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applying social learning theory to police misconduct

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Although numerous studies have attempted to understand the causes of various forms of police misconduct, there is still no clear theoretical explanation of police misbehavior. Akers' social learning theory posits that peer associations, attitudes, reinforcement, and modeling are predictors of delinquency and crime in general. With this article, we seek to determine if the theory can account for police deviance. Data from a random sample of Philadelphia police officers are used to examine how officer attitudes and perceptions of peer behavior are related to citizen complaints of police misconduct. Findings suggest that social learning theory provides a useful explanation of police misconduct.

Police misconduct rears its ugly head in American cities several times each decade when a high profile case exposes the often hidden phenomenon. Certain forms of police abuse are considered to be among the most serious human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 1998). However, there is a lack

of data on the extent of police misconduct, brutality, and corruption. Although there are no national level statistics on the extent of police deviance, it is likely that virtually every police department has witnessed some type of police corruption or scandal (Kappeler et al. 1998; McCafferty, Souryal, and McCafferty 1998).

Policing is a unique occupation with features that contribute to the opportunity for deviant behavior (Barker 1977; Reiss 1971). Police officers enjoy many freedoms that are not accorded to regular citizens, such as speeding, using deadly force, and seizing property. Not only does the occupation provide many opportunities for deviance, but it also provides justifications if the behavior is questioned. Moreover, deviant officers are unlikely to be detected because of loose supervision and the fact that officers often work in isolation from public observation.

Police misconduct has been defined in many ways and the term has been used to describe many different actions, including drug using and selling, brutality, protection of illegal activity, insubordination, and neglect of duty. In this study, we focus on accepting gifts and meals from the public, opportunistic theft, and the use of excessive force.

According to Alpert and Dunham (1997), acceptance of meals and gifts is the most common and most extensive form of police corruption (see Barker and Roebuck 1973). Many cities actually allow officers to accept free or discount meals. It is often accepted behavior when it is an act of gratitude toward the police, but sometimes the motive is to buy protection from the police. In other words, some businesses offer free items or services in expectation for quicker response times and extra protection from the police (Alpert and Dunham 1997:134).

Alpert and Dunham (1997; but see Barker and Roebuck 1973) describe ''opportunistic theft'' as a result of situations that provide unusual opportunities for theft. For example, the police are likely the first respondents to a burglary call. When belongings or merchandise have already been taken illegally, the opportunity presents itself to steal something and blame it on the burglary. Another example is taking money or drugs from drug dealers and failing to report it to the police department.

The term excessive force is used to describe ''force that exceeds what is objectively reasonable and necessary in the circumstances confronting the officer to subdue a person'' (Human Rights Watch, p4). Police officers are to use force only when necessary and only to the extent required for the performance of their duty. It includes, but is not limited to, unjustified shootings, severe beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment (Human Rights Watch 1998; Article 3 of the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers).

Although useful documentation of police deviance has occurred, researchers and practitioners continue to struggle in developing a comprehensive theoretical picture of police misconduct. Previous attempts have viewed police misconduct as a product of the authoritarian personality (Adorno 1950; Niederhoffer 1967), individual deviance (i.e., the ''bad apple approach'') (Sherman 1974), organizational or group deviance (Hickman et al. 2001; Langworthy 1986; Lundman 1980; Wilson 1968), a social ecological phenomenon (Kane 2002; Klinger 1997), the breakdown of deterrence and rise of impulsivity (Pogarsky and Piquero 2003), and the larger police subculture and occupational socialization (Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969; Herbert 1998; Neiderhoffer 1967; Stoddard 1995; Van Maanen 1978).

This article analyzes police misconduct from a unique theoretical base. We believe that the social psychological behaviorist approach of Akers' social learning theory provides a unique theoretical lens through which to view police misconduct. Herein, we examine how officer attitudes and perceptions of peer attitudes and ideas about the likelihood of punishment influence officially documented citizen complaints.

PRIOR RESEARCH ON CITIZEN COMPLAINTS

Little is known about the extent of police misconduct. This is largely due to a lack of accurate reporting of police misconduct incidents, and to the fact that misconduct, in general, is a relatively rare event. One of the ways it has been measured is with citizen complaints (Lawton et al. 2001; Lersch 1998a, 1998b, 2002; Lersch and Mieczkowski 2000; Terrill and McCluskey 2002). This approach is not without limitations. There are under- and over-reporting problems; only one third

of people who believe they have been mistreated by the police actually file a complaint (Walker and Bumphus 1992).

In general, there are at least three issues associated with citizen complaints that must be recognized. First, citizen complaints have been used to measure multiple concepts, including police misconduct, police-citizen relations, and police productivity. It has been observed that police officers who are most active are more likely to receive complaints, whether they are participating in misconduct or not (Brandl et al. 2001; Lersch 2002; Terrill and McCluskey 2002). A second problem lies in the validity of citizen complaints to measure police misconduct. Lersch and Mieczkowski (2000) examined this issue by comparing the occurrence of externally (citizen) generated complaints to internally generated complaints filed with the internal affairs office of a large police agency in the southeast. They found that officers identified by citizens as having engaged in misconduct were significantly more likely to be accused of misconduct by their peers. A third issue is that complaints are filed from the perspective of the citizen. Previous research suggests that police officers tend to define misconduct narrowly, while citizens define it more broadly (Adams 1996; Lersch 1998b; Lersch and Mieczkowski 2000). There also is concern about the method by which complaints are handled in an agency. If citizens are aware that their department takes complaints seriously, this may affect their decision to file a complaint. Thus, departments with excellent community relations may actually have higher rates of citizen complaints because people feel more comfortable reporting misconduct to the agency (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2000). Alternatively, complaint processes and procedures that are intimidating or complicated can affect the decision to file a complaint. If the victim has a criminal record, he or she may not want to draw attention to him- or herself (Lersch 1998b). Finally, if officers perceive that their department does not investigate complaints thoroughly, then they may be less likely to modify their behavior in response to complaints, thus affecting the number of future complaints filed.

Unfortunately although researchers have been successful in documenting police misconduct, extant research has been slow to provide a theoretical lens through which to view police misconduct. In the next section, we highlight one

criminological theory that we believe offers unique insight into the causes of police misconduct.

SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

Akers developed social learning theory as an extension of Sutherland's differential association theory to explain acts that violate social norms (Akers 1998, 2000). The basic assumption behind social learning theory is that the same learning process can produce both conforming and deviant or delinquent behavior. Akers posits that four variables function to instigate and strengthen attitudes toward social behavior: differential association, definitions, reinforcement, and modeling. The balance of these influences determines whether one will be prone to engage in conforming or deviant behavior. The central variable in social learning theory is differential association, or the influence of those with whom one associates frequently. Akers argues that individuals develop favorable or unfavorable definitions to deviance in interactions with their peers. These definitions are then reinforced, positively or negatively, by the rewards or punishments (either real or perceived) that follow their behavior. Additionally, peers provide models of behavior to follow.

Social learning theory has received considerable scholarly attention and empirical support; however, its focus has tended to be on explaining crime and delinquency more generally, and not police misconduct in particular. Next, we provide a brief review of how social learning has been dealt with in the policing literature.

Differential Association

As it applies to the police, the subculture is the primary peer group in which officers learn definitions. According to Alpert and Dunham (1997), one of the most profound pressures operating in police agencies is peer influence. In this vein, most researchers and police officers acknowledge the existence of a police subculture (Conser 1980). The subculture may facilitate deviant behavior by transmitting the beliefs, values, definitions, and ''manners of expression'' that depart from acceptable behavior. This happens because the subculture shared value system allows them the opportunity to rationalize, excuse, and justify deviance (Kappeler et al.

1998). Alpert and Dunham (1997) maintain that since social isolation is a feature of the police subculture, officers are likely to withdraw into the subculture for support and approval. The result is that the police officer is ''subjected to intense peer influence and control,'' and this can involve the acceptance of deviance (Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert 2001).

Due to the isolation that police officers often feel, they tend to spend more time with other officers, especially for social purposes. Therefore, it becomes more important for the officer to feel accepted by the peer group for the development of a satisfactory self-concept (Conser 1980). Accordingly, Skolnick (1966/1994) reported that the strength of the organizational culture in a police department was so salient that regardless of personal differences, individuals adopted the beliefs and definitions of the department.

The police subculture provides an opportunity to learn deviant activity because attitudes, values, and beliefs are transmitted from one generation to another in a learning process (Kappeler et al. 1998). Skolnick (1966/1994) asserts that the police develop ''cognitive lenses'' through which to view the world. Sherman (1978) further contends that police corruption may be explained as the transmission of cultural values via the influence of reference groups.

Savitz (1970) looked at police recruits' attitudes toward police deviance at three different time periods. He found that as recruits advanced from the police academy to the streets, exposure to the police subculture increased, and their attitudes became more permissive regarding deviance. The officers began to favor less severe punishments for various forms of misconduct, such as accepting bribes and theft (Savitz 1970).

Definitions

Many police scholars have noted the importance and development of definitions in the police context, especially regarding deviance. For example, Sherman (1978) views corruption as the result of a continuous definitional process involving various stages. Van Maanen (1978) writes that the ideology of the police subculture serves to ''support and maintain codes, agreements and habits existing in the work place'' Herbert (1998, p117) discusses a normative order,

which he defines as ''a set of generalized rules and common practices oriented around a common value. (p 347)'' The normative order is analogous to learned definitions, and has been recognized by several researchers (Ahern 1972).

Differential Reinforcement

Police scholars often comment on the importance of peer acceptance and approval regarding their own behavior and beliefs. According to Herbert (1998), officers engage in certain behaviors to maintain good standing in a desirable occupational environment. It is suggested that officers learn corrupt behavior through the reinforcements obtained from the subcultural group (Aultman 1976). According to Conser (1980), the subculture is a powerful reference group that has a great capacity for the reinforcement of corrupt behavior. He suggests that corruption arises through a process of interaction during which the individual officer learns such behavior in accordance with the responses of others. Akers (2000) notes that the selection and continuation of associations are functions of differential reinforcement. However, in the special circumstance of the police subculture, it would be more difficult to separate whether peers are deviant or not. One study found that receiving free meals, services or discounts was viewed by many police officers as a fringe benefit of the job and anticipated little risk of punishment for these behaviors. In sum, it is likely that the police subculture reinforces and encourages certain types of police misconduct (Alpert and Dunham 1997).

CURRENT STUDY

In this study, we present what we believe is the first application of Akers' social learning theory (2000) to account for police misconduct. As it applies to the deviant subculture of the police, social learning theory suggests that officers develop peer groups within the department. These peer groups either hold conventional or non-conventional, pro-deviance beliefs. Assuming the subculture is already formed, the theory would argue that as a new officer enters the peer group, he or she will be exposed to models of behavior that will influence his or her own attitudes and behavior. Because police officers are exposed to their co-workers much more

often than others, it is likely that the officer will learn to accept and internalize the definitions shared by other officers.

We employ data from a random sample of police officers from Philadelphia who were queried on a number of issues related to police misconduct. Three hypotheses are examined. First, officers who associate with deviant peers are more likely to have citizen complaints. Second, officers who consider misconduct to be less serious will have a higher likelihood of citizen complaints. Third, officers who anticipate less punishment for misconduct are more likely to have citizen complaints.

DATA AND METHODS

The data are drawn from a survey administered to a sample of police officers from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). The population of study includes all Philadelphia police officers assigned to patrol, including the ranks of Police Officers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants, as of January 2000. This amounts to 3,810 officers from the 23 Philadelphia patrol districts. A simple random sample of 504 officers was drawn from this population, the majority (91%) of which were patrol officers. Out of the possible 504 officers, only five officers refused to participate, leaving a sample of 499 available for analysis. Males comprised 68% of the sample; 53.5% of the sample was non-white (45.7% were black). Respondents ranged in age from 20–61, with a mean of 35 years. On average, respondents had 7.5 years of police experience. Finally, 46% of the sample were married. There were no substantive differences in the demographic characteristics for the sample used in this study and the larger population of officers.

Researchers attended roll-calls in all 23 Philadelphia police districts. A master list of the officers selected to participate from a target district was faxed to the districts ahead of time. The department provided a copy of the rotation schedule so that research staff could determine which officers would be at a given roll-call. When research staff arrived at the target district, they brought a list of the officers who were selected to participate in the survey and would be at roll-call. A copy of the list was shown or provided to the individual(s) in charge of roll-call, the Captain, or to a ranking

officer who would facilitate the survey administration. The survey was administered to officers immediately following their roll-call, prior to going out on the street. On average, it took about 15 minutes for an officer to complete the survey (Hickman et al. 2001).

Dependent Variable

Police misconduct was measured by the presence of citizen complaints. Officers were asked if they had ever been the subject of a formal citizen complaint. About half of the sample had received at least one complaint. In this study, we compared officers who had no complaints to officers who had one or more complaints. Because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression was employed.

Independent Variables

Several independent variables were obtained via officers' responses to several hypothetical vignettes (i.e., scenarios). The vignettes, or third person scenarios, were designed to present respondents with realistic examples of a variety of deviant and conforming behavior. This methodology has previously been applied to the study of police behavior and deviance (Goodman 1998; Hickman et al. 2001; Klockars et al. 1997; Pollock 1998), and is a common technique in the social sciences (Nagin and Paternoster 1993; Piquero and Tibbetts 1996; Weber 1992). In the Klockars et al. (1997) scenario study of police integrity, officers were asked to respond to several hypothetical scenarios, such as theft, bribery, and accepting gifts. Officers were asked to rate the seriousness of each act from their own perspective as well as from the perspective of their peer officers on 5-point Likert scales. They also were asked to rate the amount of discipline they thought would follow the act.

In this study, we employed five of the hypothetical scenarios used by Klockars et al., and the questions following the scenarios were used to measure social learning concepts. The first two scenarios involved (1) accepting meals and objects of small value and (2) accepting gifts from merchants on holidays. The second two scenarios involved theft from a crime scene: (1) stealing a watch after a jewelry store burglary and (2) stealing money out of a lost wallet. The fifth

scenario involved using excessive force. As will be seen in the next section, scales of the social learning indicators were created by summing responses for items that loaded .50 or above on the factor in a factor analysis.

Peer Associations

Akers (2000) argues that the perception of peer behavior may be just as important as the actual behavior itself. Even if deviant peer behavior is misperceived as more or less than it actually is, the peer influence will still operate through that perception (Akers 1998). Three variables measured the perception of peer behavior, and for each item, respondents were asked, "How serious do most police officers in the PPD consider this behavior to be?". The first measure indicated whether officers perceived their peers to consider behaviors, such as accepting gifts and meals, to be serious ($\alpha = .75$, $M = 7.53$). Response options ranged from 1 (very serious) to 5 (not at all serious) for each behavior. The second measure indicated peer attitudes about two types of theft ($\alpha = .71$, $M = 2.86$). Response options ranged from 1 to 5. The third measured peer attitudes about excessive force ($M = 2.57$). Response options ranged from 1 to 5. Since higher values correspond with the perception of decreased seriousness, we expected that peer associations will be positively related to misconduct, and thus, citizen complaints.

Definitions

Definitions refer to one's attitudes and beliefs that define the commission of an act as right or wrong (Akers 2000). According to the theory, the stronger one's feelings are against certain acts, the less likely one is to engage in them. Officers were asked to respond to several acts committed in each of the three scenarios (accepting gifts and meals, theft from a crime scene, and using excessive force). Specifically, officers were asked: "How serious do you consider this behavior to be?" Response options ranged from 1 (very serious) to 5 (not at all serious) for accepting gifts and meals ($\alpha = .72$, $M = 6.84$), for two types of theft ($\alpha = .72$, $M = 2.32$), and for excessive force ($M = 2.10$). Since higher values correspond to a more accepting attitude toward criminal behavior (i.e., decreasing levels of seriousness), these variables are expected to be positively related to citizen complaints.

Reinforcement

Reinforcement refers to anticipated rewards or punishments associated with certain behaviors that serve to determine whether someone will repeat the behavior. In effort to measure this concept, the following question was used: "If another officer engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do *you* think *would* follow?" Choices ranged from none (0), to verbal and written reprimands, suspension without pay, demotion in rank, and dismissal (6), and were reverse coded so that higher values correspond to lower expected punishment. The question was asked in accordance with the three domains of misconduct noted earlier. Response options ranged from 1 to 6 for each item (two for accepting gifts and meals ($\alpha = .89$, $M = 8.14$), two for theft ($\alpha = .83$, $M = 3.10$), and one for excessive force ($M = 3.39$).

ANALYTIC PLAN

Our analysis follows three steps. First we predict citizen complaints with a series of controls in order to capture baseline estimates. Then, we examine the effects of peer, definition, and reinforcement variables, as well as all of the aforementioned variables combined in an effort to predict citizen complaints.

RESULTS

In general, officers consider stealing and using excessive force to be serious violations, while they consider accepting free gifts and meals from the public as not so serious violations. They perceive their peers' attitudes to be similar to their own. When asked what kind of discipline they thought would follow, they perceived verbal or written reprimands for accepting gifts and meals, but they perceived much more serious punishment for theft and excessive force. Most officers believed if they were caught stealing, they would be dismissed, whereas if they were caught using excessive force, they would be "suspended without pay." It is interesting to note that they perceive theft to be most serious, as evidenced by their anticipation of the harshest punishment for it.

In Table 1, we present a baseline analysis of the influence of control variables on citizen complaints. The model shows that both length of tenure and gender have a significant influence on citizen complaints. Males, and those officers with more tenure, are more likely to have citizen complaints.

In Table 2, we add the peer association variables to the baseline model and examine their relation to citizen complaints. Measures representing male and tenure remain significant in this model. Additionally, two of the peer variables are significant. Consistent with Akers (2000) respondents who think their peers consider using excessive force to be less serious are more likely to have citizen complaints. However, and inconsistent with Akers, respondents who think their peers consider theft to be less serious are less likely to have citizen complaints.

The regression presented in Table 3 adds the social learning effect of definitions in order to predict citizen complaints. Again, measures of tenure and being male continue to be significant and positively associated with citizen complaints. Definitions about gifts and theft are not significantly associated with citizen complaints, but definitions about using excessive force are significant predictors of citizen complaints. The results show that, to the extent that officers do not consider using excessive force to be serious, they are more likely to have citizen complaints, a finding consistent with social learning theory.

TABLE 1 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Citizen Complaints: Control Variables

	B	St. Error	Odds Ratio
Control Variables			
Tenure	.093	.018	1.098*
Race (1 = nonwhite)	.038	.213	1.039
Marital Status (1 = married)	.064	.217	1.066
Gender (1 = Male)	.605	.231	1.832*
Intercept	−1.198	.272	.302*
Pseudo R-Square	.153		

*$p < .05$; p-values computed for one-tailed significance tests.

TABLE 2 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Citizen Complaints with Social Learning Variables: Peer Variables

	B	St. Error	Odds Ratio
Control Variables			
Tenure	.093	.018	1.097*
Race (1 = nonwhite)	.075	.215	1.078
Marital Status (1 = married)	.097	.219	1.102
Gender (1 = Male)	.586	.232	1.797*
Peer Associations			
Gifts	−.001	.049	.999
Theft	−.112	.081	.894*
Force	.136	.095	1.145*
Intercept	−1.246	.461	.288*
Pseudo R-Square	.161		

*$p < .05$; p-values computed for one-tailed significance tests.

The next analysis (Table 4) shows the effects of reinforcement variables on citizen complaints. As in the previous model estimations, measures of gender and tenure remain significant and positive. The only significant reinforcement variable concerns the use of excessive force. To the extent

TABLE 3 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Citizen Complaints with Social Learning Variables: Definitions Variables

	B	St. Error	Odds Ratio
Control Variables			
Tenure	.091	.018	1.096*
Race (1 = nonwhite)	.124	.219	1.132
Marital Status (1 = married)	.106	.219	1.112
Gender (1 = Male)	.569	.233	1.767*
Definitions			
Gifts	−.027	.046	.973
Theft	−.036	.119	.965
Force	.194	.101	1.215*
Intercept	−1.36	.462	.257*
Pseudo R-Square	.164		

*$p < .05$; p-values computed for one-tailed significance tests.

TABLE 4 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Citizen Complaints with Social Learning Variables: Reinforcement Variables

	B	St. Error	Odds Ratio
Control Variables			
Tenure	.097	.019	1.102*
Race (1 = nonwhite)	.037	.216	1.038
Marital Status (1 = married)	.049	.219	1.050
Gender (1 = Male)	.661	.235	1.936*
Reinforcement			
Gifts	−.042	.054	.959
Theft	.070	.063	1.072
Force	.151	.103	1.163*
Intercept	−1.651	.517	.192*
Pseudo R-Square	.167		

*$p < .05$; p-values computed for one-tailed significance tests.

that respondents anticipate less punishment for using excessive force, they are more likely to have citizen complaints.

Finally, Table 5 presents the results for the complete model. Consistent with the previous models, measures of tenure and gender were significantly and positively related to citizen complaints. One's perception of peer attitudes about theft was significantly related to complaints, but in the opposite direction. Also, the less serious an officer considered the use of excessive force, the more likely he or she was to have citizen complaints. Finally, if officers anticipated lesser punishment for theft, they were more likely to have citizen complaints (consistent with a learning approach).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to apply Akers' social learning framework to police misconduct. Using data from a random sample of Philadelphia police officers, we examined the influence of social learning variables on citizen complaints for police misconduct. Three key findings emerged from our effort. First, accepting gifts from the public or from businesses is considered, by this sample of officers, to be normative and not indicative of other more serious forms of misconduct.

TABLE 5 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Citizen Complaints with Social Learning Variables: Full Model

	B	St. Error	Odds Ratio
Control Variables			
Tenure	.097	.019	1.102*
Race (1 = nonwhite)	.121	.222	1.129
Marital Status (1 = married)	.111	.223	1.118
Gender (1 = Male)	.588	.239	1.800*
Peer Associations			
Gifts	.073	.074	1.075
Theft	−.187	.102	.830*
Force	.012	.121	1.012
Definitions			
Gifts	−.070	.070	.933
Theft	.067	.148	1.069
Force	.178	.128	1.195*
Reinforcement			
Gifts	−.043	.056	.958
Theft	.105	.069	1.111*
Force	.111	.109	1.118
Intercept	−1.733	.626	.177*
Pseudo R-Square	.185		

*$p < .05$; p-values computed for one-tailed significance tests.

Second, officer attitudes about the use of excessive force were related to citizen complaints more so than attitudes about theft or accepting gifts. Third, officers anticipated more punishment for theft than for using force, but variables related to force were the most consistent predictors of citizen complaints. In sum, the results of this study indicate that Akers' theoretical framework may provide a useful theoretical lens through which to view the problem of police misconduct.

This study has several practical implications. First, police departments and training units need to focus on the development and sustainment of attitudes consistent with being fair and just. Departments need to recognize that attitudes are shaped by the salient subculture, and that training needs to ''override'' these definitions in order to prevent misconduct. Second, our analysis uncovered important linkages between

officer attitudes and officer behavior, a finding not too often found in the policing literature (see Worden, 1989). Thus, departments should track officer attitudes about various behaviors as they may translate into actual ''on-the-street'' behaviors. Finally, Arrigo and Claussen (2003) recently suggested a theoretical approach by which to test for potential police misconduct at the pre-employment screening phase. In particular, they suggest that psychological tests such as the Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI) and the Revised-Neo Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) should be used to assess antisocial behavioral tendencies and conscientiousness personality traits, both of which have been valid predictors of successful job performance. Taken together, these tests may help police officials screen out high-risk applicants and identify officers in need of further scrutiny.

As with most research, several limitations of the current study should be recognized. Most notably, our measures were indirect and only tapped into a few pieces of Akers' theoretical framework. Additionally, as the concept of peer involvement takes a unique form in the policing context, our measures focused on the perceived deviance of peers instead of the frequency and intensity of interaction with deviant peers. Third, only one measure of behavior, citizen complaints, was examined in this study, and we did not partial the complaints indicator into ''type'' of complaint. Thus, whether these attitudes relate to other behaviors remains unknown. Fourth, our data came from one large police department. The extent to which the results hold in smaller jurisdictions is an empirical question. Finally, our data were cross-sectional in nature. To be sure, a more complete test of Akers' theory would employ longitudinal data in order to sort out the bi-directional relationships between attitudes and behavior.

With these limitations in hand, we hope that interested researchers will continue to examine officers' attitudes about different types and levels of misconduct to fully gauge where attitudes begin to affect complaints on the continuum of police misconduct. Much theoretical and policy knowledge is to be gained from such a concerted approach. Our analysis is but one step in this direction.

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