



Disclaimer

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Kn wledge Lab









NGS in the Clinical Laboratory

- · Germline variant identification for inherited diseases
- · Somatic variations in cancer
- · Detection of circulating cell-free DNA subpopulations
- · Metamicrobial genomes of human flora
- · Viral and bacterial genome sequencing during infections

CLMA

NGS Challenges in the Clinical Laboratory

- · Which platform is best?
- · How do I fit it in my lab workflow?
- · How much will it cost?
- · Who do I need to hire?
- · Where does all the data go?
- · What do I report?



CLMA



2003-2012: Origins of The Antibiotic Resistance Crisis in the Military Health System

- · Complicated, slow healing wounds
- · Patient to nurse transmission
- · Co-location w/ host nation patients
- · Rapid transfer to numerous facilities
- Frequent intra-hospital transfers
- Positive pressure irrigation
- · Need for reconstructive surgeries
- · Dry pipeline: "Bad bugs, no drugs"





Standard Clinical Microbiology

- · Bacterial Identification
- · Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
- Screening assays for resistance
- · Confirmatory tests for resistance
- · Performed in-house?
- · Sent out to reference lab?
- Turn-around time?







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Birth of the Multidrug-resistant organism Repository and Surveillance Network (MRSN)

- Still no novel ABX; AMR worsening
 - · CDC, WHO, "Global threat", Frontline "Nightmare Bacteria"
- · Resistance genes on the rise best control strategies remain unknown
- Transformation by highly fragmented and damaged DNA environmental cleaning implications
 - » PNAS @www.pnas.org/cgi/doi10.1073
- Standard-of-care genotyping methods insufficient
 - > Clin Infect Dis 2014:58:609-618
 - Clin Infect Dis 2014:56:609-616
 2 MRSN reports Kuwait and CRE- SAMMC-WRNMMC
- Need WGS
- · Sequencing not enough- need bioinformatics
- No integrated network: U.S. is 20yrs behind Europe
 - Clin Infect Dis 2013:56;1445



Case in Point: the MRSN-ARMoR Program


· MISSION:


- Conduct enterprise-wide epidemiologic surveillance of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) to inform clinical practice, healthcare policy, and enhance infection control by collecting and characterizing MDRO across the Military Health System
- Perform translational and applied research to improve surveillance and isolate characterization


• BENEFITS & UNIQUENESS:

- Centralize and standardize the characterization and reporting of MDRO
- Unburdens hospital labs of outbreak investigations
- Collects isolates from unstable areas and war zones
- · Provides local and regional resistance data and trends
- High resolution characterization of phenotypes of exceptional interest
- Assist MHS with NHSN reporting of MDRO
- · Facilitates Joint Commission accreditation









MRSN Capabilities

- · Phenotypic Microbiology
 - Phoenix
 - Microscan
 - Vitek
 - MALDI-TOF
 - Sensititre
 - E-tests
- Sequencing
 - Next-SeqMi-Seq
 - IVII-Seq
 PacBio
 - Automated Liquid Handlers

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ARMoR-Database

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MRSN	Chal	leng	es
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- · Lack of standardized QC metrics
- · "Non-agile" contract and acquisition process
- · Technology limits

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Lessons Learned and Solutions

- · Maximize sequencing capacity!
- · Minimize TAT!
- Pursuing CAP-accreditation of NGS (Mi-Seq), participation in GMI 2016 Proficiency Test
- Be vigilant of the NGS market and have vendors provide notification of new products
- Be business-minded know how to get your purchases through!
- · Be ready to hurry up and wait for IT assistance/approval
- Support and participate in standardization and accreditation organizations



MRSN-ARMoR Impact

- Hospitals currently enrolled: 288 (Iraq and Afghanistan included)
- Total isolates collected: ~26,000; total characterized: 5,000
- Assists w/ outbreak investigations: 25
- USNS Comfort post earthquake Haiti
- Fatal MRSA in NICU (policy influenced; illness and death probably averted)
- HAP/VAP in Afghanistan (bronchoscope)
- Colistin resistant Acinetobacter (antibiotic restriction)
- VRE
- Monthly reports and special bulletins generated as needed: 11
 - First report of bla_{NDM-1} gene in MHS
 - First report of qacA/B gene in U.S. patient cohort
- Infection Prevention support to military working dogs (MRSA analog)
- Developed and validated RT-PCR assays for 'ESKAPE' pathogens



Making an Impact?

- First Place 2010 Surgeon General's Excalibur Award
- · 2013 MHS Health Innovations Readiness Award
- 2015 MHSRS Outstanding Research Award -Military Team
- \$10M funding for FY16

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Summary

- · Implementing a large scale NGS surveillance program
- · Contracting and acquisitions in a bureaucracy is hard!
- · Consider potential hurdles to avoid/mitigate risk
 - · Data generation
 - · Data analysis
 - · Data sharing
 - · Data storage
- · Leverage experience of others

CLMA

Partners and Supporters COL Emil Lesho AFHSC-GEIS LTC Paige Waterman CDR Franca Jones Ms. June Early Bacterial Disease Branch COL Michael Zapor LTC Stuart Tyner LTC Kate Hinkle Dr. Bob Clifford Dr. Pat McGann Mr. Erik Snesrud

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MRSN

UR Stuart Tyner WRAIR Command COL Stephen Thomas COL Pitzer COL Dana Renta COL Dana Renta CLMA*

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Encoding Gene	Species	# of Isolate		Infection by	Surveillance by	2000
Encoding Gene				Infertion by	T. 6	
Encoding Gene						Facilities Found At
bla _{sec} K			Found In	species	species	Tucincies Found Fit.
	C. pneumoniae	110	70	86	24	A, B, C, E, F, K, U, N, Q, R
	. coli	11	6	11	0	B, G N
E	cloacae	3	3	3	0	B. D. N
blanou K	C. pneumoniae	6(2*)	4	2	4	H, M, N, P
	. cloacae	3*	3	3	0	LM, H
	A. baumannii	27(3*)	24	27	0	F, I
A	L schindleri	1	1	0	1	N
p	2. stuartii	2	1	2	0	Н
E	. coli	2	2	1	1	н
bla _{to} P	P. aeruginosa 1*		1	1	0	J
A	A. hemolyticus 1*		1	1	0	J
A	1. junii	2*	2	2	0	J
A	L nosocomialis	1*	1	0	1	J
	l. baumannii	1*	1	1	0	J
	freundii	2	2	1	1	B, E
	aeruginosa	3	3	2	1	H, O, U
	2. snesrudii	1	1	1	0	E
E	. cloacae	1	1	0	1	N

