UN DP

EVALUATION OF
RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AT UNDP

ACHIEVING
RESULTS

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EVALUATION OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN UNDP

FOREWORD

This report presents the assessment of an independent evaluation conducted by the UNDP Evaluation Office of the adoption of results-based management as an approach. Results-based management was introduced in UNDP in 1999 and considerable experience has been gained by the organization since its introduction. The Executive Board, recognizing the need to take stock and build on this experience, approved in its annual session in 2006 the inclusion of this evaluation in the Evaluation Office's work plan.

The main purpose of this evaluation is to examine the degree to which results-based management has fostered a results culture within the organization, enhanced capacity to make better management decisions, and strengthened UNDP's contribution to development results. The intent of this study is not to assess whether results-based management systems are in place in UNDP, as compliance on management systems is reviewed by audit. This evaluation was careful not to duplicate the extensive studies and reviews of results-based management in UNDP carried out both by the organization and by partners. The study did not, therefore, focus on how results-based management systems are used in reporting on UNDP's performance to the Executive Board or on the quality of the results frameworks used or indicators selected. The core analysis of the evaluation is directed at how results-based management has been used to enhance UNDP's contribution to development effectiveness.

The scope of the evaluation extended to all geographic regions, covering country, regional, global and corporate levels of programming and organizational work. UNDP's experience in results-based management from 1999 to the present was covered. Evidence for the assessment was drawn from case studies in five countries (Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Moldova and Zambia), interviews and focus-group discussions in UNDP headquarters in New York, an electronic survey of programme staff in country offices in all regions to which there were 365 responses, and a desk review of related evaluative literature.

UNDP was among the earliest UN organizations to introduce results-based management and the evaluation finds that its experience has not diverged significantly from that of other public-sector agencies. There are however, some specific challenges that UNDP faces. The evaluation concludes that UNDP is largely managing for outputs rather than outcomes and that the linkages between outputs and intended outcomes are not clearly articulated. The introduction of corporate systems and tools, which have had some efficiency benefits, have not, however, strengthened the culture of results in the organization or improved programmatic focus at the country level. The current approach of defining and reporting against centrally defined outcomes tends to undermine UNDP's responsiveness and alignment to nationally defined outcomes and priorities.

The evaluation makes a number of recommendations to address these and other challenges. There are important recommendations relating to developing a culture of results at all levels through strong leadership, changes in incentives, investment in capacity, streamlining systems, and investing in and responding to performance audit and evaluation. Stronger oversight by the regional bureaux is recommended, moving from the current emphasis on process compliance to a substantive engagement with country offices on the content of country programmes and their contribution to development results. The evaluation recommends a shift to a lighter corporate results framework in the Strategic Plan that provides clear 'boundaries' regarding priority areas defined by the Executive Board while allowing and enabling country offices to define development outcomes with national partners in line with national priorities

as identified in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

We are very grateful to the Executive Board members, governments and civil society representatives in the case-study countries who were very generous with their time and ideas. I would like to express our particular gratitude to all the resident representatives, UNDP staff and members of the UN country teams in the countries visited by the team, as well as the colleagues in New York who provided vital feedback to the team to enable them to reach their conclusions.

The report is the result of the dedication and intense team work of a number of people. The Evaluation Office is deeply grateful to the team that prepared the report. The team leader, Derek Poate, developed the methodology for the evaluation and led the drafting of the report. Other members of the team were Paul Balogun, Munhamo Chisvo and Robert Lahey, each of whom participated in one or more case-study missions and contributed to the evolution of the main report. The team benefited from the involvement of John Mayne who has extensively studied results-based management in the UN system. The case studies were strengthened by the work of national experts including Arcadie Barbăroşie (Moldova), Seheir Kansouh-Habib (Egypt), Farsidah Lubis (Indonesia), Kenneth Mwansa (Zambia) and Oscar Yujnovsky (Argentina).

The Evaluation Office invited independent experts to join an advisory panel for the evaluation. The members of the panel were Sulley Gariba (former President of the International Development Evaluation Association and Head of the Institute for Policy Alternatives, Ghana), Peter Van der Knaap (Director of Policy Evaluation, Netherlands Court of Audit), Jehan Raheem (former Director of the UNDP Evaluation Office and Professor at Brandeis University, United States) and Odetta R. Ramsingh (Director-General of the Public Service Commission, South Africa). The final report benefited from the comments and suggestions of the advisory panel.

The evaluation was ably task managed by Suppiramaniam Nanthikesan, Evaluation Advisor, in our office. Other colleagues in the office made important contributions to the report including Evaluation Advisor Oscar Garcia, Michelle Sy who handled administrative support, and Anish Pradhan who provided information technology support to the electronic survey and to the publication process. Research support was provided by Elizabeth K. Lang and Nayma Qayum.

As the report points out, results-based management is a journey not a destination and results-based management is just one piece in the complex set of efforts directed at achieving intended results. I hope that this evaluation will be useful in helping UNDP chart a course in this journey to manage better for results that enhance development effectiveness in the countries where UNDP works.

Saraswathi Menon
Director, Evaluation Office

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATLAS   UNDP's enterprise resource planning programme

BDP   Bureau for Development Policy

CCA   Common Country Assessment

CCF   Country Cooperation Framework

CPAP   Country Programme Action Plan

CPD   Country Programme Document

M&E   Monitoring and Evaluation

MDG   Millennium Development Goal

MfDR   Managing for Development Results

MYFF   Multi-year Funding Framework

NHDR   National Human Development Report

OECD-DAC   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-
               Development Assistance Committee

OSG   Operations Support Group

PRINCE 2   Projects in Controlled Environments
               (a process-based method for effective project management)

RBA   Regional Bureau for Africa

RBAP   Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific

RBEC   Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS

RBLAC   Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean

RCA   Results and Competency Assessment

ROAR   Results-oriented Annual Report

RSC   Regional Support Centre

SURF   Sub-regional Facility

UNCT   UN Country Team

UNCDF   UN Capital Development Fund

UNDAF   UN Development Assistance Framework

UNFPA   UN Population Fund

UNIFEM   UN Development Fund for Women

UNV   UN Volunteers

VDA   Virtual Development Academy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This report sets out the findings of an evaluation of the adoption and use of results-based management. The evaluation has focused on the organizational strategy, vision and expectations of the results-based management approach; the design, implementation and use of the system to operationalize this approach; as well as the results of this effort. The scope of the study covers the period 1999-2006, all geographic regions, and the adoption of results-based management at the programme, country, regional and corporate levels.

An inception report prepared by the evaluation team proposed a theory-based methodology. The theory identifies a causal process with five key elements. This five-stage process provides the structure for enquiries:

- Setting a strategic framework to describe the desired results

- Developing programmes aligned to the strategic results framework

- Measurement and analysis of the actual results achieved

- Use of information to improve design and delivery of programmes

- Reporting on performance as part of the accountability process

Information was gathered through interviews with staff in UNDP and other United Nations organizations at headquarters; review of UNDP documentation and that of other organizations; visits to five country programmes (in Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Moldova and Zambia), where interviews were held with a wide range of stakeholders in the United Nations system, government, civil society and other development partners; and through an electronic survey of UNDP staff in country offices. The choice of countries did not include conflict-affected situations, a specification in the original terms of reference, and this limits the ability to generalize, in the conclusions and recommendations, about the use and impact of results-based management in those contexts. A full list of people consulted in all locations is presented in the report.

THE EVOLVING DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

The 1990s marked a shift from aid flows being determined by geopolitical considerations to having a focus on the promotion of sustainable human development. That shift was accompanied by a steady decline in official development assistance and increasing pressure to demonstrate the effectiveness of aid. UNDP adopted results-based management with the clear intent of reversing the declining resource base, assuring predictability of programme funding and demonstrating a performance focus to donors.

Since then, the role of UNDP has changed from mainly funding and implementing downstream activities to emphasizing upstream activities involving advocacy, policy support and capacity strengthening, using national execution as the predominant mode of delivering assistance. This has been reinforced by the changing environment for development cooperation. The increasing need for country-based joint assistance strategies, as was emphasized by the Paris Declaration, has led to new aid modalities, such as direct budget support and sector-wide approaches. The decline in resources has been overcome, and programmatic services delivered by UNDP increased from $2 billion in 1999 to $4.36 billion in 2005.

INTRODUCTION OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

For results-based management to be successful, organizations need to develop and nurture a culture of results where enquiry, evidence and

learning are valued as essential to good management. The use of results information in managing and informing decision-making is usually seen as the main aim of introducing results-based management. Managers are expected to: understand why projects and other activities contribute to the outcomes sought—the theory of change, set meaningful performance expectations, measure and analyze results, learn from this evidence to adjust delivery and modify or confirm programme design, and report on the performance achieved against expectations. When results-based management was introduced in UNDP, it was seen as involving all the features previously listed, and the importance of building a 'culture of results' was recognized.

In many respects, results-based management was a logical continuation of management reforms from the 1990s. A large number of tools and systems within UNDP are now associated with results-based management, but these emerged without a guiding design over a 10-year period of innovation, redesign and change, which has at times been unsettling for country office staff.

Results-based management is not without its critics. In trying to set clear, concrete objectives and targets, political scientists argue that results-based management can conflict with the need to keep objectives sufficiently imprecise to gain widespread support. Another criticism is that many of the developmental results sought by UNDP cannot easily be measured. As a result, results-based management forces measurement and reporting of less important results, especially outputs. When an organization overemphasizes any set of performance indicators and targets, the staff tend to become preoccupied with those indicators and targets rather than the wider results.

It is important to take these concerns into account when developing and, especially, managing the results-based management regime.

GOALS AND PROGRAMME FOCUS

One of the most visible elements of the results-based management approach was the adoption of multi-year funding frameworks (MYFFs), which have strategic goals designed to help focus the programme and improve communication with external stakeholders. Alignment of country programmes with strategic goals was further promoted by a shift in focus from project outputs to outcomes. In a parallel initiative, a series of Administrator's business plans introduced plans to change the culture of the organization and put forward the 'balanced scorecard' as a tool to report against a broad range of physical and financial indicators of operational change.

This evaluation has found that the goals of UNDP in the strategic frameworks have changed in presentation, but the underlying areas of work have remained almost the same as before. The focus areas under the goals have been rationalized and simplified, but it is hard to identify substantive change to the scope of activities at the country level. Managers and staff in country offices believe that the MYFFs have helped to bring focus and improve positioning and advocacy. They have been a positive tool in conjunction with the reformed United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and country programme document to foster dialogue about country results. However, their effect on country portfolios has been limited to encouraging the removal of 'outlier' activities. Projects have just been mapped to the new frameworks.

The reasons for these limited effects are several. The MYFF sub-goals and service lines were very general and were not implemented with strictly monitored 'hard boundary' rules about what could and could not be justified under them. Intended outcomes for country programmes also tended to be vague, rather than rigorous statements forcing consideration of what projects would best contribute to their achievement. In other words, outcomes were defined to cover the existing portfolio rather than drive decisions as to how the portfolio should be refined and developed.

Results-based management assumes that managers have the flexibility to allocate programme resources to maximize results. That assumption does not generally hold true for UNDP. Core

programme resources, the one area where managers have some financial flexibility, may have increased during the evaluation period, but core programme resources have become a progressively smaller percentage of total programme funds. Country offices have thus become more dependent on non-core programme financing, which is relatively inflexible, and often find that the core programme resources are only sufficient to act as seed money.

Flexibility to change country office organizational structures has the potential to foster closer linkages to results. Development and investment in thematic practice areas was intended to foster skills. Twenty-five offices have appointed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialists and 10 have an M&E unit. There is evidence that country offices organize their staff for delivery of results, with many structuring programme staff teams around broad programme areas. The Results and Competency Assessment for staff has the potential to foster a results and accountability culture. But in practice, mobilization of resources and delivery are more powerful drivers of individual performance among programme staff than achievement of outcome level results. In its current modality, the Results and Competency Assessment does not support managing for results.

MONITORING AND ADJUSTMENT

The results-oriented annual report was introduced to monitor country programmes, but it has become primarily a tool for reporting to senior management—of little use for country office or regional management—and is viewed as the data source for the annual MYFF report to the Executive Board. That report, in turn, is criticized by Board members as being too vague and containing little substantive detail on results. With the advent of results-based management, the focus of results shifted to outcomes, but apart from the results-oriented annual report, no specific tools were developed to help monitor results. The ATLAS system is steadily gaining in importance, but its primary focus is financial management and project monitoring.

The removal, in 2002, of many mandatory project monitoring tools and procedures was considered a risk, but it was done in the hope that country offices would continue with project monitoring as well as moving into outcome-level monitoring. The evidence suggests that the move may have led to a decline in project-level M&E capacity in some country offices, but it has stimulated the creation of diverse M&E approaches in others—especially where there is a staff member dedicated to M&E. While some progress has been made in country offices towards monitoring outcomes, approaches fail to explain how projects are contributing to programme outcomes.

Evidence from countries visited also shows that country offices face challenges in defining outcomes that are owned by other partners, although the UNDAF/country programme document/country programme action plan process is a help, as are joint assistance strategies. This reflects the reality that many partner governments and donors have their own M&E systems, which may or may not use results-based management. The clearest indicator of this is the absence of joint outcome evaluations and the limited use by UNDP of M&E evidence derived from other systems of partners.

The oversight and management roles of the regional bureaux do not focus on results. Formal points of interaction with country offices are concentrated in the development of new country programmes, but the interaction focuses on process conformity rather than on substance. Thereafter, the engagement is generally driven by resource mobilization and delivery. Routine interaction between country offices and the respective bureaux takes place through desk officers in the regional bureaux, who are an important link in understanding country performance but are overworked, junior in status, and often lack resources and technical skills.

In order to address shortcomings in the results-oriented annual report, the regional bureaux have approached information management in different ways, often drawing on the new

information tools. But the quantitative information in ATLAS and other tools is not accompanied by qualitative information that explains performance. Some regional bureaux argue that the shift in focus to outcomes has not been matched by M&E tools to measure performance. The current system is dominated by self-reporting through the results-oriented annual report and the Results and Competency Assessment, without adequate mechanisms for periodic validations of quality.

Overall, the evaluation finds that there is little evidence to indicate that results are being used systematically to inform adjustments to the country portfolios.

EVALUATION, LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The adoption of results-based management in 1999 was followed, in 2002, by the introduction of outcome-level evaluations. Adoption of outcome-level evaluations in the countries visited has been slow. In general, they have been underbudgeted and poorly timed to influence the content of country programme documents. Independent evaluation is an important element of results-based management to validate performance. Yet country evaluations conducted by the UNDP Evaluation Office have emphasized learning over accountability and have not measured performance against stated intentions. Validation occurs only through infrequent audits. However, the role of evaluation was strengthened in 2006, when the Executive Board endorsed a new evaluation policy.

Little use is made of results for the purpose of learning at the country level, and staff would like to see more time allocated to this process. At UNDP headquarters, the Bureau for Development Policy's (BDP) practice architecture is used for technical support, but this architecture has poor linkages to build on lessons emerging from evaluations and has produced few products clearly tailored to business processes.

The UNDP accountability framework does not support results-based management. Roles and responsibilities are generally clear, but country programme outcomes and indicators are not subject to quality assurance and there is little independent validation. Individual targets in the Results and Competency Assessment are self-selected and are often applied retrospectively and poorly linked to incentives. Despite the intended shift to managing for outcomes, individual staff remain tied to a project orientation and accountability for outputs.

There is no evidence that the Resident Representative/Country Director is held accountable for managing for outcomes, and there is considerable scepticism within UNDP over whether this is feasible, despite evidence of moves towards such an approach in sister organizations such as UNFPA.

MANAGING FOR RESULTS IN THE WIDER CONTEXT

UNDP works in a multilateral context, in which its mandate emphasizes the centrality of national ownership and the role of UNDP in building national capacity. This implies the need to work through national systems, where feasible. UNDP programmes invest significant attention in supporting national systems for tracking progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other development results. But there is little evidence of engagement with national planning and results/performance systems at the sector or the programme level.

This suggests two important things. First, UNDP has missed opportunities to harmonize with the results-based management approaches of national partner governments. This reduces the scope for national capacity development and for enhancing national ownership. Second, UNDP has not fully considered the implications of its results-based management approach on broader United Nations reform initiatives such as the Paris Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus, which emphasize closer alignment and harmonization with governments and development partners.

The shift in strategic direction and the new results framework brought early gains to the programme through a clearer expression of UNDP roles and functions. Staff have found strategic frameworks to be valuable in discussions with governments and development partners. But the goals in the results frameworks for the two MYFFs and the draft strategic plan are too broad to help UNDP focus support in areas where it has a comparative advantage. The strategic objectives have not been used to define what is and what is not appropriate for country programmes to support.

Sharpening the focus in this regard would require a change in the relationship between regional bureaux and country offices. The focus would have to shift away from oversight of processes and resources, to a greater emphasis on substantive content. The low level of core funding and high reliance on non-core funds by many country programmes means that the management spotlight needs to be on the degree to which Resident Representatives manage to refocus in this situation.

In the inception report for this evaluation, a table of benchmarks based on international performance standards for results-based management was introduced as an evaluation tool. The report assesses each benchmark, drawing on the findings of the present study and relevant independent studies. Unfortunately, in their present form, it is not possible to use the benchmarks to assess the status of UNDP relative to other United Nations organizations or to the wider population of public-sector organizations that use results-based management approaches. But progress has been made in most areas. Of the 21 categories assessed, two are assessed as 'fully achieved', 16 as 'partially achieved', and three as 'not achieved'. The large number of benchmarks assessed as 'partially achieved' reflects the positive work of UNDP towards creating an architecture to manage for results, but it also reflects that too many elements of the approach are not functioning effectively.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, UNDP has established a cycle of setting and revising corporate goals, introduced improved office systems to manage project finances, institutionalized the need to report on corporate and individual performance, and raised awareness about results throughout the organization.

Conclusion 1: The experience of UNDP with introducing results-based management is similar to that of other organizations.

UNDP was one of the first United Nations organizations to move to a results-based management approach. Review of the literature strongly suggests that the experience of UNDP did not diverge significantly from that of many other public-sector organizations. The present evaluation identified a number of areas where greater progress could have been made, but even under perfect conditions, it is unlikely that UNDP could have fully institutionalized a results-based management approach within eight years. Subsequent conclusions and the recommendations therefore focus on the key challenges for UNDP.

Conclusion 2: UNDP has a weak culture of results.

Adopting results-based management was a logical continuation of the management reforms that occurred in the 1990s and a response to pressure to improve performance across the United Nations as a whole. Significant progress has been made on a number of fronts, sensitizing staff to results and creating the tools to enable a fast and efficient flow of information. Managing for results has proved harder to achieve. In particular, the strong emphasis on resource mobilization and delivery; a culture that does not support risk-taking; systems that do not provide adequate information at the country programme level; a lack of clear lines of accountability; and a lack of a staff incentive structure all work against building a strong culture of results.

Conclusion 3: The corporatist approach has had only a limited effect on development effectiveness at the country level.

UNDP adopted a systems approach to stimulate managing for results, which meant that change was to be driven by the implementation of centrally designed and prescribed systems. These were developed primarily to enable aggregate reporting of UNDP performance to the Executive Board while at the same time creating a clearer focus for the programme.

In practice, the corporate goals and service lines set by headquarters have proved too numerous, with very permissive definitions. This has led to country offices manipulating their programmes to fit into corporate service lines, diverted attention away from country needs and made reporting to the Executive Board more about process than substance. There is little evidence that this approach has significantly affected the shape of country-level programmes, but there is significant evidence that it has imposed unnecessary transaction costs at the country level. A notable omission is the lack of oversight systems that focus on tracking whether programmes use results to adjust resources such as people, money and partnerships in order to improve future results.

Conclusion 4: Results-based management has been misinterpreted as not supporting the decentralized way in which UNDP works.

UNDP works in a strongly decentralized way, yet the results frameworks in the MYFF were not geared to country processes. Emerging new systems following the reform of country programmes, including the UNDAF, the country programme document and the country programme action plan have the potential to create objectives for United Nations organizations that are aligned with national plans and responsive to country needs.

Decentralization has been accompanied by delegation of authority over the country programme. Under current procedures, country programmes are not scrutinized for development potential by regional management, an abdication of responsibility. As a result, evaluation and auditing are the only means to check that country programmes are contributing to corporate goals.

The 'top-down' approach has inadvertently fuelled concerns that having corporate goals is a means of imposing upon programmes at the country level. The role of results-based management is not to constrain the ways in which programmes are negotiated at the country level but to provide a framework, so that UNDP works within its mandate and ensures that resources are aligned with achieving results. Once programmes are agreed upon at the country level, results-based management should provide standards for dialogue about how to set realistic outcomes, select objective indicators that demonstrate progress towards development objectives, and jointly monitor progress.

Conclusion 5: Results-based management systems are not helping build a results-based culture.

There are strong perceptions within UNDP that financial administration and management systems have improved. However, there is little evidence that these systems have led to an increased focus on managing for outcomes. ATLAS and PRINCE2 both deal with information at the project level, and the project is at the core of their designs. The Results and Competency Assessment does not effectively incorporate key results that reflect successful management for results by individuals. There are also concerns that systems have become too complex and time-consuming.

Results systems have been designed mainly to meet the demand for data for reporting to the Executive Board rather than to manage outcomes. Yet UNDP has not developed a system for reporting on its contribution towards development results. This reflects a number of issues. The corporate-level results frameworks have never included high-level goals with substantive measurable and agreed-upon indicators against which to assess global progress. The

goal-level reporting by UNDP contrasts starkly with the objectivity of reporting against the Millennium Development Goals. UNDP has developed a reporting system that aggregates whether or not results will be delivered when expected. This approach has limitations: the country programme outcomes against which UNDP is expected to deliver are poorly defined; the logic linking outputs delivered by UNDP with achievement of the outcomes is often not explained; and therefore, this reporting system fails to report on UNDP performance relative to what it is accountable for.

Conclusion 6: Managing for results requires leadership.

The importance of leadership to drive results-based management forward has been noted in several parts of the present report. A good example of effective leadership was the role of the previous Administrator in fighting declining resources. A strong personal commitment was supported by: a single, simple and consistent message on resource mobilization that was communicated to both internal and external audiences; development of systems to track, measure and report managers' success in mobilizing resources; and a clear perceived link between successful resource mobilization and advancement within the organization.

The same drive and visible, consistent senior-level support is needed for results-based management. Four relationships stand out as the most critical: at the Executive Board, to ensure the programme is held to account for development results; between the Administrator or Associate Administrator and the Bureau Directors; between Directors of Regional Bureaux and Resident Representatives or Country Directors; and between Resident Representatives or Country Directors and staff within country offices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Managing for results is a dynamic process, and many of the issues raised in this report are known

to UNDP management and are receiving attention. There is genuine interest and support at the country level for a better focus on results.

Recommendation 1: Strengthen leadership and direction.

The first and overarching recommendation addresses the need to capitalize on what has been achieved to date and establish a stronger culture of results. The success of this is not dependent upon tools and systems, but leadership and direction. Sustained commitment by top management, the Administrator and the Associate Administrator is required.

Strong leadership is necessary. Attention to the following issues is also needed: a shift in the accountability framework from process and compliance to results; outspoken commitment by senior management, especially the Directors of Regional Bureaux; a change in dialogue throughout the organization that prioritizes management for development results and addresses how this will be balanced against competing demands such as resource mobilization; time and space for staff to give feedback on and learn from experiences; a shift in organizational practices to take risks and manage for outcomes rather than outputs; and improved capacity to measure results.

Recommendation 2: Global goals, local solutions—Sharpen the role of the strategic results framework.

Management should adopt a results framework that distinguishes more clearly between corporate goals and country programme outcomes.

For the four UNDP focus areas, objectives should be based on the key results areas, with indicators of substantive development change comparable to those used for the Millennium Development Goals. The corporate key results areas contain the basis of what could be measurable goal-level objectives, for example: promoting inclusive growth; promoting gender equality; fostering

inclusive participation (in governance); and empowering the poor, women and youth. This approach will take time. The Executive Board and UNDP should start with those key results areas where internationally agreed-upon indicators already exist.

Identifying and reporting on UNDP contributions should not be an obstacle, any more than it is for organizations reporting country progress against the Millennium Development Goals. The development of robust models that show the links between country programme outcomes and UNDP contributions with achievement of these high-level objectives is key.

The current practice of setting corporate outcome-level objectives and indicators within the strategic plan should end. Instead, outcome objectives and indicators should be set at the country programme level, where they should be linked to UNDAF outcome objectives in the context of agreed-upon national development objectives. Comparable outcome objectives should be set within the regional and global programmes.

The above change would reinforce the decentralized nature of UNDP activities and build on United Nations reforms. The change would have to be supported by a shift in the oversight roles of the regional bureaux, senior management and the Executive Board away from compliance with procedures towards ensuring that country programmes implement robust, results-based management approaches and are designed to contribute to the UNDP focus areas.

Recommendation 3: Support managing for outcomes at country offices.

Managing for outcomes means that managers learn from results and empirical evidence and use that evidence to adjust either the projects under their control or the composition of the portfolio of projects to maximize the contribution of the organization to that outcome.

Implementing such an approach requires that UNDP consider the wider environment at the country level when defining outcomes. There is a need for improved guidance on how to balance demands on the results-based management system to meet internal UNDP needs with those imposed by the wider environment within which UNDP operates at the programmatic level. This includes dealing with three core issues raised in this report:

- Ownership of results at the country level

- The implications of harmonizing other partners' results-based management approaches and systems

- UNDP accountability for managing for results

The positive effects of some of the newly developed UNDP systems are noted above, with the caution that they are based predominantly on managing projects. Introduction of new management and reporting systems will impose significant costs on country programme teams, and the country-level perception is that there has been insufficient appreciation at the corporate level of the impact of these costs.

Country offices want to be effective and need support in several ways:

- A streamlining of systems, aiming for a more user-friendly integrated approach with better prioritization and introduction of new requirements across the organization

- Improved practical tools and guidelines to plan how projects will contribute to programme outcomes and to improve the specification of indicators

- A large-scale capacity-development programme to improve staff knowledge and skills

- Improved design of programmes based on proven models of intervention that can be tailored to country circumstances, managed, monitored and evaluated

- Introduction of quality assurance to examine country programmes and assess evaluability

- Expanded use of country office outcome evaluation plans geared to joint evaluations with government and development partners

- Revision of the results-oriented annual report to improve the evidence-base and structure of the report

Recommendation 4: Expand investment and use of evaluation and performance audit.

Improving country programmes requires attention to detail and development of sound objectives and indicators. A quality assurance process is recommended as an ex ante way of scrutinizing country programmes. This needs to be supported by independent review of processes and compliance, along the lines of the current enhanced audits.

The structure of results proposed here places more responsibility on country offices to develop programmes that respond to country needs and contribute towards global goals. It also frees them from having to fit into centrally determined service lines. The test, therefore, is whether the programmes that are developed contribute to the goals of UNDP. This will require a stronger evaluation function that addresses both learning and accountability. The 2006 evaluation policy is a step in the right direction. The challenge now is implementation that supports accountability and the new results management guidance.

The above recommendations are intended to be mutually reinforcing and ought to be viewed as a whole. Some recommendations focus on overall framework rather than specific tools or issues. Dealing with leadership, the results framework, programme focus and accountability of the regional bureaux are the highest priority, followed by tools to help country offices chart contributions to outcomes, and quality assurance systems for programme review.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This report sets out the findings of an evaluation of the adoption and use of results-based management. UNDP adopted results-based management in 1999. There is considerable organizational interest in reviewing UNDP's experience as evidenced by the number of reviews being conducted on related issues.[1] In addition, recent evaluations conducted by the UNDP Evaluation Office have highlighted persistent issues and gaps related to the operation of results-based management systems and approaches at the country office level.

The Concept Note for the evaluation states that the evaluation will focus on the organizational strategy, vision and expectations of the results-based management approach; the design, implementation and use of the system to operationalize this approach; as well as the results of this management approach.[2] In doing so, the evaluation aims to provide feedback on UNDP's efforts to strengthen the existing results-based management practices and make forward-looking recommendations. The evaluation will not examine the tools of results-based management in any detail as these have been reviewed in other studies.

The scope of the study is quite broad. It covers the period 1999 to 2006, all geographic regions, and the adoption of results-based management at the programme, country, regional and corporate levels. In the choice of countries that were visited for this evaluation,[3] this study has assessed the results-based management approach under diverse development conditions in which UNDP functions—including countries with very high aid dependence and varying capacities for M&E. This review also takes note of any specific characteristics peculiar to the specialized funds for UN Volunteers (UNV), UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF).[4]

1.1 METHODOLOGY

An Inception Report prepared by the evaluation team proposed a theory-based methodology and data collection using three research methodologies:[5]

- A desk review of relevant secondary material

- Five case studies of countries and their regional bureaux

- Interviews with staff in headquarters and a survey of staff in all country offices to gather data on issues emerging from the desk review and pilot-country case study

The theory of change for results-based management was derived from literature on the introduction of results-based management systems and is presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.[6] It identifies a causal process with five key elements. This five-stage process provides the structure for enquiries.

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1 MSI, 'Background Paper on Results-Based Management in Development Organizations', Management Systems International, July 2006, p 6; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Assessing Results Management at UNDP', 15 June 2006; UNDP Administrator's Office, 'Management and Workflow Review—Phase I', January 2006.

2 UNDP, 'Concept Note: Evaluation of Result Based Management at UNDP', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2007. See also the Terms of reference in Annex 1.

3 Argentina, Egypt (pilot country), Indonesia, Moldova, and Zambia.

4 All three were added to the scope during the pilot country visit.

5 Poate D, Balogun P, 'Evaluation of Result Based Management at UNDP', Draft Inception Report, March 2007.

6 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles', not dated.

1. Set out a strategic framework that describes the objectives and desired results of the organization and the strategies to be used to achieve those results.

2. Develop programmes and sub-programmes in the organization aligned to the strategic results framework, showing more specifics on the results expected—resources, outputs, and

Figure 1. Theory of change for results-based management

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                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │  Managing for Results   │
                    └─────────────────────────┘

                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
        ┌──────────▶│ Set strategic goals for │
        │           │         UNDP            │
        │           └─────────────────────────┘

 Programme          ┌─────────────────────────┐
 orientation        │ Goals create a framework│
                    │ to define programmes,   │
                    │ organizational structure│
                    │ and management          │
                    │ arrangements            │
                    └─────────────────────────┘

                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │ Plan specific results to│
                    │ achieve the strategic   │
                    │ goals                   │
                    └─────────────────────────┘

 Primary            ┌─────────────────────────┐        ╱‾‾‾‾‾╲
 institutional  ───▶│ Align resources (people,│◀──────▶│External│
 effects            │ money and partnerships) │        │factors │
                    │ to achieve results      │        │and risks│
                    └─────────────────────────┘        ╲_____╱

                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │ Monitor implementation  │        ╱‾‾‾‾‾╲
                    │ for progress and        │───────▶│Organiza-│
                    │ performance             │        │tional   │
                    └─────────────────────────┘        │learning │
                                                       ╲_____╱

  ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ╱‾‾‾‾‾╲
  │Timely infor- │─▶│Knowledgeable │─▶│Decision-maker│◀▶│Institu- │
  │mation goes to│  │interpretation│  │responds      │  │tional   │
  │decision-makers│ └──────────────┘  └──────────────┘  │incentives│
  └──────────────┘                                      ╲_____╱

 Secondary          ┌─────────────────────────┐        ╱‾‾‾‾‾╲
 institutional      │ Efficient adjustment of │◀──────▶│External│
 effects            │ resources (people, money│        │factors │
                    │ and partnerships) to    │        │and risks│
                    │ achieve results         │        ╲_____╱
                    └─────────────────────────┘

        ┌──────────────────┐
        │ Evaluate strategic│◀──────
        │ goals            │
        └──────────────────┘

                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │ Improved Performance:   │
 Goal               │ organizational &        │
                    │ development             │
                    │ effectiveness           │
                    └─────────────────────────┘
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the logic, sequence and timing of outcomes expected to lead to the accomplishment of the programme objectives—and how the results are to be measured.

3. Measure and analyze results achieved and the contribution being made by the programme to the expected results through both ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluations.

4. Use the results information gathered to improve the design and delivery of programmes.

5. Report on the levels of performance achieved as part of the accountability process.

The diagram follows the key principles for results-based management at UNDP. The stages in the diagram identify key effects, starting with a clearer orientation of the programme as a whole, followed by realignment of resources towards results, efficient adjustment of resources and links with knowledge and institutional learning. An over-arching condition is having an organizational climate or culture that encourages managing for results. This issue is developed further with practical examples in Annex 6.

The implicit goal is improved performance (interpreted here as organizational effectiveness and contribution to development effectiveness). Details of the pathway by which results-based management processes that improve management decision making and stimulate development effectiveness are not clearly specified in the literature. This is methodologically challenging compared with the situation in many other agencies, since UNDP programmes are usually implemented by development partners who, in management terms, are at arm's length from UNDP and UNDP's contributions are often small in scale, and work through policy advice and advocacy, as well as money.

Evaluating results-based management systems and processes within UNDP poses two significant challenges:

■ At present, there are no internationally agreed-upon standards that define what should be

included within a results-based management system and how such components should operate in practice.

■ Initial discussions with headquarters stakeholders and review of discussion on the Practice Networks indicate that there is not a consensus within UNDP on what the results-based management system is, how it should operate and the intended effects.

The evaluation team therefore defined a set of benchmarks, drawing on three sources of performance expectations, to assess whether systems are in place and the expected processes are being used in their operation. First, the evaluation team adopted the benchmarks developed during the UN Joint Inspection Unit's review of results-based management within the United Nations in 2004. These benchmarks primarily focus on the existence and operation of relevant systems. Second, the team developed benchmarks building on material presented in the Joint Venture on Managing for Development Result's Source Book. These benchmarks, which are less precise in nature, mostly focus on assessing whether systems are applied using a sound approach. Third, the team developed additional benchmarks using the objectives set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, dealing primarily with issues such as use of country systems, alignment and harmonization. These provide a more forward-looking orientation to help ground the evaluation in the evolving context within which UNDP operates. The benchmarks are set out in Annex 9 together with findings from the evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Extensive consideration was given to the selection of case-study countries. A purposive approach was adopted, dictated by looking for cases that would provide evidence to test against the theory, rather than using a randomized sampling approach. Specific criteria that were assessed include:

■ Countries where key informants believe that the office has used results-based management approaches to some extent. All managers will

use information to make decisions, but the focus of the evaluation is on the extent to which information from the results-based management systems is used.

- Size of the UNDP programme—previous analyses and interviews with UNDP Headquarter staff confirm that the size of the programme dictates whether or not somebody will be dedicated full time within the UNDP country office to ensure the implementation and smooth functioning of the results-based management systems.

- A broad range of development context (such as high aid dependence and level of income), and taking account of audit reports on the processes followed.

- Representation across the regional bureaux, on the assumption that the management styles across the regional bureaux vary and this may have affected how results-based management has been institutionalized.

There was neither time nor enough information to select case studies that could be considered a 'representative sample' of the entire population.[7] Therefore, following case-study theory, in order to generalize from the findings of the case studies and avoid bias, the evaluation used the evaluation findings to generalize from the theory underpinning results-based management and as outlined in the Theory of Change. The unit of analysis for the case studies was the country programme and the relevant regional bureau. The final countries selected were: Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Moldova and Zambia. This selection allowed for a better understanding of how decision making is affected by results-based management across the chain of accountability within the organization. However, the evaluation did not examine results-based management in conflict-affected situations, a specification in the original terms of reference, which limits the ability to generalize in the

conclusions and recommendations about the use and impact of results-based management in such contexts.

The primary data collection methodologies used were individual interviews with stakeholders both within and outside of UNDP and the use of group exercises to elicit country office views in key issues. Annex 2 is a list of all people interviewed. This was supplemented by an analysis at headquarters of how results-based management systems were developed, how that development was coordinated with the development of other key systems (mainly the human resources, knowledge management and financial allocation and monitoring systems), and how their implementation was supported across the organization.

Additional data was collected via an electronic survey of all management and programming staff in country offices (excluding the five countries visited). The survey was similar in style to the regular global staff survey—asking respondents if they agree or disagree with a series of statements about how results-based management functions and the culture of results. A full list of the questions appears in Annex 8 together with a summary of results. The questionnaire was sent to approximately 1,700 staff; 365 replied.[8]

1.2 THE EVOLVING AID CONTEXT

In recent years within the international development community, there has been enhanced cooperation to reduce poverty and work to increase development effectiveness. The MDGs have set new standards for multilateral organizations, donors and partner countries. For at least a decade, the international community has been developing partnership approaches to development assistance, such as sector approaches and poverty reduction strategies. Some of these approaches, such as general budget

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7   Yin RK, 'Case Study Research: Design and Methods', 3rd Edition, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume 5, Sage Publications, 2003.

8   The anonymity of the survey system means that details of who did or did not reply are not known.

support, have been the subject of intense debate regarding their effectiveness. Aid effectiveness has also been a subject of increased attention over the last few years, with agreements to work towards better harmonization, alignment and results. At the same time, policy makers have tried to reach beyond development assistance to consider the impact of other policy measures and private-sector activities, especially the impact of foreign direct investment and remittances.

The 1990s saw a shift in the thinking and practice of development cooperation from aid flows being determined by national strategic considerations to a focus on the promotion of sustainable human development.[9] This shift also resulted in a steady decline in official development assistance and increasing pressure from the public in donor countries to demonstrate effectiveness of aid. In response, some bilateral organizations (led by USAID), and the public sector in some donor countries (such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand) began to adopt a results-based management approach that was widely used in the private sector. To reverse the declining resource base, assure predictability of programme funding and demonstrate performance focus to the donors, UNDP also adopted results-based management.

Since adopting this new management approach, UNDP has had to deal with both quantitative and qualitative changes affecting the aid environment, including:

- *Expanded operational capacity*—Programmatic services delivered around the globe by UNDP increased from USD 2 billion in 1999 to USD 4.36 billion in 2005.

- *The changing role of UNDP*—The organization has shifted from mainly funding and implementing downstream activities to emphasizing upstream activities involving advocacy, policy support and capacity strengthening, and adopting National Execution as a predominant mode of delivering assistance.

- *The changing environment for development cooperation*—Increasing the need for country-based joint assistance strategies as emphasized by the Paris Declaration has also led to new aid modalities, such as direct budget support and sector wide approaches. This environment reinforces the shift to upstream activities.

1.3 WHAT ENTAILS RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN UNDP?

Different organizations define results-based management in different ways, yet there is a strong common denominator among definitions. All reflect the underlying idea of learning from empirical evidence based on past experience and using that information to manage. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) Managing for Development Results Source Book[10] puts it well:

> *"Results-based management asks managers to regularly think through the extent to which their implementation activities and outputs have a reasonable probability of attaining the outcomes desired, and to make continuous adjustments as needed to ensure that outcomes are achieved."*

For results-based management to be successful, organizations need to develop and nurture a culture of results where enquiry, evidence and learning are considered essential to good management. The use of results information in managing is usually seen as the main aim of introducing results-based management. In results-based management, managers are expected to:

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9   UNDP, 'The Multi Year Funding Framework Report by the Administrator', UNDP Executive Board, DP/1999/CRP 4, January Session 1999.

10 OECD and World Bank, *Emerging Good Practice in Managing for Development Results, First Issue,* Source Book, 2006, p 9, available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/10/36853468.pdf.

- Understand why the programme and projects are believed to contribute to the outcomes sought—the theory of change.

- Set meaningful performance expectations/targets for key results (outputs and outcomes).

- Measure and analyze results and assess the contribution being made by the programme to the observed outcomes/impact.

- Deliberately learn from this evidence and analysis to adjust delivery and, periodically, modify or confirm programme design.

- Report on the performance achieved against expectations—outcomes accomplished and the contribution being made by the programme, i.e. what difference it is making.

When results-based management was introduced in UNDP, it was seen as involving all the above features, and the importance of a culture of results was well recognized. This is evident in a series of notes produced in 2000.[11] A longer treatment of these issues is given in Annex 6.

An important aspect of UNDP is the nature of working in a multilateral and decentralized setting, where work is planned and managed at the country level in response to diverse country needs yet done so within a global corporate environment that provides technical and management support. Arrangements need to be made so that planned results clearly respond to country needs yet are focused within a corporate framework that enables UNDP to add value within its areas of competence. The decision on those areas of competence is an issue for the Executive Board, not an element of the results-based management system.

The challenges in implementing results-based management in an organization are many (see Box 1).[12] Perhaps key is, as the UNDP Overview and Principles document noted,[13] the importance of emphasizing 'management and learning' over reporting and systems, in order to foster a 'culture of performance'. Developing results frameworks, measuring results and reporting results in an organization clearly will involve systems. If a culture of performance can be developed, then the main purpose of results-based management will not be lost. But without strong efforts to develop and support such a culture, the systems become the dominant feature. Senior managers

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Box 1. Results-based management is a challenge faced by other development partners

The World Bank 2006 Annual Report on Operations Evaluation reviewed progress with managing for results.[14] The report found:
- The World Bank has instituted policies and procedures to manage better for results.
- These have not yet translated into improved practices at the operational level.
- World Bank managers and operational staff struggle to link goals to operations.
- Performance indicators are often inadequate.
- Many staff are unclear about how to use performance information in their day-to-day work.
- World Bank culture acts as a disincentive to managing for results.

These findings resonate with the challenges faced by UNDP, described in this report.

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11 UNDP, 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and Principles', 2000; UNDP, 'RBM in UNDP: Technical Notes', 2000; UNDP, 'RBM: Concepts and Methodology', 2000.

12 See for example Mayne J, 'Challenges and Lessons in Implementing Results-Based Management', Evaluation, 2007, Volume 13, Issue 1, 89-107.

13 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles', p 6, available online at http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/methodology/rbm/RBM-Overview-GP.doc.

14 World Bank, 'Annual Report on Operations Evaluation', IEG, 2006. Quote from website, www.worldbank.org/IEG.

have a special role to play in fostering this climate of results through clear leadership and demonstrating that results and results management do matter. Reviews of experience with results-based management show that:

> *"Leadership support for results-based management reforms is important. Without strong advocacy from senior managers, results-based management systems are unlikely to be institutionalized broadly or effectively within an agency. Leaders can send strong messages of support for results-based management to their staff by giving speeches, sending out agency-wide notices, participating in results-based management-oriented workshops, providing adequate budgetary support, etc."* [15]

Not everyone considers results-based management a good system. Critics of using results-based management in public management point to a number of aspects of public-sector life that mitigate against a rational approach to managing. A case is often made that trying to manage by numbers in a political context is, at best, unrealistic and can be dysfunctional. In trying to set clear and concrete objectives and targets, political scientists argue that results-based management can conflict with the need to keep objectives suitably fuzzy in order to gain widespread support.

This is true to some extent, but in the end, UNDP has to make choices about funding specific programmes consistent with national priorities. Clarity in objectives can only help their design and delivery.

Other critics of results-based management argue that many of the developmental results sought by UNDP and other public-sector organizations cannot be measured. As a result, results-based management forces measurement and reporting of other less important results, especially outputs.

But many, if not most, results sought can be measured, especially if the evaluation team considers measurement in the public sector to be a means of reducing the uncertainty about what is happening, rather than definitively proving something. Flexibility in measurement approaches would allow a wide variety of means to be used to increase understanding about the performance of a programme from different perspectives.

Focusing on any set of performance indicators can distort behaviour as people work to reach targets. Arguably, this is a characteristic of the drive for resource mobilization and delivery in UNDP. While this is a real problem, there are many ways to counter this tendency, such as focusing on outcomes not outputs, reviewing measures regularly, using a balancing set of indicators, and developing indicators in an inclusive manner.

There are legitimate concerns over results-based management, and organizations should be aware of the possible downsides of implementing results-based management. More details and specific references are given in Annex 6. It is important to take these concerns into account in developing and managing the results-based management regime.

The Overview and Principle document foresaw this potential problem when it noted that "RBM [results-based management] is a learning process … evolving over a considerable period of time and incorporating flexibility to make changes as experiences are gained."[16] Results-based management is at the same time conceptually quite simple—seeking and using results information to assist management and accountability—yet a significant challenge to implement in organizations since it does require culture change and persistence. It is a journey, not a destination, requiring ongoing attention and commitment.

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15 Binnendijk A, 'Results-Based Management in the Development Cooperation Agencies: A Review of Experience', Background Report, DAC OECD Working Party on Aid Evaluation, Paris, France, 2001, p 134. Available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/1/1886527.pdf.

16 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles', p 5, available online at http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/methodology/rbm/RBM-Overview-GP.doc.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report is structured in five chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of results-based management and examines how it was introduced to UNDP and what tools and systems were developed. Chapter 3 presents the main findings from the country visits and interviews at UNDP Headquarters. Chapter 4 interprets the findings and tries to explain the progress that has been made to date. Chapter 5 includes conclusions and recommendations.

Key points

- The central feature of a results-based management system is managers using information to guide management decisions.
- UNDP documents show that the importance of change to a *culture of results* was well recognized when results-based management was introduced.

Chapter 2

RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN UNDP

2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN UNDP

The history of results-based management in UNDP can be traced to the mid 1990s. Many people in the organization see the process as a logical evolution of earlier initiatives, such as programme planning. For the purposes of this evaluation, the Administrator's Annual Report of 1997,[17] which calls for the establishment of "an overall planning and results management system in UNDP" is taken as a defining point. Box 2 highlights some characteristics of the approach to results-based management taken by specialized funds and programmes.

The Administrator's Annual Report clearly states the intention to develop plans that would "be aligned with the budget for the 1998-1999 biennium, and the organization would be able to manage results against planned goals and targets and with the appropriate resources assigned to achieve those results."[18] However, there is no single document in which the organization described how its overall approaches and systems would be changed to institutionalize a results-based management culture, or how the organization would measure the degree to which the intended changes in management practice had been achieved. The various tools and systems that comprise results-based management emerged over several years and are set out in detail in Tables 1 and 2 in Annex 5.[19] The main building blocks are summarized in Table 1.

UNDP has invested heavily in the development of new results-based management relevant systems between 1998 and 2007 and the period is characterized by a high degree of change.

Table 1. Key events in the development of results-based management	
Year	**Key Event**
1998-1999	Strategic results frameworks piloted then adopted across all country programmes
2000	First Multi-year Funding Framework (MYFF); First Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR); Balanced scorecard introduced across all country offices
2002	Revision of Results and Competency Assessment (RCA); Handbook on M&E for Results; Reorganization of Practice Areas to match the MYFF
2004	ATLAS (Enterprise Resource Planning Tool) introduced

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17 'Annual Report of the Administrator', DP/1997/16/Add.7, 1997.

18 Ibid, p 36.

19 In the survey conducted for this evaluation, staff identified the following systems to be part of results-based management: MYFF, CPAP results framework, annual work plan targets, ROAR, CO balanced scorecard, outcome evaluations, project evaluations, RCA performance targets and assessment, executive snapshot, Global Staff Survey results, partner survey results, and ATLAS.

Box 2. Managing for results in associated funds and programmes

Within the UNDP group (UNCDF, UNV and UNIFEM), organizations have responded to results-based management in differing ways. The text below reflects interviews held with the funds and a short review of documents on managing for results within their organizations.

UNCDF—A specialized fund within UNDP. For the first time, UNCDF is being incorporated in the same Strategic Plan as UNDP (for the period 2008-2011). In the recent past, UNCDF has developed a strategic view of the Fund's comparative advantage in the context of the One UN vision. This has confirmed the Fund's focus on two areas of work, namely Decentralization and Local Development and Microfinance/Inclusive Finance. There is a conscious sense of wanting to be leading reform, not catching up.

The Fund has a policy of trying to harmonize with UNDP and agree upon joint indicators and targets.[20] Internal documents and interviews suggest that the Fund is looking at value-for-money questions, such as 'What are the costs of achieving their targets?' The Fund appears to be using results information: comparing countries, looking for best practices, tracking new issues that arise, and figuring out where to invest—all examples of a results culture. A proposal to move towards supporting national programmes and sector-wide approaches as an aid modality was circulated in February 2007[21] and has influenced the formulation of outcome indicators for the Strategic Plan. The paper describes the two focal areas of the programmes in a results framework that has five core results and 15 outcomes groups. The outcomes are realistic, specific and measurable. In support of these objectives, the Fund has set out planned intervention maps that show how financial and technical support from the Fund can lead to Programme Purpose (Outcomes).

UNIFEM—The United Nations Fund for Women.[22] In 1998, UNIFEM adopted several standardized tools to put results-orientation into practice including the mandatory requirement of developing logical frameworks for all programmes, and the revision of the guidelines for periodic reporting to focus on results. Terminology is not identical to UNDP but draws on their definitions and others such as the OECD-DAC and specialist organizations including Save the Children. UNIFEM shares some characteristics with UNDP. UNIFEM's work in empowering women and promoting women's human rights means that processes or 'how things are done' can be as important as the final results of a project or programme. In addition, much of the 'soft assistance' that UNIFEM provides in terms of advocacy, policy advice/dialogue, and facilitation/brokerage of information, etc. is geared towards creating or consolidating processes that can facilitate women's empowerment.

An independent review in 2002 identified degrees of ambiguity and/or fragmentation among UNIFEM practices and policies in terms of what, when and how progress should be tracked. This led to simplification of the existing results framework, but the main change came with the 2004-2007 MYFF. The strategic results framework has just four goals and four outcomes (the outcomes cut across all four goals) that are realistic, specific and measurable. These are accompanied by a set of indicators that are to a large extent linked back to the MDGs and identify international sources such as UNAIDS and UNFPA. An evaluation of the programme was underway during fieldwork for this evaluation.

UNV—The United Nations focal point for promoting and harnessing volunteerism for effective development. UNV has possibly been more closely allied to the UNDP approach than the other two organizations. The second MYFF influenced how UNV reports results, as the annual reports to the Board structure discussion around the five goals found in the MYFF.[23] UNV has been involved in both reporting against the MYFF and developing the new strategic plan, where their main concern was to ensure that 'civic engagement' was included as one of the 'operational principles for development effectiveness.' One challenge has been that UNV cannot report against significant aspects of its work (i.e. promotion of volunteerism) because the MYFF does not cater for that as an objective.

In 2005 and 2006, UNV developed its own business model and supporting results framework, which have been aligned with the MYFF and were approved by the June 2006 UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board. They were developed in a participatory manner with staff and partners. The UNV results framework is currently designed at the corporate level and needs further work to ensure consistent understanding of the results across staff within the organization and internal coherence. The focus is now shifting to how to operationalize the framework at the business unit and project levels, which will include definition of suitable indicators and strengthening analysis of how UNV contributes to achievement of results. Major technical challenges will include the fact that UNV's contribution is mostly at the community level and therefore not ordinarily picked up by national monitoring systems and the fact that UNV volunteers work within projects administered by others, making it more difficult to identify UNV's contribution.

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20 'Proposed Partnership Framework for UNDP and UNCDF', DP/2007/11; 'Progress Report on the UNDP-UNCDF Strategic Partnership', DP/2007/34.

21 UNCDF, 'Moving to Sector-wide Approach for Decentralization and Local Development and Inclusive Finance—A Strategic Shift for UNDP and UNCDF in a Direct Budget Support Environment', 2007.

22 The work of UNIFEM is mandated through two international agreements: the Beijing Platform for Action resulting from the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Annex 5 Table 1 shows that at least one key initiative relevant to results-based management has been launched across the organization every year. Each of these initiatives has demanded that country offices do at least one of the following:

■ Participate in the design of new systems

■ Change their business processes to reflect new systems introduced

■ Change the information that is reported to corporate level on their performance

2.2 INTENDED EFFECTS ON THE ORGANIZATION

In the absence of a single statement of strategy that results-based management can be evaluated against, the approach taken here is to identify the following various themes of reform as a structure for analysis: setting strategic goals, aligning results and resources with those goals, monitoring for results, adjustment and learning, and evaluation and accountability.

2.2.1 SETTING STRATEGIC GOALS

The intended purpose for setting strategic goals has been to allow greater focusing of the programmes at the country level. This has been consistent during the past 10 years, as reflected in the quotes below from 1997 and 2007:

"To be effective, UNDP cannot attempt to do everything, even within its SHD [sustainable human development] framework. Given the diversity of national situations in programme countries, achieving focus within the framework must be accomplished primarily at the country level. While respecting the need for country-level

flexibility, broad parameters and corporate strategic objectives must be established globally to maximise the capabilities, impact and substantive accountability of the organisation as a whole."[24]

"The Strategic Plan, 2008–2011, seeks to take results-based management a step further by providing an instrument that: (a) clearly articulates UNDP priorities, objectives, targets and performance indicators; (b) creates a solid basis for internal resource allocation; and (c) sets a stronger platform for comprehensive results management. … This simplified framework will increase UNDP's focus, clarify its areas of comparative advantage, and facilitate the measurement and reporting on results. For each focus area, *UNDP will spell out its key results areas and outcomes, with a view to further strengthening alignment."*[25]

These quotes clearly recognize that the focus of programmes emanate from country-level needs, yet the instrument to implement this focus was the global strategic framework. This creates a tension between corporate and country offices, and an effective results-based management system has to balance these conflicting pressures. Annex 6 addresses this issue in more detail under a note on working in a decentralized structure.

The MYFFs, and presumably the new Strategic Plan, are also reported to have a prominent secondary role in communicating with external stakeholders, as a concise explanation of the programme. Intended uses include addressing:

■ Questions from the differing Executive Board constituencies over which goals UNDP should focus upon. For example, the

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Against Women (CEDAW), known as the women's bill of rights. The spirit of these agreements has been affirmed by the Millennium Declaration and the eight MDGs for 2015, which combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy and gender inequality, and build partnerships for development. In addition, Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is a crucial reference for UNIFEM's work in support of women in conflict and post-conflict situations.

23 UNIFEM, 'How Are We Doing? Tracking UNIFEM Progress in Achieving Results for Management and Learning', A Briefing Note, 2002; UNIFEM, 'Multi-year Funding Framework 2004-07', DP/2004/5.

24 'Annual Report of the Administrator', DP/1997/16/Add.7, 1997, p 30.

25 From 'Frequently Asked Questions about the Strategic Plan', internal guidance on UNDP intranet site concerned with development of the new Strategic Plan.

fact that the MYFFs and Strategic Plan, to some degree, reflect where the demand for UNDP services is, allows the organization to work in areas that some Executive Board members consider sensitive. The clearest example quoted has been the use of the MYFFs in supporting UNDP's increased focus in the governance area.

■ Concerns within the wider UN family over whether UNDP was moving into areas that would be better served by other organizations within the United Nations.

■ Donors' questions about the 'value added' of UNDP and, accordingly, a need to demonstrate results to donors. This was particularly important given the relative decline in UNDP funding during the 1990s and thus the need to demonstrate to donors the value of increasing their commitments to the organization.

2.2.2 ALIGNING RESULTS

Within the broad goals set within the MYFFs and the Strategic Plan, UNDP has embarked on two (until recently) parallel strands of work related to definition of results by the organization.

The first has been the move at the country programme level from managing project inputs to managing a portfolio of projects and other UNDP support[26] to deliver at the outcome level. This move started in 1998, with the piloting of strategic results frameworks, which were structured around delivery of outcomes, in a limited number of country programmes. This tool was then rolled out across all country programmes in early 1999. All those interviewed during this evaluation who were involved in development of strategic results frameworks stated that the intended purpose of the tool was to foster a strategic management approach at the country programme level, in which programme managers

would clearly be aware of how they expected UNDP projects and other support to contribute to delivery of the agreed outcome. This intention is also clearly set out in the quote below:

*"A further general lesson that emerged was the importance of **stressing management** over **measurement**. The fundamental goal of results-based management is to improve development effectiveness, which requires helping managers to better manage. In comparing RBM [results-based management] systems, the distinction is sometimes made between managing by results and managing for results. The former is principally oriented towards accountability and external reporting; the latter focuses on a cycle of planning, periodic performance and organizational learning. In implementing RBM, UNDP made a deliberate decision to emphasise management and learning…. RBM must explicitly aim at changing the way the organization is managed, fostering a strategic orientation and culture of performance. Improved external reporting was approached as very important, but a secondary benefit."*[27]

Support for a strategic approach at the county level has also come from reforms to the UNDAF process, which have started to work through UNDP country programmes in recent years. The introduction of the UNDP CPD and CPAP, using a format common to the Executive Committee (ExCom) agencies,[28] has helped to clarify the alignment of UNDP's country programme with national policies and harmonization with partner UN organizations. In particular, joint programming for the UNDAF provides a stimulus for UNDP to ensure that its programmes reflect strategic areas from the MYFF and do not conflict with those of other UN organizations.

The second strand of work has been the introduction and use of the balanced scorecard in 2000. This tool was originally introduced for

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26 Advocacy, policy dialogue and institutional strengthening, and field presence.

27 UNDP, 'Development Effectiveness Report', 2000, p 23-24.

28 The ExCom Agencies are UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP.

monitoring implementation and the results of the internal management reforms proposed in the Administrator's Business Plans, 2000-2003, which were intended to drive cultural change within UNDP, as summarized in Table 2.[29] These changes complement results-based management and support an environment that focuses on results.

2.2.3 ALIGNING FUNDING

The concept of results-based management assumes that resources will follow results—in other words, as results are aligned with goals, resources would be managed to achieve those results. In practice, the extent to which alignment with goals and results from the results-based management system was intended to influence the allocation of financial resources was severely limited. This partly reflects the view of significant constituencies within the Executive Board that funding should primarily reflect needs rather than results. Major sources of funds during the period under evaluation are shown in Table 3.

The sources and uses of funds in UNDP at the country office and corporate levels is complex, with limitations on management flexibility. The main distinction is first between core and non-core. The targeting and allocation of core resources is managed as a resource supply to programmes and operations. Shortfalls in funding to achieve development results have to be made up by extra-budgetary income and non-core sources.[30]

Taking core funding first, there are three core programmatic budgets: TRACs 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3. [31]

Table 2. Prospective cultural changes in UNDP		
Today		**Tomorrow**
Project driven	⮌	Policy driven
Process orientation	⮌	Results orientation
Low-level specialized expertise	⮌	Clear competency profile
Low knowledge-based capacity	⮌	Innovative and information technology networked capacity
Risk aversion	⮌	Risk taking
Introverted, sceptical of partnerships	⮌	Outward looking, partnerships oriented
Cumbersome decision making	⮌	Flexible and real-time decision making
Bureaucratic culture	⮌	Merit-rewarding and initiative-driven culture
Weak management accountability	⮌	Responsive leadership management

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29 UNDP, 'The Way Forward. The Administrator's Business Plans, 2000-2003', 1999, para 28.

30 'Assessment of Programming Arrangements, 2004-2007', paper presented to the Executive Board DP/2007/8, available online at: http://www.undp.org/execbrd/word/dp07-8.doc.

31 More commonly spoken of as TRACs 1, 2 and 3, for simplicity.

Table 3. Percentage of programmatic funding by source		
Source of Funds	2000	2006
Core Funding		
TRAC 1 & 2	17	11
TRAC 3	1	1
Other	3	1
Subtotal	*21*	*13*
Non-core Programmatic Funding		
Thematic trust funds	0	1
Trust funds	17	24
Government cost sharing	47	35
Donor cost sharing	10	21
Other	5	6
Total	*100*	*100*
Total value (USD, million)	1,862	4,049

Source: Compiled by Bureau of Management, UNDP

- The TRAC 1.1.1 budget represents the minimum level of resources targeted to be available for an individual programme country during a given financial period. It is calculated in accordance with the board-approved distribution methodology, using per capita gross national income and population as the primary criteria.

- TRAC 1.1.2 resources are in the first instance earmarked by region. These are subsequently allocated by the regional bureaux on an annual basis between country programmes. In theory, allocation should be on the basis of the quality of the planned UNDP assisted programmes. TRAC 1.1.2 earmarking for a given region is equal to two-thirds of the total TRAC 1.1.1 earmarking for all countries in that region. The allocation formula for TRAC 1.1.2 assignment for an individual country was initially expressed as a percentage of the country's TRAC 1.1.1 earmarking, and ranged from 0 to 100 percent (averaging 66.67 percent).[32]

- The TRAC 1.1.3 facility was established to provide the Administrator with the capacity to respond quickly and flexibly to the needs of countries in special development situations. This budget, which has grown significantly, is mostly used to support work in crisis situations.

There is no prior prescription on how TRAC 1.1.1 funds are allocated between programmes at

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32 Temporary changes were made to the TRAC 1.1.2 allocation system through an Executive Board decision 2005/26.

the country level, but it is only for TRAC 1.1.2 resources that the possibility of assigning resources against country level results exists.

Non-core resources are all earmarked, such as in the case of the Thematic Trust Funds and donor cost sharing, or allocated at the country level, as in the case of partner government cost sharing.

UNDP's overall financial framework reflects a complex mix of funding allocations according to: substantive programming components at the country, global and inter-country levels; line item inputs (i.e. economist lines); and organization unit funding (e.g., the Human Development Report Office and the Office of Development Studies). As such, the financial framework is not directly aligned with the UNDP goals or practices, as defined in the MYFFs.

It is only at the lower levels of budgeting and programme planning, principally at the country programme level and below, that alignment with the MYFF goals and results takes place. However, UNDP does not actively monitor or set targets at the country programme level for the degree to which programmatic resources are aligned around delivery of outcomes or the programme as a whole.

2.2.4 ALIGNING HUMAN RESOURCES

There are three areas in which UNDP could have aligned human resources with delivery of its intended results. These are:

- Structuring within operational units to deliver specific outcomes

- Aligning the staff performance appraisal system, the RCA, with delivery of results

- Aligning the practice areas with delivery of specific goals within the MYFFs

During the period under evaluation, there were no central prescriptions on how the country offices should be structured, although guidance issued in 2002 suggests organizing programme staff around outcomes. The current approach of the Management Change Team (an internal change-management service) is to help country offices align with the strategic plan and work efficiently with office-wide systems such as ATLAS.

The annual RCA was revised in 2002 to strengthen linkage with delivery of results in a logical sequence:

1. Annual strategic targets are set for the country office based on the strategic results framework and objectives and indicators in the balanced scorecard.

2. Once annual strategic results have been defined, the team or sub-unit level develop work plans that aim to deliver against the defined strategic targets.

3. Staff members agree upon a number of individual results against which they will be judged. Those most relevant to the results-based management system are:

   a. Five key individual results that are supposed to identify the primary contributions of that staff member: resource mobilization, resource delivery, learning, support to policy and output delivery

   b. A key result relating to 'learning and growth' for individual staff members[33]

The RCA is intended to focus the work of staff around strategic outcomes but is designed and used on an individual basis and not as an input to team management.

The development of practice-area expertise was originally intended to ensure that UNDP had substantive policy capacity in the thematic areas where demand is greatest. Practice areas aligned with the demands identified in the MYFF 2000-2003 were launched in 2002.[34]

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33 It is important to note that these are self-selected results.
34 Executive Board decision 2003/8.

2.2.5 MONITORING FOR RESULTS

Monitoring is the conduit by which information about results is fed back to management. During the evaluation period, there was a significant expansion in the number of tools that report on performance at country level. In fact, the focus of monitoring was primarily for an external audience.

> "At headquarters, strategic results frameworks assist managers to judge whether the overall results of UNDP assistance worldwide meet the goals, principles and standards set out in the Mission Statement, Business Plans and Executive Board decisions as well as in operational and thematic policies. As such, they are intended to improve UNDP's substantive accountability to national stakeholders and the Executive Board and, for the first time, lay the basis for a funding strategy to support approved programmes based on results that are clearly identified and monitored."[35]

The first clear directive about monitoring under results-based management was given in 2002. Corporate guidance and prescriptions on M&E systems were significantly revised to enhance their results orientation. These changes included:

- Removal of many of the previous mandatory M&E requirements at the project level, shifting attention to programme outcomes

- Publication of the Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results (commonly referred to as the Yellow Book)

Table 4 shows the planned shift of emphasis this new policy brought.

Table 4. Key features in implementation versus outcome monitoring[36]		
Elements of Implementation Monitoring (Traditionally used for projects)		**Elements of Outcome Monitoring (Used for a range of interventions and strategies)**
Description of the problem or situation before the intervention	⮑	Baseline data to describe the problem or situation before the intervention
Benchmarks for activities and immediate outputs	⮑	Indicators for outcomes
Data collection on inputs, activities and immediate outputs	⮑	Data collection on outputs and how/whether they contribute towards achievement of outcomes More focus on perceptions of change among stakeholders and more focus on 'soft' assistance
Systematic reporting on provision of inputs, etc.	⮑	Systematic reporting with more qualitative and quantitative information on the progress of outcomes
Directly linked to a discrete intervention (or series of interventions)	⮑	Done in conjunction with strategic partners
Designed to provide information on administrative, implementation and management issues as opposed to broader development effectiveness issues	⮑	Captures information on success or failure of UNDP partnership strategy in achieving desired outcomes

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35 UNDP, 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles', 2000, p 7.

36 UNDP, 'Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results', 2002, p 11.

The changes summarized in Table 4 were pre-empted by the ROAR, which was introduced in 2000. The subsequent M&E policy revision in 2002 was a radical but belated attempt to cater to the ROAR as the primary country office reporting tool for results and ameliorate rising concerns about the apparent expansion of reports and systems in country offices. Furthermore, other changes were taking place in the architecture of planning and reporting systems that were driven as much by UN reform as by UNDP's approach to results. Annex 5 Table 2 brings together the full range of planning and reporting tools currently in use.

2.2.6 ADJUSTMENT AND LEARNING

Within the logic of programme management, there are two main occasions when the country office would take a structured approach to adjustment of the programme. The first would be during the development of the CPD, which includes development of the strategic results framework covering the forthcoming programming period. Inclusion of the strategic results framework in the new CPD is a direct response to the introduction of results-based management. The second is during the annual review process for the outcomes, which is a review process directly introduced in response to the introduction of results-based management.

The greatest change in approaches to learning derived from introducing results-based management was the move from M&E mainly at the level of the project to M&E at the level of the outcome. This shift is neatly encapsulated in the following quote from the UNDP's Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators:

"An outcome evaluation aims to improve understanding of the outcome itself—its status and the factors that influence or contribute to its change. It does not look at the process of inputs, activities and other bureaucratic efforts but shifts attention to the substantive development results (outputs and outcomes) that they are aimed at affecting. It also provides real-time answers about the outcome rather than waiting until a project is completed and the outputs produced to ask questions. These answers may be part of a 'questioning continuum'."[37]

The institution of the UNDP 'practices' enable the organization to provide substantive support to programme countries. The objective is to encourage an internal culture of knowledge sharing and substantive skills development, capitalizing on the experience inherent in its network. As UNDP increasingly oriented itself towards policy advisory services and capacity development, it recognized the need to strengthen its substantive knowledge base in its key practice areas. Key initiatives were to:

- Establish practices in areas of need and enhance staff participation in the practices

- Strengthen and sustain policy and substantive support services

- Increase learning and training

- Upgrade ICT for knowledge management

2.2.7 ACCOUNTABILITY

Results-based management asks managers to focus on the outcomes to be achieved, track the outputs and sequence of outcomes being achieved and, based on a theory of change for the programme, adjust their activities and outputs to maximize the likelihood that the desired outcomes are realized. It recognizes that outcomes by definition are results over which managers do not have control.

The organizational structure of UNDP with corporate headquarters, regional bureaux and country offices suggests that management arrangements would reflect that structure in terms of control and accountability. In 1996, the

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37 UNDP, 'Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators', Monitoring and Evaluation Companion Series, #1, UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, 2002.

Executive Board accepted the recommendations in the 1997 Annual Report of the Administrator,[38] including the shift to an ex-post accountability framework, in which country offices managed programmes, finances, administration and personnel. This was in turn based on the accountability review.[39] Regional bureaux were to assume a new role of holistic oversight of country office performance—assembling and maintaining a complete, up-to-date overview of UNDP operations and providing corporate management with consolidated monitoring reports and monitoring country office compliance with defined indicators of management performance, including delivery, resource mobilization and the Resident Coordinator function.

In 2007, UNDP implemented a new Accountability Framework as an integral part of its Strategic Plan. The Framework addresses accountability at the organizational level, manager's level and individual level. The roll-out of the Accountability Framework provides an opportunity to support a stronger results-based management focus in UNDP by moving accountability beyond process and outputs.

2.2.8 GUIDANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING FOR RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

A range of guidance has been issued to support implementation of the various components of the results-based management system.

- Initial guidance issued in 2000 included:
  - Results-based management in UNDP: Overview and General Principles

- Results-based management in UNDP: Technical Note

- Results-based management in UNDP: Selecting Indicators

- The Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results (2002)

- Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators (2002)

- UNDP's Programme Management Guide, which has now been superseded with the new Results Management Guidance (2006). On-line training on results-based management has been available since 2006 but is not yet a mandatory and integral part of the orientation programme of new or incumbent staff.

- Guidance issued on an annual basis on how to enter data into the computerized reporting system for the ROARs. Such guidance often included rules on definition of outcomes, etc. and tended to act to reinforce how the system was supposed to operate.

- Access to technical advice from the corporate level through Sub-regional Facilities (SURFs), now called Regional Support Centres (RSCs).

- A course called Managing for Development Results run by the Virtual Development Academy.

The practice has been for UNDP to run workshops to assist in the introduction of new tools. Thereafter, the practice networks support further implementation.

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38 'Annual Report of the Administrator (1997)', DP/1997/16/Add.7

39 'Successor Programming Arrangements, Report of the Administrator (1995)' Annual Session of the Executive Board, 5-16 June, New York, DP/1995/32.

Key points

- The tools and systems for results-based management evolved without a comprehensive design, creating a 10-year period of rolling innovation, redesign and change.

- The primary purpose of strategic objectives has been to help focus the programme, whilst also improving communication with external stakeholders.

- Alignment of programmes to strategic goals was promoted by a shift of results focus from outputs to outcomes. In parallel, the balanced scorecard was a response to the Administrator's Business Plans to change the culture of the organization and report against a broad range of physical and financial indicators of operational change.

- Very little flexibility was given in core financial resources to manage for results.

- Greater flexibility and closer linkages to results were created through scope to change country office organizational structures, the adoption of the RCA, and development of practice areas to foster thematic skills.

- Developments in reporting were led by the ROAR, but monitoring lagged behind in terms of policy and tools to help monitor progress towards country outcomes.

- Adjustment of programmes was expected to take place mainly through annual and country programme cycles. No specific provisions were made for more frequent interventions.

- Links to learning were supposed to occur through the shift from project to programme outcome evaluations and interactions with the practice areas and networks.

- An accountability framework is under development with provisions for individual, managerial and organizational accountability.

Chapter 3

FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION

3.1 RESULTS ORIENTATION

3.1.1 EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC GOALS AND EFFECTS ON THE ORGANIZATION

The goals of an organization define the framework within which programmes and organizational structure are developed. They also provide a reference point for stakeholders and other parties with which the organization has a relationship. This has been a particularly important issue for UNDP, whereby statements about the use of goals have been intended to focus the programme.

Table 5 lays out the evolution of the goal statements of UNDP between the first MYFF and the forthcoming Strategic Plan. Aside from goals 6 and 7, which are related to internal management within UNDP and the United Nations in the first MYFF, the substantive development goals have remained almost the same over the last three strategic documents.

Governance (defined as an enabling environment for sustainable human development under the first MYFF), poverty reduction and the environ-ment are constant across all three documents and periods, with only the language changing to reflect the advent of the MDGs. Gender was dropped as an explicit single goal in the second MYFF and instead became one of six 'drivers of development effectiveness'.

The specific goal on HIV/AIDS found in the second MYFF will be dropped in the new Strategic Plan, but as noted under the Strategic Plan's Frequently Asked Questions:

"As a co-sponsor of UNAIDS, UNDP will continue to be part of the worldwide effort to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Based on the established division of labour, UNDP is designated as the lead organization on behalf of the UN system for addressing 'AIDS as it relates to development, governance, mainstreaming, legislation, human rights and gender.' UNDP's work in executing these responsibilities is now reflected within the Democratic Governance and Poverty Reduction and MDG development focus areas."[40]

With the exception of the statement to achieve the MDGs, all the goals represent processes or areas of activity, without inherent targets or predefined indicators of performance. This makes progress towards them hard to evaluate.

The statements of goals are supported by areas of work at a lower level called strategic areas in MYFF 1, service lines in MYFF 2, and key result areas in the Strategic Plan. Annex 5 Table 3 presents a comparison across these areas of work. This analysis shows that although the wording has changed and some components of MYFF 1, such as area-based and downstream work, have been dropped, there has been little substantive change to the scope of activities. One major innovation associated with the new draft Strategic Plan is the proposal to build corporate outcome indicators into the results framework, but at the time of writing this has yet to be approved by the Executive Board.

Regarding the use of the strategic frameworks as a communication tool, senior managers in UNDP and partner organizations believe that

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40 Available online at http://intra.undp.org/results/strategic_plan_faq.shtml.

Table 5. Key strategy documents and evolution of UNDP goals	
Strategy Document	**Goals Identified**
MYFF 2000-2003	1. To create an enabling environment for sustainable human development
	2. To eradicate extreme poverty and reduce substantially overall poverty [WSSD Commitment 2]
	3. To protect and regenerate the global environment and natural resources asset base for sustainable human development
	4. To achieve gender equality and advance the status of women, especially through their own empowerment
	5. To prevent or reduce the incidence of complex emergencies and natural, environmental, technological and other human-induced disasters, and to accelerate the process of sustainable recovery
	6. To provide effective UNDP support to the United Nations Agenda for Development
	7. To achieve excellence in the management of UNDP operations
MYFF 2004-2007	1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty
	2. Fostering democratic governance
	3. Energy and environment for sustainable development
	4. Crisis prevention and recovery
	5. Responding to HIV/AIDS
Strategic Plan 2008-2011	1. Poverty reduction and the MDGs
	2. Democratic governance
	3. Crisis prevention and recovery
	4. Environment and sustainable development

the frameworks have had a positive effect on the presentation of the programme to stakeholders and third parties.

3.1.2 ALIGNMENT WITH STRATEGIC GOALS AT THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME LEVEL

It is clear that the development of strategic frameworks was intended to help focus the programme, but the extent to which focus meant substantive change, or improved specification, is less clear. Increasing focus implies reducing the range of activities being supported. This raises important questions about how UNDP interacts with government (as the owner of the planned results) and development partners. One purpose behind the drive for focus was to enable UNDP to foster areas of competence and avoid overlap with other UN partners. Few changes were

expected from the first MYFF, as that was largely drawn up around current programmes and designed to make the presentation of the portfolio more coherent and logical. There was more scope with MYFF 2.

Analysis of the five case-study countries reveals some signs of changing programmes, but a disparity exists between perceptions of staff and management and the structures of the country portfolios. According to a recent survey of country offices, the large majority of Resident Coordinators and Deputy Resident Representatives believe the practices and service lines introduced in 2002 have benefited their work by providing greater focus, improving knowledge management and focusing on results. This increased focus has facilitated positioning and advocacy at the

national level, especially by identifying areas of legitimate involvement by UNDP.[41] This view was echoed in the countries visited.

The main evidence in support of increased focus is the steady reduction in the number of outcomes, especially since MYFF 2. For example, the Indonesia programme has reduced outcomes from 28 to 5. But much of the change was driven by structural guidance from headquarters limiting country programme outcomes to 10 or fewer under MYFF 2. In three of the five countries, close inspection of the portfolio and discussions with staff revealed that the underlying areas of support have remained largely unchanged. The exceptions are Zambia, where there has been a clear withdrawal from agriculture, rural development and food security, and employment generation and sustainable livelihoods; and Argentina, where the programme saw a dramatic change of orientation following the economic crisis of 2001-2002.

All of the case-study countries characterized this process as a remapping of projects against the evolving strategic frameworks, rather than substantive change. This process has become increasingly elaborate as the language of objectives has evolved and the framework of results has become steadily more complex.[42] For example in Egypt, the programme in 1993 was configured under two areas of concentration and nine themes. By 2007, the nine UNDP Egypt outcomes were mapped into a framework of five UNDAF outcomes, four MYFF goals, nine service lines and nine core results. It is only with the advent of CPDs and the annual CPAP that a practical tool has emerged that enables UNDP and national partners to agree on the focus of

results in a way that is coherent with the wider span of UN support at the country level. As more countries develop second-generation UNDAFs, the clarity that the UNDAF/CPD/CPAP structure brings has the potential to have a strong positive effect on both UNDP's drive for focus and national ownership of results.

In the five case-study countries, changes to the composition of the portfolio of projects are more likely to arise from other pressures such as: carry over of projects from previous planning periods, the need and opportunity to mobilize resources (examined in the next section), and relationships with other development partners.[43] Most importantly, country office staff have observed that outcomes are broad permissive statements that act as umbrellas in the planning process rather than objectives that drive the choice of projects. A 2007 Country Programme Outcome Evaluation for Egypt concluded that greater focus was needed within the outcome areas, a point echoed in the case study for Zambia. There is clear evidence that countries have responded to strategic guidance by removing outlier projects. For example, in Egypt, projects in support of science, space technology and infrastructure have been terminated.

The extent to which corporate strategic plans have focused the portfolio was examined by the Operations Support Group (OSG) in 2006. That analysis concluded that 87.5 percent of a random sample of projects were fully or substantially aligned to the 2004-2007 MYFF. The 12.5 percent unaligned actually accounted for 35.7 percent of expenditure (a finding that suggests most unaligned projects had substantial infrastructure and procurement components).[44] However, this

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41 UNDP, 'UNDP Management Review Phase II – Report of the Management Review Team', Internal UNDP Report, 2007, para 73.

42 Terminology has, at various times, included some or all of: goals, sub-goals, key result areas, outcomes, practice areas, service lines, and core results.

43 Examples were given in Indonesia and Zambia of circumstances where the World Bank assumed the lead from UNDP in post-tsunami reconstruction and decentralization due to a stronger presence on the ground and larger resources. Other instances include rationalization of projects that are within the mandate of other UN agencies, such as support to counter female genital mutilation in Egypt.

44 'Alignment Analysis', OSG/ExO (AB), 30 Oct 2006.

Box 3. Broad, permissive outcome statement

The Indonesia country office has taken the UNDAF sub-outcomes as its overarching framework. The sub-outcomes are broad and cover the full spectrum of UNDP's previous activities with no influence at all on UNDP's portfolio. For example sub-outcome 1.4 reads: "By 2010, increased opportunities for achieving sustainable livelihoods in the poorest provinces of Indonesia through development and implementation of appropriate participatory policies and programmes." The implication is that, under this outcome, anything to do with policy or a programme that increases opportunities for achieving sustainable development can fit. (Indonesia case study)

analysis raises a question about the quality of outcomes. The statements of goals in Table 5 and the areas of work (service lines etc.) in Annex 5 Table 3, reveal that the wording tends to be phrases that describe activities to be carried out, rather than measurable objectives. They are broad, permissive statements within which a wide range of project activities can be clustered (see Boxes 3 and 4.)

Concern over the quality of outcomes has been noted by the Evaluation Office as part of a review

of M&E practices. It found, inter alia, that most results orientation was predominantly at the project output level and that trying to use outcomes as the focus of evaluation raises difficulties of linking the status of outcomes to interventions and the relevance of current approaches to strategic and operational planning in country offices.[45] The study was able to cite some instances of good practice at the country level and similar examples were also found in the case-study countries.[46]

Box 4. Making outcomes evaluable

An example of training material from the European Commission, which uses a similar definition of outcomes as UNDP, illustrates how careful specification can help planners develop more measurable outcomes.

UNDP definition
Outcomes are actual or intended changes in development conditions that UNDP interventions are seeking to support. They describe a change in development conditions between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact. For example:

- Improved national capacity to monitor human and income poverty and inequality
- Increased access of the poor to finance (formal, informal, micro)
- Reduction in the level of domestic violence against women

European Commission training guidance
The *outcome* is the effect that project outputs will have on the beneficiary, institution or system. It defines the project's success. Test the outcome by asking is it a realistic statement, specific to project outputs, and measurable at reasonable cost. For example:

- Improved performance in the national statistics office for timely production of human and income poverty statistics of verifiable quality to international standards
- Increased utilization of formal, informal and micro finance by poor households in (designated) area or for (designated) purpose
- Reduction in the (reported or estimated) level of domestic violence against women in designated areas

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45 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practice at Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005, para 4.19, 4.21 and Summary.

46 See for example, Table 7 in the Egypt Case Study, which provides an illustration of improving outcome and indicators, UNDP Evaluation Office Internal Report.

The five study countries present a wide spectrum of funding status.[47] At one extreme, Argentina and Egypt have very low levels of core funding (less than 1 percent and less than 4 percent respectively) and rely on mobilizing funds from donors and the government for virtually all their programmes. The proportion of core funds was higher in Indonesia (13 percent), Moldova (38 percent) and Zambia (65 percent). However, evidence from the five countries was consistent that resource mobilization and delivery were the major internal criteria used to assess overall performance. A key issue therefore is the strategies to use core funds and to mobilize funds in support of outcomes. Table 6 summarizes the explanations given by the five countries for how core funding is managed. None of the countries incorporate results in their decision process.

Mobilization of non-core funds creates a potential conflict for country programme management. Many countries are dependent on fund mobilization to generate a 'critical mass' of programme activities and staff their office. As a result, mobilization tends to be a driving force behind the work of programme staff.[48] Examples exist, such as in the Indonesia office, where there has been success in matching non-core funds to their outcome objectives. But more

often, acquisition of resources is opportunistic and reflects availability of funds from donors and the government rather than being driven by programme outcome objectives.

The 2007 Country Programme Evaluation of Egypt concludes:

"The current partnership strategy is strongly driven by resource mobilization ends and not the other way around. Diversification of UNDP positioning strategy can hurt the total size of the profile in terms of resources, but is likely to deepen impact of UNDP interventions at the policy level towards achieving the MDGs especially forging alliances around difficult but common platforms in governance areas. There is the temptation to invest in areas that carry prospects of non-core resources, resulting in UNDP spreading itself too thin at the expense of focusing on its strategic strengths and expertise. Projects in the pipeline need to be re-evaluated with this caveat in mind."[49]

This same issue was raised by the Evaluation Office in 2006:

"Conflict of interest and confusion of roles may arise where UNDP seeks to combine the roles of

Table 6. **Core fund allocation strategy**					
Strategy for Core Funds	**Argentina**	**Egypt**	**Indonesia**	**Moldova**	**Zambia**
Use as seed money		✓			
Allocate according to needs				✓	✓
Allocate according to fund-raising potential			✓		
No formal strategy	✓				

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47 Funding analysis reflects experience over a variety of years as available at the CO: Argentina 2005-2008; Egypt 2002-2006; Indonesia 2001-2005; Moldova 2002-2006; and Zambia 2004-2006.

48 55 percent of staff agreed with the statement "Because most of our funds are raised through cost sharing or from donors, we have little scope in allocating resources across our programme or within outcome areas according to results;" 62 percent agreed with the statement "In my office, country programme staff are under more pressure to raise resources and ensure timely delivery than on enhancing the contribution by UNDP to achievement of the outcomes."

49 Afaf Abu-Hasabo et al., 'Evaluation of Egypt Country Programme (2002 – 2006)', UNDP Egypt, March 2007.

policy coordinator, donor, rights advocate, neutral broker and project implementer. In particular, areas where UNDP has a comparative advantage but is unlikely to mobilize external resources—such as donor coordination, neutral broker activities and advocacy for human rights—can be crowded out by activities for which cost-sharing assistance is more readily available and government consent easier to secure."[50]

Reforms to human resources management over the period were driven by the Administrator's Business Plans and the aim to reorient UNDP upstream to policy engagement rather than processing of projects.

The experiences in the five countries share some common threads, but are largely different. Changes in Argentina were linked to the expansion in the country programme. These changes did enable some realignment of staff to substantive programme areas but were not linked to results-based management as such. The organizational structure of the Egypt Country Office was changed by each of the previous two Resident Coordinators and is currently being reassessed by the new incumbent. Unique among the five study countries, Egypt adopted a flat structure in 2002 with responsibilities for projects allocated to individuals without a structure based around programmes or outputs. Various systems were put in place to manage for outcomes, but these have not been maintained and staff feel this has contributed to a lack of strategic direction during the transition to the present management team.

Three of the five country offices underwent reprofiling exercises with varying degrees of reorganization between operations and programming staff, including the development of new job descriptions and the need for new skills. Indonesia also adopted a flat structure but with units grouped around programme areas and staffed according to programme size. Zambia reported missing an opportunity during reprofiling, with existing staff being fitted into new job

descriptions rather than new skills being found or developed. Moldova underwent reprofiling and has continued with further reform, culminating in a change process and restructuring in 2006. This is the nearest example of a results orientation, with the drivers being:

- Aligning staff around delivery against key UNDAF outcome areas relevant to UNDP

- Addressing the burdens imposed by the rapid increase in programme resourcing

- Strengthening UNDP's resource mobilization capacity[51]

The RCA has been adopted in all offices with varying degrees of success. It is generally seen as strengthening the potential for accountability with the link between staff member to supervisor to senior manager. RCAs do not yet include measures of whether staff are managing for outcomes. For this reason, the Zambia office has found the RCA to be a more powerful tool for operations staff, whose procedures foster stronger accountability and feedback, than programme staff where the focus should be on managing for outcomes.

Specific criticisms were raised about three aspects of the RCA, both in the country offices and in headquarters:

- First, although staff performance assessment is rated on a five-point scale, in practice only three points are used, as the lower scores of four or five trigger management action, which all parties seek to avoid. This results in clustering of staff and poor differentiation in assessment.

- Second, there is no difference in the financial reward for good performance between grade three and the highest grade of one, which reduces incentive for higher performance.

- Third, the targets set for performance assessment are self selected and, in an estimated 70 percent of cases, are agreed retrospectively during the year of assessment.

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50 'Annual Report of the Administrator on Evaluation in 2005', DP/2006/27, para 67.
51 UNDP, 'Moldova Case Study Report', UNDP Evaluation Office, Internal Report, para. 4.33.

- UNDP's goals in the strategic frameworks have changed in presentation but the underlying areas of work have remained almost the same.
- The focus areas under the goals have been rationalized and simplified, but it is hard to identify substantive change to the scope of activities at country level.
- Managers and staff in country offices believe the MYFFs have helped to bring focus and improved positioning and advocacy. They have helped remove outliers on country portfolios, but have otherwise had little effect. Projects have just been mapped to the new frameworks.
- Outcome statements for country programmes tend to be broad and permissive rather than providing a test for how well a project contributes.
- Mobilization of resources is, in practice, a more powerful driver of individual performance among programme staff than achievement of results.
- There is some evidence that country offices organize their staff for delivery of results.
- The RCA is welcomed as a tool but in its current modality does not support managing for results.

3.2 MANAGING FOR RESULTS

3.2.1 MONITORING AT THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME LEVEL

Monitoring at the country level is an interesting discussion. To a large extent, the expectations set out in Table 4 of Annex 5 have not been achieved, but the five case-study countries reveal some local initiatives as country managers try to grapple with the challenge.

Table 4 in Annex 5 brings together responses from the case-study countries about progress towards outcome monitoring. The findings show that progress is uneven, but there are consistent signs of greater use of baseline data and setting indicators for outcomes. There is also evidence of progress towards more collaborative work with partners and greater use of national surveys and tools, such as the preparation of the National Human Development Report (NHDR). The weakest areas are the intermediate steps that demonstrate how UNDP-supported projects are delivering contributions towards outcome objectives. This type of analysis will not be derived from national statistics and requires both a clear causal pathway against which progress can be charted and data collection that is specific to

project activities. Similarly, the country visits reveal little progress towards data collection about perceptions of change among stakeholders and systematic qualitative information.

The shift to outcome monitoring and the 2002 monitoring policy has contributed to a growth of local initiatives as managers look for ways to improve their control of the project cycle. These initiatives are particularly strong in those countries that have invested in dedicated M&E staff or M&E units: Argentina, Egypt and Indonesia are examples in the study sample.[52]

- In Argentina, there has been a focus on developing tools for the whole project cycle, with a strong focus on monitoring and risk assessment. A new ex-ante evaluation procedure has been introduced with procedures such as review by the Local Project Approval Committee.[53] Some of these procedures are being taken up by the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC) as part of regional guidelines.
- The Egypt country office has retained the long-standing quarterly and annual project reports, joint annual tripartite reviews and

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52 Currently, 25 country offices have M&E specialists and 10 have a dedicated M&E Unit.

53 The ex-ante evaluation procedure is referred to elsewhere in this report as 'appraisal' following normal project cycle convention.

project self-evaluations that were made non-obligatory in the 2002 policy. Standard approaches to M&E have been introduced in project documents and the office reports M&E becoming stronger—borne out by a review of how outcomes and indicators for programmes have improved over the period. The office still finds it hard to link project monitoring to programme outcomes for the ROAR.

■ Indonesia has developed a number of tools, most prominent of which is Touchstone, a locally developed project and programme management software. A database brings together information to demonstrate the way in which individual projects contribute to programme outcomes. (See Box 5 for a range of instruments in use.)

■ Less progress has been made towards monitoring in the Moldova programme. The national setting was formerly not very conducive—national planning only started in 2002 with the uptake of Medium Term Expenditure Framework and few government systems are in operation. The country office monitors projects through project reports and annual programme reviews, though stakeholders report it is difficult to get government counterparts to devote the time necessary for in-depth discussion of issues.

■ Zambia appears to have made most progress towards working through government systems and with the United Nations and other development partners. This is a reflection of the country having a large budget support programme for aid. Harmonized working was fostered by a joint assistance strategy aligned with the Fifth National Development Plan (which has an M&E component). UNDP's programme document is directly aligned to the plan as well. The programme works through sector advisory groups and participates in joint programme annual reviews.

A common complaint is the absence of tools to relate progress with projects to contributions to

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Box 5. Monitoring and evaluation system components

The Indonesia Country Office's internal M&E functions are supported by the appointment of M&E focal points in each programme unit who interact with the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in bi-weekly coordination meetings.

In addition to the standard corporate tools such as MYFF, the ROAR, and outcome evaluations, a range of other instruments for monitoring are operational. These include:

■ Touchstone (project management guide)
■ Project Data Base System (has the format of ROAR, tracks results quarterly)
■ A five-year M&E Plan
■ Unit/programme workplans
■ Unit-level M&E Guides (e.g., Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit and Environment)
■ Quarterly review meetings with the government
■ Bi-monthly meetings with the State Secretariat, the National Development Planning Agency and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
■ Joint field visits and joint monitoring of selected projects with government counterparts
■ Management team meetings
■ Unit head team meetings
■ Bi-weekly meetings with M&E focal points
■ Annual Results Reports
■ Reporting on progress towards the achievement of MYFF and balanced scorecard targets

programme outcomes. This disconnect contributes to the finding that more progress has been made with reporting than in the use of reports. One consistent message from the country case studies is that the ROAR is primarily a reporting tool to headquarters, with little operational value at country level. The shift from projects to the ROAR undermined the evidence about results in UNDP projects and failed to provide new tools to track progress from projects towards outcomes. Staff were questioned about the ROAR in the staff survey on results-based management. This produced the counter-intuitive finding that 62 percent of staff considered the ROAR to be an effective outcome monitoring tool, but among managers (Deputy Resident Representatives and above), 59 percent think it is not effective—a finding more in line with observations in the case-study countries.

Another channel of performance reporting from countries is the Resident Coordinator's annual report.[54] This is described in the current guidelines as "an essential element of the accountability and results framework for UN operational activities." The report follows a structured format with some narrative and tabular data. It brings together information about performance during the past year in the following format: an introductory letter highlighting progress in UN reform, major results achieved, good practices and lessons learned; results and use of funds table; UN Country Team (UNCT) workplan matrix; and good and bad coordination practices and procedures. A sample of these reports was examined from each of the case-study countries and an example of reporting against one UNDAF outcome is reproduced in Table 5 of Annex 5. The report covers key issues of performance, but the information is limited to observations about delivery of outputs, with little or no dialogue about contribution to outcomes. The nature of the presentation differs between countries, and reveals the varied quality of outcomes and indicators already noted in this

report. The example in Annex 5 illustrates how difficult it is for a reader to track what progress is being made and to understand how the UNCT will contribute to development outcomes.

3.2.2 ADJUSTMENT OF RESOURCES

Adjusting work in response to results is the cornerstone of an effective results-based management system. This study has failed to find any convincing evidence that suggests that results are influencing management. All country offices recognized that adjustments are made to projects from time to time, but there were no obvious examples of information about results guiding decisions about finance or human resources, especially not at the level of programme outcomes. Some practical examples were noted in Moldova:

■ There has been a balance between support at the central and local government levels. The balance between these two streams of work has been a continued focus of the programme, affected by UNDP's assessment of the prospects of creating sustainable capacity at the central level.

■ In its strengthening of the government's poverty-monitoring capacity, UNDP initially gap-filled this function by directly contracting and managing consultants. UNDP realized that this was unsustainable and used the 2005 outcome evaluation to help convince the government to start creating its own capacity in this area. UNDP supported this process by building the capacity of the new staff.

■ The Moldova programme is closing its project supporting strengthening of the Parliament based on evidence that support is unlikely to be effective, since there is insufficient support from the partner.

■ In its project supporting re-integration of victims of human trafficking, monitoring highlighted that sustained impact depended upon helping women find jobs. Therefore, the subsequent phase of the project has focused upon this challenge.

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54 Copies dating back to 2002 can be found via the UNDP internal website at: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=490.

These examples illustrate practical responses to information from a range of sources. The formal results-based management tools may or may not have been prominent, but managers have to make decisions with whatever information is on hand—in this case, a mixture of monitoring and periodic evaluations.

3.2.3 RELATIONS WITH THE REGIONAL BUREAUX AND SUBSTANTIVE CORPORATE OVERSIGHT

Despite the intention in the mid 1990s for regional bureaux to undertake holistic oversight of country office performance, the management relationship between country offices and headquarters has remained ill-defined.[55]

Most significantly, the regional bureaux have not been considered accountable for the development effectiveness of country operations in their region. One of the reasons for this is the intention to decentralize management and accountability to the country level and the limited number of entry points at which regional bureaux can intervene in country programmes. Projects are planned and approved within country offices, so one of the main entry points for the regional bureaux is the CPD approval process, which occurs every four years. Even this is of limited scope as the CPD is, on paper at least, a government programme presented to the Executive Board by UNDP.

In practice, the regions have approached their role of substantive oversight in a variety of ways, some more imaginative than others.[56] Interaction was more likely to occur around operational issues, and good performance was traditionally seen as resource mobilization and delivery. Indonesia found the interaction with Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific (RBAP) over the development of the 2006 CPD to be 'timely and conscientious', although most interaction was about process and procedural compliance rather than substantive content.

All the regions have had to adjust their relationships to accommodate the new monitoring tools: ATLAS, the balanced scorecard, Global Staff Survey, RCA and the Dashboard have changed the information environment for regional directors. These tools predominantly deal with financial and process information, and that predominantly at the level of projects.

The Moldova and Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (RBEC) experience is interesting. In response to ambiguity over the precise meaning of oversight, RBEC has developed its own tool to maintain oversight of country-level operations and effectiveness. This is the Strategic Note, which was introduced in 2002. The Note is a six-page document, drafted annually, that briefly sets out progress on resource and programme issues in the past year and major actions in the coming year. More importantly, the Strategic Note includes mutually agreed targets on what the country office will deliver in the coming year and what has been delivered against the targets agreed for the past year. Targets set for Moldova between 2004 and 2007 are in Table 7 and show that the dominant focus of oversight is on resource mobilization and delivery.

The Moldova Resident Representative reports that there has been no substantive discussion between the Moldova country office and the RBEC over development results. Instead, discussion focuses on resource mobilization and delivery. In common with annual targets set in the balanced scorecard and ROAR, targets need only be agreed upon in April-June, four to six months into the planning year, which considerably weakens their value as tools that drive intended behaviour.

Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC) and Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) have developed a Composite

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55 UNDP, 'Annual Report of the Administrator and Related Matters', 1997, DP/1997/16/Add.7. Addendum: Change Management: UNDP 2001.

56 Definition of oversight has now been given in the 2006 Results Management Guide.

Table 7. Targets in the Moldova Strategic Notes (2004-2007)	
Year	**Targets**
2004	■ Delivery: 100% of USD 2.66 million (of which TRAC is USD 1.48 million) ■ Resources mobilized: USD 1.48 million
2005	■ Core delivery: 100% of USD 1.77 million ■ Non-core delivery: USD 4.2 million ■ CCA and UNDAF finalized ■ A national monitoring system in place, with DevInfo at its heart, helping to track progress towards Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and MDG targets ■ One outcome evaluation/best practices 'knowledge management product' on local development
2006	■ Non-core delivery: USD 3.75 million ■ Resources mobilized: USD 6.0 million ■ One outcome evaluation (Human Rights & Access to Justice) ■ CPD approved by the Executive Board ■ NHDR on quality of economic growth for human development
2007	■ Non-core delivery: USD 5.0 million ■ Resources mobilized: USD 8.0 million ■ 1 programme evaluation conducted (Joint Programme Support to Strategic Policies) ■ 1 study on non-governmental organizations published ■ 1 joint programme launched (Disaggregated Statistical Data)

Performance Ranking index to track country performance. RBA argues that this has to some extent informed allocation of TRAC 2 funds. However, there is a sense of information overload, as much of the data in ATLAS and other tools is project-based and hard to interpret without supporting qualitative explanation.

The tools provide a strong quantitative asset to oversight. Less strong is the management interface to understand qualitative issues. Regional bureaux typically have a desk officer or programme officer responsible for the day-to-day relationships with the country office. Sometimes these relationships work well, but there are a number of weaknesses:

■ Manpower resources mean that, in some regions, each desk officer has to deal with as many as eight countries.

■ Travel budgets restrict country visits to, at most, two a year

■ Desk officers are typically employed at grades P3 or P4. Resident Representatives will usually be D1, and in the strongly hierarchical culture of UNDP, that grade disparity makes it difficult for the desk officer to raise critical questions. This results in issues being moved up to the level of regional director or deputy director.[57]

■ Desk officers do not always have the technical skills to intervene in substantive programming issues.

Tools such as ATLAS are changing the relationship between regional bureaux and country

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57 The absence of a deputy regional director in RBA is believed to have undermined the oversight role in the recent past and led directly to RCA target setting for RR and DRRs not being completed for 2007.

offices. As project management information expands in content and coverage, the imbalance of greater attention to finance and process rather than results may be reduced. However, much of the progress reporting in ATLAS and the ROAR is still self assessment and focussed on project performance. Validity only gets checked at the country level once every four years when an expanded audit is carried out.[58] The management response to the Office of Audit and Performance Review for 2004 for UNDP Zambia shows that the expanded audit by the Office is a useful process for course correction, but some of the recommendations may have been

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Box 6. Office of Audit and Performance Review

The Office of Audit and Performance Review works on a decentralized basis through about 45 staff in total. Some 35 country office audits were completed in 2005-2006. Their extended or full-scope audits deal with good management, including results-based management. Staff have not received any specific training in results-based management per se. The results-based management guide is used as their audit criteria.

The approach adopted is to look at outcome coherence with UNDAF, outcome specification and relation to outputs, targets, and measurement approaches. They make a compliance check to see if the annual review and update of projects has been done and followed up on.

MYFF reports (the ROAR) are examined and their quality, consistency with previous statements and expectations, and the evidence behind statements made are assessed.

In Office of Audit and Performance Review's judgement, results planning and measurement are often of poor quality: output/outcome distinctions are not clear, results are not measurable, and indicators are poor. They believe there is a need to have a procedure for outcome verification.

Key points

- Some progress has been made towards outcome monitoring, and country offices have shown interesting initiatives, but there is little explanation of how projects are contributing to programme outcomes.

- The absence of firm procedures has led to creative diversity in M&E, especially where the country office has a dedicated staff member.

- The ROAR is primarily an upward reporting tool with little utility in the country office or for regional management.

- There is no clear and convincing evidence that results are being used systematically to inform adjustments to the country portfolios.

- Strong and effective decentralization has been accompanied by an ill-defined role of oversight for the regional bureaux.

- Diverse approaches at the regional level, often drawing on the new information tools, have been implemented for interaction with country programmes. The quantitative information in ATLAS and other tools is predominantly project-focused and not matched by qualitative information that explains performance.

- Desk officers in the regional bureaux are an important link in understanding country performance but are overworked, under-resourced, junior in status and often lack technical skills.

- The dominance of self-reporting is not adequately balanced by the current system of periodic expanded audits.

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58 Although the Office of Audit and Performance Review carries out full-scope audits every year, each year, a different sample of countries is selected. This works out to a frequency of one full-scope audit per country in every four years, on average.

CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION

overtaken by events. Hence the frequency of such ex-post audits, though appropriate from a cost perspective, may not be appropriate to foster strategic managing for results (see Box 6).

3.3 EVALUATION, LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

3.3.1 ROLE AND USE OF EVALUATION

In 2002, UNDP's formal project-level evaluation requirements were dropped and outcome-level evaluations were introduced. New rules, mandated by UNDP's new Evaluation Policy of 2006, now make it mandatory that country offices fund and carry out outcome evaluations and that there be a follow-up management response for all evaluations.

Among the five case-study countries, outcome evaluations have been carried out in all except Argentina, where thematic 'cluster' evaluations have been conducted. Zambia has retained aspects of the old evaluation practice by conducting mid-term and terminal evaluations of projects, but in the other countries, these only take place at the instigation of a development partner. Egypt was the only country to have undertaken a country programme evaluation.

Resources for evaluations is one of the issues that have arisen. Under funding has led to late implementation. In the case of Egypt, findings were delivered too late to influence the CPD process. In Moldova, no allowance was made for the lack of project-level evaluation as a data resource. As a result, the duration of consultant time was too short to gather evidence. Poor quality of consultants was highlighted in several countries and related to budget constraints.

None of the countries had clear evidence that evaluation findings had influenced programmes.

In Egypt, concerns were raised over unclear accountability for the management response and follow up to evaluations. The closest example of a positive management response was found in Zambia for an audit. The Office of Audit and Performance Review Full Scope Audit of 2004 (report released in 2006), contains a matrix stating management's response.[59] The response shows concrete suggestions or progress already made by the country office towards adjusting operations on the basis of the recommendations in the audit.[60] The matrix also indicates the responsible manager, the implementation date, level of priority and the cause.

The findings at the country level show that country offices are adapting to the new evaluation policy. In some respects, it is too early to pass judgement on issues of accountability and management response to evaluation findings. But viewed within the wider context of the move away from project evaluation and the overall focus of the Evaluation Office at Headquarters, the evidence suggests a decline in the quality and depth of the evaluation base to support managing for results.

The UNDP Evaluation Office was peer reviewed under the auspices of the OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation in 2005.[61] Their findings were generally positive and noted the difficulties of evaluation as UNDP moves into softer areas of policy advice. However the review highlighted some critical issues:

- Evaluability of programmes has been severely and consistently constrained by the performance within UNDP's results-based management systems (para 92 et seq)

- Follow-up systems to evaluations were found to be weak (para 144)

- The relative emphasis has been greater on learning as opposed to accountability (page 32)

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59 Office of Audit and Performance Review, 'Full Scope Audit Report: UNDP Country Office in Zambia', 2006, p 30.

60 The response section also allows management to explain/defend progress made vis-à-vis challenges encountered.

61 OECD-DAC, 'Peer Review: UNDP Evaluation Office', December 2005. Conducted as part of Peer Assessment of Evaluation in Multilateral Organizations by OECD-DAC.

Recommendations made to strengthen the role of evaluation as a 'reality check' for the programme and to strengthen evaluation against intended results have been reflected in the Evaluation Policy endorsed by the Executive Board in June 2006. Specific actions include the commitment to issue management responses for all evaluations, the Evaluation Office's maintenance of a system to track management responses and report cases where there are concerns over implementation of the management commitments to senior management, and adoption of a policy of disclosure for all evaluations.

3.3.2 LEARNING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

Learning and technical support are supposed to be provided through interaction between country office staff and the practice forums and networks. The practice forums are not only for communication but also have a wider range of organizational functions including knowledge management, advocacy, partnership building, learning and professional development, and providing programme countries access to substantive resources (such as rosters of experts and co-financing possibilities).

Together with the knowledge networks, the SURFs and RSCs were planned to help transform UNDP into a knowledge-based organization. They provide technical and policy advice, referrals, comparative experiences and issues-based applied research from specialists with in-depth, multi-disciplinary knowledge of the regions in which they operate.

Findings from the country offices highlight difficulties the countries have had in putting this support into practice. The value of SURFs' and RSCs' cyclical support in the design of new projects is recognized, but learning from results at the country level is less clearly articulated. The two strongest examples come from Argentina and Indonesia.

The Argentina programme used a cluster evaluation of four projects linked to the Medical Inputs Procurement System to reassess their approach.[62] One project was subsequently closed, the others were reoriented to new objectives, and the lessons learned were applied to project planning in other provinces. In Indonesia, the 2005 Annual Report describes a process of reducing geographical coverage to focus on provinces with a low human development index and susceptibility to conflict or disasters. The office also cites lesson learning as the force behind a decision to collaborate more with the private sector.

No evidence was found of interaction with the practice areas for lesson learning. Interviews at headquarters with the capacity development, democratic governance and poverty practice areas in BDP reveals a variety of approaches being followed. Provision of advice appears to be demand driven and staff who were interviewed acknowledged that horizontal communication across the practice areas and with other headquarter units, such as the Evaluation Office and the regional bureaux, could be stronger. Too much interaction hinges on personal relationships. A clear tension exists between the view that technical support needs to be responsive to demands and able to cope with a variety of requests from the country offices, and the view that BDP should be more prescriptive about intervention models that demonstrate how to design UNDP-supported actions that lead to programme outcomes.[63]

The Management Review Team looked at the practice areas in 2006. While the basic approach is in place, implementation of the concept still remains a challenge, as shown in the quote below:

"Having successfully introduced the practice architecture, the next challenge will be to strengthen and refine the practice approach and

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62 These procurement projects comprised a significant part of country office resource mobilization at the time.

63 One point of view is that staff in country offices lack the tools to manage for outcomes and, in particular, lack support to plan and implement sound interventions. Some staff argue that only three areas of work have well-developed intervention models with supporting technical advice: capacity development, HIV/AIDS, and support to elections.

its implementation. This is critical, given that country offices, despite their satisfaction with the overall practice architecture, have not received consistent and high quality support across all service lines, and that support has generally not included advice to UNCTs. Concerns have been voiced repeatedly over:

- *The lack of systematic and coherent delivery of policy advisory services;*

- *Inadequate definition of roles and responsibili-ties, and unclear expectations on part of clients;*

- *A high cost and lack of flexibility in the financial model;*

- *Too broad a scope in terms of themes addressed and products and services offered;*

- *A disconnect between knowledge products and services and business processes; and*

- *Products and services not always adapted to national development context.*"[64]

3.3.3 ACCOUNTABILITY

A sound accountability framework would be expected to consist of at least four basic features:[65]

1. Definition of clear roles and responsibilities (accountability relationship)

2. Clear performance expectations and reward systems (transparent incentive mechanism)

3. Credible and timely measurement and reporting of the results achieved (giving account)

4. Mechanism to hold to account (fair review of results, 360-degree feedback, reward achieve-ment or appropriate consequences for under achievement, resolve disputes, apply incentive system, or adjust if necessary)

3.3.4 DEFINITION OF CLEAR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONSHIP)

UNDP undertook a global exercise to reprofile country offices to ensure organizational structures and human resources matched the new work flows and processes introduced by results-based management. This was a good attempt to define more clearly roles and responsibilities of country office staff. Three of the five case-study countries participated in this as described earlier. Job descriptions were modified and staff went through a transparent re-recruitment exercise. However, since then, job descriptions of old staff have remained static while new results-based management tools and guidelines have been released, which have added new roles and responsibilities for staff. The main changes in tools include: phased rolling out of ATLAS starting in 2004, together with gradual develop-ment of additional features; introduction of PRINCE 2 in 2006; and release of the Results Management User Guide in 2006. These have changed workflows and processes, often with significant impact on staff workload, but with no incentives for use of the tools. The nature of work and type of skills needed has also changed as UNDP refocuses itself on upstream policy and legislative reforms and institutional strengthening. Yet the results-based management procedures and reporting tools take up a large percentage of staff time.[66]

A critical issue in defining responsibilities concerns the focus of development results on project outputs or programme outcomes. Results-based management was accompanied by a shift of attention to outcomes, but this has never been reflected in definition of responsibilities. Staff questioned during the country case studies indicated that there is a high degree of consensus

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64 UNDP, 'UNDP Management Review Phase II—Report of the Management Review Team', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, 2007, para 73. Internal UNDP Report.

65 Early drafts of new proposals for an accountability framework prepared by Bureau of Management were in circulation during this evaluation.

66 The view was expressed that senior staff spend a disproportionate amount of time approving transactions in ATLAS. The main point being that results-based management increased, rather than reduced, the work to be done at country offices, yet many of these country offices have a shrinking allocation of core funds and therefore have to cut down on staff fund-ed by the core budget.

on individual responsibilities and accountability for project outputs, but no consensus and varying views about accountability for outcomes. The staff survey found that 61 percent of staff agreed that roles and responsibilities at all levels are clearly set out and known to staff; 79 percent agreed that the Resident Representative/Country Director is accountable for achievement of country programme outcomes (see Annex 8).

3.3.5 CLEAR PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS AND REWARD SYSTEMS (TRANSPARENT INCENTIVE MECHANISM)

At the level of the Resident Representative/ Country Director, the balanced scorecard is considered the predominant oversight instrument for setting targets and assessing country office performance. Senior country office management participates in the setting of some of the balanced scorecard targets while others are set by headquarters. The RCA is also at the core of performance evaluation of country office top management. The Global Staff Survey results are consciously monitored by senior management and internal adjustments are made to improve the relationship between staff and management so that the indicators improve. In addition, the partnership survey, together with many other criteria, contributes to performance evaluation of the Resident Representative.

The Resident Representative or Country Director set targets annually, both for their individual RCAs and for the country office balanced scorecard, a process noted above. The balanced scorecard, Global Staff Survey and Global Partnership Survey are increasingly being used for benchmarking country office performance against others in the same region or beyond. Hence there is always a desire by country offices to measure up to, or outdo others in their group.

Below the level of top management, the balanced scorecard is not cascaded down to units within the country office nor is it used for headquarters units such as OSG or Bureau of Management. The main instrument for cascading corporate targets to lower level staff is the RCA, described earlier in this report.

However, the link between corporate targets and individual staff RCA targets, especially for development results, is weakened by the absence of unit-level workplans. The link between corporate and individual staff targets is clearer and stronger for quantitative targets of resource mobilization, delivery and financial accountability. The quality of targets in RCAs gives the impression that UNDP is preoccupied with mobilization and delivery of non-core funds, whilst development results are secondary.

3.3.6 CREDIBLE AND TIMELY MEASUREMENT AND REPORTING OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED (GIVING ACCOUNT)

In terms of results related to financial and process targets, ATLAS and the Dashboard have enhanced timeliness of measurement and reporting. The inter-linkage of ATLAS and the RCA with the balanced scorecard provides for some transparency in results reporting within the balanced scorecard. The main gap, however, relates to timely and credible measurement and reporting of development results, currently not handled satisfactorily either through the ROAR or through outcome and country-programme evaluation. Without a corresponding pressure from top management for results, the systems tend to exacerbate both a project focus and a reporting culture.

3.3.7 MECHANISM TO HOLD TO ACCOUNT

The end-of-year review of RCA results is participatory, and corporate RCA Guidelines give staff an opportunity to challenge their performance ratings through the Career Review Group. UNDP has three principal mechanisms of holding staff to account: promotion, annual salary adjustment, and contract renewal. Employees funded by core resources have two-year (renewable) contracts, while those paid from extra-budgetary resources usually have one-year contracts.

Top management is aware of the consequences of poor performance through promotion prospects. Employees strive to achieve so that their contracts may be renewed. In theory, these

processes should function adequately. In reality, this accountability framework is weak for a number of reasons.

First, staff contracts and the tenure of office of the Resident Representative/Country Director are both shorter than the period of the CPD and not necessarily in phase with the CPD. Hence accountability for results implicitly concerns only short-term targets—such as resource mobilization, delivery and project outputs—rather than longer-term development outcomes. Since programme staff in many offices are funded from extra-budgetary resources, their accountability for results is aligned more to outputs of projects as opposed to delivering at outcome level.

Second, regional bureaux oversight of the process of measuring and reporting results is weak and hence scores in RCAs, the Global Staff Survey, the balanced scorecard and the ROAR are not immune to strategic manipulation.[67] The quality and reliability of the ROAR is only independently evaluated at the time of the Full Scope Audit.

3.3.8 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR OUTCOMES

There are several challenges in considering accountability for development outcomes. First, there are influences other than the programme itself, such as other programmes and social and economic factors. Second, many outcomes of interest take a number of years to bring about. There is a need to reconcile the planning and reporting period with the longer time frames often required for outcomes to occur. Third, UNDP is, in most instances, only a small contributor of resources in comparison to donors and government. So the attribution of outcomes to UNDP's efforts needs to be carefully constructed.

This issue has been examined in other settings and both New Zealand and Canada have concluded that there is a need for a revised concept of accountability to take into account the fact that outcomes are not controlled by managers and that managing for outputs alone is incompatible with results-based management. In both countries, the case has been made that managers need to be accountable for influencing outcomes rather than achieving outcomes, and for adjusting activities and outputs as a result of tracking performance to date.[68]

There is some evidence that similar ideas are being put into practice within UNFPA. UNFPA describes an 'accountability for outcomes' in their 2007 Strategic Plan as—in relation to the above elements—being accountable for:

- Ensuring financial controls
- Achieving and monitoring outputs
- Monitoring outcomes (global trends and outcome indicators)
- Ensuring outputs contribute to outcomes[69]

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67 It is possible, for instance, for senior management to persuade staff to rate them favourably in the Global Staff Survey in exchange for better RCA scores, which would also boost his/her RCA/balanced scorecard scores.

68 See Annex 6 references for Baehler (2003) and Auditor General of Canada (2002).

69 UNFPA, 'UNFPA Draft Strategic Plan 2008-2011: Accelerating Progress and National Ownership of the ICPD Programme of Action', Executive Board Informal Meeting, 16 May 2007.

Key points

- The 2002 evaluation guidance has led to outcome-level evaluations and country-programme evaluations. In the countries visited, these were not adequately budgeted and were poorly timed to influence new CPD planning.

- Country evaluations conducted by the Evaluation Office have emphasized learning over accountability and not measured performance against stated intentions.

- Results are rarely used for learning at the country level. The practice architecture in BDP is appreciated for technical support, but has poor linkages with functions such as evaluation and has produced few products clearly tailored to business processes.

- The accountability framework linked to results-based management is weak. Roles and responsibilities are generally clear, but targets are self-selected and poorly linked to incentives.

- Tools such as ATLAS and the balanced scorecard have greatly improved timeliness and access to information but are geared towards resources and process. The ROAR lacks substance on results and is rarely assessed for quality.

- Individuals are tied to a project orientation and accountability for outputs. All accountability for outcomes is vested in the Resident Representative/Country Director.

- Results-based management is about managing for outcomes that are not within management control. Accountability can be set for individual staff to manage for outcomes and this approach has been taken up by UNFPA.

- In the 2006 Evaluation Policy endorsed by the Executive Board, commitments were made to strengthen follow-up systems for evaluations.

Chapter 4

DISCUSSION

4.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT

While this evaluation was focused on UNDP's internal arrangements, the wider context within which the results-based management approach has developed has had significant implications. UNDP works in a multilateral context, in which its mandate emphasizes the centrality of national ownership and the role of UNDP in building national capacity.

This implies the need to work through national systems, where feasible. The evidence from the five case-study countries suggests that UNDP programmes invest significant attention in supporting national statistical and poverty monitoring systems for tracking progress towards the MDGs and other development results. However, the case studies show little evidence that staff make comparable efforts to engage with national planning and results/performance systems at the sector/programme level where budgets are allocated and medium-term planning and objective setting occurs.

This suggests two important things. First, UNDP does not systematically look for opportunities to harmonize UNDP's results-based management approach with results-based management approaches in national partner governments (when present). Not only does this reflect a shortcoming in the planning process, but it also signifies missed opportunities for national capacity development and further enhancing national ownership. Second, UNDP has not fully considered the implications of its results-based management approach on broader UN reform initiatives, such as the Paris Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus, which reinforce greater alignment with governments and harmonization between development partners. This requires guidance on how to balance demands on the results-based management system to meet internal needs relative with those imposed by the broader environment within which UNDP operates. This evaluation suggests that country programmes are aware of these challenges but have struggled to find solutions to three issues with little support from the corporate level. These are:

- Who do results really belong to?

- The implications of working through national systems and harmonizing with other partners' results-based management approaches and systems.

- What should UNDP be accountable for? While UNDP accountability is clearly set out in legal agreements, accountability for results remains unclear. This applies at several levels. For example, what accountability for project outputs should lie with programme staff, if the major approach to project implementation is national execution? If results-based management means a focus on results at the outcome level, then how can staff be held accountable for managing towards this?

UNDP has not revised its corporate guidance to clarify such issues. The guidance has not been adjusted to reflect the shift in results-based management approaches towards how to manage *for* results, rather than *by* results. Nor has the guidance been revised to clarify the significance of cost-sharing as a source of funding. The case studies suggest that funding partners at the country level, particularly donors, persist in applying their own performance assessment requirements,

imposing additional transaction costs for both UNDP and national implementing partners.

The country programme staff perceive corporate initiatives as being focused on meeting corporate agenda—particularly the demand for reporting and better financial administration. This, in turn, reflects a corporate response to the wider environment.

More broadly, there has been a general shift in demand from assessing aid effectiveness to assessing development effectiveness. Within UNDP, this has most clearly been seen in sustained demand from some constituencies within the Executive Board for an aggregated measure of UNDP's contribution to development effectiveness. The development of the MYFFs/Strategic Plan and systems suggests that trying to meet this demand has been the UNDP's focus at the corporate level, with little attention to supporting development of stronger management decision making based on results at the programmatic level.

4.2 A CULTURE OF RESULTS IS BEING DEVELOPED

A number of authors and reports have looked at the issue of a 'results culture', what it is and how to get there.[70] Based on this literature, an organization with a strong culture of results:

- Engages in self-reflection and self-examination, seeking evidence on what is being achieved

- Engages in results-based learning, with adequate time and opportunity

- Encourages experimentation and change, including risk taking

Thus, a weaker culture of results might, for example:

- Gather results information, but limit its use mainly to reporting

- Acknowledge the need to learn, but not provide the time or structured occasions to learn

- Undergo change only with great effort

- Claim it is results-focused, but discourage challenge and questioning the status quo

- Talk about the importance of results, but frown on risk taking and mistakes

- Talk about the importance of results, but value following process and delivering outputs

The evidence from interviews in the study countries and at headquarters is that UNDP has made some progress. However, the overall conclusion is that the organization still has a long way to go if it is to build a strong and sustainable results-based culture. This conclusion is in line with that from an assessment of results-based management at UNDP, which noted the need to enhance the culture of the organization: "…an ongoing change management effort to embed a results-based culture in the organization is required."[71] A report comparing results-based management efforts at a number of multilateral development organizations including UNDP concluded that "… [these] multilateral development institutions need to work to amend their internal incentive structures in favour of results."[72]

4.3 FACTORS HELPING AND HINDERING A CULTURE OF RESULTS

The evaluation team conducted force-field analysis exercises in the study countries to seek the views of staff on factors that affect a results focus in UNDP.[73] An example from Zambia is

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70 See text and bibliography in Annex 6.

71 Dalberg and Global Development Advisors, 'Assessing Results Management at UNDP', Commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, p 20.

72 Flint M, 'Easier Said Than Done: A Review of Results-Based Management in Multilateral Development Institutions', Department for International Development (DFID), London, UK, 2002, p 50.

73 The 'force-field' is a visual sorting tool used to categorize issues and stimulate discussion.

Figure 2. Force field analysis of factors for and against a results focus in UNDP Zambia

reproduced as Figure 2. These exercises found a broad consensus around the features summarized in Table 8.

It is interesting how clear the importance of the government is. It can be a positive, as a force seeking results, and a negative, as a constraint where planning and M&E capacity is weak. The tension between country offices and headquarters is also clear, with belief that the results-based management approach is heavily driven by headquarters' needs.

Table 8. Factors supporting and holding back a results focus

Factors Supporting Results Focus	Factors Holding Back Results Focus
■ Government and development partners seeking results ■ Growing professional competence ■ Stronger project management ■ Appointment of M&E specialists or units ■ Increased delegation of responsibilities ■ Interlinked results-based management tools	■ Lack of planning and M&E in government ■ Too much focus on the UNDP headquarters agenda ■ Focus on delivery rather than results ■ UNDP comparative advantage not clear ■ Unclear guidelines and frequent changes ■ Tools tailored to headquarters needs ■ Lack of coordination and poor communication

4.4 STAFF SURVEY ON RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

A wider sample of views was sought in an electronic survey of all staff in the country offices not visited for the evaluation. The results are summarized in Annex 8. The responses reveal a number of interesting views.

- Overall, staff do not think there is a strong culture and leadership for results, although managers (Deputy Resident Representatives and above) take a more positive view that UNDP does encourage risks in pursuit of results and has an adequate budget for results-based management.

- Staff and managers believe that programmes are well focused, organized to deliver outcomes, planned with reference to evidence, and have well understood outputs and outcomes. There is a high degree of optimism.

- The ROAR is clearly seen as the primary tool for outcome monitoring, although managers think it is less effective than staff do. All agree that UNDP monitoring and reporting is not well harmonized with other development partners nor does it make use of government systems (both important features of working in a decentralized way, driven by country needs, and reflected in the Paris Declaration).

- Staff and managers think adjustment is done collectively in discussion with stakeholders (another important feature of delivering through partners) and that there is adequate scope for managers to manage. All also agree that results affect neither the Biennial Support Budget nor programme allocation (including TRAC 2) and that cost sharing reduces scope to allocate resources according to results.

- Responses about evaluation and accountability are less straightforward. The majority of staff agree that roles and responsibilities are well known. Most agree that pressure to mobilize resources and deliver on time is greater than

pressure to achieve results. Staff think resource mobilization is a more important factor for advancement in their RCA, but managers disagree. The Resident Representative/Country Director is acknowledged by all staff to be accountable for outcomes.

- Staff believe they have received adequate training and support from RSCs/SURFs for design and indicators, but are not given enough time to learn from results and evaluations. Managers disagree about support from RSCs and headquarters and think adequate time for learning is made available.

- Both staff and managers think that UNDP's rewards systems do not provide real incentives to strengthen a results culture.

Other supportive evidence includes the 2006 Global Staff Survey finding that "responses to the question 'My office works consistently towards achieving long-term objectives' have hit a low point, with the bulk of the decline coming in country offices."

4.5 EARLY GAINS, LOST MOMENTUM

The shift in strategic direction and new results framework brought early gains to the programme through a clearer expression of UNDP roles and functions. This fostered an improved relationship with the Executive Board that helped prevent further decline in resources. There is good evidence that staff have found strategic frameworks valuable in discussions with both government and development partners. But the clarity of expression in the first MYFF that helped bring these gains was not taken further in subsequent rounds. MYFF 2 was a missed opportunity to improve programme focus, an original aim of the corporate strategy. The draft Strategic Plan is still under debate, but does not take focus much further.

The goals in the results frameworks for the two MYFFs and draft Strategic Plan are too broad to focus UNDP's support in areas where it has a

comparative advantage. UNDP has attempted, in each succeeding results framework, to reduce the number of 'strategic areas'[74] under which it makes a contribution. This approach has had limited impact upon programme composition at the country level beyond some attrition of outlier projects. Therefore, it has not been a successful approach to enhancing focus across the organization into declared areas of comparative advantage.

This is because the strategic objectives have not been used as a set of 'hard boundary' rules, defining what is and is not possible for country programmes to support. Instead, this approach has increased work for staff in country programmes, as retrofitting the programme into each new corporate results framework has become a clerical exercise rather than an approach having real influence on future programme composition.

Enhancing focus would require two things. First, an operational definition of focus for UNDP programmes. Second, change in the relationship between regional bureaux and country offices. To date, this relationship has mainly focused on oversight of processes and resources, with little systematic discussion of programmes' substantive content. This has meant that programme focus is not discussed. However, the low level of core funding and high reliance on non-core funds will mean that the management spotlight needs to be on the degree to which Resident Representatives manage to refocus in this situation. This is where interaction between regional bureaux and country offices should concentrate.

In the Inception Report for the evaluation, a table of benchmarks was introduced as an evaluation tool, drawing on performance standards for results-based management abstracted from three sources: the Joint Inspection Unit of the UN, the Paris Declaration on Aid Harmonization and Alignment, and the OECD-DAC Source Book on Managing for Development Results. Those benchmarks provide an organizing framework for the evaluation assessment. Annex 9 sets out in detail the assessment of each benchmark, drawing on the findings of this study and relevant independent studies.

Progress has been made in most areas. Two of the 21 categories are assessed as fully achieved, 16 are partially achieved and 3 are not achieved. The large number of partially achieved benchmarks reflects the positive work of UNDP in creating the architecture to manage for results. But the large number of partially achieved benchmarks also reflects this evaluation's finding that too many elements of the approach are not functioning satisfactorily. Most importantly, results performance is not informing decisions about programmes or resources across the organization. The evaluation case studies identified managers who have a strong results orientation for decision making, but they make little use of information drawn from UNDP's results-based management systems to support their work and decision making.

It is not possible to use the benchmarks to assess UNDP's status relative to other UN organizations, or the wider population of public sector organizations that use results-based management approaches. This is because benchmarking across organizations requires a database that collates individual organizational performances against a common standard, and the current benchmarks have not been set up in this way.

The literature highlights a number of areas where an organization committed to embedding results-based management should focus while introducing the approach. As shown in Table 9, UNDP has addressed many of the themes that are normally recommended but not in a consistent and sustained manner. This has resulted in a culture of results akin to the 'weak' culture described in section 4.2.

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74 Terminology used for describing the corporate-wide strategic areas has changed with each results framework. Under MYFF2, the service lines have defined these areas.

Table 9. Themes associated with managing for results[75]	
What Should Be Expected	**What Is Found in UNDP**
Demonstrated senior management leadership and commitment	■ The MYFF initiative was, to some extent, an initiative in parallel with the Administrator's Business Plans during 2000-2003 and contributed to a disconnect between the balanced scorecard and the ROAR. ■ Results-based management is not closely associated with any one Administrator. Current results-based management initiatives, though innovative and positive, are associated more with middle/senior management than with top management.
Informed demand for results information	■ All managers acknowledge the importance of results, but management is driven consistently by resource mobilization and delivery targets, rather than results. Some managers claim that's because there are no systems to measure results well, but then don't commit resources to solving that problem.
Supportive organizational systems, practices and procedures	■ Current systems do not provide rewards for risk taking or for achieving results. There is no evidence that the organization values enquiry and reflection. ■ Management at the project level is geared towards outputs, and although managers have the scope and flexibility to adjust operations, the evaluation found no evidence of results being a significant consideration in that process.
A results-oriented accountability regime	■ Accountability is disjointed with a narrow focus on the Resident Representative; accountability at lower levels is limited to managing for outputs.
A capacity to learn and adapt	■ There is little formal learning although the practice networks are lively and widely used. Staff think that not enough time is set aside for learning, though managers differ in this view.
Results measurement and results management capacity	■ There is no recognized institutional home for results-based management in UNDP, nor is there a core of excellence in the organization. Some countries have appointed M&E specialists but there is no corporate policy or incentive to do this.

4.6 MANAGING FOR OUTCOMES WAS CORRECT BUT UNSUPPORTED

The move to manage for outcomes was sensible, but the structure needs to be revisited, given the experience and escalation in UN reform, changing aid-delivery modalities with the growth of sector and general budget support, and the Paris Declaration. A critical question is: Whose outcomes need to be based on country-owned objectives with which the United Nations and

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75 For further elaboration and a bibliography, see Annex 6, 'Results-based management in development organizations.'

other development partners are aligned? This has proved challenging in several ways. Processes to foster alignment between UN organizations' objectives and national objectives have evolved substantially during the period. New rounds of the UNDAF show evidence of improved ownership and alignment. But this has led to a complex multiplicity of higher levels goals: MDGs, country national plans, UNDAF outcomes, UNDP strategic outcomes, and UNDP country outcomes. UNDP's strategies have not simplified this framework and guided resources and monitoring. As a result, the UNDP corporate outcome statement is more of a bland programme aspiration than an accountable management objective. UNDP country offices are at pains to set outcomes that are distinct from UNDAF and other UN organizations, yet in reality UNDP should probably be contributing towards joint outcomes.

The attempt to shift monitoring focus from outputs to outcomes failed for several reasons: projects are a natural unit of management around which resources are configured; project tools are simple and effective; lines of responsibility are straightforward at the project level; and there was an established body of experience at managing projects in UNDP. Collaboration with other development partners takes place mainly at the project level, perpetuating the project as the natural unit of analysis. For projects to contribute to outcomes there needs to be a convincing chain of results or causal path. Despite familiarity with tools such as the logframe, no new methods were developed to help country staff plan and demonstrate these linkages and handle projects collectively towards a common monitorable outcome.

Quality and technical support issues also failed the system. The ROAR was developed for outcome monitoring, but the initial design was too complicated and it became diverted into MYFF reporting—an example of Executive Board pressure shifting the system away from country needs and from managing for results. Selection of indicators and targets is hard (especially in the newer 'soft' areas of policy engagement), and little guidance was available. The UNDP results framework has involved non-standard and changing terminology, which has been difficult to work with in non-English speaking contexts. Results-based management is demanding from a quality perspective, with the need for well stated outcomes, objectively verifiable indicators, timely and accurate reporting for management action, and accountability. Poor initial specification of outcomes and indicators can negate the rest of the system, yet no provisions were made for quality assurance and independent scrutiny beyond infrequent expanded audits.

Faced with these problems—and bearing in mind that development outcomes are slow to emerge, hard to attribute to small UNDP interventions, and in areas difficult to measure objectively—continuing with project-level quarterly and annual reporting on outputs was as good a tool as any and has helped maintain a basis of evidence. Furthermore, project managers have freedom to intervene. Limited resource flexibility tends to mean that adjustments take place within projects rather than within outcomes. In view of the pre-eminence of projects, it is not surprising that accountability is presently at the project output level. This may be satisfactory for programme staff but at Assistant Resident Representative/Deputy Resident Representative/Country Director level, there is a need to move to managing for outcomes.

Evaluation has been under used as a tool of results-based management, although it is becoming more prominent with the advent of outcome and country programme evaluations. It is increasingly inappropriate for UNDP to evaluate outcomes in isolation from government and other development partners. A forward-looking stance for results-based management is that stakeholders, as a group, agree to manage inputs and contributions to a common result above the level of the project output. This leads logically to joint evaluations. Joint programme reviews are already found in countries with high levels of sector programmes and budget support.

A first step would be joint UNDAF outcome evaluations, an area where UNDP is well placed for an active role.

4.7 RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IS MORE THAN TOOLS AND SYSTEMS

To a large extent, systems are in place for effective results-based management, but the challenge is how they have been implemented and the degree to which they have helped foster a 'results culture' within UNDP. This culture of results is emerging, but the question is whether putting in more systems will improve the situation, given clear evidence in Chapter 3 of limited capacity at the country office level and the low level to which results are considered in management decision making. As a result, systems have had the effect of reinforcing a reporting rather than performance culture.

Results-based management cannot work if project level M&E systems are not operating effectively. The decision to remove mandatory M&E requirements in 2002 was a risk, and the result is that M&E capacity is weak in many offices. ATLAS and PRINCE 2 are positive efforts to build capacity at the project level, but there remains a danger that they push towards a process and reporting approach rather than managing for results.

Systems can change behaviour if supervised well, as seen with financial management under ATLAS. But systems don't provide the types of data that managers at the country office level really need in order to manage better strategically. In practice, lack of good data in the reporting system is because those responsible for inputting the data don't see it as something important they are accountable for. It's just one more imposition from headquarters.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings from this study have been summarized in short text boxes at the end of major sections and Chapter 4 has drawn together core strands from the analysis. Elements of a results focus within UNDP predate introduction of results-based management into UNDP, which for this evaluation is taken to have occurred in 1997, when the Administrator's Annual Report called for the establishment of "an overall planning and results management system in UNDP." This was operationalized in 1999 with the introduction of strategic results frameworks across all programme countries and development of the first MYFF. Chapter 2 discusses the subsequent eight-year period of rolling innovation, redesign and change. It is important to understand that this evolution was not guided by a comprehensive design and that there is little consensus within UNDP on what the results-based management approach and systems include.

What is clear is that, over the period, UNDP has established a cycle of setting and revising corporate goals, has introduced improved office systems to manage project finances, has institutionalized the need to report on corporate and individual performance, and has raised awareness about results throughout the organization.

Conclusion 1: The experience of UNDP with introducing results-based management is similar to that of other organizations.

UNDP was one of the first UN organizations to move to a results-based management approach, but the information does not exist to rank its achievements and status relative to other organizations. Review of the literature discussing experiences with results-based management (see Annex 6) strongly suggests that UNDP's experience has not diverged significantly from that of many other public-sector organizations.[76] Overall, this evaluation identifies a significant number of areas where greater progress could have been made, but even with perfect knowledge and the required management commitment, it is unlikely that UNDP could have fully institutionalized a results-based management approach within eight years. Subsequent conclusions and the recommendations therefore focus on the key challenges for UNDP and draw on wider experience on how these may be successfully addressed.

Conclusion 2: UNDP has a weak culture of results.

International experience suggests that an organization with a strong culture of results:

- Engages in self-reflection and self-examination, seeking evidence on what is being achieved

- Engages in results-based learning, with adequate time and opportunity

- Encourages experimentation and change, including risk taking

Adopting results-based management was a logical continuation of management reforms during the

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76 See Box 1, which summarizes challenges identified by the World Bank 2006 Annual Report on Operations Evaluation on operationalizing managing for results.

1990s, and UNDP probably had little option in view of pressure to improve performance from the Executive Board and across the United Nations as a whole. Significant progress has been made on a number of fronts: sensitizing staff to results, and creating the tools to enable a fast and efficient flow of information. Despite considerable investment in development of systems, managing for results has proved harder to achieve. In particular, the strong emphasis on resource mobilization and delivery, a culture supporting a low level of risk-taking, systems that do not provide information relevant for managing for results at the country programme level, the lack of clear lines of accountability, and the lack of a staff incentive structure to judge performance based on managing for development results all work against building a strong culture of results.

Conclusion 3: The corporatist approach has had only a limited effect on development effectiveness at the country level.

UNDP adopted a systems approach to stimulate managing for results, which meant that change was to be driven by the implementation of centrally designed and prescribed systems. The MYFF strategic plans were used to set corporate results frameworks with complex structures of service lines that tried to reflect the diversity of country programmes. These were primarily developed to enable aggregate reporting of UNDP performance to the Executive Board while at the same time creating a clearer focus to the programme.

UNDP has not developed corporate oversight systems that track the degree to which country programmes implemented a results-based management approach, instead focusing on development of systems required for upwards corporate reporting and oversight of processes. Notable is the lack of oversight systems that focus on tracking whether programmes use results to adjust resources (people, money and partnerships) to improve future results.

In practice, the corporate service lines set by headquarters have proved too numerous, with very permissive definitions. This has led to country offices manipulating their programmes to fit into corporate service lines, diverting attention away from country needs, and has made reporting to the Executive Board more about process than substance. There is also little evidence that this approach has significantly affected the shape of country-level programmes, but there is evidence that it has imposed unnecessary transaction costs at country level.

There is little evidence indicating a significant role for results-based management systems in the strategic allocation of resources (people and money) within UNDP.

Conclusion 4: Results-based management has been misinterpreted as not supporting the decentralized way in which UNDP works.

UNDP works in a strongly decentralized way, yet the results framework in the MYFF were not geared to country processes. Emerging new systems under the UNDAF/CPD/CPAP reforms are seen to have the potential to create objectives for UN organizations that are aligned with national plans and responsive to country needs. Working through these structures, UNDP country offices are now able to define realistic outcome objectives that are within UNDP's mandate, aligned to the UNDAF and harmonized with other development partners.

Decentralization has been accompanied by delegation of authority over the CPD. Under current procedures, country programmes are not scrutinized for development potential by regional management, an abdication of responsibility. As a result, evaluation and audit provide the only means to check that country programmes are contributing to corporate goals.

The corporatist top-down approach has inadvertently fuelled concerns that having corporate goals is a means of imposing programmes at the country level. Decisions about the nature and content of country programmes are inevitably reached through a political process between the

Resident Representative/Country Director, the national government and those funding specific projects. The role of results-based management is not to constrain that process but to provide a framework so that UNDP works within its mandate, or areas of competence, and ensure that adequate resources are aligned behind achieving results agreed among partners. Once programmes are agreed upon at the country level, results-based management should provide standards as a basis for dialogue about how to craft realistic outcomes, select objective indicators that can demonstrate progress towards development objectives, and jointly monitor progress.

Conclusion 5: Results-based management systems are not helping build a results-based culture.

There are strong perceptions within UNDP that systems related to financial administration and management have improved. Also, training in PRINCE 2 and ATLAS may be strengthening project administration and management skills, in some offices, where these have declined in the last decade.

However, there is little evidence that systems have led to increased focus on development results (managing for outcomes). ATLAS and PRINCE 2 both deal with information at the project level and the project is at the core of their designs. The RCA does not effectively incorporate key results that reflect successful management for results by individuals. There are also concerns that systems have become overly complex and time-consuming.

Design and use of results systems have mainly focused on producing data to meet reporting commitments to the Executive Board, rather than managing for outcomes, which is central to achieving a results orientation in UNDP at the programmatic level. However, UNDP has failed to develop a system for reporting on its contribution towards development results, which meets the demands of constituencies within the Executive Board. This reflects a number of issues.

The corporate level results frameworks have never included high-level goals with substantive measurable and agreed indicators against which to assess global progress towards meeting the goals. Comparison of the goal-level reporting by UNDP with the objectivity of reporting against the MDGs is stark. UNDP also needs to be contrasted with many other UN organizations, which can rely on objective results data reported through internationally developed systems to discuss whether or not progress is being made under their key mandated areas.

UNDP has developed a reporting system that aggregates whether results will be delivered when expected or not. This approach has limitations: first, because the country-programme outcomes against which UNDP will deliver are poorly defined and there is insufficient consistency across the country programmes on the definition of an outcome; second, because the logic linking outputs delivered by UNDP with achievement of the outcomes, and the higher level objectives found in the corporate strategic results frameworks, is often not explicitly defined and accessible; third, and the main point of interest for the Executive Board, this approach fails to report on UNDP's performance against outcomes for which it is accountable.

Conclusion 6: Managing for results requires leadership.

The importance of leadership to drive results-based management forward has been noted several times in this report. A good example of effective leadership comes from the role of the previous Administrator in fighting the decline in resources. Staff are quick to acknowledge the Administrator's success at shifting the focus of managers. A strong personal commitment was supported by: a single simple and consistent message on resource mobilization, which was used for both internal and external audiences; development of systems to track, measure and report managers' success at resource mobilization; and a clear perceived link between successful resource mobilization and advancement within the organization.

The same drive and visible, consistent senior-level support is needed for results-based management. Four relationships stand out as the most critical: at the Executive Board to ensure the programme is held to account for development results; between the Administrator or Associate Administrator and the directors of bureaux; between directors of regional bureaux and Resident Representatives or Country Directors; and by Resident Representatives/Country Directors within country offices.

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Managing for results is a dynamic process, and many of the issues raised in this report are known to UNDP management and are receiving attention. There is genuine interest and support at the country level for a better focus on results. As noted at the beginning of this report, results-based management is a journey not a destination. The recommendations here are designed to help UNDP navigate that journey.

Recommendation 1: Strengthen leadership and direction.

The first and overarching recommendation addresses the need to capitalize on what has been achieved to date and establish a stronger culture of results. The success of this is not dependent upon tools and systems, but leadership and direction. Sustained commitment by top management, the Administrator and the Associate Administrator is required.

Strong leadership is necessary. Attention to a focus on UNDP's results throughout management processes is necessary. That commitment needs to cascade down through the critical management relationships highlighted earlier. Without that, changes to systems will merely reinforce a reporting culture.[77]

Leadership is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Attention to the issues summarized in Table 9 is also needed: a shift in the accountability framework from process and compliance to results; outspoken commitment by senior management, especially the directors of regional bureaux; a change in dialogue throughout the organization that prioritizes management for development results and addresses how this will be balanced against competing demands such as resource mobilization; time and space for staff to give feedback on and learn from experiences; a shift in organizational practices to take risks and manage for outcomes rather than outputs; and improved capacity to measure results.

Recommendation 2: Global goals, local solutions—Sharpen the role of the strategic results framework.

Management should adopt a results framework that distinguishes more clearly between corporate goals and country programme outcomes.

UNDP's operational role has four focus areas: crosscutting and multi-sectoral challenges of poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development. For these focus areas, objectives should be based on the key results areas, with indicators of substantive development change comparable to those used for the MDGs. The corporate key results areas contain the basis of what could be measurable goal-level objectives, for example: promoting inclusive growth; promoting gender equality; fostering inclusive participation (in governance); and empowering the poor, women and youth. This approach will take time. The Executive Board and UNDP should start with those key results areas where internationally agreed-upon indicators already exist. This will be a major challenge for the programme, but this will provide clear guidance to country programmes about UNDP's overall objectives and help ensure

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77 Experience around the world underscores the important role of top management in creating a focus on results. Examples are quoted in Annex 6.

that debates on performance are about development rather than the quality of reporting.

Identifying and reporting on UNDP contributions should not be an obstacle, any more than it is for organizations reporting country progress against the MDGs. Key to this would be the development of robust models that show the links between country programme outcomes and UNDP contributions with achievement of these high-level objectives. This approach would also strengthen the quality of information reported, since senior management would have a greater interest in ensuring that the information is accurate, as it should also be part of the internal UNDP accountability framework.

The current practice of setting corporate outcome-level objectives and indicators within the strategic plan should end. Instead, outcome objectives and indicators should be set at the country programme level, where they should be linked to UNDAF outcome objectives in the context of agreed-upon national development objectives. Comparable outcome objectives should be set within the regional and global programmes.

This change would reinforce the decentralized nature of UNDP activities and build on UN reforms. The change would have to be supported by a shift in the oversight roles of the regional bureaux, senior management and the Executive Board away from compliance with procedures towards ensuring that country programmes implement robust, results-based management approaches and are designed to contribute to the UNDP focus areas.

Recommendation 3: Support managing for outcomes at country offices.

Managing for outcomes means that managers learn from results and empirical evidence and use that evidence to adjust either the projects under their control or the composition of the portfolio of projects to maximize the contribution of the organization to that outcome. At a minimum, this means that there is a clear link between projects and changes at the outcome level. More sophisticated approaches require managers to demonstrate that they are monitoring the assumptions and risks associated with the projects to ensure that they adjust the project outputs and project portfolio if the assumptions don't hold valid and to manage risks.

Implementing such an approach requires that UNDP consider the wider environment at the country level when defining outcomes. There is a need for improved guidance on how to balance demands on the results-based management system to meet internal UNDP needs with those imposed by the wider environment within which UNDP operates at the programmatic level. This includes dealing with three core issues raised in this report:

■ Ownership of results at the country level

■ The implications of harmonizing other partners' results-based management approaches and systems

■ UNDP accountability for managing for results

The positive effects of some of the newly developed UNDP systems are noted previously in this report, with the caution that they are based predominantly on managing projects. Introduction of new management and reporting systems will impose significant costs on country programme teams, and the country-level perception is that there has been insufficient appreciation at the corporate level of the impact of these costs.

Country offices want to be effective and need support in several ways:

■ A streamlining of systems, aiming for a more user-friendly integrated approach with better prioritization and introduction of new requirements across the organization.

■ Improved practical tools and guidelines to plan how projects will contribute to programme outcomes and to improve the specification of indicators. These are needed to change the configuration of country

programmes so that programme objectives drive the selection of projects that are implemented. This will also help resolve the tension between resource mobilization and development effectiveness.

- A large-scale capacity-development programme to improve staff knowledge and skills.

- Programmes that are designed around proven models of intervention that can be tailored to country circumstances, managed, monitored and evaluated. The BDP should develop documented intervention models of good practice based on lessons from the programme and from development partners, making greater use of evaluations as a source of learning.

- Quality assurance to examine country programmes and assess evaluability. Periodic programme-wide reviews of programme objectives, indicators and measurement arrangements can be used to provide neutral feedback to managers.

- Expanded use of country office outcome evaluation plans geared to joint evaluations with government and development partners.

- Working in a multisectoral environment means that, increasingly, country programmes need to work within the context of medium-term expenditure frameworks, programme budgets and sector-wide programmes. Future outcome evaluations, when possible, should be joint evaluations with government and development partners. As the tools and guidelines are developed, the ROAR should be revised to improve the evidence-base and structure of the report.

Recommendation 4: Expand investment and use of evaluation and performance audit.

Improving country programmes requires attention to detail and development of sound objectives and indicators. A quality assurance process is recommended as an ex ante way of scrutinizing country programmes. This needs to be supported by independent review of processes and compliance, along the lines of the current enhanced audits.

The structure of results proposed here places more responsibility on country offices to develop programmes that respond to country needs and contribute towards global goals. It also frees them from having to fit into centrally determined service lines. The test, therefore, is whether the programmes that are developed contribute to the goals of UNDP. This will require a stronger evaluation function that addresses both learning and accountability. The 2006 Evaluation Policy is a step in the right direction. The challenge now is implementation that supports accountability and the new results management guidance.

These recommendations are intended to be mutually reinforcing and ought to be viewed as a whole. Some recommendations focus on overall framework rather than specific tools or issues. Dealing with leadership, the results framework, programme focus and accountability of the regional bureaux are the highest priority, followed by tools to help country offices chart contributions to outcomes, and quality assurance systems for programme review.

Annex 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE
EVALUATION OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AT UNDP

**CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF
THE EVALUATION**

1. UNDP adopted a results-based management approach in 1999, with agreement of the first MYFF. The goal of results-based management is to enhance UNDP's contribution to development effectiveness. There is considerable organizational interest in reviewing UNDP experience in results-based management as evidenced by the number of reviews that have been conducted on related issues.[1] In addition, recent evaluations conducted by the UNDP Evaluation Office have highlighted persistent issues and gaps related to the operation of results-based management systems and approaches at the country office level. Recognizing the need to take stock of UNDP results-based management experience, the Executive Board approved the UNDP evaluation agenda that included the evaluation of results-based management at UNDP in the 2006 June Session.

2. Though a number of studies of results-based management have been conducted by different organizational units within UNDP and within the wider UN system,[2] these are mostly based on desk studies and interviews with select stakeholders at UNDP headquarters. Moreover, these studies have focused on assessing whether a results-based management system is in place and the quality of the results information reported. This evaluation aims to complement these studies rather than duplicate them and is expected to provide input to the processes underway in the organization to improve results-based management.

3. Therefore, the primary intention is not to assess whether results-based management systems are in place (this is the function of the expanded audits) or how they are used in reporting on UNDP performance to the Executive Board and external audiences (this has been covered extensively in other reviews). Nor is the intention to focus on assessing the quality of the results frameworks used or indicators selected as this has been commented upon extensively in other studies. Finally, the evaluation does not seek to evaluate the effectiveness or impact of individual projects or programmes at the country level. It limits itself to attempting to identify whether or not the contribution of results-based management to enhancing such results and impacts can be identified, based on results and impact information already produced by the country programmes and partners.

4. The main purpose of the evaluation will be to examine the degree to which the results-based management approach adopted by UNDP since 1999 has fostered a results culture within the organization, enhanced

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1   MSI, 'Background Paper on Results-Based Management in Development Organizations', Management Systems International, July 2006, p 6; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Assessing Results Management at UNDP', 15 June 2006.; UNDP Administrator's Office, 'Management and Workflow Review—Phase I', January 2006.

2   Ibid. UN, 'Implementation of Results-Based Management in the UN Organizations', Joint Inspection Unit, 2004; OECD, 'Results-Based Management in Development Co-operation Agencies: A Review of Experience', DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2001.

capacity to make better management decisions, improved focus and efficiency, and strengthened UNDP's contribution to deliver development results.

AUDIENCE AND USE OF THE EVALUATION

5. The evaluation will be presented to the Executive Board in January 2008 and the findings of this study will feed into the ongoing efforts to develop UNDP's Strategic Plan.

SCOPE AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

6. The evaluation will cover the period 1999-2006, although for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of results-based management, the evaluation will examine management approaches that preceded the introduction of results-based management.

7. It will cover all geographic regions and evaluate results-based management at the programme, country, regional and corporate levels. At the country level, the evaluation will assess the results-based management approach under the diverse development conditions in which UNDP functions—including, but not restricted to, programme size, development context such as aid-dependence, and varying capacities for monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

8. The evaluation will address the following: What was results-based management expected to achieve? How was it adapted to suit the changing context of UNDP and the aid environment? What were the intended and unintended results of the results-based management approach at UNDP? What worked (and did not) and why?

9. The evaluation will, to the extent possible, evaluate against the evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness. It is considered that the other commonly applied criteria—impact, value-for-money, client satisfaction and sustainability—are not relevant within the context and availability of data for this evaluation.

APPROACH

10. A theory-based approach, based on an underlying model of organizational change, will be used. This will allow the evaluation to build a cumulative picture of progress along a change pathway.

11. The basic theory underpinning results-based management is based on a systems under-standing of how organizations operate. The way in which results-based management might influence changing behaviour within the organization can therefore be represented as a logic model or theory of change, using simple assumptions about stimulus and response. To be used as a model for evaluation, a theory of change should have certain characteristics:[3]

■ Postulated relationship must appear coherent and logical

■ Planned change must be 'doable' (resources and expertise)

■ Theory of change must be 'testable' (amenable to empirical investigation and verification)

12. The theory of change that will be used has been derived from literature on the introduction of a results-based management system and is presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.[4] The diagram follows the key principles for results-based management at UNDP. It starts with setting strategic goals then continues with planning results to achieve the goals, monitoring implementation for

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3 These characteristics summarize the evaluability of the theory.

4 See 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles', 2000.

Figure 1. Theory of change for results-based management

Managing for Results

Set strategic goals for UNDP

Programme orientation

Goals create a framework to define programmes, organizational structure and management arrangements

Plan specific results to achieve the strategic goals

Primary institutional effects

Align resources (people, money and partnerships) to achieve results

External factors and risks

Monitor implementation for progress and performance

Organizational learning

Timely information goes to decision-makers

Knowledgeable interpretation

Decision-maker responds

Institutional incentives

Secondary institutional effects

Efficient adjustment of resources (people, money and partnerships) to achieve results

External factors and risks

Evaluate strategic goals

Goal

Improved Performance: organizational & development effectiveness

progress and performance, taking corrective management action and evaluating results. The stages in the diagram identify key effects, starting with a clearer orientation of UNDP initiatives followed by realignment of resources towards results, efficient adjustment of resources, and links with knowledge and institutional learning.

13. The implicit goal is improved performance (interpreted here as development effectiveness). Details of the pathway by which results-based management processes that improve management decision making and enhance an agency's contribution to development effectiveness are not clearly specified in the literature. This is also methodologically more challenging compared with the situation in many other agencies, since UNDP programmes are usually implemented by development partners who, in management terms, are at arm's length from UNDP and UNDP's contributions are often in terms of soft assistance, rather than money. This issue will be explored further during the evaluation.

14. Under a systems approach, results-based management should be just one of a number of sub-systems operating within UNDP. The evaluation will therefore examine how this particular sub-system has interacted with other key sub-systems and the impacts of these interactions on how the results-based management sub-system is actually used. The results-based management sub-system may be defined as including:

- The MYFF and ROAR, which focus on development results

- The Balanced Scorecard and Dashboard, which focus primarily on tracking organizational efficiency

15. Supplementing use of the theory-based approach, the evaluation will also seek to assess whether systems are in place and the expected processes are being used in their operation against benchmarks. Benchmarks should be drawn from the following: those benchmarks developed during the UN Joint Inspection Unit's review of results-based management within the United Nations in 2004; material presented in the Joint Venture on Managing for Development Result's Source Book; and the objectives set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

METHODOLOGY

16. Data will be collected using three research methodologies. These are:

- A desk review and analysis of relevant secondary material

- A survey of all country offices aiming to gather data on issues emerging from the desk review and pilot regional case study

- A number of case studies

17. The unit of analysis will be the country office up to the relevant regional bureau and Executive Office. This will allow a better understanding of how decision making is affected by results-based management across the chain of accountability within the organization. This will then be supplemented by an analysis at headquarters level of how results-based management systems were developed and their implementation supported across the organization and how development of the results-based management systems was coordinated with development of other key systems (mainly the human resources, knowledge management and financial allocation and monitoring systems). This approach to defining the unit of analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.

INCEPTION PHASE AND DESK REVIEW

18. The inception phase will include a headquarters-based mapping of issues raised in the terms of reference and preparation of background documentation. A research or technical assistant based in New York will prepare detailed syntheses and extracts of the documentation collected. This activity will support an initial visit by the evaluation team to UNDP headquarters to meet with headquarters units, including the Evaluation Office, management, regional bureaux, Operations Support Group, Bureau of Management and Bureau for Development Policy. This visit will also provide an opportunity to select the five countries for

Figure 2. Clusters of the evaluation enquiries

inclusion in the case studies. At the end of the Inception Phase, the evaluation team will prepare an Inception Report elaborating on the terms of reference and describing how the evaluation will be carried out, refining and specifying the expectations, methodology, roles and responsibilities, and timeframe. This Inception Report will be reviewed with the Evaluation Office, Expert Panel and other UNDP stakeholders and, if necessary amended, before the launching of the main evaluative work.

IMPLEMENTATION, INCLUDING COUNTRY VISITS

19. The implementation phase will include the following activities:

   - Consultations at headquarters aimed at gathering information on the development and implementation of relevant systems and the role of management and the regional bureaux in the management and oversight of country programmes.

   - Visits by members of the evaluation team to the five country programmes. Visits will last for approximately seven to eight working days and will include meetings with the government and non-governmental organizations, as well as the UN Country Team.

   - Development and use of a web-based survey questionnaire aimed at relevant staff in UNDP country offices.

FINALIZATION AND REPORT

20. An advisory group consisting of three to four international experts in results-based management and development evaluation will be the external reviewers and the Evaluation Office will provide the internal review. The review process will involve the following: assessing the feasibility of the terms of reference; assessing the soundness of the methodology proposed by the team; verifying satisfactory operationalization of the terms of reference; addressing reliability and appropriateness of the evidence used in the study; and ensuring findings and recommendations are relevant, based on solid evidence and are within the mandate of UNDP.

21. The preliminary findings for case studies will be presented to the stakeholders in mission

countries for verification of facts and evidence as part of the country missions. Short reports, detailing information and findings from the country visits will be produced and sent to the country teams and regional bureaux to allow discussion and checking of their factual accuracy.

22. The evaluation team will meet subsequent to the country visits to identify major findings prior to drafting of the main Evaluation Report. Preliminary findings and conclusions will be informally presented to UNDP management and also at the June 2007 Executive Board session. The Evaluation Office will then assume responsibility for ensuring that the draft main Evaluation Report is circulated among all key stakeholders (within UNDP, the Evaluation Office and the advisory group) to ensure that findings and recommendations are relevant, based on solid evidence and are within the mandate of UNDP. The team will respond to all comments presented by the reviewers and will provide a rationale for any and all comments which it disagrees with.

23. Final responsibility for the content of the Main Report shall lie with the UNDP Evaluation Office. The final Evaluation Report, along with the management's response to the conclusions and findings, will be presented at the January 2008 Executive Board session.

CONDUCT OF EVALUATION

24. The evaluation will be conducted in accordance to UN Evaluation Group Norms and Standards. These are available online at: http://www.uneval.org/docs/ACFFC9F.pdf.

EVALUATION TEAM

25. An international team of independent consultants supported by national experts and research/technical assistance, as needed, will undertake the evaluation. There will be four to five international team members with an array of experience linked to results-based management. A research assistant will be posted with the Evaluation Office for the preliminary desk review and to support the evaluation team. All team members will be selected and recruited by the Evaluation Office.

Annex 2

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Annex 5

TABLES

Table 1. Timeline of key events in UNDP's adoption of results-based management

Table 2. Results reporting and data capture systems in UNDP (2007)

Table 3. Comparison of areas of work across strategic documents (2000-2007)

Table 4. Evidence of outcome monitoring in five countries

Table 5. Example of outcome reporting from the Indonesia Resident Coordinator Annual Report for 2006

Table 1. Timeline of key events in UNDP's adoption of results-based management	
Year	**Key Event**
1997	A comprehensive 2001 change management process was launched in May 1996. The focus was on overhauling the way UNDP does business, rather than revisiting the mission and mandate, which were covered under Executive Board Decision 94/14. Recommendations made to the Executive Board in DP/1997/16/Add.7 aimed to achieve a client-focused, speedy, learning and growing organization. The following principles specific to results-based management in the action plan were included in this document: ■ Shift to ex-post accountability framework, in which country programmes manage programmes, finances, administration and personnel. ■ CCFs should reflect country-owned strategies within UNDP programming framework, with measurable targets for both impact and results. ■ Enhance programme focus at the country level by establishing broad corporate strategic objectives. ■ Develop overall corporate performance indicators as a basis for establishing objective management performance criteria. ■ Clarify broad strategic areas in which UNDP would mainly work. ■ Evaluation Office should complete development and testing of programme performance indicators for use as basis for better monitoring, feedback and organizational learning. ■ Complete revision and simplification of programming management procedures. ■ Build on recent pilots, decide at the senior level to move ahead with a system for performance management and measurement in programming, finance and administration. (Note this was the work that lead to the Balanced Scorecard). ■ Identify and assign clear responsibility for administering and coordinating the performance management and measurement system. Office of Audit and Performance Review and Evaluation Office should take responsibility for development of performance indicators at corporate and programme levels. ■ Focus functions of the regional bureaux on the holistic oversight of country office performance, a function at present not covered by any unit, and on management support and quality control. ■ Regional Bureau Directors should report to the Administrator through the Associate Administrator. This includes assembling and maintaining a complete, up-to-date overview of UNDP operations and providing corporate management with consolidated monitoring reports. Monitoring country office compliance with defined indicators of management performance, including delivery, resource mobilization and the Resident Coordinator function. ■ Establish the Executive Committee as a collegial body to take management decisions on strategic direction, corporate planning and policy definition.

Table 1 cont-d	
Year	**Key Event**
1998	Use of strategic frameworks piloted in selected UNDP country programmes.
1999	SRFs produced across all UNDP country offices. The principle of managing for outcomes rather than project outputs established, although key initial change identified is the move from managing inputs to managing for project outputs.
2000	■ The Way Forward: The Administrator's Business Plans 2000-2003 (DP/2000/8), presented to the Executive Board. Outlines how UNDP will be transformed into a more results-orientated organization. ■ The first corporate MYFF 2000-2003 is introduced. The MYFF comprised two basic elements: a corporate-level SRF that aggregated information across the SRFs produced by the country offices and an integrated resource framework for the organization. ■ First ROAR produced by country offices based on the 1999 SRFs. This was reporting on performance in the year before the 1st MYFF became operational. ■ Balanced Scorecard introduced across all UNDP country offices in December, focused on measuring how successful offices are at introducing new ways of doing business described in The Administrator's Business Plan 2000-2003. Balanced Scorecard focused around four perspectives: client satisfaction, internal efficiency, learning & growth and financial resources.
2001	The SRF is internalized into the country programme outline, so with each new country programme formulation, UNDP will establish intended outcomes and outputs in dialogue with the government and other national stakeholders.
2002	■ Most mandatory requirements for project level M&E are abolished in UNDP and shift to monitoring at the level of the outcome promoted. Guidance issued at corporate level in 'Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results' that outlined principles that should be used and how they should be applied. ■ Introduction of the RCA in its present approach, with explicit focus on assessment of performance against results. ■ UNDP experience with aligning and assessing country programmes with the SRF leads to identification of six core practice areas: democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, energy and environment, information and communications technology, and HIV/AIDS. Organization-wide knowledge management and technical expertise to support work of the country offices is reorganized around these six practice areas.
2003	Publication of assessment of the 1st MYFF. Key issues and results flagged include: ■ Reduction in number of outcomes from an average of 14 per country programme in 2000 to less than 10 in 2002 is an indicator of increased focus. ■ Decline in the percentage of outcomes drawn from UNDP sample outcomes and increase in outcomes agreed between the country office and partner government from 2000 onwards. ■ Problems in the quality of formulation of outcomes and outputs in country SRFs. ■ Updates on progress tended to be limited to non-key achievements and linked more to outcome indicators than outcomes.

Table 1 cont-d	
Year	**Key Event**
2004	■ Second corporate level MYFF (2004-2007) becomes active. Concept of service lines (30) introduced, which would act as a soft boundary rule on what UNDP should support at country level. Concept of core results (90) introduced, partially to address problems encountered by country offices when identifying outcomes in their SRFs. ■ Requirement for setting of annual outcome level targets introduced. Also expected that country offices would establish baselines at outcome level and also estimated budget by outcome. ■ ATLAS is introduced across all UNDP country offices (January). ATLAS is a computerized ERP system that aims to allow integration of all project-level information in a single system; i.e. budgeting, financial transactions and potentially performance (M&E) information. ATLAS also allows aggregation of all relevant project data by outcome.
2005	ATLAS used as a basis for reporting against the new MYFF, based on self assessment of progress against agreed annual outcome level targets.
2006	■ Balanced Scorecard revised to include 5th perspective tracking results performance that draws data from the ROAR reports. This represents move to link MYFF and Balanced Scorecard results reporting. ■ New guidance on Results Management issued at the corporate level that replaces the UNDP programming manual and Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results. Aspiration is that practice at country office level will reflect the new guidance by end 2007.
2007	Development of the 'Strategic Plan' for 2008-2011, which will succeed the MYFF 2004-2007.

Table 2. Results reporting and data capture systems in UNDP (2007)

	Tool	Date of intro-duction	Use	Updated	Data capture system
Corporate Level					
Planning	MYFF	2000	Set goals and parameters for focus	4 yearly	ROARs
Reporting	MYFF Report	2000	Report on performance to Executive Board	Annual	ROARs
UN Country Team					
Planning	CCA	2000	The analytical foundation of the UNDAF	In advance of UNDAF	CCA provides analytical foundation for the UNDAF. Draws on PRSP monitoring and NHDR, for example.
Planning	UNDAF	Piloted in 1997/1998. Rolled out in 2000.	The programming instrument by which all UN organizations work with governments to define a mutually agreed upon assistance framework.	Beginning of program-ming cycle	CCA
Country Programme Level					
Planning	CPD	2003	The programming instrument in which a government and UNDP set out their planned cooperation over a multi-year period. Responds to both the UNDP MYFF and country UNDAF. Approved by the Executive Board. Includes SRF and intended outcomes.	Beginning of program-ming cycle	Draws on CCA and UNDAF processes. CPD replaced CCF in 2003.
	CPAP	2006	Formal agreement between UNDP and the government to execute the country programme. The CPAP further refines the programme design and capacity development strategies outlined more strategically in the CPD. It details the programme, the major results expected and the strategies for achieving these results and clarifies the arrangements for programme/project implementation and management.	Beginning of program-ming cycle	Based on the CPD. Introduced in 2003, but only mandatory since 2006.
Reporting	ROAR	2000	Annual assessment of performance against intended outcomes. ROARs also report on other aspects of performance, as defined in annual guidance issued. During MYFF 2004-2007 also reported against the emphasis given to each of six 'drivers of development effectiveness' while pursuing results and further information in the 'strategic outlook' section.	Annual	No defined process before 2003. From 2003, M&E reformed to reflect outcome orientation, so ROAR should be based on evidence from annual project reviews, outcome monitoring and project and outcome evaluations. Synthesized during annual programme review. As CPAP was introduced, called the annual CPAP review.
	Country Office Balanced Scorecard	2000	Targets set annually (mostly by head-quarters) and monitor management performance at the country office level.	Annual	Draws on staff and partner surveys, data from financial systems (from ATLAS since 2004). Since 2006, 5th perspective draws on ROAR performance data.

Table 2 cont-d

	Tool	Date of intro-duction	Use	Updated	Data capture system
Outcome Level					
Planning	ATLAS Project Tree	2004	Maps projects and finance against individual outcomes	As needed	ATLAS
Reporting	ROAR	2000	Annual targets set	Annual	Annual review. Setting of annual target against outcome introduced in 2002.
Project Level					
Planning	Project document		The project document serves two essential and related purposes: ■ It specifies the goals and expected results of UNDP intervention. ■ It is the vehicle through which UNDP provides financial and technical support to achieve these results.	Start of project	
	Project Annual Work Plan (AWP)	2002	A detailed reporting on planned activities and results of activities, prepared jointly and signed by the country office and implementing partner ■ Focus on outputs with narrative on progress towards achieving CP outputs 'Umbrella AWP' identifies all projects according to specific partner.	Annual	
Reporting	Annual Project Report (APR)	2002	Product of annual review involving all key project stakeholders and the implementing partner, and focused on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes. All evaluations of the project, or related outcomes should be considered, along with their respective management responses and action plans.	Annual	

Table 3. Comparison of areas of work across strategic documents (2000-2007)

MYFF 2000-2003 Strategic Area of Support	MYFF 2004-2007 Service Line	Corresponding Key Result Area in the Strategic Plan
I.1.1. Promote public awareness and policy dialogue on sustainable human development issues (e.g., through human development reports, regional human development reports, NHDRs and national long-term perspective studies). I.3.1. Promote participation in development planning and other decision-making processes at subnational level. III.1.2. Strengthen capacity of national and sectoral environmental planning agencies to manage the environment and natural resources base.	1.1. MDG reporting	3. Supporting the participatory preparation and implementation of MDG-based national development strategies[5]
I.1.1. Promote public awareness and policy dialogue on sustainable human development issues (e.g., through human development reports, regional human development reports, NHDRs and national long-term perspective studies). I.3.1. Promote participation in development planning and other decision-making processes at subnational level. III.1.2. Strengthen capacity of national and sectoral environmental planning agencies to manage the environment and natural resources base.	1.2 Policy reform to achieve the MDGs	3. Supporting the participatory preparation and implementation of MDG-based national development strategies
II.2.5. Promote entrepreneurship and access of the poor to microfinance services.	1.3 Local poverty initiatives including microfinance	1. Promoting inclusive growth and gender equality[6]
I.1.3. Promote equitable management of globalization with emphasis on social protection for the interests of the poor.	1.4 Globalization benefiting the poor	2. Fostering inclusive globalization
I.1.2. Promote private sector development.	1.5 Private sector development	1. Promoting inclusive growth and gender equality
See all of Goal IV.	1.6 Gender mainstreaming	1. Promoting inclusive growth and gender equality[7]

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5   Reporting is addressed along with planning, monitoring and evaluation under this key result area.

6   There is no specific outcome or reference to micro-finance under this key result area.

7   Gender mainstreaming is also addressed at the outcome level in all poverty key result areas and under the other three development focus areas as well.

Table 3 cont-d		
MYFF 2000-2003 **Strategic Area of Support**	**MYFF 2004-2007** **Service Line**	**Corresponding** **Key Result Area in** **the Strategic Plan**
I.1.2. Strengthen institutional capacity of electoral commissions, systems and processes, and reform electoral laws. I.2.4. Strengthen a culture of good governance, including support to reform initiatives and the promotion of consensus building and tolerance between different political and social parties. 1.3.1. Promote participation in development planning and other decision-making processes at subnational level. I.2.6. Support the capacity of the poor and civil society for self-organization and development of alliances (e.g., community organizations, trade unions, farmers' associations and political parties).	1.7 Civil society empowerment	3. Supporting the participatory preparation and implementation of MDG-based national development strategies[8]
No corresponding specific area of support.	1.8 Making ICTD work for the poor	No corresponding poverty key result area.[9]
2.1.1. Promote pro-poor macroeconomic and sectoral policies and national anti-poverty plans that are adequately financed (e.g., 20/20 initiative).	2.1 Policy support	3. Promoting knowledge and practices about democratic governance grounded in UN values
I.2.1. Develop institutional capacity of parliamentary structures, systems and processes.	2.2 Parliamentary development	2. Strengthening responsive governing institutions
I.2.2. Strengthen institutional capacity of electoral commissions, systems and processes, and reform electoral laws. IV.1.5. Promote voter education for women and gender-sensitivity of elected and appointed officials regarding women's rights.	2.3 Electoral systems	1. Fostering inclusive participation
I.2.3. Reform and strengthen the system of justice, including legal structures and procedures. IV.3.4. Build the knowledge and capacities of law enforcement agents and other officials (judges, lawyers, police, immigration officers, jail wardens) regarding women's human rights under national and international law and treaties.	2.4 Justice and human rights	2. Strengthening responsive governing institutions (justice) 3. Promoting knowledge and practices about democratic governance grounded in UN values (human rights)

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8   Civic engagement is also addressed as a strategic outcome under the democratic governance key result area "fostering inclusive participation."

9   Under democratic governance, the inclusive participation key result area includes an outcome on inclusive communications and e-governance for accountability and transparency.

Table 3 cont-d		
MYFF 2000-2003 Strategic Area of Support	**MYFF 2004-2007 Service Line**	**Corresponding Key Result Area in the Strategic Plan**
No corresponding specific area of support.	2.5 E-governance	1. Fostering inclusive participation[10]
I.3.1. Promote participation in development planning and other decision-making processes at subnational level. I.3.2. Support development of sound decentralization policies, including increased allocation of resources to the subnational and national levels. I.3.3. Develop capacity of local authorities.	2.6 Decentralization and local governance	No corresponding governance key result area.[11]
I.4.1. Promote an efficient public sector that improves (economic) management and provides open access to services. I.4.2. Support awareness initiatives and national programmes that combat corruption and enhance integrity and accountability in the management of public and private resources.	2.7 Public administration reform and anti-corruption	2. Strengthening responsive governing institutions (public administration) 3. Promoting knowledge and practices about democratic governance grounded in UN values (anti-corruption)
III.1.1. Develop and implement legal and regulatory frameworks and policies that link sustainable environment and management of natural resources to critical areas of development. III.1.2. Strengthen capacity of national and sectoral environmental planning agencies to manage the environment and natural resources base. III.1.3. Strengthen national and local capacities for collection, analysis and dissemination of environmental information and statistics. III.1.4. Develop mechanisms for effective mobilization of financial resources for national action in environmental and natural resource management. III.3.4. Development, promotion and exchange of sound environmental practices and technologies (such as those on climate change).	3.1 Frameworks and strategies	1. Mainstreaming environment and energy[12] 3. Adapting to climate change
III.2.1. Implement national and local programmes that promote sustainable management of energy, land, water, forest and other biological resources.	3.2 Effective water governance	1. Mainstreaming environment and energy[13]

10 This key result area includes an outcome on inclusive communications and e-governance.

11 Key result areas 1-3 make reference to 'national, regional and global levels'.

12 This issue is mainstreamed under this key result area.

13 This issue is mainstreamed under this key result area.

Table 3 cont-d		
MYFF 2000-2003 Strategic Area of Support	**MYFF 2004-2007 Service Line**	**Corresponding Key Result Area in the Strategic Plan**
III.2.1. Implement national and local programmes that promote sustainable management of energy, land, water, forest and other biological resources.	3.3 Access to energy services	4. Expanding access to environment and energy services for the poor
III.2.1. Implement national and local programmes that promote sustainable management of energy, land, water, forest and other biological resources.	3.4 Sustainable land management	1. Mainstreaming environment and energy[14] 2. Catalyzing environmental finance[15]
III.2.1. Implement national and local programmes that promote sustainable management of energy, land, water, forest and other biological resources.	3.5 Conservation of biodiversity	1. Mainstreaming environment and energy[16] 2. Catalyzing environmental finance[17]
No corresponding specific area of support.	3.6 Control of ozone-depleting substances and Persistent Organic Pollutants	2. Catalyzing environmental finance[18]
V.2.1. Promote preventive development and a culture of peace. V.2.2. Support the implementation of peace agreements.	4.1 Conflict prevention and peacebuilding	1. Reducing the risk of conflicts and natural disasters
V.3.1. Strengthening social capital by ensuring support for affected populations, including refugees and the displaced, and their access to sustainable livelihoods and socioeconomic recovery through integrated area-based approaches and/or specific reintegration programmes.	4.2 Recovery	2. Restoring the foundations for development after crisis
V.2.3. Strengthen public security, civil protection and policing and promote disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, and conversion of military assets to civilian use.	4.3 Small arms, disarmament	No corresponding CPR key result area.[19]

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14 This issue is mainstreamed under this key result area.

15 This key result area includes sustainable environment and management.

16 This issue is mainstreamed under this key result area.

17 This key result area includes biodiversity conservation in list of environmental concerns.

18 This key result area includes an outcome dealing with Montreal Protocol financing.

19 Key result area on restoring foundations for development after crisis encompasses these issues under outcome 'security situation stabilized'.

Table 3 cont-d		
MYFF 2000-2003 Strategic Area of Support	**MYFF 2004-2007 Service Line**	**Corresponding Key Result Area in the Strategic Plan**
V.3.2. Promote ratification and implementation of the Ottawa Convention to ban land mines, and build national capacity for comprehensive mine action programmes, ensuring application of standards and appropriate technologies.	4.4 Mine action	No corresponding CPR key result area.[20]
V.3.1. Support implementation of the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation, and mainstream vulnerability analysis and hazard-mapping into all development policies. V.3.2. Develop institutional capacity for disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation, including preparation of national/local plans, improved early warning systems, trained human resources and increased interregional/national information exchanges.	4.5 Natural disaster reduction	1. Reducing the risk of conflicts and natural disasters (prevention) 2. Restoring the foundations for development after crisis (response)
No corresponding specific area of support.	4.6 Special initiatives for countries in transition	2. Restoring the foundations for development after crisis
II.1.3 Strengthen capacity of governments and vulnerable groups to take preventive measures and reduce the impact of health epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS.	5.1 HIV/AIDS and human development	4. Mitigating the impact of AIDS on human development (poverty focus area)
II.1.3 Strengthen capacity of governments and vulnerable groups to take preventive measures and reduce the impact of health epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS.	5.2 Governance of HIV/AIDS responses	4. Strengthening governance of AIDS responses (Governance Focus Area)
II.1.3 Strengthen capacity of governments and vulnerable groups to take preventive measures and reduce the impact of health epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS.	5.3 HIV/AIDS, human rights and gender	4. Mitigating the impact of AIDS on human development (poverty focus area)[21]

20 Key result area on restoring foundations for development after crisis encompasses these issues under outcome 'security situation stabilized'.

21 This key result area includes one outcome dealing with human rights and another outcome dealing with gender related vulnerability.

ANNEX 5. TABLES

Table 4. Evidence of outcome monitoring in five countries					
Aspect of Outcome Monitoring	**Argentina**	**Egypt**	**Indonesia**	**Moldova**	**Zambia**
Baseline data to describe the problem or situation before the intervention	The Human Development Index (a UNDP product) provides some data at the national and provincial levels. There are new initiatives to carry out pre-appraisal in a systematic fashion, but all at the project level.	Baseline data appears as a brief situation statement and has become more detailed in the most recent CPD.	The CCA provides a rigorous analysis of the baseline development situation. The depth of the situation analysis in the CPD is much lighter given the restrictive page length of the document, so the three documents have to be read together. The development baseline situation is not necessarily the same as the baseline situation for the outcome specified. No outcome baseline assessment was undertaken for SRF 2001-2003 and 2004-2005. The current CPD/CPAP (2006-2010) is the first to explicitly attach an annex on the SRF with a column on "outcome indicators, baseline situation and targets."	The level of baseline data around individual outcomes is mixed. This partly reflects the fact that work is mainly organized around projects and programmatic areas. It also reflects a compara-tive lack of funds to carry out necessary pre-appraisal and variation in levels of expertise in the office.	Baseline data appeared as a brief situation statement in CCF1 and CCF2 and has become more detailed in the most recent CPD which is now based on the Fifth National Development Plan which has an M&E framework and Key Performance indicators in Table 38.2 on page 372 for all sectors.
Indicators for outcomes	At the highest level, indicators for outcomes are used for reporting (progress against targets) in the annual ROAR.	Indicators are shown for outcomes since 2003.	Some of the indicators for outcomes specified in the current CPAP (2006-2010) are set too high at long-term development goal (impact) level and would be difficult to link to the contribution of project activities that UNDP plans to undertake. An example is the component on "strengthening human development to achieve the MDGs" where outcome indicators relate to national poverty statistics. Indicators for other outcomes, for example, under the governance component, are not SMART, e.g., "participatory processes and mechanisms in democratic governance adopted."	Indicators for outcomes are defined, but are only used for reporting against in the annual ROAR.	Based on the Fifth National Development Plan. Baseline indicators are shown for outcomes with 2005 as the baseline and 2010 as the target year.
Data collection on outputs and how/ whether they contribute towards achievement of outcomes	Data are collected on outputs, but rarely on how they contribute to outcomes. The annual planning and target setting exercise for ROAR may make a link (reinforced by the quarterly monitor-ing of ROAR), but only implicitly. 'Attribution' is an issue for evaluation and no 'outcome' evaluations are being conducted.	The working features on ATLAS, for instance, are 90 percent related to financial reporting and 10 percent related to substan-tive project management.	This has improved significantly under the current CPAP (2006-2010). The Project Database developed by the PMEU captures project-specific information on outputs and their contribution to outcomes on a quarterly basis and this information is used to eventually prepare the end of year MYFF Report (ROAR). Progress report format in ATLAS is not used. Joint CPAP Review Meetings are held quarterly as well as annually and the latter are attended by members of other UN organizations as well.	The working features on ATLAS, for instance, are 90 percent related to financial reporting and 10 percent related to substan-tive project manage-ment. Performance reports in ATLAS are seen as a require-ment for headquar-ters and are not used in discussing progress with partners. Data are collected on outputs, but rarely on how they contribute to outcomes.	The working features on ATLAS, for instance, are 90 percent related to financial reporting and 10 percent related to substantive project management. But for the new CPD, the national sources of data will be used for outcome results assessment.

Table 4 cont-d					
Aspect of Outcome Monitoring	**Argentina**	**Egypt**	**Indonesia**	**Moldova**	**Zambia**
More focus on perceptions of change among stakeholders and more focus on 'soft' assistance	More focus on 'substantive' projects and changing relationship with national counterparts, but focus still largely on delivery of inputs and outputs.	Policy or behavioural change indicators may not be included in national statistics.	Policy or behavioural change indicators are not included in national M&E systems. UNDP is assisting the National Aids Commission in developing and implementing an effective M&E system that draws on local expertise and capacities resident at the district through to national level. In the absence of qualitative data in national M&E systems, individual cooperating partners commission their own impact studies, often at high cost.	No. Most focus is delivery of inputs and outputs.	Policy or behavioural change indicators may not be included in national statistics.
Systematic reporting with more qualitative and quantitative information on the progress of outcomes	The ROAR provides information on progress against targets, though it has been more of a reporting tool. The recent quarterly monitoring by the country office does though assist the ability to document, review and update targets, an annual exercise.	The ROAR is more of a reporting than monitoring tool.	The Project Database systematized output reporting mainly to simplify compilation of the ROAR. The ROAR is more of a reporting than monitoring tool. There was no feedback given by Regional Bureau to the country office on the 2006 ROAR.	No.	The ROAR is more of a reporting than monitoring tool. However, the NHDR and the MDG reports are more at outcome level than output level.

Done in conjunction with strategic partners	More dialogue with national counterparts around monitoring, but still at activity and output level.	Support to the preparation of the NHDR and MDG reporting has strengthened national systems and introduced a sense of results focus on the part of the government.
		    Country office is also drawing from periodic national surveys (such as the National Demographic Health Survey (DHS)), Joint planning, Annual Tripartite Reviews and national expertise.
			Support to the preparation of the NHDR and MDG reporting has strengthened national systems. A DEVEINFO MDG monitoring tool is being developed as a key monitoring tool for UNDAF 2006-2010. Monitoring of progress towards achievement of the UNDAF outcomes was planned to be undertaken through Annual UNDAF outcome reviews, a mid-term UNDAF review and annual field visits by UNDAF outcome groups, but that plan has not been not thoroughly followed. Joint CPAP reviews (quarterly, half yearly and annually) are drawing on national expertise and involve field visits.	No.	Support to the preparation of the NHDR and MDG reporting has strengthened national systems and introduced a sense of results focus on the part of the government.
					    Country office is also drawing from periodic national surveys, such as the National Demographic Health Survey (DHS). Joint planning and Annual Programme Reviews draw on national expertise and operational information.[22]

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22 The National HIV/AIDS Joint Programme Annual Reviews for 2004, 2005 and 2006 relied mostly on information from government, civil society and partner implementing agencies at the national level.

Table 4 cont-d					
Aspect of Outcome Monitoring	**Argentina**	**Egypt**	**Indonesia**	**Moldova**	**Zambia**
Captures information on success or failure of UNDP partnership strategy in achieving desired outcomes	Any information monitored at project level and reflects inputs and output monitoring.	Results of small projects are at a level too low to be captured in national or regional statistics.	Quarterly CPAP Review Meetings, Bimonthly Technical Meeting, and Quarterly Joint Field Visits are able to capture and discuss technical and administrative glitches that affect smooth implementation and achievement of outputs and, due to their focus on projects, to a smaller extent outcomes.	No.	Results of small projects are at a level too low to be captured in national or regional statistics. But results were reflected in the Joint Programme Annual Review Reports.

Table 5. Example of outcome reporting from the Indonesia Resident Coordinator Annual Report for 2006[23]			
Outcome Area	**Expected Outputs**	**Performance Indicators**[24]	**Actual Outputs at Year End**

UNDAF Outcome 2	**Sub-outcome:** Promotion of democracy and partici-pation through civic education in the formal and non formal sectors and mass media (lead agency UNESCO).
	■ Series of training on the importance of press freedom for govern-ment officials, members of parliament and judiciary officials.
	■ Training for media professionals on civic/participatory journalism, with focus at district levels.
	■ Strengthening of public-service broadcasting through series of training on management and journalism skills.
	■ Support for community radios at district and sub-district levels to enhance public partici-pation in voicing their aspirations.
	■ Seminar on importance of the freedom of the press in strengthening democratization.
	■ Training for media professionals to promote democracy, transparency, and accountability.
	
	Sub outcome: Partnership for governance reform (lead agency UNDP).
	■ Support to local governments
		■ Training organized in at least 5 major cities in Indonesia, with minimum total partici-pants of 250 people.
		■ Training for media professionals are organized in at least 5 districts in Indonesia, with minimum total participants of 100 people.
		■ Training for public broadcasters (TVRI and RRI) in central office in Jakarta as well as at provincial levels.
		■ Minimum 5 trainings will be organized, with number of total partici-pants of 60.
		■ At least one training will be organized, with total participants of 15 people (15 managers and 15 reporters).
		■ At least two seminars will be organized (one for Aceh and one for North Sumatera), with number of total partici-pants about 200.
		■ At least 50 journalists from Aceh and from North Sumatera will be trained.
		  • In 10 Kabupaten/Kota in 5 Provinces
		  • Number of multi-stakeholder forums
		  • Increased capacity of associations (exact indicators TBC)
		  • 6 telecentres
			■ Trainings were organized in the cities of Jambi, Palembang, Medan, Batam, and Bandung, with about 120 people total partic-ipants. (UNESCO)
			■ 300 radio and TV journalism students graduated from the School for Broadcast Media (SBM).
			■ Series of trainings were organized in Aceh, focused on radio reporters from about 20 radio stations in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. (UNESCO)
			■ One training was organized for 15 TVRI reporters. (UNESCO)
			■ Trainings were organized in three radio stations in Kendal, Pati and Bantul with about 20 radio people as total partici-pants. (UNESCO)
			■ Not materialized due to the unavailablity of funds.
			■ Not materialized due to the unavailablity of funds.
			(i) Poverty Reduction Strategy and action plans have been drafted in 10 districts in 5 provinces
			(ii) Participatory development planning and health

23 UNDP, 'Indonesia Resident Coordinator Annual Report for 2006', Indonesia.

24 Formatting or referencing of performance indicators and actual outputs to link to expected outputs has not been altered from the original document.

Table 5 cont-d			
Outcome Area	**Expected Outputs**	**Performance Indicators**	**Actual Outputs at Year End**
	mainstreaming pro-poor policy in local development planning. ■ Promotion of multi-stakeholder forums for local development issues. ■ Support to associations of local government. ■ Increased availability of information and access to communications in rural areas. ■ Support to completion of regulations that define the Law 32 / 2004 as presidential decree and acceptance by national and regional stakeholders. **Sub outcome:** National MDG Monitoring and Sectoral Needs Assessment and Plan 2006- 2015 (lead agency UNDP). ■ Pilot MDG joint UN and interested donor programme in NTT province. **Sub outcome:** Review of the National Action Plan for Human Rights followed by programme of UN support to the implementation of the action plan and monitoring (lead agency UNDP). ■ Recruitment of senior UN human rights advisor. ■ UN joint human rights action plan prepared. ■ Support to establishment of Communications and Information Centre established in the	established serving at least 1,200 people • Regulations finalized ■ Joint programme document prepared ■ Plan prepared and endorsed by UN Country Team, Communications and Information Centre established • Minimum 10 new signatories • GC secretariat run by signatories • Two workshops on implementation of GC principles ■ Indonesian guidelines on GC principles and implementation published • Increased level of civic awareness among citizens and number of citizens participating in political processes • Secretariat in place • Electoral system, processes and mechanisms enhanced; number of national, regional and local parliaments participating in project ■ Plan produced and endorsed by the UN Country Team	sector through multi-stakeholder forums have been developed in 5 provinces. (iii) 8 telecentres have been established in 6 provinces, serving 2500 direct users and 60 community groups. (iv) Final draft has been sent to the President's office. ■ Needs assessment has been conducted. A concept note has been prepared for piloting an area based preparatory assistance project. ■ Interviews with short-listed candidates have been conducted, panel has taken a final decision and recruitment of advisor is under process. ■ No development due to absence of HR Advisor ■ Cappler project document has been revised and an architect identified; curriculum development initiated 1. 37 new signatories joined the Global Compact 2. Outreach events were conducted in Jakarta and Palembang 3. Local Network for Global Compact established

Table 5 cont-d			
Outcome Area	**Expected Outputs**	**Performance Indicators**	**Actual Outputs at Year End**
	Department of Law and Human Rights Advisor recruited. **Sub outcome:** Promoting good corporate governance through the Global Compact (lead agency UNDP). Support to Global Compact in Indonesia to: ■ Increase participation. ■ Strengthen secretariat in APINDO to run Global Compact activities. ■ Raise awareness. **Sub outcome:** Programme to increase participation of Civil Society Organizations in the development of national pro-poor planning and democratic processes (lead agency UNDP). ■ Support to 'Democracy in Action' initiatives. ■ Deepening Democracy Secretariat established. ■ Enhanced capacity of essential democratic institutions. **Sub outcome:** Review of UN conventions, treaties and protocols and UN action plan to support the government in implementation and the parliament in the ratification process (lead agency ILO). ■ Production of a five-year plan of action to support Indonesia's commitments to UN instruments.		4. 1 workshop on 'orientation to Global Compact' conducted to signatories (i) Efforts to raise public awareness of peace, pluralism, national unity, and civic rights have been carried out, involving youths, religious organizations, mass media organizations, academia, and government officials as target group. (ii) Deeping Democracy Secretariat has not been established yet. (iii) Electoral support decided to focus on Pilkada and support for process to draft required legislation in preparation for 2009 elections. ■ Preliminary work for the review has been conducted. ■ UNIFEM supported • Inter Governmental cooperation in implementing CEDAW principles. • Non-governmental organizations to promote and monitor the implementation.

RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

BUILDING A CULTURE OF RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

There are numerous references in UNDP documents to the need for a transformation to a new culture of results:

- "Establish an enabling environment for change to a results-based organization…"[25]

- "A culture of accountability for results is at the heart of recreating UNDP…"[26]

- "RBM [results-based management] must aim at … fostering a … culture of performance."[27]

Thus in the minds of those developing the UNDP results-based management approach—and consistent with other observers on what is needed for effective results-based management—fostering a 'culture of results' is at the heart of implementing results-based management. This note addresses what a culture of results entails and how such a culture can be developed and maintained.

A CULTURE OF RESULTS

A number of authors and reports (see references in Annex 4) have looked at the issue of a results culture, what it is and how to get there. Based on this literature, an organization with a strong culture of results:

- Engages in self-reflection and self-examination:
  - Deliberately seeks evidence on what it is achieving[28]
  - Uses results information to challenge and support what it is doing[29]
  - Values candor, challenge and genuine dialogue[30]

- Engages in results-based learning:
  - Makes time to learn[31]
  - Learns from mistakes and weak performance[32]
  - Encourages knowledge transfer[33]

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25 UNDP, 'Change Management: UNDP 2001', 1997.

26 UNDP, 'The Way Forward: The Administrator's Business Plans, 2000-2003', 2001.

27 UNDP, 'RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles', 2000.

28 Botcheva L, White CR, Huffman LC, 'Learning Culture and Outcomes Measurement Practices in Community Agencies', *American Journal of Evaluation,* 2002, 23(4): 421-434; General Accounting Office, 'An Evaluation Culture and Collaborative Partnerships Help Build Agency Capacity. Program Evaluation', Washington, DC, 2003; and Smutylo T, 'Building an Evaluative Culture', International Programme for Development Evaluation Training, World Bank and Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 2005.

29 Hernandez G, Visher M, 'Creating a Culture of Inquiry: Changing Methods—and Minds—on the Use of Evaluation in Nonprofit Organizations', The James Irving Foundation, 2001.

30 David T, 'Becoming a Learning Organization', Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2002.

31 Ibid.

32 Barrados M, Mayne J, 'Can Public Sector Organizations Learn?', *OECD Journal on Budgeting,* 2003, 3(3): 87-103; and Goh S, 'The Learning Organization: An Empirical Test of a Normative Perspective', *International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behaviour,* 2001, 4(3&$):329-355.

33 David T, 'Becoming a Learning Organization', Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2002; Goh S, 'The Learning Organization: An Empirical Test of a Normative Perspective', *International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behaviour,* 2001, 4 (3&$):329-355; and Hernandez G, Visher M, 'Creating a Culture of Inquiry: Changing Methods—and Minds—on the Use of Evaluation in Nonprofit Organizations', The James Irving Foundation, 2001.

- Encourages experimentation and change:
  - Supports deliberate risk taking[34]
  - Seeks out new ways of doing business[35]

Thus, a weaker culture of results might, for example,

- Gather results information, but limit its use mainly to reporting

- Acknowledge the need to learn, but not provide the time or structured occasions to learn

- Undergo change only with great effort

- Claim it is results focused, but discourage challenge and questioning the status quo

- Talk about the importance of results, but frown on risk taking and mistakes

- Talk about the importance of results, but value following process and delivering outputs

A CULTURE OF RESULTS AND UNDP

Based on the headquarters interviews, there is limited evidence of a results culture in UNDP, especially contrasted with interviews of several other sister organizations. There is some other evidence supporting this perception.

In summarizing the Global Staff Survey, it was noted that "responses to the question 'My office works consistently towards achieving long-term objectives' have hit a low point, with the bulk of the decline coming in COs [country offices]."

The Dalberg Global Development Advisors assessment of results-based management at UNDP noted the need to enhance the culture of the organization: "First, an ongoing change management effort to embed a results-based culture in the organization is required."[36] In a 2002 report comparing results-based management efforts at a number of multilateral development agencies, including UNDP, Flint concluded that " … [these] multilateral development institutions need to work to amend their internal incentive structures in favour of results."[37]

While it is difficult to generalize, it appears that there is not a strong results culture in UNDP. Results-based management is seen mainly as a reporting regime, rather than a results-informed management regime.

FOSTERING A CULTURE OF RESULTS

Fostering a culture of results is a significant challenge for an organization. There are a number of factors that are needed to build such a 'culture of inquiry:'[38]

- Demonstrated senior management leadership and commitment

- Informed demand for results information

- Supportive organizational systems, practices and procedures

- A results-oriented accountability regime

- A capacity to learn and adapt

- Results measurement and results management capacity

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34 Pal LA, Teplova T, 'Rubik's Cube? Aligning Organizational Culture, Performance Measurement, and Horizontal Management', Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 2003.

35 General Accounting Office, 'An Evaluation Culture and Collaborative Partnerships Help Build Agency Capacity. Program Evaluation', Washington, DC, 2003; Goh S, 'The Learning Organization: An Empirical Test of a Normative Perspective', *International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behaviour*, 2001, 4(3&$):329-355; and Smutylo T, 'Building an Evaluative Culture', International Programme for Development Evaluation Training, World Bank and Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 2005.

36 Dalberg Global Development Advisors, 'Assessing Results Management at UNDP. Commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs', New York, NY, 2006, p 20.

37 Flint M, 'Easier Said Than Done: A Review of Results-Based Management in Multilateral Development Institutions', UK Department for International Development (DFID), London, United Kingdom, 2002, p 50.

38 Adapted from Auditor General of Canada (2000) and OECD-DAC (2006).

This report summarizes the discussion at a two-day workshop held in December 2004 at the World Bank in Washington, DC, with participants from both developed (Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States) and developing countries (Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Mexico, Spain, Tanzania, Uganda).[39] In addition to the final report from the workshop, the country papers are available on the web site. Among the conclusions of the participants:

The Use of Both Top-Down and Bottom-Up Support . It was clear from the experiences of countries with an outcome approach that support from both the top political and administrative levels, as well as from middle management and staff within government, are essential for the approach to work. We consider each of these below.

The Role of Political and Senior Management Commitment and Direction. A common theme reinforced by experiences in many different jurisdictions is the necessity of top-level support for an outcome orientation. As the previous section indicated, a political imperative to produce and to be able to demonstrate results that are of central importance to government is a prerequisite for any reform effort.

   Thus, support from the top is essential to provide legitimacy and priority to an outcome orientation. This requires an expressed and ongoing commitment from senior-level officials as well as from the political level. Such commitment can provide direction and coordination to the reform effort as well as the necessary clout and profile to ensure attention and action. Top-level support can aid in garnering the necessary resources and system-wide supports and in providing overall coordination. As with any other major organizational change effort, senior-level commitment is required to address the inevitable challenges that are sure to come up, to continue the momentum, and to make adjustments and changes to the approach as needed.

   This commitment needs to be backed by actions as well as words. Otherwise, it is not likely to be taken seriously. For example, how much attention is given to an outcome approach vis à vis other priorities? How is it resourced and supported? How much recognition is given to those who undertake an outcome approach? And perhaps most important of all, how is it used? Does it represent an actual shift in how management and policy are carried out, or is it perceived as just a paper exercise?[40]

   "Senior-level support and commitment to an outcome focus has been provided in a number of different ways. For example, in Egypt the process was led personally by the minister of finance, who met directly with those most closely involved on a bimonthly basis. In Colombia, the president himself provides the leadership, talking about results wherever he goes. The outcome approach in Mexico is closely related to the president's political agenda. But in other countries, such as the United States, support comes from across the political spectrum. In some countries, legislative or even constitutional changes may be needed to facilitate the new out-come focus, whereas this is not necessary in other jurisdictions."[41]

   A study by the Auditor General of Canada[42] reviewed the results-based management experiences in a number of organizations in the United States and the Canadian federal government that had made significant progress in results-based management. Among its findings were that:

   "Managing for results takes hold when senior management visibly supports the approach and is poised to take advantage of opportunities to move towards a focus on results. Our cases and the review of experience of other jurisdictions suggests that senior management commitment and leadership is the most common and perhaps most important feature of successful managing for results."[43]

In each of these areas, based on the literature and identified good practices, there are a number of approaches that can be used to foster a culture of inquiry.[44]

Demonstrated senior management leadership and commitment. All discussions of implementing results-based management identify strong senior leadership as essential. Providing visible

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39 Perrin B, 'World Bank Roundtable—Moving from Outputs to Outcomes: Practical Advice from Governments Around the World', World Bank and the IBM Centre for The Business of Government, Managing for Performance and Results Series, Washington, DC, 2006. Available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/oed/outcomesroundtable/.

40 Ibid, p 23.

41 Ibid, p 24.

42 Auditor General of Canada, 'Moving Towards Managing for Results', Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 11, Ottawa, Ontario, 1997. Available online at: http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/ch9711e.html.

43 Ibid, pp 11-16.

44 Discussed here are those practices directly aimed at building a culture of results.

and accountable leadership through actions such as identifying and supporting results-based management champions, walking the talk (providing results-based management-consistent leadership), and demonstrating the benefits of results-based management.

Informed demand for results information. A culture of results can be greatly enhanced if managers at all levels, especially senior levels, consistently and routinely ask for results information in planning, implementing and reviewing contexts. In this way, results information becomes a routine and natural part of managing the organization.

Supportive organizational systems, practices and procedures. Having the right formal and informal incentives in place is essential to fostering a culture of results. Rewarding good managing for results—such as undertaking self-evaluation, taking informed risk and experimentation, and sharing information on results—demonstrates that the organization does indeed value inquiry and reflection. Managers seeking to achieve outcomes need to be able to adjust their operations as they learn what is working and what is not.[45] Managing only for planned outputs does not foster a culture of inquiry about the impacts of delivering those outputs.

A results-oriented accountability regime. If managers are simply accountable for following procedures and delivering planned outputs, there is little incentive to seek evidence on the outcomes being achieved. If managers are held accountable for whether or not they achieve outcomes, they will seek to ensure accountability only for outputs. There is a need to adapt the accountability regime to include the idea of influencing outcomes, being accountable for outcomes, and rewarding good managing for outcomes.[46]

A capacity to learn and adapt. Learning from empirical evidence on past performance is what a results culture is all about. Deliberate efforts are needed to build a capacity for and acceptance of learning in an organization. Creating institutionalized learning events,[47] providing group learning opportunities,[48] supportive information sharing and communication structures,[49] making the time to learn and providing adequate resources to do so,[50] seeing mistakes as opportunities to learn[51] and focusing on best practices[52] are all ways to help foster a culture of learning.

Results measurement and results management capacity. Building a culture of results in an organization requires the capacity to articulate and measure results, and a capacity to understand how results information can be used to help managers manage. Some level of in-house professional results-based management support is usually required to assist managers and staff. Senior managers and managers need to understand results-based management and how

45 General Accounting Office, 'Results-Oriented Cultures: Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other Countries' Performance Management Initiatives', US General Accounting Office, Washington, DC, 2002.

46 Auditor General of Canada, 'Modernizing Accountability in the Public Sector', Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 9, Ottawa, Ontario, 2002; and Baehler K, 'Managing for Outcomes: Accountability and Thrust', *Australian Journal of Public Administration,* 2003, 62(4): 23-34.

47 Barrados M, Mayne J, 'Can Public Sector Organizations Learn?', *OECD Journal on Budgeting,* 2003, 3(3): 87-103; and Moynihan DP, 'Goal-Based Learning and the Future of Performance Management', *Public Administration Review,* 2005, 65(2): 203.

48 David T, 'Becoming a Learning Organization', Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2002.

49 Cousins B, Goh S, Clark S, Lee L, 'Integrating Evaluative Inquiry into the Organizational Culture: A Review and Synthesis of the Knowledge Base', *Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation,* 2004, 19(2): 99-141.

50 David T, 'Becoming a Learning Organization', Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2002.

51 Barrados M, Mayne J, 'Can Public Sector Organizations Learn?', *OECD Journal on Budgeting,* 2003, 3(3): 87-103; and Michael D, 'Governing by Learning: Boundaries, Myths and Metaphors', *Futures,* 1993, January/February: 81-89.

52 Pal LA, Teplova T, 'Rubik's Cube? Aligning Organizational Culture, Performance Measurement, and Horizontal Management', Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 2003.

to support it. This capacity can be enhanced through training, using peer champions, and providing senior managers with the kinds of results question they can be routinely asking. The Joint Inspection Unit benchmarks for results-based management stress the need for adequate results-based management capacity.[53]

CONCLUSIONS

Developing a culture of results in an organization will not happen through good intentions and osmosis. Many UN organizations face this challenge. It requires deliberate efforts by the organization, especially its senior managers, to encourage and support such a culture. It needs to be clear to managers and staff that results information is valued and expected to be a regular part of planning, budgeting, implementation and review.

RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF A CORPORATE STRATEGY

UNDP, like many other UN organizations, faces a potential tension between having a corporate headquarters vision of the organization and the need for its country offices to design programmes reflecting national priorities.

This tension is highlighted even more in a results-based approach to planning and managing. Efforts to set clear and measurable intended results at the corporate level for all of UNDP could conflict with efforts at the country level to set clear results that reflect national priorities. While using both a top-down and a bottom-up approach to developing results frameworks is usually seen to be a good practice,[54] the challenge is to get these approaches to meet consistently in the middle.

As identified in interviews, UNDP's Strategic Plan serves several ends. It provides:

- A clear vision of where UNDP overall is going

- Identification of key priorities

- A map of the development results expected

At the same time, the Strategic Plan needs to allow country offices to be responsive to national priorities. The challenge is to find the right balance.

UNDP is under pressure from Member States and from the One UN initiative, to be more focused. In several of the smaller UN organizations interviewed (UNCDF and UNFPA) the need to become more focused was emphasized and actions taken in that regard described. In this light, a key role of the UNDP Strategic Plan would be setting clear priorities or boundaries on what business UNDP is in. Clarity in this regard would allow country offices to turn aside requests from national governments that did not fit UNDP's current mandate as agreed upon by Member States. Some interviewees alluded to this, arguing that country offices welcomed (or would welcome) such clear direction.

Within a well-defined mandate, the Strategic Plan can also identify the overall development results UNDP hopes to achieve. This is where the link with country office plans is critical. Too much detail at the corporate level would undermine country efforts to reflect national priorities. In the interviews, UNICEF argued that there need not be a tension between these levels. In their case, corporate priorities were general enough to allow country programming to reflect national priorities, while at the same time were specific enough to provide clear direction with respect to what business UNICEF was in. At the MDG level, common goals can be set for countries. Similarly, for UNDP, the Strategic Plan can set common outcomes at a level that would allow countries to 'fit in' their own

53 Fontaine Ortiz E, Tang G, 'Results-based Management in the United Nations in the Context of the Reform Process', Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Geneva, Switzerland, JIU/REP/2006/6.

54 Perrin B, 'World Bank Roundtable—Moving from Outputs to Outcomes: Practical Advice from Governments Around the World', World Bank and the IBM Centre for The Business of Government, Managing for Performance and Results Series, Washington, DC, 2006, p 7. Available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/oed/outcomesroundtable/.

development goals. This also allows UNDP to be able to report back to its Executive Board against the common outcomes agreed to.

Thus, the UNDP corporate Strategic Plan can set clearly defined boundaries on what business UNDP is in and provide overall direction on the development results UNDP seeks over its planning period. This would allow country offices to develop programming plans based on national priorities within the UNDP framework.

ACCOUNTABILITY IN A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT REGIME

Traditionally, accountability systems are based on being accountable for following proper procedures and using approved resources. When results management regimes are initially introduced, there is additional focus of being accountable for delivering planned outputs. These are all activities over which managers have or should have control. Thus it is reasonable to expect them to be held to account for their actions.

Results-based management, on the other hand, asks managers to focus on the outcomes to be achieved, to track the outputs and sequence of outcomes being achieved and, based on a theory of change for the programme, to adjust their activities and outputs to maximize the likelihood that the desired outcomes are realized. Results-based management asks managers to learn from prior experience and adjust their operations as required. And it recognizes that outcomes by definition are results over which managers do not have control; they are results that managers and their programmes, through their activities and outputs, influence and contribute to.

Thus, accountability focused solely on process, resource utilization and output achievement is somewhat at odds with results-based management. As several writers have noted there is a need to augment accountability systems to take into account the focus on outcomes.[55]

There are several challenges in considering accountability for outcomes. First, there are influencing factors other than the programme at play, such as other programmes and social and economic factors. Second, many outcomes of interest take a number of years to bring about, frequently beyond the biennium. There is a need to reconcile the two-year planning and reporting period with the longer time frames often for outcomes to occur.

Baehler[56] discusses this first issue in light of New Zealand's focus on outcomes and away from outputs. She concludes that rather than being accountable for outcomes per se, they should be accountable for managing for outcomes, and all that implies. The Auditor General of Canada[57] argues the need for a revised concept of accountability to take into account the fact that outcomes are not controlled by managers. She argues that managers would need to be accountable for contributing to (influencing) outcomes rather than achieving outcomes per se, and for learning, i.e., for having adjusted activities and outcomes as a result of tracking performance to date.

UNDP[58] is implementing an Accountability Framework as an integral part of its Strategic Plan. The Accountability Framework addresses

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55 Aucoin P, Heintzman R, 'The Dialectics of Accountability for Performance in Public Sector Management Reform', in *Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Revitalizing the Public Service,* B. G. Peters and D. J. Savoie, Eds., McGill-Queens's University Press, 2000; Behn R, 'Rethinking Democratic Accountability', Brookings Institute, 2000; Burgess K, Burton C, Parston G, 'Accountability for Results', Public Services Productivity Panel, London, England, 2002; Dubnick MJ, 'Accountability Matters', Shani Conference, University of Haifa, Israel, 2004; Hatry H, 'We Need a New Concept of Accountability', *The Public Manager,* 1997, 26: 37-38; and Mayne J, 'Evaluation for Accountability: Reality or Myth?', In *Making Accountability Work: Dilemmas for Evaluation and for Audit,* M-L Bemelmans-Videc, J Lonsdale, B Perrin, Eds. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2007.

56 Baehler K, 'Managing for Outcomes: Accountability and Thrust', *Australian Journal of Public Administration,* 2003, 62(4): 23-34.

57 Auditor General of Canada, 'Modernizing Accountability in the Public Sector', Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 9, Ottawa, Ontario, 2002.

58 UNDP, 'Action Brief for the Operations Group: Key Principles and Approach to the Roll Out of the Accountability Framework in UNDP', Bureau of Management, 2007.

accountability at the organizational level, the manager's level and the individual level. The roll out of the Accountability Framework provides a good occasion to support a greater results-based management focus in UNDP, by seeing what people are accountable for moving beyond process and outputs. Following proper processes and delivering outputs with approved resources are still important but need to be seen in a broader framework where one is accountable, for example, for:

- Following proper processes

- Delivering planned and modified outputs with approved resources

- Measuring the planned outcomes of interest

- Demonstrating the contribution being made by UNDP to the accomplishment of the planned outcomes

- Demonstrating what was learned over the biennium in delivering the outputs, and what changes were made as a result

Demonstrating learning and contribution would require some tracking of at least immediate outcomes to provide an indication if the expected chain of results that underlies the theory of change of the programme is in fact being realized. This chain of results needs to include the fact that UNDP delivers through partners, hence ensuring partners have the capacity to deliver and monitor for results is an important result. If things seem to be happening as expected, then no changes are likely required. The theory of change is being confirmed and there is a basis for arguing that a contribution is being made to the intended outcomes. Otherwise, some changes are called for, since the theory of change is not being realized; perhaps the partnering arrangement is not well structured or the

delivered programmes are not working as expected. One would expect learning to occur and changes made in the activities and outputs produced to maximize the likelihood that the programme is contributing to the achievement of the outcomes. Describing and explaining the reasons for such changes demonstrates that learning and good results-based management are occurring.

In essence, following Baehler,[59] accountability for outcomes can be reasonably interpreted as being accountable for good results-based management, rather than for achievement of outcomes per se.

There is some evidence that ideas close to these are being put into practice within UNFPA. UNFPA[60] describes an "accountability for outcomes" in their Strategic Plan as—in relation to the above elements—being accountable for:

- Ensuring financial controls

- Achieving and monitoring outputs

- Monitoring outcomes (global trends and outcome indicators)

- Ensuring outputs contribute to outcomes

It would be useful for UNDP to discuss with UNFPA this approach to accountability for outcomes.

The second challenge mentioned above was linking the often longer time required for outcomes to be achieved with the shorter planning and reporting period. Wye, in reflecting on many years of experience in the United States, argues that this should not be a problem.[61] One should be able to "provide a narrative explanation of the reporting cycle and the issues raised, and use available data to comply with the reporting schedule."[62] In other words, write a narrative statement on when the outcomes will be achieved, and develop a milestone tracking

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59 Baehler K, 'Managing for Outcomes: Accountability and Thrust', *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 2003, 62(4): 23-34.

60 UNFPA, 'UNFPA Draft Strategic Plan 2008-2011. Accelerating Progress and National Ownership of the ICPD Program of Action', Executive Board Informal Meeting, 16 May 2007.

61 Wye C, 'Performance Management for Career Executives: A "Start Where You Are, Use What You Have" Guide', In *Managing for Results 2005*, JM Kamensky and A Morales, Eds. Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, England, 2005.

62 Ibid, p 68.

system to report progress in the interim years. Many of the outcomes UNDP is seeking will take many years to accomplish. Restricting the consideration of outcomes and reporting to the two-year planning budgeting period or even the four-year strategic planning period does not support a results-based management orientation. At the same time, it is quite reasonable to expect UNDP to indicate the extent to which expected intermediate outcomes along the results chain of a programme are being realized as useful efforts to track progress towards longer-term outcomes.

CHALLENGES TO RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

Not everyone supports results-based management as a good thing. Critics of this approach to public management point to a number of public-sector aspects that mitigate against a rational approach to managing. Some of the most common criticisms—and responses to them—include:

■ Trying to manage by numbers in a political context is, at best, unrealistic and can be dysfunctional.[63] For example, in trying to set clear and concrete objectives and targets, political scientists argue that results-based management runs up against the real need in a political environment such as at the UNDP, to keep objectives suitably fuzzy so as to gain the widest support. This is true to some extent, but in the end, the UNDP has to fund specific programmes consistent with specific national priorities. Clarity can only help their design and delivery. And by remaining

flexible, the measurement of results can include a range of end results sought by different parties.

■ In a similar vein, trade-offs are inevitable and are best handled through the regular political process not via some rational analysis of pros and cons.[64]

This is also true, but results-based management is not intended to replace the management process or the political process. Rather, it should be seen as one means of informing debate and decision making, not as making decisions.

■ Many of the results sought by UNDP and other public sector organizations cannot be measured.[65] As a result, results-based management forces measurement and reporting of other less important results. Norman found this view expressed in his review of New Zealand's results-based management experiences.[66]

But many, if not most, results sought can be measured, especially if we consider measurement in the public sector to be a means of reducing the uncertainty about what is happening rather than definitively proving something. Flexibility in measurement approaches would allow a wide variety of means to be used to increase understanding about the performance of a programme from different perspectives.

■ It is not plausible to hold organizations to account for outcomes over which they have limited control.[67]

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63 Thomas P, 'Performance Measurement and Management in the Public Sector', *Optimum,* 2005, 35(2): 16-26; and Radin BA, 'Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity and Democratic Values', Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2006; and Hood C, 'Public Service Management by Numbers: Why Does it Vary? Where Has it Come From? What Are the Gaps and the Puzzles?', *Public Money and Management,* 2007, 27(2): 95-102.

64 Thomas P, 'Performance Measurement and Management in the Public Sector', *Optimum,* 2005, 35(2): 16-26; and Radin BA, 'Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity and Democratic Values', Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2006.

65 Clark ID, Swain H, 'Distinguishing the Real from the Surreal in Management Reform', Canadian Public Administration, 2005, 48(4); and Radin BA, 'Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity and Democratic Values', Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2006.

66 Norman R, 'Managing through Measurement or Meaning? Lessons from Experience with New Zealand's Public Sector Performance Management Systems', *International Review of Administrative Sciences,* 2002.

67 Clark ID, Swain H, 'Distinguishing the Real from the Surreal in Management Reform', Canadian Public Administration, 2005, 48(4); and Radin BA, 'Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity and Democratic Values', Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2006.

However it is plausible to hold organizations to account for influencing outcomes and for managing for results. This is how accountability for outcomes should be interpreted. UNFPA is moving in this direction.

■ Focusing on any set of performance indicators ends up causing perverse behaviour—gaming—as people work to make the numbers go up.[68]

While this is a real problem, there are many ways to counter this tendency, such as focusing on outcomes not outputs, reviewing measures regularly, using a balancing set of indicators, and developing indicators in an inclusive manner.

There are legitimate concerns over results-based management and organizations should be aware of the possible downsides of implementing results-based management. The key point is perhaps the need to take these concerns into account in developing and, especially, in managing the results-based management regime.

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68 Clark ID, Swain H, 'Distinguishing the Real from the Surreal in Management Reform', Canadian Public Administration, 2005, 48(4); Perrin B, 'Effective Use and Misuse of Performance Measurement', *American Journal of Evaluation*, 1998,19(3): 367-379; Radin BA, 'Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity and Democratic Values', Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2006; Hood C, 'Gaming in Targetworld: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services', *Public Administration Review,* 2006, 66(4): 515-521; and Hood C, 'Public Service Management by Numbers: Why Does it Vary? Where Has it Come From? What Are the Gaps and the Puzzles?', *Public Money and Management,* 2007, 27(2): 95-102.

Annex 7

SOURCES AND TYPES OF FUNDING TO UNDP

A. Overall analysis. UNDP overall (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	17	15	14	14	13	12	11
TRAC 3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Other	3	2	2	2	2	1	1
Total Core	21	18	17	17	16	14	13
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	47	48	40	43	37	32	35
Donor Cost Sharing	10	10	13	13	18	23	21
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
Trust Funds	17	16	22	20	21	24	24
GEF	3	6	6	6	5	5	6
MP/CAP21	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	79	82	84	84	83	86	88
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	1,862,047	2,030,908	2,140,582	2,402,634	2,870,369	3,662,506	4,048,946
Note: Due to rounding, the sum core and non-core values for the tables may not equal 100 percent.							

B. Regional breakdown. **Regional Bureau for Africa (percentages)**							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	47	47	47	45	44	26	24
TRAC 3	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
Other	4	4	3	3	0	0	1
Total Core	53	52	51	49	46	27	26
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	3	2	1	3	1	3	5
Donor Cost Sharing	10	15	14	17	27	33	29
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	2	3	1	1	1
Trust Funds	28	24	23	21	19	31	35
GEF	5	7	7	7	5	4	4
MP/CAP21	1	2	1	1	1	1	0
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	0	1	0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	47	50	48	52	54	74	74
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	287,802	292,246	294,050	353,846	394,035	738,000	918,703

Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	Time Period						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	45	39	28	25	19	17	19
TRAC 3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Other	5	2	2	2	0	0	0
Total Core	51	42	31	27	19	18	19
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	5	16	7	9	4	2	3
Donor Cost Sharing	10	5	17	21	34	37	34
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	1	1	1	1	0
Trust Funds	17	15	31	30	34	35	34
GEF	7	15	10	9	5	5	7
MP/CAP21	9	8	4	3	2	2	2
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	48	59	70	73	80	82	80
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	273,686	290,553	375,157	405,806	663,550	812,226	730,316

B. Regional breakdown. Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific (percentages)

B. Regional breakdown. **Regional Bureau of Arab States (percentages)**							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	13	10	8	8	14	11	8
TRAC 3	2	1	1	1	3	1	1
Other	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Total Core	16	12	10	10	17	12	9
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	18	20	15	17	21	19	23
Donor Cost Sharing	3	4	4	4	16	24	33
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	0	1	0	1	0
Trust Funds	57	58	66	63	40	38	31
GEF	5	5	4	5	5	5	4
MP/CAP21	2	1	1	1	0	0	0
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	85	88	90	91	82	87	91
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	211,962	224,017	284,962	292,899	234,229	326,145	382,867

B. Regional breakdown. Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	15	15	15	15	16	14	13
TRAC 3	3	2	0	1	5	(2)	1
Other	2	1	1	1	0	0	0
Total Core	20	18	16	17	21	12	14
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	20	24	20	22	21	24	24
Donor Cost Sharing	35	37	35	29	27	34	24
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	2	2	1	1	1
Trust Funds	16	11	15	19	21	22	26
GEF	8	10	11	11	8	8	10
MP/CAP21	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	79	83	84	83	79	90	86
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	122,520	142,307	146,007	177,922	196,398	281,273	310,840

B. Regional breakdown. Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
TRAC 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Core	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	88	84	81	84	84	83	84
Donor Cost Sharing	7	7	10	8	9	9	7
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	0	0	0	0	0
Trust Funds	2	3	3	2	2	2	4
GEF	1	3	3	3	2	3	2
MP/CAP21	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	98	98	98	98	98	98	97
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	886.427	999,410	937,953	1,069,437	1,128,173	1,227,976	1,417,215

B. Regional breakdown. Bureau for Development Policy (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	-	-	-	-	0	1	0
TRAC 3	5	5	3	4	2	4	2
Other	26	19	23	32	18	13	16
Total Core	31	24	26	36	20	18	18
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	-	-	(2)	-	-	-	0
Donor Cost Sharing	20	15	14	10	5	7	6
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	2	5	2	2	3
Trust Funds	41	48	49	39	53	55	52
GEF	6	8	7	9	16	16	20
MP/CAP21	3	5	4	1	4	2	2
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Non-Core	70	76	74	64	80	82	83
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	79,650	82,375	102,453	102,724	253,984	276,866	289,005

C. Breakdown for Country Case Studies. Zambia (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	50	52	75	67	85	82	48
TRAC 3	0	0	0	1	2	1	0
Other	7	3	6	14	8	5	2
Total Core	57	55	81	82	93	88	50
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	0	0	(2)	0	0	0	0
Donor Cost Sharing	5	20	21	7	0	0	38
Thematic Trust Funds	0	0	1	8	3	1	0
Trust Funds	0	0	2	(2)	0	0	1
GEF	0	0	0	2	3	5	10
MP/CAP21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Development PAF	0	0	0	0	2	5	1
Other	39	25	(3)	2	0	2	0
Total Non-Core	44	45	19	17	8	13	50
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	5,552	5,346	3,681	3,635	5,016	6,326	17,450

C. Breakdown for Country Case Studies. Moldova (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	32	37	45	65	51	27	33
TRAC 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other	4	1	1	3	5	3	2
Total Core	36	38	46	68	56	30	35
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	1	1	0	0	4	0	2
Donor Cost Sharing	50	58	39	9	5	19	21
Thematic Trust Funds	0	0	10	11	2	1	6
Trust Funds	4	1	2	5	23	46	33
GEF	7	3	3	2	4	1	0
MP/CAP21	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Other Development PAF	0	0	0	0	4	1	0
Other	0	0	0	4	2	2	1
Total Non-Core	64	63	54	31	44	71	64
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	1,857	2,415	1,804	1,576	2,897	6,708	6,977

C. Breakdown for Country Case Studies. **Indonesia (percentages)**							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	24	22	16	18	13	10	9
TRAC 3	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Other	4	1	0	3	1	1	1
Total Core	28	23	16	21	14	12	11
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	6	43	2	2	1	0	0
Donor Cost Sharing	8	(11)	19	19	9	28	65
Thematic Trust Funds	-	-	-	0	0	35	10
Trust Funds	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GEF	3	3	2	1	0	0	0
MP/CAP21	2	3	3	3	7	1	1
Other Development PAF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	54	40	57	54	69	24	13
Total Non-Core	73	78	83	79	86	88	89
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	11,458	17,613	26,076	32,620	58,921	72,331	96,805

C. Breakdown for Country Case Studies. Egypt (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	12	7	10	6	83	80	3
TRAC 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	(2)	1	0	1	15	17	1
Total Core	10	8	10	7	98	97	4
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	66	72	73	68	2	2	73
Donor Cost Sharing	9	4	4	6	0	0	10
Thematic Trust Funds	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Trust Funds	0	0	1	5	0	0	7
GEF	12	13	11	11	0	0	5
MP/CAP21	3	3	0	2	0	0	0
Other Development PAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total Non-Core	90	92	89	93	2	2	96
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	18,877	23,072	15,139	19,573	1,419,808	1,728,887	49,134

C. Breakdown for Country Case Studies. Argentina (percentages)							
Programme Expenditure 2000-2006	**Time Period**						
	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Core							
TRAC 1/2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
TRAC 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Core	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Non-Core							
Government Cost Sharing	99	97	97	98	95	95	99
Donor Cost Sharing	0	2	1	0	2	2	0
Thematic Trust Funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trust Funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GEF	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
MP/CAP21	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Other Development PAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	3	2	0
Total Non-Core	100	100	99	100	100	100	100
Total Core + Non-Core (USD, thousands)	180,940	136,894	58,873	136,777	245,178	321,881	271,989

Annex 8

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM THE STAFF SURVEY ON RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

Percentage of respondents (A)greeing or (D)isagreeing	n= A/D	365 All	52 RC/RR/ DRR	313 Others
Culture and leadership				
3 UNDP encourages risk taking and mistakes in the pursuit of results	A D	35 65	52 48	32 68
4 In UNDP it is more important to achieve results, than to follow process and deliver outputs	D	66	64	66
5 In my country office an adequate budget is made available for operating the results-based management system	A D	46 54	56 44	44 56
Programme focus				
6 The main value of the service lines is in allowing us to focus our programme by saying no to partners in non-strategic areas	A	53	58	52
7 UNDP outcomes in my country are developed through a process that brings ownership by all stakeholders (government, other UN organizations, development partners, civil society)	A	76	87	74
8 It is normal in our country office that policy and planning decisions are informed by empirical evidence on past performance.	A	66	77	64
9 The organization in my office is structured to deliver the CPAP outcomes	A	72	79	71
10 I can confidently explain to my colleagues and development partners the difference between an output and an outcome	A	93	96	93
11 I can explain clearly how outputs contribute to programme outcomes	A	94	100	93
12 The focus of management in my country is the achievement of outcomes rather than implementation of individual projects	A	56	69	54
Monitoring and reporting				
13 The ROAR is an effective outcome monitoring tool	A D	59 41	41 59	62 38
14 The country office Balanced Scorecard is more important than the ROAR in managing for results at country programme level	D	62	73	60

Percentage of respondents (A)greeing or (D)isagreeing	n= A/D	365 All	52 RC/RR/ DRR	313 Others
15 Monitoring and reporting are well harmonized with other development partners and make use of country reporting systems	D	67	94	63
Adjustment and learning				
16 Stakeholders and managers collectively analyze performance and decide on action	A	61	65	60
17 Development managers have the latitude, flexibility and authority to arrange resources (financial and personnel) as required to achieve the desired outcomes	A	57	73	54
18 There is a clear link between allocation of the Biennial Support Budget and four yearly Programme Allocation, and evidence of results in our country programme	D	61	69	60
19 Because most of our funds are raised through cost sharing or from donors, we have little scope in allocating resources across our programme or within outcome areas according to results.	A	56	55	56
20 Whether positive or negative, performance information is used to foster learning	A	72	82	70
21 There is effective follow-up and actions on management response to evaluations	A	61	73	59
Evaluation and accountability				
22 Roles and responsibilities at all levels in my country office are clearly set out and known to staff	A	61	83	57
23 Under the RCA, the key factor in UNDP enhancing promotion and advancement prospects is demonstrating a proven ability to raise resources and in delivery	A D	49 51	37 63	51 49
24 The RC/RR/CD is accountable for achievement of country programme outcomes	A	79	74	80
25 The RC/RR/CD can only be held accountable for delivery of UNDP outputs	D	61	45	64
26 In my office, country programme staff are under more pressure to raise resources and ensure timely delivery than on enhancing the contribution by UNDP to achievement of the outcomes	A	64	53	66
Support systems				
27 I can easily find guidelines and support from the RSCs and headquarters to help design objectives and indicators for projects and programmes	A D	55 45	35 65	58 42
28 The training I have received has equipped me with the ability to plan and manage for outcomes	A	60	67	59
29 In our country office adequate time and structured occasions are made available to learn from results and evaluations.	D	58	39	61
30 UNDP's rewards systems provide real incentives for strengthening a results culture within the organization	D	76	81	75

Annex 9

RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT BENCHMARKS ASSESSMENT

Table 1. Rationale for judgement against benchmarks	
Benchmarks[69]	**Assessment**
PLANNING – GOALS	
Benchmark 3: Long-term objectives have been clearly formulated for the organization (Joint Inspection Unit [JIU])	JIU[70] states that "A key step for RBM [results-based management] is to identify the long-term goals and objectives to be pursued by the organization. They derive from the statutory instruments, the mission statement and the related mandates contained in the pertinent resolutions and decisions. The main actions to be carried out are to: (1) Adopt a long-term planning instrument for the organization (corporate strategic framework). (2) Identify the internationally agreed goals that closely relate to the organization's mission, and to which a contribution from the organization is expected in view of its specific mandate and sphere of competence. (3) Define clearly the long-term objectives for the organization that would contribute to the attainment of the identified goals; the objectives should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) and constitute, therefore, the critical results to be accomplished or assessed by the organization over the period of time covered by its strategic framework. (4) Ensure a participatory process in the development of the corporate strategic framework." **Partially achieved.** (1) MYFF 1 and 2 and the proposed Strategic Plan represent the long-term planning instrument. (2) Internationally agreed goals that closely relate to the organization's mission, and to which a contribution from the organization is expected in view of its specific mandate and sphere of competence, should be identified. The MDGs and reporting against them is not explicitly incorporated into the MYFF planning and reporting framework, although selection of the practice areas and explanation of the assumed linkage to the MDGs is found in the MYFFs. (3) Long-term objectives are defined in the MYFF 1 and 2 and also in the Strategic Plan. In practice, these objectives do not define targets that drive planning at operational level. Instead, they are expected to be used as a set of boundary rules defining areas in which UNDP should and should not work. To date, definition of SMART indicators has been the major weakness. For example, conclusion from MSI was that "A performance monitoring plan with performance indicators, definitions, units of measure, and specified data

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69 Sources of benchmarks: **JIU** – Fontaine Ortiz E, Kuyama A, Münch W, Tang G, 'Managing for Results in the UN System Part 1: Implementation of Results-based Management in the United Nations Organizations', Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Geneva, Switzerland, 2004. **Paris** – Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005. **MfDR** – OECD, 'Emerging Good Practice in Managing for Development Results – Source Book (2006)', Joint Venture on Managing for Development Results, OECD DAC.

70 Fontaine Ortiz E, Kuyama A, Münch W, Tang G, 'Managing for Results in the UN System Part 1: Implementation of Results-based Management in the United Nations Organizations', Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Geneva, Switzerland, 2004.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	collection methodologies has not been developed to measure MYFF goals, service lines or core results."[71] (4) The process for development of the corporate strategic framework is not participatory, but in theory it is an aggregation of objectives and results agreed by UNDP at country level that have been derived using a participatory process.
Goals reflect the mandate of UNDP and its comparative advantage (Paris 3)	**Achieved.** MYFF 1 and 2 and the proposed Strategic Plan clearly reflect UNDP's mandate and—despite changes between plans, which have been aimed at simplifying the presentation—the plans have been consistent on what UNDP's mandate is. The MYFF 1 and 2 and the Strategic Plan are intended to be statements of what is seen at corporate level as UNDP's comparative advantage. However, little evidence presented to substantiate assertion on what that comparative advantage is.
Goals reflect development objectives of member countries (Paris 3)	**Achieved.** Dealt with when UNDAF and UNDP outcomes are agreed with partner governments.
Goals are developed through a process that brings ownership by all stakeholders (Managing for Development Results [MfDR] 1)	**Not achieved.** Not relevant—see discussion of outcomes below.
PLANNING – RESULTS AND RESOURCES	
Results lead directly to strategic goals, adapted to partner country context (Paris 7) (MfDR)	**Partially achieved.** Not achieved at corporate level, see conclusion from MSI that "A performance monitoring plan with performance indicators, definitions, units of measure, and specified data collection methodologies has not been developed to measure MYFF goals, service lines or core results."[72]
Results can be attributed plausibly to programmes (MfDR)	At the country level, UNDP should be able to substantiate how results lead directly to strategic goals, adapted to partner country context. This would be through the UNDAF/CPD/CPAP planning processes. Evidence from the evaluation case studies is that results frameworks do not convincingly link results directly with achievement of goals specified. Findings of evaluation case studies agree with those of others, including:

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71 MSI, 'Background Paper on Results-Based Management in Development Organizations', Management Systems International, July 2006, p 6.

72 Ibid, p 6.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	A UNDP assessment[72] concluded that: "One of the challenges to improving the strength of practice identified is the quality or evaluability of the planning and programming frameworks upon which M&E rely. As noted in the review of the pilot UNDAF matrices, and highlighted in the review of outcome evaluations, the lack of clearly defined and measurable objectives, supported by appropriate indicators and data streams has restrained the accurate assessment of results for sector and inter-sectoral learning and corporate accountability. As a further, more unique and internal constraint, it was raised that the planning horizon in UNDP may be too short to be able to meaningfully assess progress with outcomes. Whereas outcomes may easily take 5-10 years to materialize, most programmes are designed for a 2-4 year duration, intentionally being kept within the timeframe of the CPD/CCFs. The challenge for country office is then to identify methodologies, standards and indicators that meaningfully capture performance and attribution within the timeframe of their operational horizon." Longhurst[73] concluded the following about UNDAF results matrices: ■ Poor identification of risks and assumptions. ■ Lack of targets and timelines. ■ Outputs not linked to those accountable. ■ Indicators not properly identified, often vague and very general. (This is not a matter of whether qualitative or qualitative—there should be a balance—but whether the correct indicator has been chosen. A quantitative element does help in later M&E.) ■ Broadness of outcomes so that there was no suitable practical indicator to show whether the outcome had been achieved or not. If national priorities are broad, then the outcomes will be as well. ■ Commitment to disaggregating results by gender, which emphasizes the general view that gender mainstreaming needs to be strengthened in the UNDAF.
Benchmark 4: The organization's programmes are well aligned with its long-term objectives (JIU)	JIU[74] states that to achieve this, the following conditions are required: (1) A clear definition of the cascade of objectives at each level of the organization's programme structure. (2) Ensuring that objectives are logically consistent among levels reflecting cause-effect linkages. (3) Regrouping and reformulating the programmes to provide better focus for the work of the organization within the framework of the identified long-term objectives thereby avoiding strategic disconnect in programme planning. (4) Adoption of results-based management tools and approaches to the specificities of various operational entities. **Partially achieved.**

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72 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005, para 7.4-7.5.

73 Longhurst R, 'Review of the Role and Quality of the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs)', Overseas Development Institute, London, England, May 2006, p 26.

74 Fontaine Ortiz E, Kuyama A, Münch W, Tang G, 'Managing for Results in the UN System Part 1: Implementation of Results-based Management in the United Nations Organizations', Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Geneva, Switzerland, 2004.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	(1) A clear definition of the cascade of objectives at each level of UNDP's programme structure is rarely achieved.[75] (2) Ensuring that objectives are logically consistent among levels reflecting cause-effect linkages is not consistently achieved.[76] (3) Evidence from the evaluation case studies is that regrouping and reformulating the programmes to provide better focus for the work of the organization within the framework of the identified long-term objectives thereby avoiding strategic disconnect in programme planning does not generally happen. Instead, changes in the strategic objectives and framework triggers remapping of projects and programmes, rather than a re-appraisal of the programmes and portfolio of projects. (4) Adoption of results-based management tools and approaches to the specificities of various operational entities has happened to varying extent. See evidence in evaluation case studies. Also following conclusion from UNDP:[77] "The pre-2001 project-orientated framework for M&E remains strongly embedded in many country practices, overlain at a higher level by elements of the new (post-2001) results-orientated approach. The variation in practice and experience relates primarily to the extent to which country offices have sought to not integrate and localize elements of old and new within their specific partnership and country contexts."
Benchmark 5: The organization's resources are well aligned with its long-term objectives (JIU)	JIU[78] states that to achieve this, the following conditions are required: (1) Ensuring coherence and compatibility between budgeting and programming decisions (e.g., any budget cuts should correspond to specific and identified programme cuts). (2) Development of effective cost accounting systems that allows linking expenditures to expected results. (3) Adoption of a programming instrument linking resources to results. (4) In case of a short programming cycle (2-3 years), merging budgeting with programming and appropriate necessary resources. (5) In case of medium term programming (4 years or more), approving a targeted overall level of resources and appropriating on annual or biennial basis. (6) Identifying under-performing, obsolete or marginal programmes and activities over time and shifting resources not only to proven efficient and relevant ones, but also to those programmes considered to be of the highest priority. **Partially achieved.** (1) At present, at the corporate level ensuring coherence and compatibility between budgeting and programming decisions (e.g., any budget cuts should correspond to specific and identified programme cuts) is difficult since programming and budgeting planning cycles are separate. A proposal to integrate into one cycle and link programming and budgeting more explicitly was agreed upon by the Executive Board in 2006 for implementation from 2008. (2) Development of effective cost accounting systems that allows linking expenditures to expected results. This started with introduction of ATLAS in 2004, but progress has been slow, since agreed that while potential to use this

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75 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005; and Longhurst R, 'Review of the Role and Quality of the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs)', Overseas Development Institute, London, England, May 2006.

76 Ibid.

77 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005, para 4.3.

78 Fontaine Ortiz E, Kuyama A, Münch W, Tang G, 'Managing for Results in the UN System Part 1: Implementation of Results-based Management in the United Nations Organizations', Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Geneva, Switzerland, 2004, 47-55.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	data in strategic manner exists, has not yet been adopted by many senior managers to date. (3) Adoption of a programming instrument linking resources to results. Achieved with introduction of ATLAS. (4) In case of a short programming cycle (2-3 years), merging budgeting with programming and appropriate necessary resources. In theory, achieved through introduction of CPAP from 2006. (5) In case of medium-term programming (4 years or more), approving a targeted overall level of resources and appropriating on annual or biennial basis. Achieved at the country level through the CPDs. (6) Identifying under-performing, obsolete or marginal programmes and activities over time and shifting resources not only to proven efficient and relevant ones, but also to those programmes considered to be of the highest priority. No transparent and systematic system to achieve this. Note that most TRAC funding is allocated to country programmes on an entitlement, and not priority/ results basis. Varying levels of constraints on allocating non-TRAC resourcing at corporate level, since priorities are somewhat set by donors. Also evidence that even when opportunity to allocate funds (i.e. within thematic trust funds) and TRAC 1.1.2 on the basis of priorities and results, this has not been done. At the country level, evaluation case studies suggest that there is no systematic tool for doing this. In terms of staffing: MSI[79] concludes that "UNDP's headquarters' structure is not organized to support the implementation of the service lines. For example, there are not active or designated service line managers for many of the service lines and programming models, best practices and toolkits have not been developed and validated." The Management Review states:[80] "According to a recent survey of COs [country offices],[81] 94% of RCs and DRRs indicated that the practices and service lines introduced in 2002 have benefited their work by providing greater focus, improved knowledge management and a focus on results, and through facilitating positioning and advocacy at the national level. Having successfully introduced the practice architecture, the next challenge will be to strengthen and refine the practice approach and its implementation. This is critical, given that country offices, despite their satisfaction with the overall practice architecture, have not received consistent and high quality support across all service lines, and that support has generally not included advice to UN Country Teams. Concerns have been voiced repeatedly over: ■ The lack of systematic and coherent delivery of policy advisory services; ■ Inadequate definition of roles and responsibilities; ■ A high cost and lack of flexibility in the financial model; ■ Too broad a scope in terms of themes addressed and products and services offered; and ■ A disconnect between knowledge products and services and business processes." The Management Review Team[82] also states: "In recent years, COs [country offices] have been asked to be more flexible, to do more with less, while programmatic resources and core staffing levels in

79 MSI, 'Background Paper on Results-Based Management in Development Organizations', Management Systems International, July 2006, p 7.

80 UNDP, 'UNDP Management Review Phase II – Report of the Management Review Team', UNDP, March 2007, para 73.

81 This survey was undertaken within the framework of Phase II of the Management Review.

82 UNDP, 'UNDP Management Review Phase II – Report of the Management Review Team', UNDP, March 2007, para 63.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	some offices have fallen. In some cases, sudden increases in the volume of resources have forced COs to quickly step up efficiency and performance. Consultations at the GMTM in January 2006 and ad-hoc surveys have highlighted both the pressure felt in COs for increased accountability and delivery of results, and the related constraints that make this goal hard to achieve. Operational capacity constraints also prevent COs from reaching goals in delivery, and thus contribute to the build-up of unspent balances. The most commonly cited constraints fall mainly into two categories, i.e., *operations-related processes and systems* (procurement, ATLAS, reporting, etc.) and *staff capacity/knowledge* (resident capacities, staff profiles, training and learning, etc.), and are largely attributed to a lack of adequate human and financial resources. While Central Services Bureaux are seen as providing some of the needed support (including through the Regional Service Centers), this is not perceived to be enough or in the areas needed to make up for the shortfall in capacity."
Outcomes are developed through a process that brings ownership by all stakeholders (MfDR 1)	**Partially achieved.** Outcomes are supposed to be developed in a participatory fashion as part of the UNDAF/CPD/CPAP development process. 76% of UNDP staff responding to the evaluation survey agree that outcomes bring ownership. This finding is supported by the Egypt and Indonesia case-study evidence, but in Moldova ownership is poor, partially due to lack of capacity within the government and its level of substantive engagement in the process.
Development managers have the latitude, flexibility and authority to arrange resources as required to achieve the desired outcomes (MfDR 4)	**Partially achieved.** 57% of UNDP staff responding to the evaluation survey agree that managers have the latitude, flexibility and authority to arrange resources as required to achieve the desired outcomes. Evidence from the evaluation case studies suggests that managers (RR/DRR level) have the necessary discretion and power at country level, but don't have enough control of the resource base to be able to fully use the discretion and power.
Resources are committed in a predictable fashion	**Partially achieved.** TRAC 1.1 and 1.2 resources are allocated on a predictable basis to country programmes. However, non TRAC funding is far greater in volume and is much less predictable. In the case of donor or government cost-sharing, funding is only predictable once agreement is formally made. In terms of trust fund resources, normally allocated on an annual basis and must be used within the financial year. Inability to roll over use of TRAC and Trust Fund resources from one year to the next creates pressure to disburse, even when recognized that expenditure will be ineffective.
MONITORING AND REPORTING	
Benchmark 6: An effective performance monitoring system	The JIU[83] states that to achieve this, the following conditions are required: (1) Adoption of clear provisions for the supervisors to systematically verify that tasks assigned to meet the objectives and targets are being successfully carried out.

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83 Fontaine Ortiz E, Kuyama A, Münch W, Tang G, 'Managing for Results in the UN System Part 1: Implementation of Results-based Management in the United Nations Organizations', Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Geneva, Switzerland, 2004.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
is in place (JIU) (Periodic assessments of performance are made against defined targets)	(2) Identification of the type of data and information needed to be collected for performance monitoring. (3) Assignment of clear responsibilities among staff and managers for performance monitoring. (4) Linking future resource disbursements for programmes to the discharge of their performance monitoring requirements. (5) Refining the quality of the defined results and indicators through the process. (6) Using both qualitative and quantitative indicators, as appropriate, and identifying standard or key indicators to measure performance at the corporate level. (7) Establishment of baselines and targets against which progress could be measured over a certain period of time. (8) Simplification of performance measurement, including through the initial use of relatively few results statements and performance indicators. (9) Development of a clear information and communication strategy to guide, inter alia, the selection of the performance monitoring information system to be used, and ensure coherence in systems throughout the organization. (10) Weighing carefully the return on investment expected from various options to select performance monitoring information systems. (11) Ensuring that performance information systems are supported by a reliable telecommunications infrastructure. **Partially achieved.** (1) Adoption of clear provisions for the supervisors to systematically verify that tasks assigned to meet the objectives and targets are being successfully carried out is achieved. Operates through the RCA. (2) Identification of the type of data and information needed to be collected for performance monitoring is partially achieved. As references above show, definition of appropriate indicators is relatively poor. (3) Assignment of clear responsibilities among staff and managers for performance monitoring is partially achieved. Role of regional bureaux in oversight of country offices has not been well defined during the evaluation period, as confirmed by the evaluation case studies. Within country programmes, evaluation case studies confirm the findings of UNDP:[84] "The strength of implementation of plans and associated systems was found to reflect in large part the *nature and quality of internal organizational arrangements for M&E*. To date, very few COs [country offices] were found to have M&E officers, although the majority (just over 100 offices to date) have nominated M&E focal points. In the latter case, these individuals range in terms of function and location within the office from DRR to JPO, thus reflecting a spectrum of ability and decision-making authority. Further, the location of the M&E officer/ focal point was also found to have an effect over the nature of the function, whether located more on the programme or operations side." (4) Linking future resource disbursements for programmes to the discharge of their performance monitoring requirements is focused at the level of delivery. (5) Refining the quality of the defined results and indicators through the process happens in some country offices. (6) Using both qualitative and quantitative indicators, as appropriate and identifying standard or key indicators to measure performance at the corporate level. Intermittent application of this approach. (7) Establishment of baselines and targets against which progress could be measured over a certain period of time became mandatory at outcome level from 2003. (8) Simplification of performance measurement, including through the initial use of relatively few results statements and performance indicators is not suggested in UNDP guidance.

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84 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005, para 4.13.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	(9) Development of a clear information and communication strategy to guide, inter alia, the selection of the performance monitoring information system to be used, and ensure coherence in systems throughout the organization. Not found within UNDP. Note conclusion from MSI[85] study: "UNDP has developed numerous monitoring systems—including the Balanced Scorecard, the Partner Survey, the Staff Survey, project evaluations, and country assessments—but these tools do not always communicate and complement one another, in particular in relation to the MYFF objectives. It is not clear what program and management decisions are guided by MYFF performance data." (10) Weighing carefully the return on investment expected from various options to select performance monitoring information systems has not been done. (11) Ensuring that performance information systems are supported by a reliable telecommunications infrastructure. Implementation of robust telecommunications systems was one focus of the Administrator's Business Plans, 2000-2003.
Qualitative and quantitative arrangements are in place making use of country level mechanisms (Paris 10) (MfDR)	**Not achieved.** 67% of those responding to evaluation survey disagree with this statement.
Monitoring and reporting are harmonized with other donors (MfDR)	**Not achieved.** 67% of those responding to evaluation survey disagree with this statement. Evidence from evaluation case studies indicates some harmonization around (driven by) other donors systems (i.e. Egypt Female Genital Mutilation project). Finding is supported by finding of UNDP study:[86] "The interaction between UNDP and the state and non-state actors in the field of M&E at the country level was found to be limited. With few exceptions, UNDP's M&E activities were found to be focused solely on its own programmes, despite often managing and supporting M&E related initiatives."
ADJUSTMENT AND LEARNING	
Whether positive or negative, performance information is used to support constructive and proactive management decision making (MfDR 5)	**Partially achieved.** Regional bureaux will respond if poor performance scored in the ROAR of a country programme, but in general, oversight focuses almost exclusively on resource mobilization and delivery (see evaluation case studies). Country programmes see arrangements with regional bureau as for reporting rather than management. There is little evidence from evaluation case studies of use of performance information at outcome level, but there is evidence of use at project level. A UNDP review found:[87]

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85 MSI, 'Background Paper on Results-Based Management in Development Organizations', Management Systems International, July 2006, p 7.

86 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005, para 4.4.

87 Ibid., para 5.1-5.2

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
	"The issue of use relates primarily to the questions of what purposes M&E information is and can be utilized for, and to what effect(s). The findings identify five main uses: first, internal CO [country office] operational planning and management (to feed into staff meetings, retreats, performance assessment); second, corporate reporting (e.g. SRF/MYFF, ad hoc headquarters requests for information); third, partner/counterpart liaison, consultations and decision-making (e.g. steering committee meetings, TPR); fourth, resource mobilization (project briefs, proposals, 'success stories'); and fifth, as substantive contributions in participation in Government/donor consultation groupings and UN inter agency working groups. Less evidence was found on dissemination of lessons learned for global and cross-national learning. In most of the cases, information derived from the monitoring function has been found to be confined to a small cadre of operational staff within the arrangement of implementing agency, UNDP and government, servicing the input and activity tracking functions. The notion of participation in this context often hinged only upon the involvement of these 'internal' stakeholders, and thus relates, even unintentionally, largely to the control function of projects. However, where regular feedback mechanisms were found, where steering committees and Tripartite Reviews are systematically practiced and located within broader programmatic structures, the information generated was found to be of wider operational and strategic relevance."
Stakeholders and managers collectively analyze performance and decide on action	**Partially achieved.** In the evaluation survey, 61% agreed with this statement, although the focus was at project level.
Development managers have the latitude, flexibility and authority to arrange resources as required to achieve the desired outcomes (MfDR 4)	**Partially achieved.** In the evaluation survey, 57% agreed with this statement, although the focus was at project level.
Whether positive or negative, performance information is used to foster learning (MfDR 5)	**Partially achieved.** In the evaluation survey, 72% agreed with this statement, but 58% say there is inadequate time and resources for learning.
Benchmark 9: A knowledge-management strategy is developed to support results-based management (JIU)	**Partially achieved.** There is a Knowledge Management strategy seen through the practice networks, but this is not geared to results-based management. The evolving role of RSC is under debate.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY	
Benchmark 7: Evaluation findings are used effectively (JIU)	**Partially achieved.** Findings from evaluation case studies agree with those of the UNDP study:[88] "In terms of UNDP and its primary partners own use, the findings from the country assessments and the RBEC workshop suggested the majority of evaluations conducted have enabled senior management to determine and respond to aspects of quality of the delivery, strengths and weaknesses, potential gaps and identified future needs. Country offices stated that they were using the findings of the evaluations for strategic and programmatic adjustment and development. This include the drafting of new SRF and Country Programme documents, and in one case for the complete reassessment of work arrangements, approach, staff needs and advocacy in the area attended by the evaluation. The wide scope of outcome evaluation, beyond the traditional sectoral boundaries, has in other cases identified the lack of cross-fertilization of knowledge and ideas within UNDP and beyond In another, post-conflict, case, the evaluation was recognized as the first ever comprehensive written account of what UNDP set out to do, and what has effectively been achieved in relation to other donor/ NGO contributions. The format or presentation of knowledge generated by evaluation was found to impact the extent to which it was likely to be taken up by diverse audiences. In the majority of cases, the findings and recommendations were presented orally to UNDP staff and one or two key stakeholders, and through the written reports. Only in few cases was there evidence of an extensive dissemination process. With few exceptions, country offices and their partners felt that there was a broader audience that could benefit from the information generated. This audience was generally perceived by to be the public or the end-users to whom the outcomes ultimately pertain."
Benchmark 2: Performance-oriented systems of accountability replace traditional, compliance-based systems (JIU)	**Partially achieved.** RCA was modified in 2002 to reflect a more results orientation. Opinion was evenly divided in the evaluation survey on the degree to which this had shifted the focus from compliance to results. However, 64% reported that mobilizing resources and delivery were more important than results.
Benchmark 3: Accountability is applicable at all levels, from the top down. The executive heads and the heads of major organizational units are therefore the first to be held accountable for the results that they are expected to deliver (JIU)	**Not achieved.** Evidence from the evaluation case studies strongly indicates that accountability focuses almost exclusively at the level of the Resident Coordinator/ Resident Representative. Programme staff do perceive that they are accountable for delivery of project outputs, but nobody is identified as accountable for ensuring that projects and programmes are managed to maximize their contributions to achievement of the outcome which is the key aspect expected in the results-based management system.

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88 UNDP, 'An Assessment of UNDP Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation at the Country Level', UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, NY, February 2005, para 5.4-5.5.

Table 1 cont-d	
Benchmarks	**Assessment**
EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY	
Assessment of performance and accountability for results takes into account both contextual factors and risks and makes adjustments accordingly (MfDR 5)	**Partially achieved.** Technically this is covered in the ROAR, Balanced Scorecard and RCA reporting. In practice, this is not a concern for most staff since targets are formally agreed between four and six months into the annual programming period and therefore can be set to reflect ex-post changes.

Annex 10

FINDINGS FROM THE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

ARGENTINA

PERCEIVED STRENGTHS OF THE RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Argentina Country Office has built a strategic direction for results-based management within a broad set of organizational and process reforms that have been ongoing during the last two to three years within the country office. Within a relatively short period of time, a transition process has been developed, launched and is generating change.

The results-based management model that has been developed presents 'results' and results-based management in a holistic manner. It focuses on aligning three levels of performance/results: at the development programme-level and project-level; the institutional level; and at the cross-agency level involving UN coordination. This helps underscore the importance of not only measuring results/impacts, but also understanding the process. That is, observing the 'how' in order to be able to provide advice and lessons learned to help others change behaviour.

Managing for results has brought a more systematic and disciplined move to project development and monitoring and a series of new tools and processes has been introduced and shared with national counterparts.

The country office and project-level systems have introduced a platform with which to pursue results-based management capacity building with partners, and coordination and harmonization with other UN organizations and donors.

The dedicated M&E Unit (now three full-time officers) has been identified as an important supporting element to the results-based management exercise in the Argentina Country Office.

Associated with this are the training sessions offered to UNDP staff and project officers, recognized as critical elements of results-based management capacity building. There is wide use and some improved understanding of the language of results-based management, though staff indicate a need to understand better how to operationalize concepts such as indicator, targets and outcomes.

PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES OF THE RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

There are however, limitations to what the introduction of results-based management has produced to date in UNDP Argentina. The country office is clearly in transition in its implementation of the results-based management model, and while the model identifies a number of tools and processes, some are still under development and others are not being implemented to the extent that results-based management normally implies. Of note is the absence of outcome monitoring and outcome evaluation.

The further introduction of results-based management in the country office appears to be at a crossroads, as there does not appear to be a consensus on the direction of how to further enhance the implementation of results-based management within the country office. The current project-level focus at this time seems to be overlooking the broader dimensions of the results-based management framework.

Despite the umbrella of 'outcomes' offered by the Country Programme and SRF, management still focuses primarily on the project, its activities and outputs. The work done to link projects to outcomes is really a mapping exercise. The assignment of projects to outcome categories is somewhat subjective, though it has allowed for the identification of outlier projects that have been targeted for removal upon completion of the cycle. While this is not necessarily problematic, it does suggest that much of this is administrative in nature to serve reporting needs rather than results-based management per se.

A weakness of the current system is that there are neither dedicated funds nor priority for outcome evaluation.

An underlying problem that the country office faces is that the structure of funding available to the country office is at odds with managing on the basis of performance. Only a small proportion of funds have any flexibility in their use by the country office and the necessity to mobilize funds to support the country office operation is a powerful incentive to prioritize funding over performance. In effect, the old measure of performance and 'success' ('mobilizing resources') is generally at odds with an results-based management approach.

Last, two related aspects of the nature of UNDP's activities make monitoring results a challenge. First, UNDP is an extremely small player financially, which makes it hard to attribute change to UNDP activities. Second, the upstream aspects of the country office's more substantive work, such as policy engagement, represent a difficult area in which to identify and measure outcomes. That said, both of these objections can and should be dealt with.

EGYPT

INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC GOALS ON COUNTRY PROGRAMME

The two MYFFs led to structural reorganizations of the portfolio in response to corporate priorities, but the core orientation of the programme has

not change markedly from the definition in the first CCF in 1997.

The first UNDAF had no material constraining effect on the programme. The second UNDAF, completed in 2007, still has broad and permissive outcome domains. The extent to which the structure will influence UNDP will depend on the implementation of proposed UNDAF outcome groups.

ALIGNMENT OF RESOURCES, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

A steady change can be seen in the articulation of the programme over the period under review. Outcomes have been reworded, baseline situations are stated and outcome indicators are becoming more precise. The objectives structure of the portfolio has become increasingly complex, with the projects under the new CPD being fitted into UNDP country outcomes, core results, service lines, corporate goals, and UNDAF outcomes. But the composition of the portfolio has changed little. The main change is removal, through natural attrition, of outlier projects.

The office was organized around thematic teams during the 1990s. That was changed to a flat structure, not related to outcomes, but retaining thematic teams up to 2007. Plans are currently being developed to return to a team structure geared toward outcomes.

Owing to the changing structure of objectives, it is difficult to track changes in the configuration of financial resources around objectives. The 2007 Country Programme Evaluation concluded that the programme strategy has been driven by resource mobilization and not by results.

MONITORING SYSTEMS

Steady progress has been made in using monitoring tools. Support from the results-based management officer has been instrumental in this achievement. There are no routine mechanisms to review and improve the quality of objectives and indicators. Headquarters-promoted tools

either prioritize financial management (ATLAS) or are geared towards reporting upwards (ROAR). Yet the primary unit of monitoring at the country level is the project.

Strong support to monitoring national outcomes can be seen through the NHDR, though this is not always recognized as a contribution to results-based management. Development assistance to Egypt is mostly projectized rather than through budget support and, partly as a result, harmonization of M&E systems with the Government of Egypt and with development partners has developed on a project-by-project basis.

ADJUSTMENT AND LEARNING

Interviews with programme staff produced clear examples of systematic use of information to manage at the project level. This was particularly prominent in key projects with other development partners, such as addressing Female Genital Mutilation with the European Union and CIDA, and was reinforced by the project cycle management procedures used by those partners. Evidence about managing at an outcome level is less compelling. Some programme staff hold discussions around the ROAR, but there is no clear link back to decisions about programme strategy and composition. Links to regional service centres are strong in specific areas such as for the environment portfolio and, in general, for the development of new projects.

EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The office has continued project-level evaluation even though the requirement was dropped in 2002. Five evaluations have been undertaken at the outcome level during 2006-2007, but these were delayed as they were under budgeted and had to be financed by cost sharing across projects.[89] Furthermore, a full country programme evaluation for the 2002-2006 cycle was also conducted. There is no evidence yet about how management and the regional bureau will use the findings.

There is a lack of clarity around aspects of the roles and responsibilities of staff and management in three key areas:

- Accountabilities for planning and implementing a functioning results-based management system

- Accountabilities for the use of information in the country office and at higher levels

- Accountabilities for the performance of projects, programmes and the country office itself

The programme can be characterized as having islands of excellence such as the Female Genital Mutilation project, where monitoring, adjustment and evaluation are rigorous and effective, but those standards are not applied across the portfolio as a whole.

INDONESIA

PERCEIVED STRENGTHS OF THE RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Both the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) and the Integrated Resource Framework are considered useful tools by the country office in that they define and narrow down the mandate of UNDP. For an organization that does not have a lot of resources, having corporate policy on paper helps when negotiating with governments and other counterparts who might request projects totally unconnected with the UNDP mandate. The articulation of a clear mandate also helps carve a niche for the organization in an environment characterized by competition for development space and for resources. Before the introduction of the practice areas and service lines, UNDP had lost its identity, especially as the word 'development' was subject to very broad interpretation and varied between country offices.

In CPAP 2006-2010, UNDP Indonesia set programme targets for, and allocated funds to, each outcome for the first time. According to

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89 An Assessment of Development Results was also undertaken by UNDP Evaluation Office in 2004.

staff, this practice ensured rational allocation of resources across outcome themes such as governance, as staff often challenged whether resources they were committing to a particular outcome would be sufficient to achieve the outcome.

UNDP sets annual targets in the CPAP that are reported in the ROAR. However, the quarterly reviews of CPAP assist UNDP, the government and other partners in tracking progress towards achievement of outputs and outcomes.

The introduction of new tools (especially ATLAS, the Balanced Scorecard and RCA) has improved upward reporting and global transparency and benchmarking. The country office can compare and contrast its performance with other UNDP field offices and this motivates improved performance.

Despite its limitations, the new RCA is appreciated by some staff as an attempt by the organization to link individual staff performance to annual targets of the organization. Its link to learning goals and long-term staff development initiatives is particularly useful in obtaining a corporate view of training needs and planning for these activities.

The Global Staff Survey has contributed towards achieving a 360-degree feedback system. Management in the Indonesia office takes the results of the Global Staff Survey seriously.

PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES OF THE RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Whilst the theoretical underpinnings of the concept 'managing for results' are sound, the roll-out plan for UNDP was not explicit and was not accompanied by adequate headquarters guidance and resources to support country offices. Based on the experience of Indonesia, it would appear that staff orientation, training and capacity building for results-based management was one of the weakest points of the UNDP results-based

management roll-out process. The whole process relied too heavily on a small number of regional face-to-face courses and intranet-based guidelines and training programmes. The use of the intranet should have been balanced with the use of face-to-face courses at the national level. Face-to-face courses at the regional level were too few to reach a critical mass or impart sufficient knowledge on the concept of managing for results. Implementation of results-based management within the country office is thus characterized by information asymmetry.

The training was confined to the regional level on the premise that it would reach a sample of staff who would, in turn, train others at the country level. Unfortunately, those trained at the regional level were not supported with resources to offer substantive training to the rest of the staff in the country office. Furthermore, because of the short duration of contracts, two of the three trained staff have already left the organization. It is important to note that most training is being developed and forced down on staff. Staff complained of redundant modules in courses such as Prince 2.

The fact that appreciation of results-based management concepts and tools varied across staff within one country office, compromised the impact of results-based management on internal organizational efficiency and development effectiveness.[90]

The Service Lines were expected to do wonders in terms of narrowing the focus of country programmes. However, sometimes this has not happened because of their poor wording. In Indonesia, the programme on deepening democracy was placed under the service line on policy for lack of a matching service line. Service lines for crisis recovery are also so broad that they cannot restrict country offices to focus on specific key deliverables.

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90 This feedback came from a short workshop with UNDP staff in Indonesia that explored the factors holding back and those supportive of results culture.

Some of the modules for ATLAS, such as Project Management, continue to be a work in progress and underused. This, in part, explains why UNDP Indonesia has gone beyond available corporate tools on project management to develop one composite module with all features.

Tools for measurement of development effectiveness of UNDP support have been lacking from the UNDP results-based management model, or they have just been difficult to put in place. The latter tends to be the excuse for concentrating on financial mobilization and delivery targets as the backbone of results-based management in UNDP. The ROAR is more for upward reporting to headquarters and remains a self assessment tool with little, if any, feedback from the headquarters. Without feedback, the instrument is not being used effectively by the regional bureau in its oversight function. The Balanced Scorecard has been effective in driving financial performance and learning and growth achievements upwards, but is a subjective assessment instrument. The idea of introducing outcome evaluations was noble, but the absence of enforcement of quality standards and corporate rules concerning management response compromises their potential impact in terms of changing the corporate culture at UNDP.

Another issue missing is a strong accountability framework. Some accountability exists, but a comprehensive system tying everyone from top management down to the lowest officer at the country level has been absent. There is no custodian of power to hold UNDP accountable. Commitment to results, in terms of development effectiveness, has been eroded by a preoccupation with resource mobilization, which has kept the organization afloat. This has tended to further reinforce the project approach, as most donors want to fund projects that have visibility at the community level. For as long as UNDP continues to focus on non-core funds, which are often projectized, development impact shall remain elusive to measure.

Incentives are an integral part of any performance-enhancement strategy. So far, UNDP has no mechanism to reward competitively and promptly above average performers. The staff RCA is a good instrument but weakened by the fact that UNDP does not as yet have a mechanism to recognize in financial terms those that exceed average performance.

MOLDOVA

INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC GOALS ON THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME

There is no evidence that the MYFFs have influenced the focus and composition of the country programme found in Moldova. The second MYFF's main effect may have been a symbolic reiteration from UNDP headquarters of the need to deliver results.

Results set at the outcome level were defined purely to meet headquarters' requirements, and reporting against them was seen as meeting a headquarters' reporting requirement. When the programme attempted to use the results and indicators as a management tool, it found that they were not useful. The fact that targets set in the Balanced Scorecard and ROAR are often not agreed upon with headquarters until June—six months into the implementation period—reinforces the perception that the targets are a formulistic reporting burden rather than a tool to frame and drive planning and performance at the country office level.

Whilst outcomes may be defined in consultation with government and donors, there is no evidence that outcomes are owned by anybody other than UNDP. While outcomes have been used for structuring some discussion and analysis, this has been focused within the programme team. There is no evidence of using outcomes with other stakeholders to discuss their different contributions to delivery of joint outcomes. In terms of the government, the lack of terminology for discussing results-based management or M&E in Romanian, and the almost complete lack of formal M&E systems within the government was a challenge that the programme hasn't

surmounted. In terms of donors, only in the field of Public Administration Reform has there been the possibility of structuring discussion of results around a common outcome, and this opportunity has not yet been grasped. Elsewhere, cost-sharing donors have relied upon their own M&E systems.

ALIGNMENT OF RESOURCES, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

There is no evidence that projects identified and other activities, such as advocacy, are organized around outcomes. Instead, revisions in outcomes trigger a remapping exercise in which projects are retrofitted under outcomes. Nor is there evidence that definition of outcomes influences identification of new projects.

The programme has been very successful at meeting its resource mobilization and delivery targets during the past five years. This has mainly been achieved through projects that the management acknowledge are not focused in the areas of key interest to UNDP or where it has a policy related comparative advantage. Rather, these donor cost-sharing projects were won due to UNDP project administration capacity relative to alternative providers, its relative flexibility and, to a lesser extent, a perceived focus on results from its projects. However, while there is evidence that the programme has tried to align resource mobilization with the broad areas of engagement found in the programme areas identified, these efforts have had only limited success to date.

The Resident Representative considers increasing professional programme staffing and a number of other investments in this area as the major evidence of an increased results focus in the country office. The number of professional programme staff in the office expanded from three in 2002 to eight by the end of 2006. The programme section was also reorganized in an attempt to lessen the hierarchical culture and expand roles and responsibilities of staff to engage in substantive work. Programme teams were reorganized around the major programme teams, although not around specific outcomes,

which would have been difficult given the small number of staff.

MONITORING SYSTEMS

With the removal of many of the mandatory monitoring requirements in 2002, the office moved to a very light project-monitoring system based around development of annual work plans and quarterly reporting to Project Steering Committees against the annual work plans. The office does not use annual project reviews and the use of tri-partite reviews was also discontinued. Above the level of the project, a system of annual programme reviews was instituted.

The office has found it difficult to use reports generated in ATLAS for monitoring with the Project Steering Committees, since presentation of information is not user friendly—not enough narrative information on performance is included and reports are in English. Therefore it has reverted to the use of short, informal narrative reports when discussing performance with the Project Steering Committees. However, there is little evidence that monitoring focuses above the level of inputs and outputs.

There is no formal monitoring system focused at the level of the outcome. The annual programme review meetings have, to date, mostly focused on presentation of a few key results, but the office is uncertain how these meetings might be better used to allow substantive discussion of results.

ADJUSTMENT AND LEARNING

There were examples of adjustment of the programme or within individual projects. However, there is little evidence linking these adjustments to information on results derived from the formal results-based management systems.

Stakeholders report that Annual Programme Reviews have normally lasted for two hours, which only allows 10 to 15 minutes of presentation on key results within each outcome area. This approach does not allow time for substantive discussion. The country office has experimented

with increasing the level of substantive discussion during the Programme Review process, such as its presentation of the results of the Local Governance Outcome evaluation at the 2005 review meeting. However, how to re-structure the country programme review process to enhance its value as a learning and action approach remains an unresolved issue.

EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Only one project evaluation has been carried out since 2002, although three outcome evaluations have been completed. While no longer mandatory to carry out project evaluations, reviews by the Evaluation Office have shown that a lack of project evaluations will adversely affect the quality of outcome evaluations. The experience of UNDP Moldova in using outcome evaluations to guide programme development has been mixed, partly due to the quality of the evaluations.

Staff believe that they can be held accountable for delivery of project outputs. In terms of accountability and responsibilities in the office, there are three main findings:

- There is consensus on accountability and responsibilities at the level of the project.

- The roles and accountabilities of the programme team leaders are not well defined. This suggests that the wish to move from a flat structure in which all programme staff report to the Programme Coordinator to a system with teams organized around the two major programme areas has not yet been completed.

- There is no consensus on roles and account- abilities within the country office for delivery of UNDP's contribution to delivery of its outcomes.

PRESENT STATUS

The office wishes to move to a greater focus on delivery of results in its work, and over the past few years, management has worked to ensure that there are sufficient staff to implement the needed change. However, the country office faces the following major challenges:

- To survive the office must continue to meet challenging resource mobilization and delivery targets, which are strongly monitored from headquarters. Balancing these needs against what a results focus would suggest should be done is an on-going challenge.

- Systems designed at corporate headquarters have not supported development of a results orientation and have instead imposed additional transaction costs, with little perceptible benefit at country level.

- There is little evidence of support or advice from the wider UNDP on how the country office might more effectively introduce a results focus while managing its competing priorities.

Despite the umbrella of 'outcomes' offered by the UNDAF and the CPD, management still focuses primarily on the project, its activities and outputs. The work done to link projects to outcomes is really a mapping exercise, and there is no apparent demonstration of 'results' informa- tion being used to strategize on which projects to select or reject based on their performance. The assignment of projects to outcome categories is somewhat subjective, though it has allowed for the identification of outlier projects that have been targeted for removal upon completion of the cycle. The outcome formulation is broad and permissive, allowing wide scope for future projects to align against a particular outcome. While this is not necessarily problematic, it does suggest that much of this is administrative in nature to serve reporting needs rather than results-based management per se.

The plethora of modifications by headquarters to the monitoring and reporting systems being introduced (i.e. changes to a particular system or interpretation of some element of implemen- tation), has resulted in frustration and confusion among staff. One of the system-related weak- nesses expressed by staff is that some systems do not relate easily to one another. Most frequently mentioned was ATLAS, which provides financial and performance reporting on a project basis. The office found that the

information produced is totally unsuitable for engaging with partners and therefore has reverted to producing separate narrative reports for engaging with other stakeholders.

There is some evidence that the country office does adjust the programme but little evidence that this adjustment is based on assessment of results.

Last, two related aspects of the nature of UNDP activities make monitoring results a challenge. First, UNDP is an extremely small player financially, which makes it hard to attribute change to UNDP activities. Second, a significant element in the programme's work concerns policy engagement, and this is a difficult area in which to identify and measure outcomes.

ZAMBIA

PERCEIVED STRENGTHS OF THE RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The setting of corporate goals (practice areas) has helped narrow down the focus of country office programmes to a smaller set of thematic areas and services where the organization has a clear comparative advantage. In the case of Zambia, the five practice areas identified in the second MYFF were validated as priority areas where the government and bilateral and multilateral institutions would like UNDP to provide future assistance.

UNDP sets annual targets in the CPAP that are reported in the ROAR, and this assists the organization in tracking progress towards achievement of outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, it helps the country office plan its resources with a results focus and adjust the programme as necessary.

The introduction of new tools (especially ATLAS and the Dashboard) has improved upward reporting and global transparency and benchmarking. The country office can compare and contrast its performance with that of the rest

of UNDP field offices, and this motivates improved performance.

Despite its limitations, the new RCA is appreciated by some staff as an attempt by the organization to link individual staff performance to annual targets of the organization. Its link to learning goals and long-term staff development initiatives is particularly useful in obtaining a corporate view of training needs and planning for these activities.

The Global Staff Survey has provided some 360-degree feedback to management. Management in the Zambia office is taking the results of the Global Staff Survey seriously. The office has introduced annual management and staff retreats for joint planning and put in place mechanisms to improve information flow between management and staff. One of the mechanisms has been to share minutes of the weekly Country Management Team and sectional meetings with staff by uploading them on its website.

PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES OF THE RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Whilst the theoretical underpinnings of the concept 'managing for results' are sound, the roll-out plan for UNDP was not explicit, neither was it accompanied by adequate headquarters guidance and resources to country offices. Based on Zambia's experience, it would appear that staff orientation, training and capacity building for results-based management was one of the weakest points of the UNDP results-based management roll-out process. The whole process relied too heavily on a small number of regional face-to-face courses and intranet-based guidelines and training programmes. The use of the intranet should have been balanced with the use of face-to-face courses at the national level. Face-to-face courses at the regional level were too few to reach a critical mass or impart sufficient knowledge of the concept. Implementation of results-based management within the country office is thus characterized by information asymmetry. This is manifests in the variable quality of outcomes per thematic area for example in the current CPD.

One example of an outcome that needs improvement is found for the programme component on HIV and AIDS, which is: "mainstreaming and implementation of multi-sectoral and community responses to HIV and AIDS at subnational, provincial and national levels strengthened." This is more of an activity or process than a specific, measurable and time bound outcome.

Staff training was confined to the regional level on the premise that it would reach a sample of staff who would, in turn, train others at the country level. Unfortunately, those trained at the regional level were not supported with resources to offer substantive training to the rest of the staff in the country office. Instead, they held no more than 'feedback meetings'. The concept of regional 'Training of Trainer' courses was a noble idea, allowing headquarters to concentrate on a nucleus of trainees who would, in turn, offer training to a larger group back in their country offices. However, the approach fell into the usual trap that most Training of Trainer programmes fall into: emphasis on the first layer of training (i.e., the training of the trainer) that overshadows the second layer (multiplier courses within the country offices). Yet it is the second layer that is most important in terms of achieving the desired outreach and enabling uniform application of results-based management skills in country offices. The fact that appreciation of results-based management concepts and tools varied across staff within one country office compromised the impact of results-based management on internal organizational efficiency and development effectiveness.

The above was exacerbated by the fact that different aspects (modules) of the UNDP results-based management system and tools were rolled out at different stages. Also, most systems were introduced not as final products but as works in progress, and improvements were made in the course of results-based management implementation. This trapped the organization in a system-churning process, characterized by changing global policy (MYFF 1, MYFF 2 and now the draft Strategic Plan), evolving results-based management guidelines, and introduction of new results-based management tools. ATLAS, an enterprise resource planning tool that was piloted in 2003, was rolled out in January 2004 as a work in progress. A new RCA was introduced with new guidelines during the period of results-based management implementation. The Balanced Scorecard was also introduced and adapted in the course of implementation. Prince 2, with its origin in the U.K. Government, is also being rolled out. All these developments present challenges at the country level, where the country office has to adapt to not only internal changes but also external changes in the aid architecture driven especially by UN reforms and the Paris Declaration.

Some of the modules for ATLAS, such as Project Management, continue to be work in progress and underused. Staff in the UNDP Zambia office confirmed that while almost all the financial, human resources and procurement modules in ATLAS were now being fully used, only a small proportion of the project management module was being used. At the time of the review, 90 percent of staff time invested in ATLAS was estimated to be spent on financial transactions and only 10 percent was for substantive programme issues. This is, more or less, the same pattern observed in Egypt.

The accountability framework for development results is particularly weak—little investment has been made or seems likely in the foreseeable future, although this problem is appreciated by headquarters. The results of expanded audits or outcome evaluations are not linked to other results-based management tools, yet they are very important especially for monitoring results achievement. UNDP has been lost in resource mobilization in delivery, thus reducing results-based management tools to management of inputs and only in quantitative terms. Results-based management has thus become a resource mobilization and utilization management tool as opposed to 'managing for development results'.