $c = 1$ if the household actually receives credit. The variables equal zero otherwise.

When the outcome of interest is the vector of incomes Y , say, the impact of credit C is

specified linearly as:

$$Y = C d + X g + u. \quad (2)$$

Latent credit demand is given by

$$C^* = Z a + n. \quad (3)$$

The matrix X includes household- and individual-specific variables, as well as a full set of village fixed effects, and u and n reflect unmeasured household-specific variables (with

$E[u|X, Z, e, b] = E[n|X, Z, e, b] = 0$). Concern with selection bias is given by the possibility that

$E[un] \neq 0$. The identification problem is complicated by the fact that $Z \not\perp X$; i.e., there are no standard variables that explain latent credit demand but which do not plausibly also help explain variation in outcomes of interest. A solution to the identification problem arises by noting that for household i in village v

$$\begin{aligned} C_{iv} &= 0 && \text{if } e_{iv} = 0 \text{ or } b_v = 0, \\ C_{iv} &= 0 && \text{if } C_{iv}^* < 0, \\ C_{iv} &= C_{iv}^* && \text{if } C_{iv}^* \geq 0 \text{ and } e_{iv} = 1 \text{ and } b_v = 1. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Thus, credit received can be rewritten as

$$C_{iv} = e_{iv} b_v c_{iv} \bar{C}_c + e_{iv} b_v c_{iv} (C_{iv}^* - \bar{C}_c), \quad (5)$$

where $\bar{C}_c$ is the average amount borrowed by participants. Apart from the first line of equation

(4), this is a standard instrumental variables problem.¹¹ Equation (5) suggests a potential

¹¹I thank Mark Pitt for stressing the importance of this distinction. In an earlier draft, two-stage least squares estimates were presented. The results were qualitatively similar to the results here, but the simple differences-in-differences are preferred.

instrument is the indicator of potential eligibility interacted with an indicator of program availability ($e_{iv} b_v$). This instrument will be correlated with the first term on the right hand side of equation (5), but not the second. Thus, it will deliver an estimate of average impacts, not marginal.

The instrument set can be expanded to include variables correlated with second term in equation (5). The candidates are interactions of household characteristics with the dummy variable that equals one only if the household has program access and is eligible -- i.e., $e_{iv} b_v Z_{iv}$, where the Z_{iv} include any or all variables in the latent credit demand equation.¹² Since these instruments will be correlated with the second term in equation (5), they explain the intensity of participation, not just incidence (and the exclusion restriction on $e_{iv} b_v$ can now be dropped.)

At its root, the strategy is an application of regression-discontinuity research design. But as illustrated in Figure 3 above, violations of the eligibility rule undermine the use of this strategy. Figures 4 and 5 explore more closely the empirical bases underlying the approach. Figure 4 echoes Table 1 in showing how the probability of borrowing *increases* with landholdings above 0.5 acre. The sample is restricted to eligible households in two overlapping

¹²This discussion captures the essence of Pitt and Khandker's procedure. Their limited information maximum likelihood approach entails estimating credit demand in a first stage Tobit using just households in program villages that are eligible to borrow ($e_{iv} b_v = 1$). The resulting predicted credit amounts are then entered into the second stage, with others ($e_{iv} b_v = 0$) receiving zeroes for predicted credit demand. This essentially creates instruments of the form ($e_{iv} b_v Z_{iv}$). In their application, Pitt and Khandker also explore the impact by gender and by each of the three programs using the same structure. Population weights capture weighted exogenous sampling (WESML). The instrumental variables approach parallels limited information maximum likelihood (LIML). And adding village-level dummy variables addresses the fixed effects (FE).




Fig 4. Probability of Borrowing, Pitt-Khandker Samples

samples used by Pitt and Khandker (1998a). The “male access” sample excludes villages with only female groups, and the “female access” sample excludes villages with only male groups.

The top two panels of Figure 5 show that cumulative borrowing also increases with landholdings.¹³ The bottom two panels show that conditional on borrowing, the relationship is flat after 0.5 acre. The figures show substantial variation on the high end. One consequence is that, despite the instruments, the effects of endogeneity can slip in via mistargeting, as argued above.

A contributing factor is that Pitt and Khandker’s framework for estimating marginal impacts implicitly rests on a long series of exclusion restrictions. Their second stage includes six

¹³The key explanatory variable is total borrowing from microfinance programs between December 1986 and 1992, converted into 1992 prices using regional deflators. Thus a stock is being used to explain a series of flows.

endogenous credit variables, pertaining to male and female borrowers from each of the three programs. Each endogenous variable is associated with 16 instruments (since there are 16 variables in their first-stage gender-specific credit demand equations and these are then interacted with program-specific indicator variables).

This provides considerable flexibility that remains unexploited. First, their second stage includes these same sixteen variables on their own, but neither their interaction with eligibility status (e_{iv}) nor with status as a program village (b_v).¹⁴ As a result, the instruments may pick up any systematic differences between the landless and landed in, say, the impact of age on income, even when the differences are not particular to landless households in program villages. If non-linearities in the effects of explanatory variables are picked up by the instruments, the instruments can also pick up the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, providing a plausible explanation for their positive results on household consumption: “better” borrowers get bigger loans, yielding what appear to be positive and significant marginal impacts.¹⁵ Exploring these issues further is beyond the scope of this paper.

Pitt and Khandker (1998b) also consider impacts on seasonality. Their results by season

¹⁴Entering these interactions in the second stage is technically feasible in their set-up. Despite the emphasis put on the quasi-experiment by Pitt and Khandker, identification does not rely on it. In their current specification, the control group (non-program village) data increases the efficiency of the estimates, but they are not strictly required for identification. They would be needed, however, to identify interactions of eligibility status and income determinants. Madajewicz (1997), e.g., provides an incentive-based argument that predicts heterogeneous impacts across wealth categories.

¹⁵The issue of non-linear responses is noted by Pitt and Khandker (1998a) in their footnote 6: “to ensure that the program is not driven by the linear relationship between landholdings and the outcome variable, we have estimated the model while allowing for land to enter as a quadratic and successively higher level polynomial. The program effect results reported below were not qualitatively altered by these changes.” However, following the discussion above, the measured impact may reflect non-linear relationships in any of the explanatory variables, not just land. Thus, exploring polynomials in land is inadequate to address the issue, especially given the small role of land in predicting credit demand in their Table 1.

are consistent with the improved consumption-smoothing found here. Strikingly, they also find that selection into the programs is determined by low levels of *Aus* season consumption levels, where the period after *Aus* (just before the *Aman* harvest) is generally considered the most difficult time of the year for poor households. However, their result that relative impacts are greatest during *Aus* season are not replicable using the simple control-treatment framework here.

Implications for impacts by gender

Concern with gender is motivated by the observation that women tend to be more reliable borrowers than men, with much lower probabilities of delinquency, and that women may allocate resources differently from their spouses (Wood and Sharif, 1997). Pitt and Khandker (1998a) interpret their finding that loans to women have higher marginal impacts than loans to men as an indication of a lack of fungibility of capital and income within the household.

But since loans to males are larger on average, the difference can also be explained by the standard theory of declining marginal returns to capital. Although the average loan sizes in Pitt and Khandker (1998a) show females with much higher average borrowings (e.g., women borrowed 956 taka from Grameen versus 374 taka borrowed by men; Pitt and Khandker, 1998a, Table A1), the average is for the entire sample with zeroes included for non-borrowers. The numbers turn around when calculated conditional on actually borrowing. Then males borrow slightly more on average from Grameen (15,797 taka versus 14,128 taka). For BRAC, males cumulatively borrowed 5,842 taka versus 4,711 taka for women, and for BRDB, males borrowed 6020 taka versus 4118 taka for women (see Appendix Table below).

Still, there may be important gender-specific heterogeneity. A more complicated selection

problem emerges now since participation in the program is not just a matter of whether a member of the household should participate but also specifically *who* in the household should participate. Pitt and Khandker identify their estimates by exploiting the fact that credit groups are never mixed by gender (by regulation), and not all villages have groups of both genders. Thus, men in villages with no male groups will not be eligible to borrow. Likewise for women. In the 87 villages surveyed, 10 have no female groups and 22 have no male groups (and 40 have both, leaving 15 villages with no groups). Identification comes from comparing how men with access to male groups compare to men without access. Likewise for women.¹⁶

This step requires additional identifying assumptions since the formation and composition of groups is endogenous. The fact that a man is in a village with no male groups may say something about the unobserved qualities of the men and the strength of their peer networks in that village. If it says that the men are poor credit risks, then the evaluation will overstate the pure impact on men who do participate. Similarly, if having a strong peer group increases impacts directly, the identification procedure may reflect partly the role of peer groups in addition to the role of the program. The village fixed effects may pick up much of this unobserved village heterogeneity, but, as argued above, they will not control for features of peer networks that are specific just to target (functionally landless) households in program villages.

7. Conclusions

The microfinance movement has captured the imagination of academics, policymakers,

¹⁶Formally, instruments now take the form $e_{iv} b_v Z_{iv} G_{iv}$, where G_{iv} is a dummy variable indicating residence in a village with just female or just male groups.

and practitioners. It has demonstrated possibilities for lending to poor households and has transformed discussions of poverty alleviation. However, few microfinance programs have received rigorous statistical evaluations. Doing so is complicated by biases due to non-random program placement and participation by clients. Simple measures of impacts are thus likely to be driven partly by correlations of unobserved client quality and patterns of lending, with respect to both participation and the size of borrowings. The results above show how misleading the simple measures can be.

The study sets out a set of simple comparisons that take sources of bias into account. Access to the programs is associated with substantially lower variation in labor supply and consumption across seasons -- a benefit that may be considerable for poor agriculture-based households. At the same time, no evidence was found to support claims that the programs increase consumption levels or increase educational enrollments for children relative to levels in control villages. One explanation is suggested by Todd (1996) who found that many borrowers were using loans to purchase land, rather than to complete their proposed projects. Her anecdotal evidence is consistent with the evidence of relatively frequent and large land purchases here. The fruit of those investments are not apt to show up immediately, and it is possible that stronger impacts of the microfinance programs would show up in time.

That said, the findings above are plausible given the high level of activity by non-governmental organizations throughout Bangladesh. The control groups may not yet have credit programs, but they are served in other ways by informal lenders (including relatives) and social service organizations, so it should not be surprising that strong positive differences between treatment and control villages remain elusive. The microfinance programs may make important

absolute differences in the lives of borrowers, even if the relative differences are small. Tens of millions of dollars worth of subsidized resources support these programs, and the question now is whether these benefits are justified by their substantial costs.

8. References

- Angrist, Joshua, Guido Imbens, and Donald Rubin (1995), "Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 91 (434), June: 444 - 455.
- Binswanger, Hans and Mark Rosenzweig (1986), "The Behavioural and Material Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture," *Journal of Development Studies* 32: 503 - 539.
- Buntin, John (1997), "Bad Credit: Microcredit yields macroproblems," *The New Republic*, March 31: 10-11.
- Campbell, Donald T. (1969), "Reforms as Experiments," *American Psychologist* 24: 409 - 429.
- Chase, Jessica (1997), *The effect of microfinance credit on children's education: evidence from the Grameen Bank*. Harvard University Undergraduate Honors Thesis in Economics.
- Deaton, Angus (1997), *The Analysis of Household Surveys*. Baltimore: The World Bank/Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Economist Magazine* (1997), "Microlending: From Sandals to Suits," February 1: 75.
- Grameen Bank (1993), *Annual Report 1992*. Dhaka: Grameen Bank.
- Hashemi, Syed (1997), "Those Left Behind: A Note on Targeting the Hardcore Poor," chapter 11 in Geoffrey Wood and Iffath Sharif, eds., *Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
- Heckman, James J. (1997), "Instrumental Variables: A Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions Used in Making Program Evaluations," *Journal of Human Resources* 32 (3), Summer: 442 - 462.
- Hossain, Mahabub (1988), *Credit for Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh*, International Food Policy Research Institute Report 65, February.
- Madajewicz, Margaret (1997), "Capital for the Poor: The Role of Monitoring", Harvard University, draft.
- Microcredit Summit (1997), *The Microcredit Summit Report*. Washington, DC: RESULTS Educational Fund.
- Moffitt, Robert (1991), "Program Evaluation with non-Experimental Data", *Evaluation Review* 15 (3), June: 291 - 314.
- Morduch Jonathan (1995), "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9(3), Summer, 103 - 114.
- Morduch, Jonathan (1999), "The Microfinance Promise," *Journal of Economic Literature*, forthcoming..

- New York Times* (1997), "Microloans for the very poor" [editorial], February 16.
- Pitt, Mark and Shahidur Kandker (1998a), "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?" *Journal of Political Economy*, October.
- Pitt, Mark and Shahidur Kandker (1998b), "Credit Programs for the Poor and Seasonality in Rural Bangladesh," Brown University and World Bank, draft, January 9.
- Pitt, Mark, Shahidur Khandker, Signe-Mary McKernan, and M. Abdul Latif (1997), "Credit Programs for the Poor and Reproductive Behavior in Low Income Countries: Are the Reported Causal Relationships the Result of Heterogeneity Bias?" Brown University/World Bank/FTC/BIDS, manuscript.
- Rahman, Mizanur and Julie Da Vanzo (1997), "Influence of the Grameen Bank on Contraceptive Use in Bangladesh", ICDDR,B/RAND working paper.
- Rashid, Mansoor and Robert M. Townsend (1993), "Targeting Credit and Insurance: Efficiency, Mechanism Design, and Program Evaluation," The World Bank and University of Chicago, draft.
- Todd, Helen (1996), *Women at the Center: Grameen Bank Borrowers after One Decade*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Wood, Geoffrey and Iffath Sharif, eds. (1997), *Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
- Zaman, Hassan (1997), "Micro-Credit Programmes: Who Participates and What Does it Matter?" chapter 10 in Geoffrey Wood and Iffath Sharif, eds., *Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: University Press Limited.




Figure 1: Typical Program and Non-Program Villages

Table 1
Percentage of Borrowers by Classification
(weighted, n = 1498)

	Grameen	BRAC	BRDB
<i>Borrowing by “eligible” households:</i>			
under 0.5 acre (prior)	39	40	25
over 0.5 acre (prior)	60	55	83
<i>By de facto eligibility status:</i>			
“Eligible”	44	42	29
“Not Eligible”	0	0	0
<i>By holdings prior to participation:</i>			
Under 0.5 acre	38	39	24
Over 0.5 acre	19	22	11
<i>By holdings at the time of the survey:</i>			
Under 0.5 acre	38	40	25
Over 0.5 acre	18	20	10

Note: Data on land-holdings prior to 1991-92 only available for borrowers; “before” data for others is replaced with 1991-92 data. Landholdings comprise total land held by household.

Table 2:
Distribution of landholdings by program and eligibility category

		Percentage of Households by Landholding				
		Total households	Under 6 decimals	6 to 50 decimals	Over 50 decimals	Initial Land: Over 50
Grameen Villages	Participants	312	24	46	30	28
	Other Eligible	126	39	46	15	--
	Ineligible	72	0	3	97	--
BRAC Villages	Participants	285	37	40	24	21
	Other Eligible	126	44	44	11	--
	Ineligible	71	0	1	99	--
BRDB Villages	Participants	308	31	47	21	18
	Other Eligible	126	41	59	0	--
	Ineligible	72	0	1	99	--
Control Villages	Eligible	255	35	65	0	--
	Ineligible	45	0	0	100	—

Table 3:
Size of landholdings in 1991-92 by program and eligibility category

		Average Land Size by Category (Decimals)							
		Group Avg.	Under 6		6 to 50		Over 50		
			Avg	s.d.	Avg	s.d.	Avg	s.d.	max
Grameen Villages	Participants	56.4	2.8	1.6	21.2	12.7	152.7	158.1	1377
	Other Eligible	28.2	2.8	1.5	22.9	14.4	110.2	51.4	200
	Ineligible	292.4	--	--	27.0	8.5	300.0	281.5	1330
BRAC Villages	Participants	49.1	2.5	1.6	18.3	13.0	174.2	147.5	785
	Other Eligible	19.6	2.5	1.4	21.2	13.1	81.6	45.5	206
	Ineligible	323.4	--	--	45.0	0.0	327.4	441.7	3360
BRDB Villages	Participants	43.8	2.5	1.4	20.8	11.7	154.8	103.6	631
	Other Eligible	14.1	2.5	1.4	22.3	14.5	--	--	50
	Ineligible	429.2	--	--	45.0	0.0	434.6	863.6	5750
Control Villages	Eligible	15.7	3.1	1.3	22.4	14.4	--	--	--
	Ineligible	233.5	--	--	--	--	233.5	253.8	1343

Table 4: Average household land transactions while in program
(905 participating households, hundredths of an acre)

	Land Type				Total
	Homestead	Pond, etc.	Cultivation	Other	
Number with type	871	274	386	88	882
Initial size	44.9	81.9	89.3	77.3	44.5
Number changing	91	20	125	16	212
Initial size	19.1	15.6	84.5	68.9	57.8
Size of change	4.3	9.8	41.0	8.6	27.6
Positive changes	85	17	111	14	191
Size of change	5.2	11.6	51.9	11.3	34.1
Negative changes	6	3	14	2	21
Size of change	8.8	0.8	45.3	10.5	2.3

Sample restricted to 905 participating households; 23 landless households are excluded from figures above.
Second column includes holdings of ponds, orchards, bamboo groves.

Table 5: Method of acquiring or disposing of land

	Land type:		Cultivation		
	Home- stead	Pond, orchard, grove	For self	To lease	Other
Number with acquisition/disposal	91	20	102	60	16
Number with complete data	82	20	93	59	16
Method of acquisition/disposal:					
Purchase	50	13	53	15	9
Inheritance	38	7	52	46	7
Gift, dowry, other	5	0	3	1	0

Note: Sample restricted to 212 households with changes in land status. Method of acquisition/disposal is only provided for households with complete data. Multiple methods may be used to complete an acquisition/disposal.

Table 6
Average logarithm of consumption per capita,
Difference-in-difference using *de facto* classifications (n = 1798)

	Grameen	BRAC	BRDB		Difference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Control	(1)	(2)	(3)
“Eligible”	4.23	4.24	4.18	4.24	-.01 (.33)	0 (.16)	-.06** (1.98)
“Not eligible”	4.50	4.53	4.60	4.51	-.01	.02	.08
Difference	-.27	-.29	-.42	-.27	0 (.05)	-.02 (.12)	-.14 (1.54)

Absolute values of t-statistics of differences in parentheses; ** (*) significant with 95% (90%) confidence.

Table 7
Average logarithm of consumption per capita,
Difference-in-difference using *de jure* classifications (n = 1562)

	Grameen	BRAC	BRDB		Difference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Control	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under 0.5 acre	4.17	4.21	4.17	4.24	-.07** (2.12)	-.03 (1.08)	-.07** (2.33)
Over 0.5 acre	4.51	4.54	4.61	4.51	0	.03	.10
Difference	-.34	-.33	-.44	-.27	-.07 (.75)	-.06 (.65)	-.17* (1.91)

Absolute values of t-statistics of differences in parentheses; ** (*) significant with 95% (90%) confidence.

Table 8

**Average within-household variance of the logarithm of consumption per capita,
Difference-in-difference using *de jure* classifications (n = 1536)**

	Grameen (1)	BRAC (2)	BRDB (3)	Control	Treatment/control (%)		
					(1)	(2)	(3)
Under 0.5 acre	.061	.061	.057	.069	88.4 (.87)	88.4 (1.04)	82.6 (1.42)
Over 0.5 acre	.116	.132	.117	.069	168.1	191.3	169.6
Treatment/ control (%)	52.6	46.2	48.7	100.0	52.6** (2.24)	46.2* (1.92)	48.7** (2.58)

Absolute values of t-statistics of differences in parentheses; ** (*) difference from 100 significant with 95% (90%) confidence.

Table 9

**Labor supply per adult: average logarithm
and within-household variance of the logarithm,**

Difference-in-difference using *de jure* classifications (n = 1536)

						Treatment/control (%)		
		Grameen (1)	BRAC (2)	BRDB (3)	Control	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under 0.5 acre	Average	4.80	4.66	4.75	4.73	.07** (2.00)	-.07 (1.35)	.02 (0.71)
	Variance	0.118	0.131	0.125	0.135	87 (0.62)	97 (0.30)	93 (0.44)
Over 0.5 acre	Average	4.57	4.44	4.25	4.52	.05	-.08	-.27
	Variance	0.187	0.233	0.212	0.130	144	179	163
Treat- ment/ control (%)	Average	0.23	0.22	0.50	0.21	.02 (0.02)	.01 (0.24)	.31** (2.69)
	Variance (%)	63	56	59	104	61 (1.52)	54 (1.28)	57 (1.43)

Differences for average logarithm of household labor supply per capita are absolute. Differences of within-household variance of the log are in percentage terms. Absolute values of t-statistics of differences in parentheses; ** (*) difference from 100 significant with 95% (90%) confidence.

Table 10

**Average labor supply of men and women,
Difference-in-difference using *de jure* classifications**

		Grameen	BRAC	BRDB		Treatment/control (%)		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	Control	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under 0.5 acre	Male	213	198	201	189	113** (3.66)	105* (1.86)	107** (1.92)
	Female	48	32	44	43	112 (0.97)	74** (2.30)	102 (0.23)
Over 0.5 acre	Male	172	154	132	161	107	96	82
	Female	34	18	18	17	200	106	103
Treatment/ control (%)	Male	124	129	152	117	106 (0.63)	109 (0.86)	131** (2.86)
	Female	141	178	244	253	56 (1.10)	70 (1.26)	95 (0.48)

Samples include 2068 men and 1991 women. Absolute values of t-statistics of differences in parentheses; ** (*) difference from 100 significant with 95% (90%) confidence.

Table 11

**Percentage of children age 5 to 17 enrolled in school,
Difference-in-difference using *de jure* classifications (n = 1798)**

		Grameen	BRAC	BRDB		Treatment/control (%)		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	Control	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under 0.5 acre	Male	45.6	49.4	44.0	47.5	96.0 (0.39)	104.0 (0.20)	92.6 (0.72)
	Female	46.8	51.8	37.1	53.7	87.2 (1.29)	96.5 (0.43)	69.1** (3.31)
Over 0.5 acre	Male	57.6	80.3	69.1	62.5	92.2	128.5	110.6
	Female	68.8	74.3	59.8	60.9	113.0	122.0	98.2
Treatment/ control (%)	Male	79.2	61.5	63.7	76.0	104.1 (0.25)	80.9** (2.04)	83.7 (1.23)
	Female	68.0	69.7	62.0	88.2	77.2 (1.08)	79.1 (1.12)	70.4 (1.13)

Samples include 1055 boys and 1022 girls. Absolute values of t-statistics of differences in parentheses; ** (*) difference from 100 significant with 95% (90%) confidence.

Table 12:
Average outcomes for borrowers and non-borrowers
holding less than 0.5 acre

Variable	Households with less than 0.5 acre	Grameen Bank	BRAC	BRDB
Log consumption per capita	borrower	4.18	4.21	4.21
	non-borrower	4.17	4.21	4.15
Variance of log consumption	borrower	.060	.060	.065
	non-borrower	.062	.062	.053
Log labor per adult in past month	borrower	4.83	4.66	4.78
	non-borrower	4.78	4.65	4.74
Variance of per adult log labor	borrower	.111	.114	.130
	non-borrower	.123	.143	.124
Adult male labor hours in past month	borrower	218	212	206
	non-borrower	208	188	199
Adult female labor hours in past month	borrower	52	35	49
	non-borrower	42	30	42
% male school enrollment (age 5 - 17)	borrower	57.4	51.0	54.1
	non-borrower	30.1	48.0	44.1
% female school enrollment (age 5 - 17)	borrower	54.0	58.0	39.1
	non-borrower	41.1	47.4	32.8

Note: Definitions and samples are comparable to those in Tables 7 - 11.