

**The Social Dimension and Social Cohesion.**

**Or,  
On Reconciling Adam Smith with Thomas Hobbes.**

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**Presentation to the Seminar  
'The Social Dimension of the European Higher Education Area and  
world wide competition',  
The Sorbonne,  
Paris, January 26 – 28<sup>th</sup> 2005.**

## **Introduction:**

Let me start by noting a certain paradox. This paradox resides in the fact that ensuring social cohesion has long been one of the constant and underlying tasks of education in general and higher education most specifically so. Indeed, the reform of the two basic variations of the modern European university – the Humboldtian and the Napoleonic – had, amongst other purposes this very deliberate end, which is scarcely surprising given the situation both countries then faced – the collapse of the social order of the first after the battle of Jena (Nybom, 2003) – and seating a dynasty on firmer footing in the case of the second. (Verger, 1986) It has, even so taken four years after the signature of the Bologna Declaration for attention to turn to the Social Dimension and Social Cohesion. Still, there is doubtless some consolation to be had from the adage “Better late than never.”

When we broach the issue of social cohesion and we do so within the setting of the European Higher Education Area it is as well not to forget that the best part of two hundred years have been spent defining, and refining social cohesion within the setting of the Nation State. Indeed, of all the world’s universities, it is the European that has had the Nation State as its basic referential framework the longest. (Huisman, Maassen & Neave, 2001) That we are being asked to consider a new and broader definition of social cohesion is therefore no small task.

## **Operationalising the Concept.**

The concept of social cohesion can of course be operationalised around very different criteria. Indeed, we have heard our Dutch colleagues applying it to describe the disparities between modes of student financing and the differences in what is known in that hideous barbarism derived from the Franglais, portability. That there are differences in modes of student financing and funding and thus, portability, is scarcely surprising. What is more surprising, however, is that such differences should be seen as posing obstacles to ‘social cohesion’. (Vossensteyn, 2004) It may well be that such a diagnostic term is not meant to be understood as it stands. Rather, it may be viewed as yet another example of Euro-speak which opens the door to further questions such as the type of ‘coordination’ to ensure cohesion defined uniquely in terms of student finance and who shall exercise it, not to mention the type and the range of ‘solutions’ that may be contemplated. Whether they are to be contemplated in unitary terms – one size fits all - or whether they are to perpetuate the notion of national diversity, and the glorious obduracy of national practice perpetuated, is the heart of the matter, of course.

## **De-coding the felicitous phrase.**

In the Russian doll of Euro-politics, inside one issue another always lies waiting. And in the case of ‘social cohesion’ interpreted in the narrow terms of financing students when abroad, there lurks the well-exercised conflict over the distribution of power between Commission and Member States, not to mention by whom and how student mobility is to be sustained in the near future. And he who speaks of ‘sustaining’ anything in these latter days is but one step away from the question of resources and the eternally vexed question who is to pay what for whom and how?

Within this very special decoding of the felicitous term, other questions put themselves forward. Assuming that 'social cohesion' is a stalking horse for 'co-ordination' - perhaps harmonisation or even architecture would smell as sweet - the first question when applied to the funding of students venturing outside the frontiers of the Nation, is surely "where are we to set the limits to conceiving difference as obstacles?" If differences in national practice are an obstacle, and we have spent the last two centuries seeking in every way possible to mark ourselves off from our neighbours - above all, our neighbours - by our differences, where is the process of 'removing obstacles' to stop? On this criterion, we might as well begin the learning of Letzenburgisch on the grounds that by learning it we will remove obstacles, impose an equality of great difficulty upon everyone concerned and, by so doing, counter the inadmissible domination of the North Atlantic tongue.

### **A Broader Understanding.**

Yet, the issue of social cohesion, read in its meaning *en clair* rather than encoded, is a serious issue. It is a serious issue because one tends to evoke social cohesion only when it seems to be in question and apparently in a condition of fragility. Or, to put matters slightly differently, social cohesion is only brought into question with the imminent prospect of social instability or its likelihood. A number of feline phrases are currently going the rounds that give voice to this anxiety, though it has to be said that they are not identified with the Bologna Process as such though, by using that platform to turn our attention to the social dimension, Bologna serves perhaps to amplify our awareness of them. Within the Nation State, marginalisation, exclusion fall into the category of those forces in society that weaken the social fabric. Or, as another possibility, as forces that work in favour of new definitions of collective identity that do not lend themselves easily to accommodation within existing institutional or social structures and which notorious poverty or a shared sense of what Gary Runciman termed 'Relative Deprivation' may serve to accelerate and precipitate. (Runciman, 1966)

That the Bologna process has opened up the social dimension serves to underline that factors of disparity, which determine and accompany differences in the quality of life within the Nation State, are now shared across them. Such disparities, whether socially or geographically sited, are not new. Indeed, higher education policy - at least in Western Europe - has from the mid Sixties onwards been engaged in seeking to remedy them - either through policies of institutional distribution - or through various policies to strengthen the influence of regional authorities in the affairs of academia, beginning in Sweden with the 1977 reforms, and spreading into Spain with the Organic Law of 1983, in Belgium with the Federalisation of the Kingdom in 1988 and in Britain with the regionalisation of the higher education funding base in 1992. Others are certainly not backward in this sphere. The 'fit' between the location of institutes of higher education and regions of notorious deprivation is not always close. Nevertheless, the use of higher education to spur regional development, if not always regional identity, is an enduring trend these four decades past.

### **Social Cohesion and Higher Education: a brief excursion across History.**

Now the issue that the very concept of social cohesion poses is “It is its purpose to achieve even closer harmony, architecture or common practice? Or is it evoked simply because the thrust of social and technological change is dissolving the established mechanisms of social stability?” What evidence have we from the domain of higher education?

As Moscati has pointed out, competition and meritocracy are the abiding values of higher education and for that reason are also central to the notion of social cohesion. But their continuing and vital part in determining who goes to higher education can be made to serve vastly different social objectives and thus very different interpretations of social cohesion. The historic and identifying feature of the European university, though not ostensibly its American counterpart, has been the close alignment of higher education with public service, whether that public service is construed in terms of the services of the State – or, in the setting of an ideology that has now gone the way of all flesh – of the party. The historical origins of this engagement to the collectivity, not unnaturally, vary from country to country. They may be traced back to the Josephine reforms at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in Austria, were re-affirmed in the Memorandum of Wilhelm von Humboldt on the future of Berlin University in 1806 and, for France, as I have said, were re-stated in the form of the Imperial University. (Neave, 2001) The University acting on behalf of the Nation supplied the talent that in turn fed what the American political scientist Robert Dahl termed “the value allocating bodies in society” – the church, the law, the education system *sensu lato*, national administration and, not least, the tax system. (Dahl, 1966 *The Political System*) These ties were made closer by what in some countries is termed the ‘*effectus civilis*’, namely that certain university degrees were held to be valid to compete for a place in public service and for a place in what economists qualify as ‘the fixed price labour market’. (Kerr, 1986)

Clearly, the first major break in the saga of the elite university took place with the drive towards massification in Europe from the mid Sixties onward. Its rationale remained fully within the post war settlement which involved the Nation assuming new responsibilities and thus taking over new dimensions that underpinned social cohesion in the form of the welfare state – in health, unemployment and child benefits, pensions and not least the right first to secondary education and later to higher education. Key to this was the recognition that education determined life chances. Higher education took on an active and re-distributive role as indeed the welfare state itself performed. Education and the university by extension acted as a public instrument for the re-distribution of wealth through investing in social mobility and above all, through public investment in the younger generation.

Seen from this perspective, the first stage in Western Europe’s drive towards massification stood as an unprecedented act of social solidarity and very explicitly so in its focus on what were then presented as ‘first generation students’. The fundamental assumption that underpinned this interpretation of social cohesion rested on the conviction that social mobility and raising the general level of education amongst the population was an issue of collective responsibility. It extended into higher education the basic tenets of the welfare state in the broad domain of social security. In this, three aspects remained constant. First, the principle of merit itself ;

second that mobilisation of society around technological and social change was primed by the public sector – a social counterpart of Keynesian theory in economics; and third, that the pace of economic change was in keeping with the capacity of the labour force to keep pace on the basis of the intellectual baggage it had once acquired in youth.

In effect, the factors that undermined this particular model of higher education's part in social cohesion are also to be found along these three dimensions and very especially in the relationship between social cohesion and economic development. Is social cohesion a condition of economic development? Or, on the contrary, is economic development a condition of social cohesion? The fundamental assumption that lay beneath the 'welfare state' model of higher education policy inclined towards the former, namely that social solidarity was a prior condition to economic development, a view which received operational definition by placing priority on equality of opportunity, often expressed in terms of 'social justice'. If we accept this interpretation of social cohesion, we have to ask ourselves what were the elements of disolution?

#### **Erosion of a model of social cohesion: the Welfare State.**

The usual explanation given for the demise of the 'welfare state' model of social cohesion in higher education is astounding in its simplicity – namely, that the Nations of Europe could not afford to fund mass higher education in the same lavish manner as they had its elite predecessor. None will disagree the part cost played. But it is not the whole explanation. There is another one. And whilst both are inextricably linked to the process of massification itself, the second is important on its own account. Social demand for higher education not only outstripped the ability – or, as the theory of fiscal stress suggests (Vossensteyn, 2003) - the willingness of governments and their citizens to pay (an interesting example of de-solidarization). It also outstripped the capacity of the public sector to absorb the increase in qualified output from higher education. Precisely when this historic watershed was reached is not greatly important. There is evidence aplenty to suggest that the latter part of the 70s – with variations between countries – provides a reasonable marker. There are other pointers as well, not least of them being the refocusing of higher education policy – and research which tends to follow in its train – away from access to higher education and instead to concentrate on output, on occupational change and on the ties – increasingly problematic - of higher education with the labour market.

Such a refocusing went hand in glove with a root and branch revision in re-thinking the place of the public sector and, more to the point, the economic condition of the Nation, a revision which, in its more extreme forms set about defining the economy as the prime lever in social cohesion. This, in essence, is precisely what is meant by the twin credos of 'marketisation' and 'privatisation'. In other words, the relationship between social cohesion and economic development which, in the welfare state interpretation of higher education, saw social cohesion as the path that led on to economic fortune, was thus reversed. Economic development was thus the prior condition to social stability, if not to social cohesion

### **Effects upon the University.**

Placing the emphasis upon the market as the prime condition of social coherence has had weighty consequences indeed for the European university – as the unprecedented 20 years saga that lies behind us of reform in purpose, administration, governance, authority, financing and intake capacity all bear witness. This is not to say that the place of the university is any the less central to society. Indeed, the very idea of a Knowledge Economy and within it, the strategic place of higher learning, affords it even greater significance as the prime supplier of trained Human capital and capital expressed through ideas and innovation. (Kogan, forthcoming) Even so, the university occupies a very different siting precisely because social cohesion is held to be conditional upon the economy rather than the other way round.

Our tendency in the area of policy research in higher education has been both to conceive and to analyse these reforms individually and separately. Each is, after all, a highly complex affair. There is, however, an excellent case to be made for trying to weld them into a whole and to re-contextualise them within the framework of the consequences they have for the notion of social cohesion. The first thing to note is that inverting the relationship between the economy and social cohesion places the latter as a sub set of a particular ideology that is variously described as ‘Economic Liberalism’ or in certain quarters, ‘Ultra-Liberalism’ which has a certain kinship with supply-side economic theory. It is the guiding Mantra behind the process of Globalisation. (Marginson, 2004)

### **Setting Neo Liberalism in context.**

The interpretations that may be placed upon this ideology are many. For its adepts, the market provides the freedom for individual initiative and as such, a necessary corrective to the restraining influence of the State. Individual freedom and enterprise, thus liberated, drive the economy forward, create jobs, satisfy consumers and contribute to the wealth of individuals inside the Nation – or more accurately described, inside the ‘common wealth’. (Neave, 2003) The central credos of neo liberalism turn around individual performance, efficiency and above all competition which, aggregated up, ensure national prosperity. It is, in its essence, a doctrine derived from the notion of possessive individualism (Macpherson, 1962; Neave, 2002) Placed in an organisational setting, its institutional form of reference is the business enterprise and the world of corporate – in the American sense of the term – practice.

There are two features well worth the noting that accompany the permeation of this doctrine into society. This first is that the Nation-State itself assumes the status of the local context and very particularly so in the case of multi-national firms. But the firm does not simply exist in the Nation or across Nations. Nor is it simply the prime operant of globalisation. Neo Liberalism, since it cannot entirely eliminate the value allocating bodies without putting itself in danger, in effect adds one more to those that, in an earlier age, operated within the Nation State. It adds The Firm. (for this see above, pp. ) If one wishes evidence for this statement, one has only to consider how far reform of higher education turns to ‘business practice’ as the yardstick of its successful modernisation. And whilst practices are not always the same thing as ‘values’, nevertheless the influence of what is held to be ‘good business practice’ exercises upon universities – whether entrepreneurial (Clark, 1998) or innovating -

suggests that institutional centrality of the firm, which characterizes neo liberalism in its relationship to society, is indeed every bit as comparable in its pervasiveness and its norm-shaping power to the earlier bodies of value allocation. Indeed, business efficiency becomes a value in itself

### **Farewell to a Nineteenth Century Vision of Social Cohesion.**

There is, however, a second difference and it, too, has direct bearing upon the notion of social cohesion just as it does in the relationship of higher education to social cohesion. The relationship of a firm with other enterprises may carry obligations. But in essence, it is contractual, formal, written and based on a utilitarian notion of securing services, advantages or advancing opportunities – most of which are time specific and conditional – that is, there are objectives to be attained as part of the exchange, the attainment of which determines the fulfilment of the contract. And indeed, it is precisely this type of contractual, targeted and conditional relationship that now governs the ties between higher education and the public. Higher Education is no longer perceived in terms of collective identity, as a repository and as hander down of the national genius or, for that matter as the crowning example of national unity, all of which are forms of cohesion expressed through notions of continuity and commonality pursued across generations.

One can, of course, point out that this nineteenth century vision of the university had already been severely mangled in the heady days of May 1968 and its aftermath that spread across Western Europe. Very certainly, the advent of participant democracy, of group interests inside the groves of Academe, (de Groof, Neave & Svec, 1998) antedated the arrival of Neo-Liberalism and the advent of ‘new public management’. (Pollitt, 1992) Nor is it out of place to note that even the welfare state model of social cohesion defined and measured how far the university had met its mission of social cohesion in terms of groups defined by social background or relative disadvantage. If anything, the drive into higher education from the mid Eighties through to the mid Nineties, put a final touch to the fragmentation of the student estate, extending its range of ambition. Most significant of all, it brought to an end the concept of students as part of an organic collective order – the Student Estate as opposed to the Academic Estate. In keeping with the tenets of Neo-Liberalism, student status was brought within the canons of the new theology and individualised as ‘consumers’.

### **Towards the Stakeholder Society.**

Though few systems have, I would suggest, gone as far down the path as Britain in shaping higher education as a ‘consumer service’, that the student qua consumer is today a common-place, is much more than a shift in analogy and symbolism. The shift from collective ‘Student Estate’ to individual ‘consumer’ is itself a very sensitive pointer to some of the basic changes taking place in the concept of social cohesion within higher education. What separates the ‘student qua consumer’ from the student as member of a one-time privileged order is not just that the notion of privilege has disappeared and with it the sense of obligation to public service that implicitly accompanied student funding under the welfare state. It is the shift towards the individual assuming responsibility for investment in himself. As enrolment fees are introduced across Europe and repayable loans replace grants or indirect subsidy, so the cohesion symbolised by inter-generational investment transmutes into an instrumentality to spur on at one and the same time individual

competition and individual accommodation to rapid economic change. And with it also changes the notion of the State both in its relations with higher education and, for that matter, vis a vis the individual student. For whilst one may argue that a certain element of solidarity has not entirely vanished and is visible in the form of publicly provided loans, they constitute very much a short term conditional solidarity. Student funding systems become stakeholders in the student, just as students in turn, for the period of their studies, become stakeholders in the university: the former for the repayment of the loans, the latter for that training which will furnish him – or her – with the operational skills to ensure ‘employability’ and thus permit the repayment of that loan. Seen from this angle, loans are not so much an act of solidarity – though means-testing permits a nicer rationing of the amount of solidarity to be afforded – so much as a lien upon the individual and as a spur for the individual to be ‘performing’ if the debt is rapidly to be discharged.

The individualisation of student status, the fragmentation and diversity in ability and social origin have radical consequences for the university. Whilst the notion of the ‘Stakeholder University’ is more evident in English speaking systems – Australia, Britain and the United States – certain dimensions of the Stakeholder university are becoming generic to the university in the post-modern world. The first of these features is the re-siting of the university as an expression of national culture and casting it as a service and training institution the purpose of which is predominantly defined in terms of serving one particular interest within the Nation, namely the Firm and the development of one over-riding priority – the embedding of entrepreneurial culture as its central referent.

### **Resocialising the University.**

There are many pointers to this re-alignment, both in the terms some establishments use to distinguish themselves from the historic university and in terms of the skills which they claim to engender amongst their students. Evidence of the former emerges, of course, in such self-descriptions by individual universities as ‘Entrepreneurial’ ‘Responsive’ ‘Innovating or Service. (Neave, 2004). From a European perspective, such descriptors are as good a pointer to the detachment of the university from public service as ever one might wish. They also point to an amazing reduction in its central purpose, which, if more precise and for that reason more capable of being operationalised, is but the servicing of one interest in society. Such descriptors thus stand as a fundamental re-alignment in the dialectical relationship between higher education and society which calls for the university to adapt to external change – a far cry from its civilising mission within the Nation State that once it had.

The second feature is rather more subtle. It involves an equally marked shift in what may be seen as the university’s role in socialisation. This has narrowed from the broader definition in terms of broad social obligation, professional skills and ethics to concentrate on the technical and operational skills and attitudes that accompany performance in the private sector – to wit, the much quoted trilogy of flexibility, adaptability and performance. Certainly, few systems have gone so far as the United Kingdom which, in the mid Nineties, sought to inject an ‘enterprise culture’ into academe in the shape of the so-called ‘Enterprise Initiative’ project. By the same token, few establishments of higher education in Europe will deny their engagement

to this new and more focused edition of socialisation presented under the guise of 'professionalisation'.

There remains, however, a third dimension which we have touched upon briefly earlier. (see above p.5) This is the pace of change itself. That higher education has entered a phase where, if the growing literature on the matter is to be believed, change is held to be continuous as new occupations are created – above all in the area of Information and Computer Technology. This is why such a premium is placed upon responsiveness in institutions, adaptability amongst their students and flexibility in both.

Taken together, these three features of the contemporary university, pose a number of very crucial questions above the viability of the cohesion they appear to endorse. The first of these is whether the transformation of the university into a university of interests is not itself a dissolvant of collective solidarity. This is not to say that conflict of interests is absent from academia and that all is sweetness and light. Even so, the individualisation of student status, the notion that the purpose of the university is to optimise individual choice as a means for the individual to ensure his own 'employability' - which is light years away from the notion of 'employment' – pose another highly uncomfortable question. That question is whether the university may be said to be symbolic of any kind of unity – regional, national or for that matter, European – let alone of solidarity and cohesion. That the governing ethic of the contemporary university is one of competition serves merely to underline the issue.

### **The Ambiguous Nature of Competition.**

Competition may indeed secure brilliant students and lavish sources of revenue. But it cannot, by definition, do so for all. Indeed, depending on the prosperity – and perceived self- interest - of the private sector, so those that benefit will be more or fewer. In all cases, they will be a minority in the national – or regional -provision. Competition discriminates – in the original meaning of the word. Or, to revert to the jargon of our trade, it differentiates. Just as the massification of higher education posed the issue of public service versus private advantage, so the drive towards universal higher education – which thirty years ago Martin Trow set at a 40 percent enrolment rate for the appropriate age group (OECD, 1974) - raises another highly delicate problem – namely, that of exclusion. And many systems of higher education in Europe have already gone beyond the threshold of 'universal' higher education - with France in the lead as it was in passing the tipping point to mass higher education in the early Seventies.

Exclusion takes two forms, the first best expressed in the jingle penned by the English Victorian librettist W.S. Gilbert, in *Iolanthe* a delightfully light operette :

'When Every one is somebodee,  
Then no one's anybody.'

### **Universal Higher Education and Marginalisation.**

Certainly, advantages – and very substantial ones at that – are still to be had by participating in higher education : lower unemployment rates and, increasingly, the opportunity to place oneself in the European or global labour market. But, by the

same token, as more drive into higher education, so the penalties for those who do not, increase. Whilst the problem of downward substitution – that is, those better qualified replace those less qualified in jobs once identified with the latter, an outcome of the diploma spiral – may not be as great as many feared (Teichler, 1998 check) But the perception that this process stands in the wings is most assuredly present and with it the very real possibility that, even if the university does not generate exclusion through its graduates replacing secondary school leavers in the central labour market, thereby forcing the latter into the peripheral labour market, the belief that it does, is present, powerful and highly detrimental to the public image of the university. There is, I would suggest, no greater threat to higher education than for it to be seen wholly and exclusively as a competitive arena, above all by those who, for one reason or another, cannot – or will not – come in from the cold. And whilst it may be argued that compensatory opportunities are present in the form of life-long education and training, one cannot ignore the fact that for the most part, those who take up these opportunities are largely those who have already been hearty consumers of higher education. As the proverb suggests, appetite comes with eating !

### **Envoi.**

The real question Bologna poses and which constructing the European Higher Education Area begs is not whether we have a social dimension to either, though it should perhaps be pointed out that Bologna's phasing and strategy follow the Neo-Liberal model of mobilising for social change, namely by concentrating primarily on the economic dimension and bringing in the social dimension as a follow up. The key issue is, on the contrary, how far in advancing both a balance may be struck between the principles of individual opportunity and those of collective advantage. From the standpoint of political philosophy, this is a very old dilemma and one which, when extended beyond Europe, is no less evident in the relationship Europe seeks to have with the rest of the world. It is also explicit in the narrower terms of 'social cohesion' as it applies to the different modes of financing those who study abroad. As I have argued, this particular instance is one manifestation of a broader and deeper-seated dilemma.

In truth, the dilemma that confronts both Bologna and the Higher Education Area is how to reconcile Adam Smith with Thomas Hobbes, the Sage of Malmesbury and the author in the mid 17th century of *Leviathan*, that paen in justification of a strong, regulatory State. Each in his way was concerned with the place of competition in the social construct. For Smith, competition was the driving force of human society and individual initiative. For Hobbes, competition was most certainly an innate human trait. It was not, however, positive. (Oakshott, 1972) On the contrary, competition was the brutish comportment of man in the state of Nature, prior to the social contract, when 'Every man's hand was turned against his neighbour.' And where the lot of Mankind was 'poor, solitary, nasty, brutish and short.' For Hobbes, in competition lay the heart of mayhem and civil strife. These two contrary imaginings extend to the place of the State as a very real restraint upon individual adventurousness in the case of the father of Economics or as a restraint upon the bestial excesses of Man's otherwise natural instincts in the case Hobbes as advocate for the rule of *Leviathan*.

That competition can be subject to so different interpretations is, I would suggest, quintessential to the current quandry in which we find ourselves when constructing the European Higher Education Area. We are confronted with the same dilemma about the degree of solidarity that forms the base on which social cohesion in its deepest sense, reposes. Yet very precisely, this dilemma is in-built to the Bologna Declaration itself. It emerges in the notion that relations between systems of higher education inside the European Union are to rest on the principle of cooperation and that competition – in the form of our civilised attractiveness - shall shape our dealings with the world at large. (van der Wende, 2001) As a statement of intent, it is a fine and splendid thing. We agree to reserve Adam Smith, like strong medicine, for ‘external use only’. And we hope that Thomas Hobbes will serve us well on the home front, though even there is every sign that, reviewing the social contract requires a slight shrinkage in the power of Leviathan the better to harness some of the raw energies found in the State of Nature. Others believe they are also to be found in The Boardroom

The European dilemma is how far the gospel according to Adam Smith should be seen as “the way, the truth and the life”, just as it is how far we see it desirable to abandon Leviathan and with it the social cohesion Leviathan regulated and shaped – in higher education, not least. The problem can be stated conversely, of course. How far is Europe prepared to accept a possible further weakening of social cohesion by utterly embracing the unpredictable acts of Mr Smith’s more ardent pupils who in their organised expression may just as well be presented as an alternative Leviathan but dressed in corporate clothing ?

These are delicate issues for whilst their resolution lies at the heart of building the European Higher Education Area, they also re-shape the social and institutional fabric in general. Yet, if Europe is to generate any citizen cohesion – apart from that expressed in the domains administrative, legislative and formalistic- it is important to ensure that interests external to Europe do not confine the European identity to that construction from which we are just emerging, namely a ‘Common Market’, populated not by citizens but by consumers. That is the crux of the matter when we enter globalisation into our calculus. Yet, the translation of consumers to citizens depends precisely on creating a sense of solidarity. Whether that sense of solidarity without which social cohesion remains a technocratic code word, is to permeate from above or grow up from below is very certainly a task that deserves our engagement, if only to find ways by which Mr Smith and Mr Hobbes may be reconciled.

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