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CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON PERSONALITY

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■ **Abstract** Ecologies shape cultures; cultures influence the development of personalities. There are both universal and culture-specific aspects of variation in personality. Some culture-specific aspects correspond to cultural syndromes such as complexity, tightness, individualism, and collectivism. A large body of literature suggests that the Big Five personality factors emerge in various cultures. However, caution is required in arguing for such universality, because most studies have not included emic (culture-specific) traits and have not studied samples that are extremely different in culture from Western samples.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Recent *Annual Reviews of Psychology* have had chapters dealing with personality (Wiggins & Pincus 1992, Magnusson & Töerestad 1993, Revelle 1995) and with culture (Shweder & Sullivan 1993, Bond & Smith 1996a, Cooper & Denner 1998), but not with both culture and personality. The culture and personality topic is controversial. Bruner (1974) assessed the field as a "magnificent failure." Shweder (1991) saw little that can be considered positive in this field. For instance, Shweder argued that (*a*) individual differences in conduct are narrowly context dependent and do not generalize across contexts. Thus, global traits do not exist. Shweder further argued that (*b*) early childcare practices per se do not have predictable consequences for adult character, (*c*) the greater the cultural variation, the smaller is the situational comparability, and that (*d*) "objective" conditions, such as reinforcers and other "external" stimulus events, do not predict the accommodation of an organism to its environment.

More positive evaluations have emerged recently (e.g., Lee et al. 1999a). Lee et al. (1999b) edited a book that vigorously defended the utility of culture and personality studies, summarized the history of this topic, and provided chapters about Mexican, Chinese, African, German, Indian, and Japanese personality, as well as studies for the improvement of interaction across cultures. Piker (1998) thought that Shweder's objections to previous work employed "straw dummy tactics" (p. 21).

McCrae and his colleagues (McCrae 2000, McCrae et al. 2000) also presented a view diametrically opposite to Shweder (1991). According to McCrae et al., global traits do exist. They claim that "studies of heritability, limited parental influence, structural invariance across cultures and species, and temporal stability all point to the notion that personality traits are more expressions of human biology than products of life experience" (p. 177). This view places too much emphasis on biology, and more balanced assessments of the influence of genes and environment (e.g., Maccoby 2000) suggest that personality corresponds to the area of a quadrangle, one side of which is genes and the other, environment. In short, personality emerges under the influence of both genes and environment. Furthermore, behavior is likely to be a function of not only culture and personality but also the interaction between personality and the situation. We review studies where most of the variance in behavior is a function of such interactions.

In any case, McCrae et al. (2000) argued that there are basic tendencies (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) that are independent of culture. For example, animal psychologists (e.g., Gosling & John 1999) have identified personality traits (such as extroversion and dominance) in some higher animals, so at a basic level, contrary to Shweder's view, such traits are likely to exist (see also Munroe 1999). Many of Shweder's other points can be criticized in similar ways, leading us to agree with Piker's (1998) comments.

Shweder (1991) proposed that cultural psychology would provide the way to think about culture and personality. He recommended "thick description" of the

cultural practices without attempts at generalizations. However, the facts of phylogenetic continuity make generalizations possible. We can examine universals across cultures while admitting that the meaning that individuals give to a particular event may differ from culture to culture and must be incorporated in our understanding of the way culture is related to individual differences in behavior. Thus, in this chapter we take a position that is intermediate between Shweder (1991) and McCrae et al. (2000). We look for universal generalizations, while at the same time admitting emic (culture-specific) information.

Personality is shaped by both genetic and environmental influences. Among the most important of the latter are cultural influences. Culture is transmitted through language and the modeling of behavior when conditions permit humans to communicate through shared language, by living in the same historic period, and when they are sufficiently proximal to influence each other. The overarching model of cultural influences on personality that we have adopted in this chapter is that though biological factors have an important role in shaping personality, they do not account for most of the variance. Ecology, among other factors, shapes the culture, which in turn shapes the socialization patterns, which shape some of the variance of personality (Maccoby 2000). For example, Rohner (1986, 1999) has shown reliable links between socialization practices and personality. Both within and between cultures when parents accept their children (there is much hugging, comforting), the children become sociable, emotionally stable, have high self-esteem, feel self-adequate, and have a positive world view. When parents are rejecting (hitting, using sarcastic language, humiliating, neglecting), their children become adults who are hostile, unresponsive, unstable, immaturely dependent, and have impaired self-esteem and a negative world view.

Of course, historical factors and cultural diffusion also shape cultures, but limitations of space preclude their discussion. Broad empirical support for such a model does exist (e.g., Singelis & Brown 1995). In addition to these factors, we consider other constructs that are needed for a better understanding of the way culture influences personality.

SOME DEFINITIONS

Culture

The conceptualization of culture is by no means a simple matter. One possible way to think about culture is that "culture is to society what memory is to individuals" (Kluckhohn 1954). It includes what has worked in the experience of a society, so that it was worth transmitting to future generations. Sperber (1996) used the analogy of an epidemic. A useful idea (e.g., how to make a tool) is adopted by more and more people and becomes an element of culture (Campbell 1965). Barkow et al. (1992) distinguished three kinds of culture: metaculture, evoked culture, and epidemiological culture. They argue that "psychology underlies culture and society,

and biological evolution underlies psychology" (p. 635). The biology that has been common to all humans as a species distinguishable from other species, results in a "metaculture" that corresponds to panhuman mental contents and organization. Biology in different ecologies results in "evoked culture" (e.g., hot climate leads to light clothing), which reflects domain-specific mechanisms that are triggered by local circumstances, and leads to within-group similarities and between-groups differences. What Sperber describes, Barkow et al. call "epidemiological culture."

Elements of culture are shared standard operating procedures, unstated assumptions, tools, norms, values, habits about sampling the environment, and the like. Because perception and cognition depend on the information that is sampled from the environment and are fundamental psychological processes, this culturally influenced sampling of information is of particular interest to psychologists. Cultures develop conventions for sampling information and determine how much to weigh the sampled elements from the environment (Triandis 1989). For example, people in hierarchical cultures are more likely to sample clues about hierarchy than clues about aesthetics. Triandis (1989) argued that people in individualist cultures, such as those of North and Western Europe and North America, sample with high probability elements of the personal self (e.g., "I am busy, I am kind"). People from collectivist cultures, such as those of Asia, Africa, and South America, tend to sample mostly elements of the collective self (e.g., "my family thinks I am too busy, my co-workers think I am kind") (Triandis et al. 1990, Trafimow et al. 1991).

Personality

Funder (1997) defined personality as "an individual's characteristic pattern of thought, emotion, and behavior, together with the psychological mechanisms—hidden or not—behind those patterns" (pp. 1–2). Characteristic sampling of the information in the environment, which corresponds to the sampling that occurs in different cultures, can be one of the bases of individual differences in personality.

Personality may also be conceptualized as a configuration of cognitions, emotions, and habits activated when situations stimulate their expression. Generally, they determine the individual's unique adjustment to the world. This view is supported by data that indicate the importance of the situation. For example, the authoritarian personality is characterized by submission to authorities, aggression toward people who are different, and conventionalism (Pettigrew 1999). Interestingly, Russians who are high on this trait reject laissez-faire individualism, whereas Americans who are high on this trait support this type of individualism (McFarland et al. 1992). Rejection of individualism is consistent with Russian conventionalism, whereas support for individualism is consistent with American conventionalism.

Level of Analysis

Studies that use culture as the *N* can provide different results than studies that use individuals as the *N*. Thus, below we attempt to make explicit the level of analysis that was used in a particular study.

Indigenous, Cultural, and Cross-Cultural Psychologies

Many theoretical perspectives are used when studying the relationship between culture and psychology (Cooper & Denner 1998). The most important are the indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural perspectives. The differences in perspectives have implications for the methodology that is likely to be used in studying personality. For example, personality tests developed in one culture and translated for use in other cultures are likely to be insensitive to cultural differences and to produce distorted results (Greenfield 1997). Cultural and indigenous psychologists do not use such tests; they use mostly ethnographic methods. Cross-cultural psychologists attempt to measure the same construct equivalently in each culture with culturally sensitive methods.

Triandis (2000b) outlined several differences among these approaches and argued that all three are needed. Converging findings using these approaches are most likely to be reliable and valid. This is also the view of Marsella et al. (2000) who, after an excellent review of the history of culture and personality studies, emphasized the use of qualitative (ethnosemantic) methods in conjunction with quantitative methods. The ethnosemantic methods include (*a*) the elicitation of all personality terms in the particular language, (*b*) the organization by research participants of the terms into naturally occurring structures, (*c*) the derivation of the meanings (e.g., spontaneous associations) of these structures, and (*d*) the linking of the terms to actual behaviors. For example, researchers might use the antecedent-consequent method (Triandis 1972) ("If one is Y then one 'would' or 'would not' do X") to determine the link between personality terms and behaviors in different cultures. It is very likely that the emic structures obtained with these methods will have some resemblance to the etic structures obtained by Western methods. Finding such convergence allows us to compare personalities across cultures (using the etic dimensions) and also describe personalities with culturally sensitive elements (using the emic dimensions).

Church & Lonner (1998) edited a special issue of the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, which utilized this convergent point of view. They included papers that linked personality and culture from the perspective of cultural (Markus & Kitayama 1998), indigenous (Ho 1998), and evolutionary psychology (MacDonald 1998). Church (2000) has provided an impressive model of culture and personality that integrated many of these approaches, especially the trait and cultural psychological approaches. According to the model, traits exist in all cultures, but account for behavior less in collectivist than in individualist cultures. Situational determinants of behavior are important universally, but more so in collectivist than in individualist cultures. Cognitive consistency among psychological processes and between psychological processes and behavior occurs universally, but is less important in collectivist than in individualist cultures.

Ecology to Culture Links

Ecology (terrain, climate, flora and fauna, natural resources) is linked to the maintenance system (subsistence and settlement patterns, social structures, means of

production) and to subjective culture. For example, large mountains and wide seas reduce the probability of cultural diffusion. Thus, the homogeneity of relatively isolated cultures (e.g., Japan in contrast to China) is likely to be high. Homogeneity makes a culture "tight," that is, its members have many rules and norms about behavior and punish those who deviate, even in minor ways, from norms. In tight cultures, such as Singapore, adolescents conform to the societal norms and do not engage in risk behaviors, such as experimenting with alcohol, tobacco, physical violence, or sexual intercourse (Ball & Moselle 1995). In "loose" cultures people are more likely to react to deviations from normative behaviors by saying "It does not matter."

An interesting ecological variable is whether the resources that a population needs for survival have high (e.g., cattle) or low (e.g., trees) mobility. Cultures where wealth is easily moveable develop a "culture of honor" in which people are socialized to be fierce and to react aggressively to insults, so that strangers will be discouraged from stealing their moveable goods. Nisbett & Cohen (1996) showed that a culture of honor is more common in the South than in the northern regions of the United States. Cohen et al. (1996) showed that, compared with students from the North, students from the South were more easily provoked and became more aggressive when verbally insulted.

Climate can also influence culture. For example, Van de Vliert et al. (1999) argued that temperature is related to violence. Data from 136 countries show a curvilinear pattern, with violence very low in cold climates (e.g., Finland), very high in warm climates (e.g., Pakistan), and moderately high in extremely hot climates (e.g., Malaysia). In warm climates the survival of offspring is possible even without the significant investment of fathers. This frees men to sire children with multiple mates and leads to greater competition among the men, and ultimately to "masculine" cultures where men are more dominant, assertive, and tough.

The cultures that emerge in different parts of the world often reflect the availability of flora, fauna, and other resources, as well as historical factors, such as migrations, wars, revolutions, and inventions. There is little inequality in hunting and gathering cultures, because food (resources) cannot be preserved for a long time, so it is not possible for one group to accumulate resources (O'Kelly & Carney 1986). The greatest inequality is in societies where inventors are financially successful and become differentiated from their peers.

The maintenance system (food gathering, agriculture, manufacturing, services) is linked to cultural syndromes (i.e., shared elements of subjective culture, such as attitudes, norms, and values that are organized around a theme) (Triandis 1996). For example, among hunters individual action is often more valuable than collective action, whereas among agricultural people collective action (e.g., building an irrigation system) is often extremely valued. The result is that hunting cultures are more individualist than farming cultures (Berry 1976) and the latter are more conforming than the former, an attribute that is associated with collectivism (Bond & Smith 1996b).

Both the genetic system (e.g., levels of arousal, activity, universals of emotions) and the cultural system are shaped by evolution (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). Culture

includes socialization patterns, which shape personality (Maccoby 2000). In the sections that follow we review studies showing the specifics of some of the links we have just discussed.

DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE

Complexity

Cultures differ in complexity (Chick 1997). The most contrast is found between hunters/gatherers and information societies. Gross national product per capita, although not sufficient, is one index of cultural complexity. Other indices include the percent of the population that is urban, the size of cities, personal computers per capita, etc.

Tightness

In tight cultures norms are imposed tightly (see above). In loose cultures deviation from norms is tolerated. Such tolerance is found in relatively heterogeneous societies (where several normative systems are present), where people do not depend on each other much, and where population density (e.g., opportunity for surveillance) is low. An open frontier is related to looseness (Triandis 1994, 1995).

Collectivism

Triandis (1994, 1995) proposed the hypothesis that collectivism is high in cultures that are simple and tight. Carpenter (2000) obtained empirical support for the correlation of collectivism and tightness. In collectivist cultures people are interdependent with their in-groups (family, tribe, nation, etc.), give priority to the goals of their in-groups, shape their behavior primarily on the basis of in-group norms, and behave in a communal way (Mills & Clark 1982).

There are many kinds of collectivist cultures. One important distinction is between vertical (e.g., India) and horizontal (e.g., the Israeli kibbutz) collectivist cultures. Vertical cultures are traditionalist and emphasize in-group cohesion, respect for in-group norms, and the directives of authorities (Bond & Smith 1996b). For instance, vertical collectivism is correlated with right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996), the tendency to be submissive to authority and to endorse conventionalism. Both vertical collectivism and right wing authoritarianism correlate positively with age and religiosity, and negatively with education and exposure to diverse persons (Pettigrew 1999, Triandis 1995). Horizontal collectivist cultures emphasize empathy, sociability, and cooperation (Triandis & Gelfand 1998). Gabriel & Gardner (1999) recently found another variation of collectivism between genders. According to their research, male collectivism is derived from group memberships (e.g., "I am an American"); female collectivism is derived from specific relationships (e.g., "I am Amanda's best friend").

A defining character of people in collectivist cultures is their notable concern with relationships. For example, Ohbuchi et al. (1999) showed that collectivists

in conflict situations are primarily concerned with maintaining relationships with others, whereas individualists are primarily concerned with achieving justice. Thus, collectivists prefer methods of conflict resolution that do not destroy relationships (e.g., mediation), whereas individualists are willing to go to court to settle disputes (Leung 1997).

Individualism

At the cultural level of analysis (in which the number of cultures is the *N* of the analyses), individualism is the other pole of collectivism. In vertical individualist cultures (e.g., US corporate cultures) competitiveness is high, and one must be "the best" in order to climb the hierarchy. In horizontal individualist cultures (e.g., Australia, Sweden) hierarchical differentiation is de-emphasized, and the emphasis is on self-reliance, independence from others, and uniqueness (Triandis & Gelfand 1998). This is only a partial list of dimensions of cultural variation. Many more (e.g., Hofstede et al. 1998) have been proposed, but limitations of space do not allow their presentation here.

Recent Findings on Individualism and Collectivism

Greenfield (1999) suggested that the individualism-collectivism contrast corresponds to the "deep structure" of cultural differences. We concur and thus feel that it deserves special attention and emphasis in this review. In recent years there were almost 100 studies published annually examining some phenomenon from the point of view of these cultural patterns. For example, Marc Bornstein (e.g., Bornstein et al. 1999) has published numerous studies concerning mother-child interactions in several cultures and has found that the contrast between collectivism and individualism provides a helpful framework for the findings. Although a complete review of this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, a number of key recent findings are summarized in this review.

The terms individualism and collectivism are used at the cultural level of analysis, where the number of observations is the number of cultures (e.g., Hofstede 1980). In such data individualism is the polar opposite of collectivism. As mentioned above, results at the cultural level may differ from results at the individual level of analysis. Thus, different terms are used to indicate the level of analysis. Individualism and collectivism are used at the cultural level, whereas at the individual level of analysis (i.e., within-culture analyses), the corresponding terms are *idiocentrism* and *allocentrism* (Triandis et al. 1985). Idiocentrism and allocentrism are personality attributes that are often orthogonal to each other. Idiocentrics emphasize self-reliance, competition, uniqueness, hedonism, and emotional distance from in-groups. Allocentrics emphasize interdependence, sociability, and family integrity; they take into account the needs and wishes of in-group members, feel close in their relationships to their in-group, and appear to others as responsive to their needs and concerns (Cross et al. 2000). It is possible for individuals to be high or low on both allocentrism and idiocentrism, though this may depend on

culture. For instance, Verkuyten & Masson (1996) found that allocentrism and idiocentrism were unrelated in a collectivist sample but negatively correlated in an individualist sample.

In all cultures there are both idiocentrics and allocentrics, in different proportions (Triandis et al. 2001). Generally speaking, in collectivist cultures there are about 60% allocentrics and in individualist cultures about 60% idiocentrics. The allocentrics in individualist cultures are more likely than the idiocentrics to join groups—gangs, communes, unions, etc. The idiocentrics in collectivist cultures are more likely than the allocentrics to feel oppressed by their culture and to seek to leave it.

At the Cultural Level of Analysis

The collectivism-individualism cultural syndrome has been studied intensively (for review, see Kagitcibasi 1997; Markus & Kitayama 1991; Triandis 1989, 1995). Collectivism-individualism are broader terms than interdependence-independence as used by Markus & Kitayama. The latter refer to self-construal which is only an aspect of the cultural syndrome of collectivism-individualism. An important goal of collectivists is to fulfill their duties and obligations. Triandis (1995) pointed out that collectivists usually have few in-groups, whereas individualists have many. Thus, the social obligations of collectivists are quite focused, whereas those of individualists are fluid and may be converted to obligations to the larger society rather than to specific in-groups. Consistent with this observation, Oyserman et al. (1998) found that collectivism increased obligation to the in-group when in-group membership was made salient.

COGNITION People in collectivist cultures see the environment as more or less fixed (stable norms, obligations, duties) and themselves as changeable, ready to "fit in." People in individualist cultures see themselves as more or less stable (stable attitudes, personality, rights) and the environment as changeable (e.g., if they do not like the job they change jobs) (Chiu et al. 1997, Chiu & Hong 1999, Hong et al. 2001, Su et al. 1999).

Norenzayan et al. (1999) claim, for instance, that East Asians making dispositional attributions see traits as quite malleable, whereas Western individualist samples see them as fixed. They reviewed a wide range of information, from laboratory studies to ethnographies, and concluded that probably all cultures make dispositional attributions. Cultural differences occur because samples from East Asia make situational attributions much more frequently and to a greater extent than samples from the West (see also Krull et al. 1999). Furthermore, Choi & Nisbett (2000) found that East Asians have a higher tolerance for contradictions than do Americans and thus are less surprised than Americans when they are presented with inconsistencies, such as a plausible hypothesis that was not supported. Choi & Nisbett (2000) suggest that the logical thinking of Western samples has advantages in the development of science, whereas the more holistic thinking of Eastern samples has advantages for the maintenance of interpersonal order and

harmony within the in-group (sensitivity in interpersonal relations, saving face, and the like).

MOTIVATION The greater the complexity, and therefore individualism, the more people desire to have many choices and to be unique. Kim & Markus (1999) used several methods to show that in some cultures people are highly motivated to be unique, whereas in others people prefer to be like everyone else. Iyengar & Lepper (1999) found that children of European-American backgrounds were more motivated when they had a choice and showed less motivation when authorities or peers made the choice for them. Conversely, Asian-American children were less motivated when given a personal choice, whereas having choices made for them by trusted authority figures and peers actually produced the highest levels of intrinsic motivation and performance.

Motivation in individualist cultures increases following success. In collectivist cultures it increases following failure, because the individual focuses on how to change the self and improve the fit between self and the demands of the social environment (Heine et al. 2000). Munro et al. (1997) recently edited a volume devoted to the relationships between culture and various types of motivation (e.g., work, religious, social, sexual).

EMOTION The prototypical emotions experienced by collectivist and individualist cultural members appear to be different. In a study by Kitayama et al. (2000) Americans reported more positive disengaged emotions (superior, proud, top of the world), whereas Japanese reported more interpersonally engaged emotions (friendly feelings, feel close, respect). Also, compared with the Japanese, Americans reported more positive than negative emotions. Mesquita (2001) reported that emotions in collectivist cultures tend to be embedded in relationships and are perceived to reflect the status of those relationships. Similar emotions may be instantiated in self-focused or other-focused ways in individualist and collectivist cultures, respectively.

In addition to the difference in the content of emotions, the weights that collectivists and individualists assign to their emotional experience as a whole seem to differ. For instance, Suh et al. (1998) found that emotions are strong predictors of life satisfaction in individualist cultures, whereas social norms (approval by others) strongly predict the satisfaction of collectivists. Levine et al. (1995) also found that emotional factors (i.e., love) play a more decisive role in major personal decisions such as marriage in individualist than in collectivist cultures.

SELF-DESCRIBED PERSONALITY TRAITS Grimm et al. (1999) examined the self-described personality traits, values, and moods of students in an individualist (United States) and a collectivist (Philippines) culture. They predicted that the Filipino sample would rate themselves lower than the US sample on individualist traits (e.g., independence, pleasure seeking, assertiveness) and higher on collectivist traits (e.g., attentiveness, respectfulness, humility, cooperativeness). The data

were generally supportive of the differences on the individualist traits, but there were no cultural differences on the collectivist traits.

WELL-BEING People in individualist cultures have more positive self-esteem (Heine et al. 1999) and are more optimistic (Lee & Seligman 1997) than people in collectivist cultures, and those factors are associated with high subjective well-being (for a review, see Suh 2000). Triandis (2000a) has proposed a wide range of factors that might contribute to cultural differences in subjective well-being. The more important ones are a good fit between personality and culture, openness to new experiences, extroversion, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, and self-acceptance (for further discussions on culture and well-being, see Diener & Suh 2000).

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR People in collectivist cultures belong to groups as a matter of right, by birth or marriage, whereas those in individualist cultures often have to earn their membership in a group. Thus, the former rarely develop excellent skills for entering new groups, whereas the latter are more likely to acquire such skills (Cohen 1991). People in collectivist cultures usually establish intimate and long-term relationships (Verma 1992). People in individualist cultures usually establish nonintimate and short-term relationships.

Collectivist cultural members are strongly influenced by the behaviors and thoughts of other people. For instance, Cialdini et al. (1999) examined how people responded to a request to participate in a market survey. They found that people from collectivist cultures were influenced by social proof arguments (e.g., your peers have complied with this request). People from individualist cultures, however, were influenced more by commitment/consistency arguments (e.g., you have complied to a similar request in the past).

In recreational settings the typical group in collectivist cultures (*a*) has stable membership, (*b*) is relatively large (more than three people), and (*c*) meets frequently. Choi (1996) found that during recreation individuals in collectivist cultures are more likely to engage in joint activities with family members and friends, whereas individuals in individualistic cultures are more likely to engage in activities alone (see also Brandt 1974). The typical recreation group in individualist cultures (*a*) has variable membership, (*b*) is often small (two or three people) or very large, and (*c*) meets infrequently. The cocktail party, after all, was invented by individualists!

COMMUNICATION People in collectivist cultures use indirect and face-saving communication more than people in individualist cultures (Holtgraves 1997). Lin (1997) points out that ambiguity in communication can be very helpful in a vertical collectivist culture such as China, where clarity may result in sanctions. One cannot point out to an official that he is not correct. The Chinese, he indicates, admire people who are frank, such as Judge Bao (p. 369), but do not emulate him.

During communication people in collectivist cultures frequently use "we"; individualists use "I." In vertical cultures the very use of words is different depending

on whether a lower status person is talking to a higher status person or vice versa. Such differences in word use are not so frequent in horizontal cultures. In fact, the languages used by people in collectivist cultures often do not require the use of "I" and "you," whereas the languages used by individualists do (Kashima & Kashima 1998). In Japan, as well as among many Native Americans, silence is acceptable. In fact, some Japanese women think that a silent male is going to be economically successful and will be a good provider and husband (Ishikawa 1970, written in Japanese, reported in Hasegawa 1996). Silence is embarrassing to people in individualist cultures, whereas it is a sign of strength for some people in collectivist cultures (Iwao 1993).

ETHICS There are three moral codes: community, autonomy, and divinity (Rozin et al. 1999). Community codes are especially important to people in collectivist cultures, whereas autonomy codes are important in individualist cultures. They evoke different emotions. Violation of communal codes, including hierarchy, evokes contempt; violation of the autonomy code (e.g., individual rights) evokes anger. Violation of the divinity code (purity, sanctity) evokes disgust. Data from Japan and the United States support the theory (Rozin et al. 1999).

Indians see helping an in-group member as duty-based, whereas Americans see it more as a matter of personal choice (Miller 1997). In fact, Americans are less likely to feel responsible than are Indians for helping siblings or colleagues whom they personally do not like. The judgments of Indians were not affected by liking (Miller & Bersoff 1998). Morality among people in collectivist cultures is more contextual, and the supreme value is the welfare of the collective. Ma (1988) has provided a Chinese perspective on moral judgment that differs from the individualistic perspective of Kohlberg (1981).

Lying is a more acceptable behavior in collectivist than in individualist cultures, if it saves face or helps the in-group. There are traditional ways of lying that are understood as "correct behavior." Trilling (1972) argues that when people have a strong sense that they themselves determine who they are, as is characteristic of people in individualist cultures, they are more likely to seek sincerity and authenticity. By contrast, when they feel swept by traditions and obligations, as is more likely among people in collectivist cultures, they de-emphasize authenticity. Triandis et al. (2001) found evidence of greater tendencies toward deception among collectivist samples.

Many observers have emphasized the importance of saving face in collectivist cultures (Hu 1944, Ho 1976). Moral persons behave as their roles, in-group members, and society stipulate. If the individual deviates from such ideal behavior, there is loss of face, not only for the individual, but also for the whole in-group. In many collectivist cultures morality consists of doing what the in-group expects. When interacting with the out-group, it is sometimes considered "moral" to exploit and deceive. In other words, morality is applicable to only some members of one's social environment.

Leung (1997) reviewed several empirical studies concerned with the way resources are distributed. He concluded that in general, in equal status situations,

equality is preferred in collectivist and equity in individualist cultures. Equal distribution is associated with solidarity, harmony, and cohesion, so it fits with the values of people in collectivist cultures. Equity is compatible with productivity, competition, and self-gain, so it fits with the values of people in individualist cultures. Some people in collectivist cultures even show a generosity rule when exchanging with in-group members. That is, they use equality even when their contribution is clearly higher than that of other members (Hui et al. 1991).

Church (2000) has summarized the major differences between individualist and collectivist cultures. The following are especially important in comparisons of collectivist and individualist cultures: (*a*) People in collectivist cultures focus on contexts more than on internal processes in predicting the behavior of others; (*b*) individual behaviors are less consistent in collectivist cultures across situations; and (*c*) in collectivist cultures behavior is more predictable from norms and roles than from attitudes.

At the Individual Level of Analysis

All humans have access to both individualist and collectivist cognitive structures, but the accessibility to these structures differs. In individualist cultures people have more access to the individualist cognitive structures and are idiocentric, whereas in collectivist cultures people have more access to the collectivist cognitive structures and are allocentric. A simple prime, such as asking people to think for two minutes about what they have in common with their family and friends, shifts people toward allocentrism, whereas thinking of what makes one different from family and friends shifts one to idiocentrism (Trafimow et al. 1991). "Frame switching" among bicultural individuals is common. For instance, priming with the US Capitol or a Chinese building results in tendencies toward idiocentrism or allocentrism, respectively (Hong et al. 2000). That is, they see the self as either stable or malleable, behavior as determined by dispositional or situational factors, and the like, as discussed above.

Allocentrics tend to define themselves with reference to social entities to a greater extent than do idiocentrics (Triandis et al. 1990). Traditional samples that have acculturated to individualist cultures show this tendency less, especially when they are highly educated. For example, Altrocchi & Altrocchi (1995) found that the least acculturated Cook Islanders used about 57% social content in describing themselves, whereas Cook Islanders born in New Zealand used 20%, and New Zealanders used 17% social content. Similarly, Ma & Schoeneman (1997) reported 84% social content for Sumbaru Kenyans, 80% for Maasai Kenyans, but only 12% for American students, and 17% for Kenyan students. Idiocentrics tend to use traits in describing other people (Duff & Newman 1997) and focus on internal dispositions in making attributions (Menon et al. 1999). Compared with idiocentrics, allocentrics use the context, the situation, and the group's perspective more in making attributions (Choi et al. 1999, Menon et al. 1999) and evaluating their lives (Suh & Diener 2001) and tend to be more field-dependent and think in more holistic terms (Ji et al. 2000).

Allocentrics are also more ethnocentric than idiocentrics; they have very positive attitudes about their in-groups and quite negative attitudes about their out-groups (Lee & Ward 1998). Allocentrics see a large distance between self and enemies and a relatively small distance between self and friend. Idiocentrics see a relatively large distance between self and all others. In short, large differentiation occurs between self and others among idiocentrics; between in-group and out-groups among allocentrics (Iyengar et al. 1999).

Several important personality characteristics distinguish idiocentrics and allocentrics. For instance, idiocentrics tend toward dominance, while allocentrics tend to be agreeable (Moskowitz et al. 1994). Realo et al. (1997) developed a measure of allocentrism in Estonia and tested its convergence with the Big Five. They found a negative correlation between openness and allocentrism and positive correlations between agreeableness and conscientiousness and allocentrism. Watson et al. (1998) found that allocentrism was correlated with social responsibility and negatively correlated with normlessness; idiocentrism was correlated with high self-esteem and normlessness. Other studies show that compared with idiocentrics, allocentrics have low self-esteem, are easily embarrassed (Singelis et al. 1999), show greater tendencies toward affiliation, are more sensitive to rejection, and have a lower need for uniqueness (Yamaguchi et al. 1995). Matsumoto et al. (1997) developed and validated an inventory that measures allocentric and idiocentric tendencies.

In studies by Dion & Dion (1996) idiocentrism was related to less intimacy and poorer adjustment in romantic love relationships. Self-actualization, a prototypical individualist construct, was related to more gratification with love, yet less love for the partner and less caring for the needs of the partner, suggesting that idiocentrism may be a factor in the high divorce rate of individualist countries (Dion & Dion 1996).

The motive structure of allocentrics reflects receptivity to others, adjustment to the needs of others, and restraint of own needs and desires. The basic motives emphasized by idiocentrics reflect internal needs, such as rights and capacities, including the ability to withstand social pressures (Markus & Kitayama 1991, Bond & Smith 1996b). Achievement motivation is socially oriented among allocentrics, and individually oriented among idiocentrics. Yu & Yang (1994) developed separate scales for these two kinds of motivation and showed that these scales are uncorrelated among allocentrics. Gabrenya & Hwang (1996) provide an excellent description of social interaction in China that illustrates most of the points presented above.

Social behavior depends on the interaction of personality and situation. When idiocentrics and allocentrics were randomly assigned to individualist and collectivist situations, the most cooperation occurred among allocentrics in collectivist situations (Chatman & Barsade 1995). In Chatman & Barsade's study, the situation was a powerful factor in determining the level of cooperation, but the interaction of personality and situation was equally important. Situations may also have implications for the kinds of behaviors that will emerge. For instance,

Kitayama et al. (1997) showed that situations freely generated by Americans are conducive to self-enhancement, and Americans are likely to be high in self-enhancement. Japanese-generated situations tend to be conducive to self-criticism, and the Japanese are likely to engage in self-criticism. Kitayama & Markus (1999) showed that the Japanese self, while internally consistent, allows the coexistence of contrasting elements, making it possible for the Japanese to be both explicitly self-critical and implicitly to evaluate themselves in a positive way. Perhaps because of this coexistence of contrasting elements of the self, on average, collectivists view themselves as more flexible across social situations than individualists do (Suh 2001).

What is the ideal relation between culture (e.g., individualism) and personality (e.g., idiocentrism)? There is some empirical support for the "culture fit" hypothesis, which states that allocentrics are better adjusted in a collectivist culture and idiocentrics are better adjusted in an individualist culture (Schmitz 1994, Ward & Chang 1997). However, there is also evidence that individuals who are high on both allocentrism and idiocentrism are especially well-adjusted to their environment (Imamoglou 1998). Also, those who were raised in a collectivist culture and become acculturated to an individualist culture are high in both allocentrism and idiocentrism (Yamada & Singelis 1999). More needs to be explored about how individual tendencies (e.g., allocentrism) unfold and change in the context of both congruent (collectivistic) and incongruent (individualistic) cultural situations.

DIMENSIONS OF PERSONALITY

The Big Five, Seven, and Other Arguments

Given that all humans are one species and that personality has genetic roots (Rieman et al. 1997), the similarities among cultural groups are likely to be greater than the differences. Not surprisingly, most personality researchers emphasize the similarities in personality structure across cultures. Goldberg (1981) makes the case that the Big Five may be universal, because they each have important survival qualities in all cultures. De Raad et al. (1998) offer a review of the cross-cultural findings on the Big Five personality factors.

The research program of McCrae and Costa suggests that the basic personality traits are transcultural. They argue that (*a*) the same personality structure has emerged in a wide variety of cultures (Digman & Shmelyov 1996, McCrae & Costa 1997, Pulver et al. 1995, Yang et al. 1999), (*b*) traits show the same pattern of developmental change in adulthood (McCrae et al. 1999, 2000), (*c*) traits are biologically based (Jang et al. 1998), and (*d*) acculturation effects are as predicted (McCrae et al. 1998b). For example, exposing Chinese to Canadian culture increases their openness, cheerfulness, and indiscriminate pro-social behavior and attitudes.

McCrae et al. (1998a) show very similar structures in different cultures, though they admit that the French varimax factors are about 15 degrees off from the American position, and the Japanese factors are 35 degrees away from the American position. Butcher et al. (1998) make the same claim for the MMPI-2, as a measure of abnormal personality. Somer & Goldberg (1999) reported that four of the five factors were clearly detectable in the structure of Turkish trait descriptive adjectives.

Instead of using the traditional lexical approach, several studies have examined the Big Five structures through other methods. Paunonen et al. (2000) constructed a nonverbal test of personality, consisting of a target person engaging in various trait-related behaviors, and found the five factors in data from Canada, England, the Netherlands, Norway, and Israel. Working with parental descriptions of child personality, Kohnstamm et al. (1998) found that in the seven countries they examined, the Big Five provided the most important categories for the classification of these descriptions.

Williams et al. (1998) linked the Big Five with individualism and collectivism. They obtained a cluster of countries that was individualist and low in power distance and a cluster that was collectivist and less economically developed. Interestingly, however, Japan and Singapore belonged to the first cluster. In the individualist cultures the more important traits were internal (e.g., dominant, distrustful, unscrupulous), whereas in the collectivist countries they were external (handsome, polished, healthy). Again, we see the emphasis on internal factors among individualists and external factors among collectivists.

Although the overall evidence in support of the Big Five structure is impressive, cross-cultural generalizations still require caution. The special issue edited by McCrae (2000) does a commendable job of including papers by critics. Bock (2000), for instance, argues that there is much within-culture variability, and any characterization of a culture on the basis of the location of the sample on the five factors will be an oversimplification. In another paper, Bond (2000) finds a *Chinese tradition* factor that was derived from emic personality studies and shows that when this factor is included in a study, it increases the predictability of behavior. One important comment made by Church & Katigbak (2000) is that traits do not predict behavior as well in collectivist as in individualist cultures.

Our own reaction to this research program is also critical. First, most of the data were collected from college students or students of secondary and technical schools (Draguns et al. 2000). In the earlier section we pointed out that education is linked with idiocentrism. We do not know what the structures would be with very allocentric research participants or with those who did not have the benefit of extensive schooling, e.g., illiterates. Schooling is a major factor in the way people are able to reason (Luria 1976) and respond to personality instruments.

Related to that criticism is the observation that the cultural distance between the American samples and the samples from the other cultures that have been investigated thus far was not especially large. Cultural distance reflects differences in language families, socio-economic level, family structure, religion, and values

(Triandis 1994). Values differ substantially among cultures (Schwartz 1992, 1994). Todd (1983) has identified eight types of family structure. A simple term like "aunt" may convey different meanings in different family structures. Noneducated samples from nonliterate cultures that have very different religions, standards of living, and values, for instance, have not been studied much so far. Because most cross-cultural studies of the Big Five used samples that are not very distant in culture, we cannot be sure as yet that the same factor structures will occur universally.

Second, cultural differences in the way people sample the environment may change the factor structure. The Big Five are etic dimensions of personality. It is possible to use indigenous markers of these five factors, which results in a quasi-indigenous personality inventory, as was done for Castilian Spanish by Benet-Martinez & John (2000). However, one step further is to use both etic and emic items (Diaz-Loving 1998, 1999). In the few cases in which the etic plus emic strategy was used, the Big Five structure survived some of the time, but not always. Such strategies resulted in new factors that apparently are more adequate for the description of personality in one culture than in another. For instance, Di Blas & Forzi (1999) found that the Big Five structure was replicated in Italian when they imposed an etic definition of the personality dimensions. However, when they incorporated an emic perspective, a three-factor structure emerged as the most satisfactory solution. Di Blas et al. (2000) found that when the evaluative and descriptive aspects of the Italian personality inventory were distinguished, three factors were obtained: evaluation, tightness (e.g., self-controlled) versus looseness (e.g., impulsive), and assertive versus unassertive. Katigbak et al. (1996) developed an indigenous Filipino personality inventory that had six factors. They found that it could be matched to the Big Five or the Big Seven, but only after significant adjustment. Benet-Martinez (1999) found that seven factors were best in describing personality in a Spanish sample.

Third, the original set of traits that was used in the development of the Big Five excluded a number of potential descriptors. According to Almagor et al. (1995), the original Allport-Odbert and Norman lists of personality traits excluded evaluative terms and terms describing temporary states (e.g., mood states). This resulted in the elimination of some factors, so that seven instead of five factors emerged when a more complete list of traits (in Hebrew) was used. Benet-Martinez & Waller (1997) started with traits listed in the unabridged Spanish dictionary and also obtained seven factors.

China is culturally more distant from the United States than Israel or Spain. When an etic plus emic personality inventory was administered in China, the results were even more discrepant (Cheung et al. 1996). The Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory (CPAI) used scales that were specific to Chinese culture (such as the Ah-Q mentality, found in a well-known fictional character in Chinese literature of the early twentieth century). It also used traits found in the Big Five. It obtained four factors that accounted for only 59% of the total variance and had no obvious relationship to the Big Five. When Cheung & Leung (1998) administered

the CPAI in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, they obtained four factors in both places that did not match the Big Five. Furthermore, when they administered the Big Five items jointly with the Chinese personality inventory, they were able to identify the neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness factors, but not the openness factor. There was also a Chinese tradition factor that had no relationship to the Big Five. It appears that the openness factor is problematic in several studies. One possibility is that because collectivism is negatively correlated with openness (Realo et al. 1997), openness emerges more readily in individualist cultures, particularly among student samples that tend to be idiocentric, than in collectivist cultures.

The utility of the etic plus emic approach can be seen when the addition of the emic factors increases predictability on some criterion. For example, Zhang & Bond (1998) found that adding an indigenous personality factor to the Big Five increased the predictability of "filial piety" in two Chinese societies.

Cultural psychologists have gone even further and developed inventories that were entirely emic. For example, La Rosa & Diaz-Loving (1991) developed a list of 700 traits by discussing the topic with 118 Mexican high school and university students. After a series of factor analyses they found 9 factors that had little resemblance to the Big Five. Diaz-Guerrero & Diaz-Loving (1994) went even further and proposed that psychologists should use different inventories depending on whether they are interested in studying clinical, educational, industrial, criminal, or social samples.

Guanzon-Lapena et al. (1998) developed four indigenous Philippine personality measures (with different samples). They were able to conceptually match their factors with the Big Five. However, they stressed that they do not claim that their factors "really" corresponded to the Big Five (p. 265). They concluded that "(a) Each of the Big Five domains is represented by one or more dimensions from each of the indigenous instruments; and (b) None of the indigenous dimensions is so culturally unique that it is unrecognizable to non-Filipinos . . ." (p. 265). They further pointed out that some dimensions such as social curiosity, excessive conformity, respectfulness, low tolerance for teasing, and thriftiness are especially relevant to a collectivist culture, such as the Philippines. Church et al. (1997) had Filipinos rate the self on 861 Tagalog trait adjectives and another Filipino sample rate it on 280 marker variables. In both cases, they obtained seven factors.

The assessment of personality across cultures is difficult because there are many ways in which nonequivalence of factors may emerge. Paunonen & Ashton (1998) pointed out that nonequivalence of the Big Five factor structure could be due to such factors as poor item translation, lack of item relevance, trait-level differences, trait-structure differences, differential causal links, response style differences, test-format problems, and differential analytic methods. They concluded that if the Big Five structure is obtained in other cultures it means that these factors are applicable in the other cultures. On the other hand, if the Big Five factor structure does not emerge, that does not necessarily mean that the factors are not applicable, because any one of the 10 methodological factors that can create nonequivalence might be

operating. The inability to falsify the hypothesis that the Big Five are universal is a glaring weakness of this hypothesis.

Saucier et al. (2000) identified 18 methodological factors that may give the impression of nonequivalence of factor structures. They asked, When is a difference in factor structures a "real" difference? The two-factor solution, they think, is undoubtedly universal and may correspond to individualism and collectivism. The two-factor solution includes dynamism and individual ascendance as one factor and social propriety and community as the other factor. They also explored if the three- or four-factor solutions may be universal. They concluded by pointing out that "a model of descriptions does not provide a model of causes, and the study of personality lexicons should not be equated with the study of personality" (p. 43).

De Raad et al. (1998) culled trait terms from various lexicons and constructed a representative sample of trait terms and then obtained factor structures in eight Western cultures. They computed Tucker (1951) congruence coefficients between the factor structures of these cultures and the American English solution. They concluded that three or four of the Big Five factors can be identified in all cultures. The openness factor of the Big Five was again problematic. However, whether the coefficients of congruence were high enough to permit calling the factors "equivalent" is a matter of opinion. According to Tucker (personal communication, 1975), the level of his coefficient needs to reach 0.90 in order to call a factor "the same." None of the coefficients reported by de Raad et al. reached that level (they ranged from 0.23 to 0.85). It is up to the reader to decide if the factors are really equivalent.

In sum, although the Big Five seem well-established in individualist cultures, only four of these factors appear consistently in all cultures, and depending on the list of traits that one starts with, one may obtain indigenous factors or more than five factors. Also, it is worth noting that even if the taxonomies of personality are universal, it does not guarantee their identical usage (Atran 1993, Choi et al. 1997).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Spiro (1993) provided an extensive critique of the work of Markus & Kitayama (1991) and others who contrasted individualist and collectivist cultures. He thought that this characterization of such cultures is "wildly overdrawn." He emphasized that culturally normative conceptions are not necessarily manifested in the behavior of individuals. This suggests the need for research that will examine how the constructs are to be conceived. Triandis (1989) presented a probabilistic conception that emphasizes that in individualist cultures people sample mostly internal attributes of individuals and aspects of the personal self, whereas in collectivist cultures people sample mostly the collective aspects of the self. Is this conception useful in predicting behaviors? How is that conception related to differences in the ecology? In turn, how are differences in ecology related to differences in socialization practices?

The study of cultural syndromes also requires the examination of hypotheses about the relationships among the syndromes. For example, is it in fact the case that collectivism is correlated with tightness and also with cultural simplicity? Carpenter's (2000) data suggest that they are correlated, but more work is needed. Is it in fact the case that individualism is correlated with cultural complexity and also with looseness? How are these attributes related to personality? Is cultural complexity related to cognitive complexity? Is tightness related to conscientiousness?

The emic plus etic description of personality will require data from many cultures, especially nonliterate ones, and the integration of the information obtained from these studies with the study of cultural syndromes. In addition, researchers need to probe each of the Big Five traits more deeply. A recent study by Lucas et al. (2000), for instance, suggests that sensitivity to positive reward is a universally significant feature of extraversion. Many more questions need to be addressed concerning the precise meaning and importance of the Big Five traits across cultures. For instance, are traits especially relevant to successful functioning in one culture different from those of another? We speculate that agreeableness may be particularly important in cultures that emphasize interpersonal harmony, whereas surgency may be more important in individualist cultures.

Finally, an important direction would be the study of culture change and its impact on personality. For instance, as globalization increasingly pushes different cultures to interact with each other, what kinds of "culturally hybrid" personalities will emerge?

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We reviewed links between ecology and culture, and cultural syndromes and personality. In addition, we identified dimensions of socialization that are related to cultural syndromes, such as the emphasis on child independence found in individualist cultures and the emphasis on dependence found in collectivist cultures. In addition to the significant findings that continue to emerge at the cultural level of individualism and collectivism, sophisticated theories and methodologies are being developed to understand the personal characteristics of idiocentric and allocentric individuals within a culture.

A large volume of cross-cultural evidence has been accumulated in recent years in support of the structural stability of the Big Five model. Although the sheer amount of evidence in support of the Big Five model is impressive, we have highlighted several limitations in the current research that are worth considering before making sweeping generalizations about the Big Five. A challenging but highly promising future direction for the study of culture and personality is to find ways to successfully incorporate emic as well as etic elements of culture into the field's research methods and theories.

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