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major role. This constitution defined the decentralisation and administrative reforms of his second term as prime minister.

Chuan's second term as prime minister, from November 9, 1997 to November 17, 2000, was marked by a new level of confidence. Assuming concurrent appointment as prime minister and defence minister, Chuan directed attention to reinforcing the preeminent role of civilians in administering the country. During this period, the occurrence of sporadic military *coups d'état*, which were once a common part of Thailand's political tradition, lessened.

Although his government was relatively successful in managing the country's recovery from the economic crisis, some of Chuan's closest political allies were implicated in a series of highly publicised corruption scandals. While this damaged the Democratic Party's standing, Chuan's reputation as an honest politician emerged from these controversies relatively unscathed.

Chuan's influence on Thailand's broader political and economic transformation is significant. During his two terms as prime minister, he consistently struggled to displace the military from its previously unassailable position in Thai politics. He encouraged and pressured the military to professionalise and, crucially, undermined its ability to impose itself on the fledgling constitutional and democratic reforms.

He also emphasised the role that Thailand could play within Southeast Asia. By championing the nation's seaboard developments, particularly in eastern Thailand, Chuan intended to make Thailand a hub for wider economic development. He marketed the country as a "financial gateway" for the region.

Defeated in the January 2001 elections, Chuan Leekpai is widely regarded as being overwhelmed by the charisma of his CEO-style opponent, the former policeman turned media magnate, Thaksin Shinawatra. The Democratic Party, with only 128 seats, became the major opposition to the Thaksin government. Ironically, under the new constitution, this small number of seats was not enough to effectively obstruct government legislative programs that could depend on the Thaksin government's enormous majority.

During Chuan's political career, southern Thailand has been Chuan's stronghold; his influence over its development is considerable. Because of Chuan's solidarity with southern issues, he elicits special affection among southern Thais who generally regard him as one of their "favourite sons." Even when the Democratic Party, Thailand's oldest political party, polls poorly in other regions, it often dominates the southern Thai political landscape. Chuan's mother, Thuan Leekpai, who lives in the family home in Trang, has also assumed some importance as a regional "mother figure." Even after Chuan stepped down as leader

in 2003, the Democratic Party retained much of its support in southern Thailand.

Many Thais define Chuan's periods as prime minister according to his personal honesty and dependability. While some members of his Democratic Party governments experienced serious claims of corruption, Chuan remained largely unsullied. His consensus-driven approach to negotiation and capacity to build coalition governments mark an important stage in Thailand's late twentieth-century political and economic upheavals.

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See also Southeast Asia: History and Economic Development; Thailand

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CIVIC EDUCATION

Civic education, otherwise referred to as citizenship education, can be conceptualized along two dimensions. Viewed from a polity or societal perspective, it is the process through which public knowledge and public values, attitudes, and group identification norms, perceived to be germane to political stability, are transmitted from one generation to the other. Included in these attributes are the history and structure of political institutions, loyalty to the nation, positive attitudes toward political authority, belief in fundamental values (like the notion of equality and rule of law), interest in political participation, and dexterity in monitoring public policy. Civic education can also be viewed from an individual perspective, in which case it encapsulates the process of public knowledge as well as values and group identifications

being accorded private meaning and internalized as guides for behavior (Torney-Judith *et al.* 1999: 15–16; 1992:158).

Civic education encompasses both explicit and implicit goals that may be articulated through an array of educational programs, activities, and statements. The most obvious of these include a statement of educational goals, curriculum guides, a context of instructional textbooks, and teacher-prepared lessons. Explicit routines and rituals, such as reciting the national anthem, using a community service, engaging in group cooperation, using discussion as a teaching tool, and learning strategies, further exemplify the variety of ways in which civic education is transmitted within the educational realm.

Nevertheless, civic education is controversial. There is a clear absence of consensus regarding the knowledge base and attitude orientation necessary to attain effective civic education (Hursh 1994:767). How much factual knowledge of history or government structures, for instance, is required for effective citizenship? Political problems are nebulous, and arriving at an appropriate consensus about resolving them is a vast territory riddled with numerous disagreements, both philosophically and epistemologically. Furthermore, disagreements abound regarding the extent to which schools should emphasize support for the prevailing political order if doing so sacrifices students' opportunity to develop a critical mind. One school of thought avers that successful instruction in civic education depends largely on a climate characterized by open debate in a range of political issues.

Regional and National Differentiation in Civic Education

The substance of civic education tends to differ by region and country, no doubt a consequence of the contextual reality prevailing in each area. Nations have been keen to align civic education programs to their sociopolitical interests against a backdrop of the need to foster national cohesion. Thus, nationalism and patriotism have been featured prominently in civic education programs of nations engulfed in ethnic divisions and rivalries. Civic education in this instance seeks to instill in students values that promote national consensus and formation of loyal citizens, leading to national political integration. Indeed, the emergence of the school as a formal institution is often regarded as a logical sequence in the process of national boundary-maintenance function (Fagerlind and Saha 1995:132). Through the founding president Julius Nyerere's educational philosophy of Education

for Self-Reliance, Tanzania managed to weave a political education program geared toward national unity with the Kiswahili language as the medium of communication and an emblem of cultural identity.

In other contexts, civic education has been conceptualized in spiritual and ethical terms. Many developing nations in Asia fall within this category. Countries espousing religious and moral principles in their civic education content tend to give prominence to interpersonal relationships and moral rectitude in contra-distinction to an emphasis on individualism and personal liberty, which is at the core of most civic education programs in the developed nations of the West.

Diversity in civic education extends beyond the concern for national integration and religio-moral fortitude. In some quarters, civic education is envisioned as a vehicle for inculcating in students an array of values that will inspire "and enable them to play their parts as informed, responsible, committed, and effective members of modern democratic system" (Butts 1980:1). Still, other scholars and practitioners situate civic education within the rubric of conflict in power relations. According to this view, civic education should focus on developing an educational climate and school structure that revitalizes civic culture; hence, students and teachers examine the nature of meaningful self-development in the context of the entire society, as well as the relationship between the individual and society and between the individual power and collective power (Hursh 1994:767).

Civic Education in Africa

Civic education in Africa has its genesis in the postcolonial era. The need to change the inherited colonial education system and to create national unity provided the dual impetus for citizenship education programs at the dawn of independence in the 1960s. Disciplines such as history, geography, and civics were attractive to national leaders and educators as entry points in the political socialization of students. The goals of civic education then were fourfold: (i) to enable students to understand people's interaction with their cultural, social, and physical environments; (ii) to help students appreciate their homes and heritages; (iii) to develop skills and attitudes expected of citizens; and (iv) to teach students to express their ideas in a variety of ways (Merryfield and Muyanda-Mutebi 1991:621). These goals still continue to underlie civic education in the African continent today.

The development and implementation of civic education programs in Africa has been documented by Merryfield and Muyanda-Mutebi (1991) and Clive Harber (1989) in their detailed research on social studies and political education, respectively. Central to civic education in Africa is the stress laid on national development as the ultimate objective of the program. Civic education for national development has been envisioned in a holistic fashion by incorporating the cultivation of a national consensus on sociopolitical issues, ethical behavior, addressing environmental challenges, and developing problem-solving skills. Under these conditions, civic education is expected not only to lead to national development but also to promote social harmony and self-sufficiency as a counter to political disintegration and as a catalyst for social solidarity. It is, in effect, an "important legitimating agency for establishing legal jurisdiction of state authority, and above all for defining the criteria for membership in the state, that is, the bestowal of citizenship" (Fagerlind and Saha 1995:132).

Even with a similar underlying philosophy of civic education, research is explicit that political messages transmitted tend to differ from one country to the next and even within the same country (Harber 1989:195). In each country, knowledge and skills are learned in a context in which high priority is given to certain unique values. In Tanzania (in *Siasa*), until recently, emphasis was placed on socialism, in Zambia it was humanism, while in Kenya it was capitalism (in the subjects of civics, as well as social education and ethics). Educational institutions have generally accepted that these goals are not open to criticism, but the process used or needed to attain them are open to discussion.

Civic education in the continent has not been without its challenges. The tension between the attempt to create basic national goals and the role of civic education in creating a critical awareness of political phenomena remains delicate. While this situation is not uniquely African, it does indicate the functional limits of civic education as a consensus builder in the continent. Another problem is the discrepancy that prevails between the conceptualization of civic education by educational officials and the practical realities of the classroom. Teachers have tended to view civic education as an amalgam of subjects unrelated to citizenship education; they do not associate civic education with the content, attitudes, or skills of citizenship education. Lack of clarity about the meaning of civic education and how it differs from individual subjects of civics, ethics, geography, and history, common among teachers and teacher educators, hampers the development and diffusion of the education (Merryfield and Muyanda Mutebi 1991:623). The preponderance of examinations in school curriculum is also a major drawback in the development of civic education.

Civic Education in Asia

Traditionally, civic education in Asia, especially in the eastern regions, has been characterized by a disproportionate influence of the Confucian tradition in providing legitimacy to schools as they take on the mantle in providing moral education. Schools in the region are at the hub in teaching a code of behavior for everyday life alongside political allegiance to the state. Thus, ethical behavior and loyalty to the state are not regarded as mutually exclusive attributes in civic life.

This philosophy of civic education and the pedagogical process have, however, undergone transformations depending on the political reality prevailing in each country in the region. As of today, hardly is the civic education *modus operandi* homogeneous across East Asia; distinctive features characterize each nation. South Korea, for instance, has used civic (values) education to instruct students in traditional Korean culture, nationalism, and anticommunism since the end of the Korean War in 1953. The aim has been to cultivate in the students a deep sense of cultural pride while at the same time build a strong fervor of nationalism as a counter to the threat posed by the next-door Communist North Korea (Hursh 1994:768; Suh 1988:93). The People's Republic of China stressed the importance of equality and redistribution up to 1979 when focus turned toward hierarchical values. Beginning in the later part of the 1980s, Chinese schools offered courses on Communist ideology and morality, extolling the virtues of "correct attitude towards labor" and "the ability to distinguish between right and wrong" (Meyer 1988:127).

Nowhere in Asia are the dynamics between realignment of civic education to the changing political equation more vivid than in Hong Kong. During the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1980s, when capitalist-oriented Hong Kong was ensured political-economic continuity as a colony of the British, civic education was less overtly political and was more concerned with instilling traits of good behavior "to enable pupils to be well-informed and to become civic-minded enough to act as good citizens in the larger community they belong" (Wing On 1999:315). The decision of the British government to transfer the administration of the colony to Communist China in 1997 gave impetus to a more overt form of civic education with emphasis on loyalty to Hong Kong political process and

institutions as a distinct nation. The political stress became even more explicit in the 1996 Government and Public Affairs (GPA) syllabus, which placed stronger emphasis on understanding China and on Hong Kong's colonial transition (*ibid.* 1999:317). Observe the Curriculum Development Council's *Guidelines on Civic Education*:

> Politically speaking, one's civic identity is defined by ones national identity. The national community therefore constitutes the ultimate domestic context for one's civic learning. National spirit such as nationalism and patriotism is essential not only for one's national identity and sense of belonging, but also for the cohesion and strength of one's own nation. (*ibid.* 1999:321)

Research nevertheless demonstrates that civic education in the country is still encumbered by poor textbooks, inadequate attention paid to the issue of national cohesion, and a general apathy toward the subject.

Civic Education in Latin America

Latin America has had a long tradition of civic education. Indeed, one of the greatest advocates and practitioners of civic education, Paulo Freire, experimented his ideas and writings in Brazil. The country has had the most extensive civic education program, the MOBRAL, built around the Freire concept of "conscientization" of the masses, leading to sociopolitical and economic liberation. Cuba has also had a strong civic education program constructed around President Fidel Castro's Communist ideology with strong emphasis on loyalty to the state.

As in other regions of the developing world, goals of civic education in Latin America are as diverse as the multiplicity of political agendas. Those nations that have been under military rule have extensively used civic education programs to buttress their regimes. Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, among others, have introduced political education in schools with the aim of securing support from the youth. Nations that were former colonies of European countries tend to share their goals in civic education. Finally, emergent democracies in the region are keen on using civic education to build a democratic culture (Hursh 1994:768; Cummings *et al.* 1988).

Colombia represents a recent example of a Latin American country trying to strengthen its fledgling democracy. Via the 1994 Resolution 1600, the country added legitimacy to civics as education in and for democracy (Rueda 1999). The resolution stated that civic education is "to live democracy" at school and that the student acquires a citizen's "way of being" basically from interpersonal relationship. The civic education initiative has realized a number of important developments, including (i) the increased sensitivity on the part of teachers and the wider community regarding the discourse on school education for democracy; (ii) the increased initiatives by government and nonprofit agencies toward the development of new approaches to education in democracy; (iii) reforms in the organization and administration of schools, resulting into more flexibility and less hierarchical structures; and (iv) advances in instructional content and teaching methodologies.

In spite of these achievements, the program suffers from a number of problems. Wide dissonance abounds between classroom discourse about democratic school climate and the daily reality in the school environment. There is also widespread discontinuity between the goals of education in democracy as articulated in the educational policies and how these goals are translated into legislation, interpreted, and implemented at the school level. Besides inadequate and inappropriate teaching and learning materials is the added problem of widespread violence and gang culture in the society, which runs counter to the goals of education in democracy.

Prospects and Problems of Civic Education

Undoubtedly, civic education continues to be featured prominently in the educational systems of many Third World countries. The education is either planned and systematic or simply the result of a lack of awareness of the political ramifications of school organization or the curriculum (the so-called hidden curriculum). The educational process takes place through textbooks, exposure to national symbols, the nature of classroom teaching, school structures, courses in political education, youth organizations, subject choice, access to schooling, and other such factors. The political messages transmitted differ from country to country and, sometimes, within the same country.

In evaluating the efficacy of the various approaches to civic education and how these have affected values held by students, it is imperative to underscore the research evidence. While the general intention of civic education curricula is to inculcate values consistent with national political aspirations, the realization of these objectives is influenced by the environment in which the classroom and school operate. In other words, students learn as much or more from what they experience and from the models that

they see (hidden curriculum) than as from what they are told. Pedagogical techniques that center on student participation in class discussions and expressions produce students who are more politically knowledgeable and interested and less authoritarian (Torney et al. 1975:37). In contrast, those taught through a teacher-centered approach with stress on patriotic rituals and lectures tend to be more authoritarian and less knowledgeable about politics. Research has shown that African schools generally suffer from rigid bureaucratic structures, authoritarian leadership, lack of accountability amidst corruption, as well as shortages of resources and contemporary social pressures (Harber 1989:112–129). This hampers the effectiveness of civic education.

Issues surrounding the nature and form of civic education continue to cloud the programs. Developing countries are still caught in the debate over whether civic education should emphasize a narrow range of values, such as patriotism and nationalism, or a broader spectrum of values. These debates have intensified as agreements over what to emphasize have declined. In Kenya, for instance, the first and more explicit model of civic education in the 1970s was articulated through a school curriculum that was bland, descriptive, and rather conservative by avoiding or downplaying potentially controversial topics (Scott 1983:273). The curriculum displayed a complete absence of ideological orientation, and it did not mention the ruling party KANU or the national ideology of African Socialism. The syllabus in the current 8-4-4-education system has, however, been more radical in approach; through the twin subjects of history and government and social education and ethics, students have been instructed on the importance of subservience to the state, the president, and the ruling party KANU, notwithstanding that the country is an incipient multiparty democracy. Similar experiences abound in many Third World countries, and they indicate that civic education curricula are yet to move from standards implied in scientific-rational views of the state and instead create public discussions and seek to develop reasonable citizens who discharge their civic purposes.

The dichotomy surrounding civic education and national unity creates another obstacle. The basic premise of civic education is to serve as a catalyst for national consciousness and the formation of loyal citizens. Civic education in schools is viewed by some as an effective tool to break down local or regional identities and loyalties and replace them with national identities and loyalties. However, research in Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, and Nigeria shows that schooling has often been effective in increasing knowledge about the nation rather than enhancing

national identity (Harber 1989:195). The case of Nigeria is significantly instructive in that it demonstrates the broader interface between ethnicity, religion, and role of religion in society in mitigating the role of the school in the forging national unity.

Rural schools in Nigeria have been less effective than their urban counterparts in teaching about the nation. Research is explicit that ethnic differences have been exaggerated and aggravated through the education system with the result that the impact of education has been disintegrative rather than integrative (Fagerlind and Saha 1995:133). Historically, from the colonial times to the present, Nigeria has been an ethnically and culturally divided country. The British colonial policy supported the development of Christian missionary-led Western education in the southern part of the country while the north was left intact under the influence of Muslim culture. At independence, the South provided the bulk of the political elite. This disparity was later to become a disintegrative factor in Nigerian society as corrective measures in employment had to be taken, which led to charges of discrimination expressed by the South. Indeed, the tendency for educational access and attainment to discriminate unequally along ethnic, racial, regional, and other distinctions create real obstacles to the effectiveness of civic education in political integration.

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CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Civil disobedience is the deliberate defiance of a law or norm upheld by duly constituted governmental authority. The defiance is public and based on reasoned argument. It usually consists of a symbolic act and is carried out for a specific end. It is also referred to as passive resistance or "satyagraha."

Since the time of Socrates, civil disobedience was practiced by individuals and groups, such as the early Christians. St. Thomas Aquinas and later John Locke have also justified civil disobedience.

During the sixteenth century, an important thinker in France, la Boétie, attacked the basis of the theoretical foundations of royal absolutism. In linking power and popular consent, he emphasized that the former emerged only out of the latter.

Over time, a tradition of popular dissent developed in the West, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the spread of democratic ideas worldwide, a corpus of political practices centering on the concept of civil disobedience developed. In this connection, the essay of the American thinker Henry David Thoreau, "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience" (1849), marks an important milestone.

It was, however, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who, in leading the Indian national struggle against British rule, refined mass civil disobedience as a tool of political action to bring about political change. His sources of inspiration were both Eastern and Western thought. He termed his method *satyagraha,* which means an insistence upon and holding on to truth.

After an initial movement in Transvaal against the government in South Africa in 1906, Gandhi led his most famous campaign, the Salt Satyagraha of 1930–1931. The campaign began with Gandhi symbolically breaking the unjust salt law of the British government in India. Gandhi believed most conflicts in society and between the citizens and government could be solved by resorting to satyagraha, which he called a science in the making. What made Gandhi's philosophy distinctive was his insistence on *ahimsa* (nonviolence) and love.

The civil disobedient acts in accordance with a higher law, which may be divine or natural law, or indeed a person's own conscience. The civil disobedient frequently chooses intentionally to break the law publicly and sometimes with dramatic effect. By doing so, the protestor brings the injustice they are protesting against into the public eye.

An important aspect of civil disobedience is that the protestor must be acting not to achieve some private gain but to bring an end to an unjust act or law, which the protestor believes must be abolished for the common good. In doing so, the civil disobedient does not want to do away with the entire established order but targets some specific law; and this person does it according to the dictates of his or her conscience, which is considered the highest moral authority.

It is clear that civil disobedience has a chance of being carried out only in a system with some democratic norms and morality. It would be impossible as a strategy in a dictatorship. When civil disobedients do perform an act of defiance, they know they are going against the law and are committing a crime. They, in effect, deliberately court punishment. At the same time, they make a reasoned defense of their actions: on no account can an act of disobedience of law be taken lightly.

The term *civil* in "civil disobedience" is not easily explained because it has meant different things to different people. But the following meanings can be construed. "Civil" may mean the reverse of "uncivil" or "uncivilized," and in carrying out acts of civil disobedience, the protestor holds up a model code of conduct, which will inspire citizens to conduct themselves according to a higher ideal of morality. "Civil" may mean that the protest recognizes the legitimacy of the political authority overall and the duties of citizenship.

"Civil" may further indicate opposition to violence of all kinds and include a determination to adhere to nonviolence. In addition, in this sense, it may mean an acceptance that the state alone has the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. The insistence on nonviolence is found in most civil disobedience movements and is a function of the belief that they are based on a higher morality.