Programming for secure livelihoods amid uncertainty: trends and directions in livelihoods, nutrition and food security in Darfur

Jeremy Lind and Alan Nicol with Chiara Altare, Debarati Guha-Sapir, Jaideep Gupte, Patricia Justino, Pandora Kodrou and Catherine Longley

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Jeremy Lind[1] and Alan Nicol[1]

with

Chiara Altare[2], Debarati Guha-Sapir[2], Jaideep Gupte[1], Patricia Justino[1], Pandora Kodrou[2] and Catherine Longley[3]

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[1] Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. Corresponding author emails: j.lind@ids.ac.uk, a.nicol@ids.ac.uk.
[2] Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Catholic University of Louvain, Brussels.
[3] Independent consultant, Nairobi, Kenya.

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ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CE-DAT	Complex Emergency Database
CMR	crude mortality rate
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DDRA	Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DFSM	Darfur Food Security Monitoring
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GoS	Government of Sudan
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI)
IDMC	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	internally displaced person
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
IYCF	infant and young child feeding
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
MHFB	minimum healthy food basket
MSF	Medecins sans Frontier
MUAC	mid upper arm circumference
NDVI	normalized difference vegetation index
NGO	non-governmental organization

OCHA	Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OTP	outpatient therapeutic programme
PSNP	productive safety net programme
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SAM	severe acute malnutrition
SC-UK	Save the Children-United Kingdom
SDG	Sudanese dinar
SFC	supplementary feeding centre
SFP	supplementary feeding programme
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLF	Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
TFP	therapeutic feeding programme
U5MR	under-5 mortality rate
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme
WFP-VAM	World Food Programme and Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WHO	World Health Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This report examines trends and directions in livelihoods, nutrition and food security across Darfur since 2005. It provides an analysis for agencies and government that can support programming which responds more effectively to the emerging development context. The report uses data from secondary sources, both those available in Sudan and internationally. Primary data collection was planned for 2011, but could not be carried out due to factors beyond our control. Instead, the authors consulted closely with agency staff, academics and development practitioners on the use and interpretation of secondary data and employed the services of two Sudanese consultants – in Khartoum and Darfur – to provide additional material and support the wider analysis.

The original objectives of the study were to:

- Review and prepare a descriptive analysis of all nutrition, public health, livelihoods and other relevant data and secondary sources. This includes the small-scale survey reports compiled in CE-DAT[4] for health and nutrition.
- Investigate trends and determinants of malnutrition from a public health point of view in the Darfur states, in order to help agencies to better understand patterns of high acute malnutrition rates in certain areas and at certain times of year.
- Provide practical and workable recommendations for best practice to guide future programming options.

Based on these objectives the document is mainly technical in nature and practitioner-oriented. It does not speak to the wider complexities of Darfur's current and future political development.

We believe that Darfur should not be seen as an exceptional development context. Many of the trends and processes that are ongoing find echoes across sub-Saharan Africa. Other countries – and regions of Sudan – are grappling with the complexities of uncertain human and physical environments as population levels rapidly rise and

[4] CE-DAT is the Conflict Emergency Database and is housed at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology for Disasters at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium.

economic, social and environmental stresses increase. In Darfur, the added complexity is the fragile emergence, in recent years, from protracted violent conflict.

Given this situation, the report seeks to provide an overarching framework that will assist the development community as it takes forward development interventions. We base our thinking on a 'remain and return' approach at the heart of which is achievement of human security. To achieve this, we emphasise both prevention of slippage from poverty to destitution and supporting secure livelihood strategies across agriculture, pastoralism, industrial activity and service provision, reflecting the increasingly complex rural-urban mix within Darfur and the difficulties in distinguishing 'urban' from 'rural' households.

The distinguishing feature of this approach is to support the free mobility of displaced peoples and others who are assisted, who move for a variety of reasons within and between urban and rural areas associated with the need to find safety, security and opportunity. These various types of mobility are crucial for knitting together different production streams across rural, camp and urban settings, and point to the likely livelihood trajectories for many in the medium-term – be they IDP, rural residents or urban populations.

The report covers key trends and relationships that exist between livelihoods (what people are doing to derive income and the means to subsist), food security (how people ensure access to quantities of foods to ensure survival and development), and nutrition (how food and health relationships evolve and are managed over time). At the outset we recognize the importance of the framework presented within the recent *Beyond Emergency Relief* report produced by the United Nations. Released during the commissioning process of this report, *Beyond Emergency Relief* provides an overarching framework which we seek to complement and support.

Livelihoods

Resource pressures pre-existing and exacerbated by conflict include access to land, pasture/fodder, water and forest resources. In addition, there is a changing dynamic to these pressures as the population balance tilts towards urban areas. This potentially represents a changing relationship between access to and use of natural resources and will affect the demand-supply relationship in agriculture as fewer people farm and growing urban populations require feeding. Whilst there is an emerging recognition that more urban-based livelihoods are likely to be required – to support the youth 'bulge' in the economically active population for instance – there is also a complex interrelationship between urban and rural livelihoods which has, in many cases, no clear

feedback and flow of outcomes between the two. A blurring of what is urban and what is rural is one of the key outcomes of the conflict and the resultant mass displacement and settlement around urban areas.

These rapidly growing urban centres are increasingly drawing in natural resources from their hinterlands, including resources for building (bricks and wood) and energy production (biomass material). Both such trends are associated with growing environmental impacts, and, more recently, stresses on available water resources.

Food security

Agricultural production and the delivery of food aid in Darfur requires re-examination. At present no direct programming connects institutional knowledge of food security to wider livelihood security issues. Whilst the emergence of a new comprehensive assessment under WFP is an important step forward towards this understanding, there is a need to complement this with stronger household livelihoods surveying which details and tracks how individuals within households pursue different strategies, where, how and why. Food security in the future will be determined more by purchasing power and the relative costs of other everyday household items, including access to water and services such as health and education, than simply by access to productive assets – or food aid. Stronger encouragement for commercial production and agricultural markets will support Darfur's capacity for redevelopment of different sectors – including urban industry – as will the emergence of greater trade within Darfur and with other regions. In all cases, stimulating demand for labour and supporting future employment opportunities will be critical.

Nutrition

Whether or not people receive the right nutrition is based on the balance and frequency of their diet and success in absorbing key nutrients. This is compromised by morbidity and, in particular, the prevalence of diarrhoeal disease in children. Put simply, an effective nutrition programme can be jeopardized by poor attention elsewhere to safe and sufficient water supplies, and improved sanitation and hygiene practices. A food secure household is therefore not, necessarily, well-nourished, particularly amongst vulnerable groups including children under five. The hotspots of malnutrition that are revealed by nutrition surveillance in Darfur are a reflection of this challenge.

Nutrition within Darfur therefore requires a more holistic approach that ties in improvements to household income and purchasing power, effective health provision and hygiene education and access to affordable water supplies and sanitation.

Recommendations

Priorities for action

This study proposes the following priorities to contribute to strengthening the human security of the displaced and others who are assisted across diverse and changing livelihood situations in Darfur:

1. **Further rigorous empirical analysis of what livelihoods are available and their effectiveness,** including detailed analysis of the institutions through which people access resources to support their livelihoods. The body of works on livelihoods, food security and health in Darfur is thin and patchy in its geographic coverage. Many available reports are based on data collected in localised settings and/or from a limited number of households and key informants. There is a lack of systematic data collection, which could provide a clearer picture of the directionality of livelihoods in the region overall and enable comparisons of income, food security and health trends and conditions across different livelihood situations. This is necessary to make informed judgments about targeting humanitarian assistance when future levels of funding are uncertain and in a context in which there exist pockets of acute need.

2. **The development of a common intervention framework** based on concepts of asset strengthening of households, but also linking households more coherently to wider policy and other decision making frameworks including local institutions that mediate people's access to resources (and ensure that there is two-way information flow so that better knowledge on what households are doing can inform decision making). This common framework should be agreed across all agencies through convening a workshop in the coming six months.

3. **Strengthening and consolidating a safety nets programme in rural and urban areas** to prevent a slide into destitution of food insecure households. Drawing on the livelihoods data presented in this report, and also current levels of humanitarian need, it is clear that many people are unable to meet their needs for income, food, water, and health without external support. A safety net programme is needed to provide support over several years, incorporating both public workfare projects and training to increase individual capabilities (such as in literacy, numeracy, infant feeding) as well as direct support for the most vulnerable, including the disabled, expecting and new mothers, female and child-headed households and the elderly. A safety net in urban areas would focus on upgrading facilities in camp areas while providing IDPs and others assisted with

regular support and training in various occupations and skills, such as constructing sustainable shelter and business planning.

4. Alongside support to strengthen the livelihood resources of the poorest, **strengthening institutions** that support decision-making on how, where and when individuals and households deploy their livelihood assets. These structures have substantially changed since 2005, but are now emerging as critical agents of change across Darfur. They may include local government, associational structures of civil society and traditional leadership groups. In urban settings, strengthening institutions could entail support for the establishment of artisanal associations that help address the needs and capacities of providers of particular goods and services (e.g. water vendors, brick makers and other occupations) and seek to institutionalise greater income protection for these groups.

5. **Formulating particular interventions to support the livelihoods of the urban poor** (the displaced and others who are assisted including longer-term urban residents who are poor) to incorporate these groups more productively into urban economies. A three-pronged approach should focus on the following:

    a. *Strengthening the artisanal skills base of the poorest communities and specifically the most youthful section of the population*: this could be in the construction industry (carpentry, building, non-environmentally-destructive brick-making, for example), in metal working (producing tanks for water vending, and related activities where there is demand), motor mechanics, and other related sectors such as electrical engineering.

    b. *Education*: Developing basic skills in literacy, numeracy and languages, balancing the need for income generation (e.g. water vending) with access to education (e.g. many vendors in Nyala are school-age boys and use income earned to pay school fees (Nicol et al., 2012)).

    c. *Protection*: Attention to the wider policy and institutional environment in which the protection of basic livelihoods in urban contexts can be strengthened. It should also include business skills development that helps to support new initiatives through micro-credit provision (one of the greatest gaps in livelihood support at present in urban areas).

6. **Strengthening a focus on maternal and infant welfare** across 'bundles' of action in support of food, health and income security. There is a distinct lack of knowledge on maternal welfare, which is needed to better understand problems

around child health and development. A focus on maternal and infant welfare should include:

a. child nutrition (infant feeding in particular) and early motherhood support;

b. supporting specific improvement in safe water and sanitation provision for children (including a specific child focus in planning, design and implementation), possibly linked to a strong educational development programme;

c. improvements (and ramping up where necessary) of immunization programmes (prioritising measles vaccination, particularly in South Darfur where coverage is low) and other health-related activities including hygiene education.

INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Darfur is not over, but has reduced in intensity in some places and at some times. The very irregularity of the conflict means that future planning and development of humanitarian interventions are complex and necessarily responsive in nature. Since 2005, there have been periods of relative calm and periods of extreme violence, but an underlying environment of insecurity persists, even in major urban centres. This affects how and why people make decisions on where to go and what to do to support their household productive and reproductive needs. Displacement, insecurity and lack of mobility continue to profoundly impact on these decisions and to limit the range of options available to different groups. The underlying tensions and disruptors of what was previously 'normal life' a decade ago persist and are likely to into the near future. This has profound implications on the kind of 'humanitarian interventions' that are likely to benefit the most vulnerable people of Darfur.

Survival and development in Darfur is not simply about the nature, range and pattern of conflict. Several underlying factors also impact on future development pathways, most notably the gradual and unrelenting population pressure on resources, environments and decision making, and second, the profoundly complex climate features in the region that add key elements of risk to any future decision making by populations, particularly those seeking (or being induced) to return from urban to rural areas. These wider contextual issues mean that future livelihood security in the region is likely to be secured in many different ways, but that certain livelihood routes to human security – e.g. pastoralism, trade and agricultural production – are likely to be eclipsed by new form of livelihoods in the near future, largely because many groups can no longer rely upon established and secure access to natural capital assets as part of individual or collective access arrangement that were hitherto the norm across many areas of Darfur.

One key sub-issue in this changing relationship reflects far wider social shifts in sub-Saharan Africa, but perhaps amplified considerably in the insecure environment of Darfur. This is the propensity for younger, economically active populations, to seek settlement and income sources in the growing urban areas of Darfur. This phenomenon has been heightened by factors including the urbanisation of aid 'service industries' in Darfur. As huge capital has been injected into the region by these industries, so a new jobs market has grown up (and related service industry supporting the aid community) which is far more accessible from an urban base. Second, wage labour opportunities that have accompanied building booms and other urban-based economic change (e.g.

associated brick-making industries and water vending) have supported a growing number of households amongst IDPs in particular. In short, the shape of the economic and social context to Darfur has shifted significantly, with new forms of capital assets defining household livelihood security and established norms and patterns of movements, trade and economic decision making giving way.

A somewhat empty argument has emerged about what constitutes humanitarian intervention and what is longer-term 'developmental' aid. The implication of conclusion to the conflict through emphasising developmental over humanitarian aid riles some agencies and institutions. Others see security being achieved largely through livelihoods interventions that seek to support the fundamental capacity of households to develop and maintain different forms of income stream. The conclusion of this report is that the two are not separate, but for the foreseeable future will need to take place contiguously, making clear the need for a programming framework that is flexible (in both operational and strategic terms).

This report proposes a principled pragmatic 'remain and return' approach that addresses key contexts with two particular questions:

- What is the most immediate cause of human insecurity in this context and what is the best way of tackling this insecurity?
- How can our immediate responses be made part of or developed into longer-term approaches to strengthening livelihood security in Darfur and building sustainable economic growth in the region?

This approach would combine local integration with a movement-centred strategy that seeks to protect and promote various forms of mobility that can be used to knit together livelihoods and productive work across urban, town and rural settings.

The report is organised in the following sections:

Livelihood transformations in a protracted crisis defines key concepts used in the report and details a framework to understand livelihood changes in protracted crisis situations.

Contexts and conditions reviews the important trends shaping livelihood transformations in Darfur.

Securing livelihoods amid uncertainty examines trends, dynamics and impacts of these wider and local contexts and conditions on livelihoods, food security and nutrition since 2005.

The implications of these are assessed in the concluding section, **Toward a longer-term approach to strengthen livelihood security**.

LIVELIHOODS TRANSFORMATIONS IN A PROTRACTED CRISIS

Strengthening livelihoods has become a core objective of many humanitarian actors in Darfur. Nearly ten years after the outbreak of the conflict, the need to move beyond emergency relief is widely accepted. Yet, as shown in Section III, in conditions of continuing insecurity and threats to the well-being of a large section of the population, it is clear that the settings in which people make their living has radically changed. Further, there is no clear trend of improving indicators for livelihoods and productive activity for much of the population as our analysis shows in Section IV. Even though levels of armed violence have subsided over much of the region, and there are pockets and areas where security is slowly being restored, peaceful and stable conditions remain elusive. In situations of protracted crisis like Darfur, conditions of a 'slow burning crisis' last many years, there are multiple stressors and pressures on people's productive activities, mechanisms for intervention are limited, there is a disproportionate dependence on humanitarian agencies to jumpstart 'development', and the capacity of local government to deliver development – both social and economic services as well as supporting stable governance – is weakened (Maxwell et al., 2011).

In these conditions, supporting livelihoods is exceedingly difficult and far from certain. Understanding the nature of livelihoods in protracted crises and the mechanisms and processes of livelihood change is essential.

Conceptualising livelihoods

Livelihoods perspectives start with how different people in different places live (Scoones, 2009). Although the term 'livelihoods' is often equated with occupations (farming, pastoralism, collecting natural products, trading, labouring), it refers to much more than this. Other important dimensions include locale (urban, peri-urban and rural), physical geography (arid, semi-arid, sub-humid), social difference (age and gender defined livelihoods), relative poverty and wealth (destitute, better off), trajectories (improving, weakening), among others. While there is a long pedigree behind the contemporary use of 'livelihoods', many use the Chambers and Conway (1992) definition: 'a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base.'

The tendency, unintentionally in many cases, to reduce livelihoods to an occupational category has distracted from the exploration and recognition of far greater diversity of what different people actually do and how they combine different activities (cultivating, herding, trading, collecting, providing labour). People combine different work in a complex portfolio of activities because in changing contexts and uncertain conditions they must be both adaptable and flexible. In her work on livelihoods in Darfur, Helen Young observed:

> *[A]ll rural livelihoods in Darfur are based on a similar range of livelihood strategies, with farming and herding predominating. These core livelihood strategies are supplemented with other activities, including trade, collecting wild foods and other natural resources, and finally labour migration and remittances. There are of course local variants... but in essence all livelihood groups in rural Darfur practice these same five livelihood strategies (Young, 2006: 7).*

Thus, livelihoods are based on a combination of activities that are used at particular times and in particular contexts and conditions. This implies that livelihood zoning – while useful to identifying the primary economic activity linked to particular niche agro-ecologies – is less helpful to understand how different people live in different places. Population displacement and the location separation of household members in Darfur also make it difficult to use 'zoning' as a way to characterise the different ways that different people live. For these reasons, other concepts and tools are needed to understand the 'livelihood situations' of different people and how households and individuals bundle different resources and combine various activities in pursuance of different strategies.

Diversity and uncertainty are the watchwords for understanding livelihoods. In transition environments like Darfur, multiple livelihood situations are juxtaposed in the same place, reflecting the diverse backgrounds of different actors and groups, their opportunities and options to improve their situation and their own goals and aspirations. What tools are available to understand the complex on-the-ground livelihood situations in Darfur as well as how livelihoods change and what mediates such changes?

One model that was widely used to direct examination of the context for people's productive activity is the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), as shown in Figure

1.[5] The essence of the framework is to explore how different individuals and groups existing within a *vulnerability context* (an overarching setting) match different bundles of *assets* as part of *livelihood strategies* to pursue specific *livelihood outcomes* as identified by those people themselves. According to the model, an assortment of *structures and processes* shape the possibilities for matching different assets in order to make a living. An important criticism of the SLF has been that it is devoid of consideration of issues of politics and power implied in the formation of social groups and structural constraints on people's livelihoods (O'Laughlin, 2002). In practice the framework has been applied to understand what households and individuals do (livelihood activities) as well as what they have (livelihood assets) but without necessarily providing much insight into the broader political, economic and security contexts that frame people's survival and productive activity. What is needed, and what this report seeks to emphasise, is a core focus on institutions and organisations that mediate people's access to livelihoods as key determinants of livelihood vulnerabilities.

Figure 1. Sustainable livelihoods framework



Source: DFID, 1999

Notes: H = Human Capital, N = Natural Capital, F = Financial Capital, S = Social Capital, P = Physical Capital

In this report we will address a further criticism raised by Pain and Lautze (2002) that the SLF assumes the existence of peaceful and stable settings and offers few analytical tools to understand the nature of vulnerability and dynamics of how livelihoods change

[5] For an overview and introduction to the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, see: http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0901/section1.pdf.

in areas affected by conflict and violence. We seek to resolve this through articulating and applying a different livelihoods framework, as detailed below, which draws on a pedigree of livelihoods analyses in conflict-affected areas over recent years.[6] One particular shortcoming that has been emphasised is the appropriateness of a focus on 'sustainability', when conditions of rupture, dislocation and loss characterise situations of protracted crisis. The way in which 'vulnerability' was reflected in the schematic representation of the framework (see Figure 1) also suggested that vulnerability was something external rather than something embedded in the ways that people live and their possibilities to strengthen livelihoods. Adding to this, it was observed that various shocks were often lumped together as exogenous in the 'vulnerability context' on the assumption that they will trigger a similar pattern of individual and household response. However, the nature of the shock (whether endogenous or exogenous, idiosyncratic or covariate) does affect the strategies people adopt in pursuit of specific livelihood goals (Deng, 2002; Dercon, 2000).

There have been attempts to adapt predominant livelihoods frameworks to provide clearer guidance on how to assess the context of coping and productive activity in situations of conflict and armed violence. Common features of models that have been developed are the central placement of vulnerability and the explicit linkage between the wider political economy of conflict and the assets and activities of different people. Other frameworks that have sought to 'adapt' the SLF, including the model we present below, can be used to show how a logic of exclusion and encompassing forms of violence will be key factors shaping livelihood vulnerabilities in areas affected by and recovering from conflict. In these contexts, populations face difficult trade-offs in managing threats to their personal safety (such as by fleeing and abandoning lands or slaughtering livestock) or making a living (such as moving with livestock in insecure areas, or attempting to cultivate land or collect fuelwood and wild foods in areas experiencing armed attacks). Institutions and processes in these settings – such as militias, protection rackets, smuggling and contraband trade, organised crime, banditry, military institutions, militarisation and violence itself – will shape the possibilities that different people have to assemble resources for particular strategies, whether that be to accumulate resources and wealth, adapt to new conditions, exit and seek alternative livelihoods or simply to survive. They can also highlight new networks and connections that people create for protection, defence and survival, including kinship networks,

[6] For example, see Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005), Collinson (2003), Justino (2009), Korf (2004), Longley and Maxwell (2002), Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006), Stites et al. (2007), Unruh (2008), and Young and Goldman (Forthcoming).

bond friendships, vigilante groups, community guards and police, burial societies, and informal micro-credit schemes.

A framework for understanding

Livelihoods refer to how different people live – what resources they have, what they do and what they seek or aspire to. People pursue different combinations of livelihoods in particular institutional and historical settings and in response to acute pressures and shocks as well as longer-term trends. Institutions shape the pathways for different actors and groups. As shown by the examples above, institutions include social, economic and political structures and relationships as well as norms and values, and they are nested in wider and more local conditions and contexts. Building on existing works that have sought to adapt livelihoods frameworks for conflict-affected environments, a framework for understanding livelihoods in protracted crisis situations is presented below as a way to examine patterns of livelihood change and the emergence of new livelihood configurations in Darfur (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Framework for examining livelihoods in protracted crisis settings



The components of the framework are the same as existing livelihoods frameworks but the emphasis is on institutions and processes that provide differing options and opportunities for livelihood strengthening in Darfur. The components are:

- *Wider contexts and conditions* including structural (political-economic) factors, longer-term trends (climate change, shifting land tenure, changing gender and age norms), regional insecurity, and the presence of militaries or non-state armed groups
- *Local contexts and conditions* including localised degradation and resource pressure, micro-level politics and disputes, and social relations within and between households *Transforming institutions and processes* including 'rules of the game' and structures that mediate people's access to livelihood strategies and pathways
- *Livelihood resources* (these are referred to as 'assets' or 'capitals' in most existing livelihoods frameworks) referring to what people have
- *Livelihood strategies* refers to the logic of combining and sequencing particular activities and tasks, such as to accumulate, adapt, survive/cope, diversify or exit (start over)
- *Livelihood outcomes* encompass both planned and unintended results of work activities as well as social and political engagements within particular institutional settings

Rather than beginning analysis by assessing the resources belonging to different households and individuals (as is conveyed in many livelihoods frameworks), the starting point for analysis in the framework presented is to first understand transforming institutions and processes. These mediate the livelihood resources that are available to different people in different places as well as how they can combine these in different configurations (livelihood strategies) in pursuit of particular goals (livelihood outcomes). In other words, institutions and processes shape not only what people have (their livelihood resources) but also their entitlements, referring to their claims to different sets of resources. An emphasis on the effectiveness of peoples' entitlements mediated through institutions and organisations highlights the fact that certain claims to resources will prevail over others and that some people may be unable to mobilise some rights and resources that are necessary in order to make effective use of other rights and resources. This, in turn, is important to understand the failure of livelihoods to guarantee access to sufficient food or nutrition at the household level.

Wider and local contexts and conditions shape the types of institutions and processes apparent in any particular setting, the interactions amongst these and how they change over time. Contexts and conditions – 'the vulnerability/opportunity context' – is the overall framing of what people do. As explored in the following section, in Darfur these include important demographic changes including a rapidly growing population that is increasingly based in urban areas, uncertainties in land tenure aggravated by the diminishing influence of traditional authorities and the ineffectiveness of politico-administrative structures introduced by the state, environmental variability and changes in resource availability, the absorption of marketing and trade into the political economy of conflict and survival, and the establishment of aid 'service industries', particularly in Darfur's largest cities. Violence and political instability may accelerate conditions and trends that were present before the outbreak of hostilities, including forms of political and economic violence, extreme poverty as well as social exclusion and the marginality of some populations and groups. Therefore, it is not always possible to separate out completely the impacts of war from other influences at work in society (Cliffe and Rock, 1997 in Goodhand, 2001). A longer-term understanding is required to expand understandings of the causes of weakened livelihoods and vulnerability, which do not relate to recent conflict and/or experiences of displacement (Longley and Maxwell, 2003).

We use this model to understand trends and changes in livelihoods in Darfur since 2005. The need for physical safety and security has pushed many people to abandon their land, livestock and other property – the resources that are the building blocks for secure livelihoods, access to food and nutrition. The wider context of regional insecurity as well as local conditions of inter-group rivalry in certain areas have combined to force others to leave their homes and communities. A logic of predation and accumulation has been pursued through certain institutional forms, including violence itself as well as lawlessness and impunity for the actions of some groups, with widespread destructive impacts on livelihoods, food security and health for much of the population. New institutions have evolved to support survival and coping, including horizontal support networks amongst the displaced and other very poor who have migrated to urban areas in search of work, the emergence of shaikhs and other leaders in camps, banditry, community defense forces and organised gangs offering protection. Yet, options and opportunities for long-term recovery have been undermined by the increasingly rigid social relations that have developed over a long period in Darfur, and which have reached a tipping point during the crisis, which continues.

Strengthening livelihoods in the long-term

More investment is required in understanding the institutional fragmentation and crisis that is at the heart of the longer-term development challenge in Darfur. The Framework for Examining Livelihoods in Protracted Crisis Settings is one tool alongside many other that can be used to help this task. However, because livelihoods frameworks do not incorporate an explicit temporal dimension, other tools and approaches are needed to examine change over time. Both circumspective ('looking around') and retrospective ('looking back') approaches are important to understand livelihood trajectories, which Murray (2002: p. 496, quoting Bagchi et al., 1998: 457-458) explains refers to '[a] path through time, and… to "the consequences of the changing ways in which individuals construct a livelihood over time".'

Table 1. Development pathways in Darfur



As a way to envision long-term directions in livelihoods in Darfur, Table 1 proposes contrasting development pathways. This adapts a similar model proposed by Catley et al. (2012) to assess different development pathways for pastoral societies 'at the margins' in east and the Horn of Africa. As with any ideal type representation of complexity, this conceals many shades of grey and enormous variation, detail and nuance. But it is provided to open up debate of multiple pathways that might unfold in

Darfur. These will be driven by varying access to resources and non-agricultural labour opportunities, the existence of varying forms of armed violence and the provision of security for different groups. The creation of conditions for recovery and the establishment of secure livelihoods for the majority of Darfur's population will depend on the continued modification of social networks including connections within households as well as wider kinship ties, bond friendships, membership in informal associations of producers and traders and gender and age-defined groups, and ties to politico-administrative officials as well as community defense forces, militias, armed groups and military personnel. Crucially, conditions for recovery will also rest on the establishment and/or re-establishment of more effective forms of institutions – both formal and informal – to mediate access to land and high value resources like fodder and water, regulate trade and marketing, settle local disputes, provide personal safety and security, and promote interaction across social divides such as through inter-marriage and mixed schools.

Summary

- Livelihoods refer to how different people in different places live. They include the resources that individuals/households have, their capabilities to make use of these, and productive activities and other work they combine in pursuit of particular goals, aspirations and imperatives for security and safety.
- A logic of exclusion and encompassing forms of violence will be key factors shaping livelihood vulnerabilities in areas affected by and recovering from conflict.
- A Framework for Examining Livelihoods in Protracted Crisis Settings focuses on the institutions and processes through which different people negotiate, cooperate and come into conflict in longer-term transitions into and out of situations of protracted crisis.
- Greater investment is required in understanding post-conflict institutional settings in Darfur, how these connect to the livelihood configurations of different people and, in turn, which institutions and interactions amongst these might promote livelihood security for most Darfuris.

CONTEXTS AND CONDITIONS

Wider and local contexts and conditions are the overall framing for how people live in different places and seek to make a living. Often referred to as 'the vulnerability context' in livelihoods frameworks, wider and local contexts and conditions influence the livelihood resources that different people have – both in the same place and across different places, their capabilities to make use of these resources, the different activities they pursue, and their strategies for combining bundles of resources and activities in pursuit of different needs and goals. The framework to understand livelihoods in protracted crises directs attention to the connections between wider and local conditions and contexts and transforming institutions and processes. In other words, how do the broader and local framings of people's livelihoods affect the institutions and processes that mediate their access to resources, productive activities and services?

Wider and local conditions and contexts often overlap and are difficult to disentangle in many cases. Yet, they can operate in very different and unpredictable ways and elicit different individual and household responses, thus they are shown separately in Figure 2. For example, wider climate trends contributing to greater resource pressure at a regional level and an increased propensity for conflict may be counterbalanced by incentives at a local level to negotiate resource sharing agreements, as seen in certain pastoral contexts of the Horn of Africa (Letai and Lind, 2012). Expanding livestock markets for camels in north Africa and the Arabian Peninsula would be expected to encourage a shift in herd preferences amongst herding groups, yet local conditions of insecurity and violence targeting households with lucrative assets and that restrict access to browsing sites will discourage such a shift.

This section examines a number of conditions and trends that shape livelihood vulnerabilities in Darfur, including conflict, population, environment, markets and trade, and aid responses. It identifies how these are reshaping institutions and organizations, as well as giving rise to new institutions, where evidence supporting such analysis exists.

Conflict

Continuing insecurity

Since the beginning of 2011 the security environment improved in some localised areas of Darfur – particularly in West Darfur – helped by the rapprochement between the governments of Sudan and Chad. After only a trickle in previous years, the number of

returnees jumped in 2011. Since January 2011, the voluntary return of 110,000 IDPs and 30,000 refugees has been verified (UN, 2012). Yet, in spite of improved security in certain localised areas, violence has continued in many parts of the region. In the first nine months of 2010, some 270,000 were newly displaced across Darfur, including those fleeing heavy fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a faction of the SLM/A in the eastern Jebel Marra (IDMC, 2010). In 2011, conflict between the SAF and armed opposition groups flared in small pockets of North Darfur and South Darfur, including eastern Jebel Marra as well as areas around Shangil Tobaya, Dar Es Salam and Khor Abeche (UN, 2012). Inter-tribal violence, banditry and operations by non-state armed actors caused insecurity in other parts of the region, particularly along migratory routes and in the border areas with South Sudan (ibid). These different forms of armed violence displaced a further 70,000 in South and North Darfur in 2011, mostly during the planting period when people's resilience was already low (UN, 2012: p. 53). An estimated 2,000 people were displaced in February 2012 following clashes between Zaghawa and Birgid tribesmen in Dar es Salaam in North Darfur (UN OCHA, 2012)[7]. Elsewhere, in early 2012 violence was reported in Abu Delik[8], Alawna[9], Azbani[10], Ba'achim[11], Abu Shouk[12], and Kutum[13] in North Darfur, Abu Karanica[14] in East Darfur, Serba[15] in West Darfur, and Mershing[16], Shearia[17], Nyala[18], and Gereida[19] in South Darfur.

Insecurity within IDP camps is also a major issue and affects the many informal livelihood activities that have emerged in and around them such as trading, selling wood for construction and fuel, farming, and operating animal driven carts. In February 2012, armed groups attacked and prevented newly displaced from entering Zam Zam camp.[20] The largest camps are highly politicised, and some are militarised. Militarisation in some camps in the region includes the presence of armed factions and recruitment of IDPs to

[7] UN OCHA. 2012. 'Monthly humanitarian bulletin: Sudan.' Issue 1. February 1 – 29th, 2012.
[8] 'Abu Tira attacks newly displaced families at Zam Zam camp.' Radio Dabanga. February 28th, 2012.
[9] 'Fresh fighting in Sudan's Darfur.' Agence France Presse. February 24th, 2012.
[10] 'Militia attack village in North Darfur.' Radio Dabanga. March 12th, 2012.
[11] 'JEM clashes with government troops in North Darfur.' Radio Dabanga. March 6th, 2012.
[12] 'Shops looted in Abu Shouk.' Radio Dabanga. March 2nd, 2012.
[13] 'Gunmen kill two in Kutum.' Radio Dabanga. March 11th, 2012.
[14] 'Soldier opens fire on demonstrators.' Radio Dabanga. March 11th, 2012.
[15] 'Man killed, 9 missing as mob attack village.' Radio Dabanga. March 8th, 2012.
[16] 'Gunmen attack IDPs in Mershing, South Darfur.' Radio Dabanga. February 23rd, 2012.
[17] 'UNAMID peacekeeper killed in ambush in South Darfur.' Radio Dabanga. February 29th, 2012.
[18] 'UN peacekeeper killed in Sudan's Darfur.' Al-Jazeera. November 7th, 2011; 'UN employee kidnapped near Nyala, South Darfur.' Radio Dabanga. March 6th, 2012.
[19] 'Woman raped in front of son in South Darfur.' Radio Dabanga. March 7th, 2012.
[20] 'Abu Tira attacks newly displaced families at Zam Zam camp.', *op. cit.*

armed movements, taxation and parallel structures, the use of camps as bases for training and/or attacks, and the diversion of humanitarian aid (Kahn, 2008: 19).

While security improvements in parts of West Darfur have provided a permissive environment for voluntary returns, continued fighting and armed attacks in certain pockets and areas generate considerable uncertainty and discourage returns at a wider level. Even as heavy fighting has become restricted to certain areas, the threat of armed violence combined with the absence of protection in many rural areas is destabilising. The fear of violence has practical impacts such as discouraging seasonal return of IDPs to plant and harvest fields, restricting livestock movements to areas that are regarded as being 'safe', limiting movements of women to harvest wildfoods and fuelwood, and impeding reliable forms of transport, making movements costlier and increasing the costs of non-aid goods including foodstuffs, seeds and veterinary drugs.

The experience of West Darfur returnees will weigh heavily on the possibility of further returns in other parts of the region. The returns in West Darfur have proceeded even as some leaders of the displaced population have voiced concerns over the provision of humanitarian assistance and security.[21] Testament to the longer-lasting impacts of the conflict, displaced populations remain reliant on humanitarian assistance, as elaborated below. The legacies of the conflict – depleted assets, pervasive insecurity, diminished or no access to land and resources, the loss of agro-ecological knowledge amongst a younger generation, feelings of mistrust between different groups, militarisation and armed self-defense – persist. The rise in returns since early 2011, although indicating improved security in some areas[22], does not remove the pervasive feeling of insecurity felt by a large majority of the displaced population elsewhere in the region.

Militarisation, self-defense and displacement

After nearly ten years of armed violence by various actors, responses to insecurity have become deeply entrenched in the political economy of livelihood systems in Darfur. Frequent movements, protection rackets, extortion, banditry, military service, conscription, self-defense and vigilantism are key factors of current livelihood situations in the region. In response to the direct targeting of civilians, most have responded by fleeing, as described below. Others have provided support to the rebels, whether forcibly (through forced recruitment or taxation or 'protection' money) or voluntarily. In the early years of the conflict, some local communities negotiated to create

[21] 'Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad voice concerns over repatriation.' Available at: http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=403:sudanese-refugees-in-eastern-chad-voice-concerns-over-repatriation&catid=33:blog&Itemid=64; 'Darfur IDPs say concerned by Sudan-Chad deal to return refugees.' 30th July 2011. *Sudan Tribune*.

[22] 'A taste of hope sends refugees back to Darfur.' 26th February 2012. *New York Times*.

'independent areas' which were secured by community defence forces and had the assurance of the warring parties that they would not deploy their forces, thus decreasing their strategic value (Pantuliano and O'Callaghan, 2006). In some areas armed opposition groups formed reconciliation agreements with local Arab groups to establish enclaves for people to return and farm (Amnesty, 2008: 19). However, should these enclaves still exist (which is uncertain), they are an exception and their existence is subject to the wider security environment, which remains deeply insecure. Most rural areas remain under the control of Arab groups and other armed factions, where civilians are subject to extortion, violence, recruitment and conscription.

Thus, whether in the camps or not, civilian life has become increasingly focused on achieving human security and, at times, taking up arms in self-defense – to the extent that many areas have become militarised, particularly rural areas which host a variety of militias and factions – even in areas under government control – and where there is effectively little distinction between military and civilian space (Kahn, 2008). Most IDPs in rural areas live in informal settlements next to villages rather than in camps. While offering greater safety, urban areas and camps are deeply insecure, as well. Some camps with mixed populations are fraught with inter-tribal divisions, which sometimes flare into violence. In Kalma, youth have formed vigilante groups, divided by their ethnic origin (Amnesty, 2008). Violence is used as a means of control to intimidate the camp population and limit competition for resources. Up to 2008, coercive taxation and parallel government structures were common in many camps under the control of armed factions (Kahn, 2008). In the largest camps, like Kalma, communities instituted a form of policing as well as a justice system through shaikhs (Amnesty, 2008).[23]

As a consequence of the continuing insecurity – and widespread fear of violence under conditions of acute vulnerability – one of the main features of life in Darfur is extensive displacement. Although a precise appraisal of IDP numbers is almost impossible, it is estimated that between 1.9 and 2.7 million people have been displaced by the conflict (IDMC, 2010), corresponding to almost one third of the entire population, living in IDP sites scattered across the region, as shown in Map 1. The number of displaced people steadily increased from 2003 to 2005 during the most intense period of fighting, levelled off between 2005 and 2007, but increased again from 2007. The number of displaced spiked in 2010 but fell again in 2011 (UN, 2012).

[23] We have not accessed any publicly available reports or published information that will provide a picture of the current situation in 2011 although sources spoken to by research team members in Darfur confirm a similar picture exists.

Map 1. Camps and locations of internally displaced persons, 2011



Adapted from: Sudan, Darfur - IDP Sites. 27 February 2011. UN OCHA.

There have been many types of displacement, including long-distance movements across international and state boundaries, longer movements within states, and movements to nearby villages and towns. However, based on 2006 UN estimates, 90 percent of IDPs are within a two-day walk from their village of origin (UN, 2006). This relative proximity enables people to visit their place of origin more easily (even on a daily or weekly basis), depending on the wider security situation, and has two major consequences: first, where mobility is possible, IDPs can maintain a certain relation with their communities, therefore containing the social disruption a conflict usually causes; second, estimation and protection of the population become very difficult due to the continuous movement. However, the opportunities for 'near movements' back and forth between camps and villages of origin vary across the region. For example, the predominantly Fur inhabitants in Kalma camp, who came from Wadi Salih – a considerable distance – usually opt to work in farms close to Kalma that are owned by long-term residents of Nyala. Similarly, IDPs in Elsalam, Diraig and Otash camps, originally from Elgaoz Elgharbi of Buram area, also choose to work on farms in and around Nyala. IDPs in Kass, Gereida, Manawashai and Mirshing are typically from nearby and it is not uncommon for them to cultivate their lands providing there is adequate security.[24]

Summary

- Improvements in the security situation in parts of West Darfur contributed to the voluntary return of 140,000 IDPs and refugees since January 2011.
- Continuing insecurity resulted in 70,000 newly displaced in North and South Darfur in 2011. Localised violence and new displacements were reported in many areas in early 2012.
- Although heavy fighting has become limited to specific places, the threat of further violence coupled with the lack of protection in most rural areas continues to have a determining influence on livelihood strategies and most people's options and opportunities to make a living.

[24] Personal communication with Darfuri researcher, Nyala. March 8th, 2012.

Environment

Land

Access to and control of land is fundamental to support agrarian and pastoral livelihoods and production systems. A deterioration of customary land tenure governance and the conflict itself have seriously impacted claims and rights to land. Even before the onset of the conflict, the functioning of the traditional *hakura* land tenure system was strained (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008). The 1970 Unregistered Land Act abolished the right of the native authorities to administer land and transferred all unregistered land (the majority of land used for smallholder cultivation) into the hands of the government (Tanner, 2005; UN Sudan, 2010). However, war-related population movements have caused the *hakura* system to unravel (IWPR, 2010). It is alleged that members of counter-insurgency groups were empowered to claim lands belonging to displaced populations. Further, in the wake of widespread displacement during the height of fighting between 2003 and 2005, landless Arab herding groups have moved onto land previously inhabited by non-Arab sedentary groups with consequent implications for the livelihood options of the groups involved (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008).

UNHCR estimated that 30,000 Arabs from Chad crossed into Darfur between 2006 and 2007 (IWPR, 2010). Many settled on lands belonging to people displaced from Wadi Saleh and Wadi Azoum in West Darfur (Amnesty International, 2008: 30). Moreover, it was reported that some of these new arrivals were able to obtain Sudanese IDs and other documents showing their ownership of land, a claim contested by the state government (IWPR, 2010). These reports dovetail with the findings of a survey of 562 villages in the southern part of West Darfur. Olsson (2010) reports that following the outbreak of the conflict in 2003 the overall population in the study area fell by one third, mainly due to the displacement of 57,263 households from Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups (equivalent to about 57 percent of their pre-conflict population). However, 9,809 new households from Arab and other African groups came into the area. Olsson found that one fourth of all villages were squatted by newcomers, settling in villages abandoned by former Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa inhabitants, as well as in areas close to wadis where soil fertility is better (Olsson, 2010: 16).

Resolution of land disputes is the crucible to finding a long-term peaceful solution to the protracted crisis in Darfur. Without land, people will remain displaced. Even with security guarantees and protection for IDPs, many feel they have nothing to return to (IWPR, 2010).[25] In West Darfur, a lack of access to arable land is singled out as a

[25] 'Go home, Bashir tells Darfur's displaced.' 8th February 2012. Agence France Presse.

particular challenge for recent returnees alongside a lack of access to services, livelihood opportunities and agricultural support (UN, 2012: 14). Verifying rights to land – some claimed by new settlers, others unused in areas under the control of militias and armed groups hostile to IDPs – is complicated by poor or non-existent record keeping and because ownership can often only be confirmed through the collective knowledge of local communities that formerly inhabited these lands but are now displaced over a wide area (IWPR, 2010).

Resources

Natural resources are the building blocks of livelihoods. The significance of particular resources – water, fodder, wood, and soil – and the value attached to these by different actors varies not only in relation to their relative availability but also the mode of production which seeks to make use of them. Thus, while both physical and social processes contribute to changes in the availability of natural resources, the relative importance of resources will fluctuate in relation to changes in economic life and interactions between different production systems. Access to resources is embedded in the long history of conflict in Darfur. Customarily, the co-existence of multiple production systems in Darfur – different agrarian and pastoral systems as well as combinations of these – necessitated institutions to manage competing interests amongst different groups. Like in many other agro-pastoral dryland landscapes, relations between and amongst different groups wavered between cooperation and conflict. Yet, institutions – including rules of access to resources as well as forms of social bonding such as inter-marriage and trade and exchange relations – existed to manage this uncertainty and minimise violence.

However, system features of adaptability and flexibility have become compromised over time. Population growth, demographic transition and longer-term environmental trends have each in their own way fundamentally altered the conditions for cooperation, as explored below.

The direct impacts of the recent conflict and related changes in Darfur's economy have also transformed the social organisation of resource access and use. The recent conflict is thought to have greatly accelerated processes of environmental degradation (Bromwich, 2008). Displacement and the concomitant loss of livelihoods has pushed many people into crisis coping strategies connected to the survival economies in and around urban centres and camps, such as charcoal burning, brick-making, and collecting fuelwood and water. The placement of IDP camps on the edge of market towns and commercial centres has meant the loss of shelter belts, forestry and farmland

(Bromwich, 2008: 26) to sustain demand for fuel, construction material and brick-making. The household sector accounts for 93 percent of demand for wood. In urban areas, 95 percent goes to cooking, with the rest to construction, maintenance and furniture, while in rural areas the figure is 83 percent (FAO WISDOM, 2010). The imbalance between accessible biomass production and demand is greatest near to Darfur's largest cities, as shown in Table 2. In Nyala, for example, the annual accessible supply potential of wood fuel is estimated to be 91,478 tons; but actual demand is 326,170 tons. Significant vegetation change in rural areas neighbouring Nyala occurred after May 2004, when demand spiked for wood for fuel and construction as well as land to cultivate fields (Alix-Garcia, 2012). As the international response to the conflict ramped up in 2006 and 2007 and there was an influx of humanitarian agencies and peace-keepers, fuelwood consumed for the production of bricks to supply the booming construction sector in Darfur's largest cities caused a significant change in vegetation as well (UNEP, 2008). According to figures reported in Table 3, demand has dropped sharply in recent years but is still estimated to be four times pre-conflict levels.

Table 2. Wood fuel supply and demand in select urban centres (in tons)

	Demand*	Accessible supply	Balance
Al Fasher	271,262	104,570	-166,692
Al Geneina	125,159	54,962	-70,198
Nyala	326,170	91,478	-234,692
Zalengei	54,174	135,990	81,276
Al Deain	199,226	135,731	-63,495

**Assuming 'business as usual' consumption, rather than consumption figuring in the use of fuel-efficient stoves, which have become commonplace in many IDP camps.*
**Source: FAO WISDOM, 2010*

As the countryside around cities has become progressively stripped of biomass, fuelwood for domestic use has become scarce, forcing people to travel extremely long distances or to rely on firewood merchants. However, the costs of fuelwood have increased as it comes from more distant sources, impacting the displaced and other vulnerable populations with limited incomes.

The lack of effective water management institutions, combined with a massive increased concentration of demand in urban areas, has led to significant depletion of local groundwater resources in some areas, especially near El Fasher (Bromwich et al., 2007). Poor technology and lack of awareness of best practices are amongst the main constraints to water access rather than water scarcity as such. However, in some areas –

for example camp around Nyala in South Darfur – pressure on available resources in the basement aquifer is leading to a reduction in water levels (Nicol et al., 2012). Future management of access in these areas is likely to become a major challenge for camp management.

Table 3. Fuel wood consumed for production of bricks

	North Darfur m^3	South Darfur m^3	West Darfur m^3	Total m^3
1995				24,080
2004	0	1,146	590	1,737
2005	4,666	13,479	14,565	32,710
2006	376,928	145,712	4,094	526,733
2007	332,804	63,000	61,071	456,875
2008	0	4,450	5,005	9,455
2009	583	0	4,014	4,598

Source: FAO WISDOM, 2010, p. 24. Based on FNC reporting.

Access to improved water sources remains low overall, particularly in West Darfur, where just 39.6 percent of the population use improved water sources (UN Sudan, 2010). Much of Darfur's water in rural areas comes either from deep boreholes tapping into the Nubian sandstone aquifer at depth – many associated with 'water yards' where large pumps lift considerable volumes of the resource in semi-arid areas leading to major human and livestock concentrations – or from shallow aquifers associated with ephemeral streamflow during the wet season. In some cases large urban centres – e.g. Nyala – have historically grown up around these more accessible sources.

Violence, extortion and protection rackets remain a feature of rural life in many areas, and determine control over and access to resources as well as movements of people and livestock. Beyond the rural areas neighbouring Darfur's large cities, growing small towns and camps, in the much larger rural landscape, land abandonment is creating a large-scale (and unintended) fallow (Alix-Garcia, 2012: p. 384). Vegetation coverage and vigour improved markedly in west central and north central Darfur since 2003 in spite of a decrease in annual rainfall in these areas, which Schimmer (2007) attributes to population displacement and the decline in livestock numbers. Before the conflict, up to 25 percent of the sheep and goats, 20 percent of the camels and 15 percent of the cattle were estimated to be owned by farmers and agro-pastoralists including female-headed

households that depended on raising sheep and goats for their livelihoods (Aklilu and Catley, 2010: p. 18). These groups in Darfur were the main suppliers of sheep for Sudan's substantial export market before the conflict began but lost nearly all their animals after they were displaced. Average household herd sizes have also fallen amongst the cattle-keeping Baggara and camel-keeping Abbala since the conflict began due to the closure of traditional migration routes between northern and southern areas of Darfur and the confinement of many livestock in the same area in both the wet and dry seasons (ibid.). Over-grazing in localised areas is due to route disruptions caused by politics and conflict, not because of a straightforward increase in the overall ratio of animals to land.

Climate

Situated at the eastern edge of the Sahara, Darfur straddles an ecological gradient with annual rainfall increasing from 100mm per annum in the extreme north of the region to 800mm per annum in the south (see Map 2). For the period 1978 – 2007 average annual rainfall values were 194mm in Al Fasher, 427mm in Al Geneina and 384mm in Nyala (UNEP, 2008b)[26] – much of this rainfall is concentrated in a few months of the year. Further, considerable variation in rainfall exists one year to the next, with frequent droughts as well as more severe multi-year droughts occurring at regular intervals. These non-equilibrial dynamics are the most significant determinant of vegetation cover in the region, and can determine the relative success or failure of particular livelihoods. Like agro-pastoral drylands elsewhere in north-east Africa, conditions of environmental uncertainty and variation favoured the development of specialised production systems and corresponding group identities in Darfur. A multi-ethnic social order based on 'eco-niche specialisation', therefore, took root in the dynamic lie of the land. The structure of societies was loose, with different groups adapting to particular ecological niches. Adaptation meant development of particularistic production strategies and techniques for generating livelihood from the land. Yet, institutionalised ties such as resource-sharing agreements, inter-marriage, and trade and exchange relations promoted bonding across ecological and social boundaries. These also enhanced the resilience of different livelihoods in conditions of uncertainty and change.

Long-term environmental variations entail changes to production and livelihood systems and the institutions that connect different groups. Climate change models differ for the Sahel, but generally show increasing variability in rainfall patterns and shortened

[26] UNEP. 2008(b). 'Water resource management in humanitarian programming in Darfur: the case for drought preparedness.' Report of the UNEP mission to review water resource management at IDP camps and host communities in Darfur during February and March 2008.

Map 2. Rainfall gradients in Darfur



duration of rainy periods (Bromwich et al, 2007). In Darfur, climate trend analysis shows that very warm temperatures – areas with average temperatures above 30 degrees Celsius – are advancing south and the area for productive rain-fed farming is shrinking (FEWSNet, 2011). More erratic rainfall has led to more frequent and severe droughts in the last forty years: in North Darfur, for example, 20 out of the 25 driest years on record have occurred since 1972 (UN Sudan, 2010). However, this followed a relatively wet period in the 1950s and 1960s. Long-term rainfall trends indicate that conditions have improved since the 1990s. In West Darfur, the mean NDVI (normalized difference vegetation index) – a measurement of vegetative cover[27] - increased between 1981 and 2006, with the highest mean in this period recorded in 2001 (Brown, 2010). The highest mean NDVI in West Darfur occurred in 2001, suggesting improved resource availability overall, with high values also recorded in 1999 and 2002, indicating that there was better than average vegetation growth in the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the conflict (ibid.). Other evidence indicates that rainfall in Darfur did not decline significantly in the years prior to 2003 (Kevane and Gray, 2008).

How have these long-term fluctuations affected farming, herding and the connections between different livelihood groups? In the Sahel, wetter conditions in the 1950s and 1960s combined with a shift to commercialisation to encourage an expansion of farming into historically drier environments, pushing pastoralists even further to the margins (Brooks, 2006). This over-extension of farming and herding into more marginal environments in the Sahel 'resulted in a massive loss of life and livestock, the destruction of communities and livelihood systems and massive societal disruption on a regional scale,' (ibid., p.5, quoted in Young et al, 2009b: p. 18). Similar dynamics have unfolded in Darfur. Drought and famine in the region in the mid-1980s led to large scale population movements: Zaghawa pastoralists who lost their livestock moved south and became farmers; Tama and Gimir populations also moved south, as did some Arab nomads (Bromwich et al, 2007). Other groups adapted to changing ecological conditions. An increasing number of farmers shifting to agro-pastoral strategies in drier conditions in South Darfur was one of the reasons for the 3.2 percent per annum growth in the Darfurian livestock population before the conflict (Aklilu and Catley, 2010: p. 18).

Further, the impacts of the conflict have seriously damaged many of the institutions that bonded different livelihood groups and prevented violence. They include reciprocal resource use agreements, trade, exchange relations, and traditional migration routes that brought different groups into contact. Reconstructing these institutions in radically transformed political, social and demographic contexts is essential to improve the

capacities of different livelihood groups to manage the 'boom and bust' cycles that characterise non-equilbrial environments like Darfur.

Summary

- The restitution of land rights for the displaced population that seeks to return is a core need for early recovery efforts. Without land, people cannot return. Without security, they will not.
- Given the collapse of traditional institutions, complementary efforts must focus on confidence building measures to manage overlaps and contradictions in land and resource uses between different production systems.
- Conditions of uncertainty and shorter and longer-term variations are altogether 'normal' in non-equilibrial drylands like Darfur. The conflict has severely damaged many of the institutions that bonded different livelihood groups across social and ecological boundaries. Reconstruction and repair of these is an important objective for longer-term development in the region.

Population

Population growth and youth

Three broad demographic shifts are occurring in Darfur: population growth, a youth 'bulge', and increasing urbanisation. Wider demographic changes are part of the rapid change taking place in a single generation, which is 'transforming Darfur from a small, rural society into a home for almost 8 million people, about half of whom live in and around urban areas or along the roads that link the main cities' (UN Sudan, 2010: 14). Overall population has increased almost six-fold from 1.3 million people in 1973 to an estimated 7.5 million today (Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, cited by UN Sudan, 2010); 52 percent of Darfuris are aged 16 or younger, whereas the figure for Sudan overall is 47 percent (UN Sudan, 2010).

A significant youth bulge exists, with over 40 percent of the population under the age of 15. With such a youthful population, the need to provide basic services and livelihoods opportunities for greater numbers of people, particularly young people, has often outstripped the capacity of the state and economy to provide such opportunities (UN, 2012: 28). The problem is compounded by rapid urbanisation that has occurred during the course of the conflict, as described below. The protracted nature of the Darfur crisis – stretching now over nearly a decade – means that a younger generation coming of age

in urban centres and camps is far removed from the conditions of rural life. Even with the restitution of land rights, protection, and the provision of basic services and other agricultural support, it is difficult to foresee that most young Darfuris will want to return to their parents' rural homes. A generation has come of age in camps and urban centres, with their very different make up of education opportunities, economic activities, forms of social organisation and other 'urban ways'. Many IDPs themselves want their children to move into skilled trades and professions (UN Sudan, 2010).

An expanding population centred increasingly in cities and small towns will have lasting transformative consequences for rural production systems and livelihoods in Darfur. Needs for energy, water, food, shelter and work for the displaced population that chooses to permanently remain outside of Darfuri cities will put a lasting strain on resources, requiring innovative approaches to meet these demands sustainably. Yet, provided work and livelihoods can be found for the new urban population that does not return, cities in Darfur could become an important new market for farm produce, livestock products, and other natural products.

While much attention has focused on the astonishing growth of Darfur's largest cities, small towns scattered throughout the region have swelled with new arrivals since the conflict began, as well. Displaced populations living on the edges of small towns often seek to return to their rural homes when security conditions permit, as described below. Over the long-term, providing that security is re-established in rural areas, these small towns are likely to offer numerous opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurs to add value to farm produce and livestock products. In other pastoral and agro-pastoral contexts of north-east Africa, there is mounting evidence that small towns are centres for livelihood creation (Catley et al., 2012), stemming the flow of migrants to larger cities while also providing options for poor rural dwellers to diversify their income streams and keep a hold in farming or herding.

Urbanisation

Conflict and continuing insecurity have transformed Darfur from a collection of interacting agrarian and pastoral societies based in villages and sparsely populated countryside into an economy and society increasingly shaped through interactions in large cities, small towns and along the main roads connecting these, as depicted in Maps 3 and 4 reflecting the population distribution in Darfur pre-2002 and 2008, respectively. In 1983 the population of Nyala was 100,000. Today, an estimated one in four Darfuris live in Nyala and adjacent areas (De Waal, 2009; see Map 5). One estimate is that urbanisation in Darfur doubled from 20 percent to 40 percent between 2003 and 2006 and that, at present, 50 percent of Darfuris live in or near urban areas (UN Sudan,

Map 3. Pre-conflict population distribution



2010, citing Nadeem Karmali and H.E. Luka Biong, 2007). While the pace of recent urbanisation and the current size of Darfur's largest cities is unprecedented in the region's history, regional towns have long been important as centres for administration, trade, commerce and social bonding between different groups. They connected rural producers – farmers, herders and people who harvest natural products – to wider networks of trade, marketing and exchange. Drought and famine in the 1970s and 1980s hastened an incipient process of de-agrarianisation as part of the population shifted from farms and rangelands to Nyala, Al Geneina and Al Fasher. Yet, a process of intense and forced urbanisation over the past decade has eclipsed earlier processes. Although most of this is centred in the region's three largest cities – Al Fasher, Nyala and Al Geneina (UN Sudan, 2010), many smaller and medium-sized towns such as Zalengei and Al Daein have experienced tremendous growth as well.

Recent rapid urbanisation in Darfur is the result of multiple types of movement. A large proportion of the new urban population was displaced between 2002 – 2004 when intense fighting escalated and spread over many rural areas. Other 'secondary displacement' since 2005 has pushed many others to cities in search of safety and survival work. Other arrivals since 2002 include the poor, drawn in search of new opportunities for work and assistance (De Waal, 2009). However, at present there are few opportunities for creating new productive livelihoods in Darfur's urban centres. The main inducements for those who are not forced to migrate are access to services, assistance and relative security and safety.

Much recent urbanisation will be difficult to reverse. One estimate is that at least one third of the displaced living on the edges of cities and towns are economically integrated (De Waal, 2009), typically performing a variety of tasks-for-cash such as donkey karting, and providing labour on the farms and in the homes of better-off longer-term urban residents. Much of the displaced population exists in extremely precarious conditions – an underclass that is susceptible to exploitative arrangements, protection rackets and recruitment by various armed factions. Still, in spite of these very difficult circumstances, many IDPs do not want to return permanently to rural areas.

War-related population dislocations and continuing insecurity have given rise to new patterns of mobility and connectivity between cities, small towns, and rural areas. Some IDPs in camps near Nyala, such as in Otash and Kalma, tend fields in peri-urban areas. These 'urban farmers' combine opportunistic gardening with other survival work and relief assistance. Other displaced seasonally migrate to their original rural homes to cultivate and tend their fields, returning to their displaced homes in camps and on the edges of towns and cities when it is insecure and/or to seek off-farm work

Map 4. Population distribution in Darfur, 2008



Adapted from FAO WISDOM, 2010.

opportunities. Many of the displaced living on the outskirts of smaller and medium-sized towns treat the camp as a 'dormitory', making frequent 'near movements' to their farms when it is safe to do so (De Waal, 2009). These different mobilities and urban-town-rural connections relate to new livelihood configurations and actions to manage vulnerabilities and seek opportunities in reconfigured security, economic and social contexts.

Map 5. Growth of Nyala, South Darfur



Although debate on long-term development in Darfur tends to be framed in terms of supporting urban livelihoods for IDPs to remain where they are now, or supporting rural recovery and return, such sharp contrasts obfuscate the plural pathways and connections that exist between large cities, small and medium sized towns, and rural areas. Strong urban economies – far different from the survival economies, resource depleting activities and insecurity that characterise the livelihoods of so many of the displaced now – are a necessary part of Darfur's future. They are also important for rebuilding rural livelihoods and production systems, which in the future are likely to be

even more closely knitted into markets and processes of commercialisation linked to an urbanised population.

Labour migration

Migrant labour markets are also critical for individual and household income, with remittances thought to provide up to 40 percent of household incomes, closely competing with more traditional strategies of farming and herding (Young, 2006). Before the current conflict, there were three broad categories of migration and sources of remittance transfers: (i) seasonal and other short-term migration within Darfur; (ii) internal migration to other regions within Sudan; and (iii) transnational or external migration abroad (ibid.). The relative significance of each of these types of migration has varied over time according to economic and political processes and policy changes. Migration patterns, together with the scale and types of remittances have changed significantly since the start of the conflict in 2003, most notably as a result of the closure of the border between Sudan and Libya in May 2003, resulting in an estimated loss in incomes from workers in Libya of approximately US $15 million per year. However, remittances from Libya increased between 2005 and 2010 due to an increase in the number of remittance receiving households (Young et al., 2009a): in 2005, there were thought to be between 150,000 and 250,000 Darfuri migrants in Libya (Young et al., 2005), increasing to an estimated 500,000 in February 2011 when the border was opened to facilitate the return of Sudanese nationals fleeing the unrest in Libya (USAID, 2011; AEGIS Trust, 2011).

From 2005 to 2010 the border remained largely closed with 'partial openings', though from 2003 to 2005 the border was 'locked down' during the period of the most intense fighting (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). Sudan closed its borders with Libya in early July 2010 after Tripoli provided sanctuary to the now deceased former leader of JEM, Khalil Ibrahim. It re-opened the border in February 2011 to evacuate Sudanese citizens from Libya. The border remained 'open' through 2011 although there was an increased troop presence by the SAF to prevent arms flows into Darfur as well as clashes involving the Sudan Army and JEM rebels between September and November 2011.[28] In early 2012, the Sudan and Libya governments were cooperating closely to prevent weapons smuggling across the border.[29]

[28] 'Sudanese Army report fresh clashes with Darfur rebels near Libya border.' 20th September 2011. *Sudan Tribune*; 'Government beefs up control of borders with Libya.' 24th October 2011. *Sudan Tribune*.
[29] 'Bashir says working with Libya to protect borders.' 8th January 2012. *Reuters*.

Summary

- Population growth, a youth 'bulge', and increasing urbanization are important demographic factors shaping long-term development directions in Darfur.
- 52 percent of Darfur's estimated population of 7.5 million is under the age of 16. A majority of the youth population lives in camps and urban centres. Given the situation of protracted displacement, most are unfamiliar with the rhythms and ways of agrarian and pastoral life.
- Intense urbanisation has changed rural-urban interactions and their dynamics. The past decade can be described in terms of a rapid and forced de-agrarianisation. Much of the recent urbanisation is irreversible, suggesting the need for planning that incorporates a strong vision for urban economies and how they connect to forms of rural production and enterprise.
- Labour migration outside of Darfur will continue to provide an important form of 'exit' for Darfuris seeking alternative livelihoods

Markets and trade

Trade has long been the backbone of the Darfuri economy and provides the main way in which different livelihood groups interact. In this sense, it has functioned as an important institution to mitigate conflict, by connecting different livelihood groups through relations of exchange. Within Darfur, trading relationships exist between pastoralists and farmers, north and south, and rural and urban areas, providing an integral part of livelihood strategies for many people. The main export products are livestock, gum Arabic (derived from *Acacia senegal*), *tombak* (chewing tobacco) and oranges, many of which have been exported along the trans-Saharan corridor for centuries. Labour is also a key export but is susceptible to Sudan's bilateral relations, border regulation and the internal politics in countries where Darfuris travel to.

The impact of conflict on trade and markets is substantial (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul 2008). Rural markets have been restricted by attacks, transaction costs and 'informal taxes' (protection money) have increased, forcing some out of business and often those with political access are given preferential treatment. Pre-conflict informal credit arrangements have broken down or become more ethnically determined. Overall it is estimated that some 20-30 percent of urban traders went out of business early in the

conflict (ibid.). The official response has been to raise taxes (now approximately double the pre-conflict levels) on the remaining traders (ibid.).

Trade in all of Darfur's main cash crops was badly affected: up to half of North Darfur's small-scale *tombak* traders have gone out of business and the number of functioning oil processing plants has gone down (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008). The orange trade, on the other hand, has continued, though on a reduced scale and now operates along more pronounced ethnic lines. Fur producers in rebel-controlled areas sell to Fur traders in government-controlled urban markets, incurring high transaction costs due to double taxation and numerous demands for protection payments. Local grain markets diminished greatly due to the displacement of farmers and transport difficulties, but the influx of food aid helped to shore up the cereal market, stabilising prices and keeping traders in business (Dorosh and Subran, 2009). Recent evidence suggest that cereal production has returned to pre-crisis levels (UN Sudan, 2010), but it is unclear how much of this can be linked to displaced farmers returning to cultivate and harvest when they can and what proportion might reflect production by new occupants. Other trade has expanded. Between 1997 – 2002 gum arabic exports from Sudan averaged 25,300 metric tons; this increased to 33, 200 metric tons over the period between 2002 and 2008 (UN, 2012). However, it is unclear what proportion of the increasing trade can be attributed to gum arabic sourced in Darfur.

The internal and external livestock trade, which formed a substantial part of the Darfuri economy before the conflict, has also contracted. Close to 70 percent of livestock supplied to domestic and export markets came from Darfur and Kordofan before the conflict began (Aklilu and Catley, 2010). Exports of goats, sheep and camels from Sudan reached a pre-conflict peak of 2.1 million units in 1999, falling to a low of 500,000 units in 2007 – comparable to export levels in 1992 (UN Sudan, 2010: p. 28). Exports of sheep and goats – which had increasingly been reared and traded by Darfur's agro-pastoral population – fell by one half in 2007 and 2008 (Aklilu and Catley, 2010: p. 19).

Trading routes have changed significantly due to insecurity, increasing the amount of time spent trekking animals and incurring greater costs, including levies and other fees to pass through checkpoints. Herds are now moved in smaller numbers to reduce risk, while the number of herders needed to protect them has generally increased. Many small-scale traders and middlemen went out of business, and livestock traders are now more ethnically concentrated (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008). Due to the former significance of the livestock trade to the Darfuri economy, the repercussions of this disruption have been felt to varying degrees in almost all households in all segments of the population (Young et al., 2005).

Rapid urbanization has contributed to an increase in demand for certain products. For example, there are now growing dairy markets in Nyala and Al Fashir (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008). An interesting development has been the emergence of markets in some of the larger IDP camps. These markets operate largely beyond official regulation, though informally a variety of other camp authorities impose their own rules and restrictions. In effect, many IDP camps are now de facto tax havens and no longer only simply serve IDPs (ibid.). Some traders serving the urban population prefer to bring their goods to the IDP camps to avoid paying taxes on entering towns. Truck drivers trading in charcoal, for instance, choose to offload in Zamzam market to avoid paying Forestry National Corporation taxes (ibid.). IDPs from the camp then transport the charcoal into Al Fashir by donkey thereby indirectly providing an economic activity, particularly for women. The case of livestock is particularly interesting. In Abu Shouk camp, which has the biggest IDP camp market in North Darfur also serving Al Fashir, and in Kalma camp which plays the same role in relation to Nyala, livestock traders are bringing their animals for slaughter to the camps rather than to the towns to avoid taxation. The lack of regulation in camps is thought to provide a haven for marketing looted livestock, as well. In both Abu Shouk and Kalma camps the price of meat is markedly lower than in Al Fashir and Nyala towns (ibid.). One survey found that preparing and barbequing meat is an activity pursued by approximately 5 percent of the population in Abu Shouk whereas 6 percent of the population in Al Seref camp is involved in butchering (Abdelnour et al., 2008). Other important market-related economic activities reported in Abu Shouk and Al Seref include selling water, fodder and firewood, preparing and selling food and tea, operating stoves and baking, hairdressing and making and selling handicrafts (Table 4).

A long-term vision of urban economies is needed to determine how these different micro-enterprises and market-related activities might contribute to more secure livelihoods and development. Much of this activity is coping/survival work undertaken to compensate for inadequate levels of relief assistance and inaccessibility to more lucrative productive work. While much of this work is ‘creative’ and entrepreneurial, these activities generate mostly meager amounts of income and livelihood – ‘add-on’s’ to relief assistance and informal support. Although they are important for coping, they should not be mistaken for ‘integration’ that supports longer-term well-being and human security.

Table 4. Percentage of population involved in market-related micro-enterprises

Abu Shouk		**Al Seref**	
Selling water	12.5	Handicrafts	9
Renting cars for trade	12.5	Preparing and selling food, coffee and tea	9
Selling basic commodities	7.5	Operating stoves and baking	9
Hairdressing	7.5	Selling firewood	9
Preparing and selling food, coffee and tea	7.5	Tailoring and needlework	8
Selling dry fodder	5	Butchering	6
Selling veterinary drugs	5	Petty trading	6
Selling firewood and charcoal	5		

**Source: Abdelnour et al., 2008*

Summary

- The recent conflict was damaging to long-standing trade activity, which connected rural production in Darfur to wider markets and generated considerable wealth. Some forms of trade have proven resilient and even expanded, although it is unclear how the benefits of trade are distributed across different social groups.
- Markets have emerged in some IDP areas, and micro-enterprises are an important survival activity for the displaced alongside relief and informal social support.
- A long-term vision for urban economies supported by particular forms of institutionalization will be necessary to promote more productive work opportunities for new urban populations.

Aid responses

Dependence on aid amongst the displaced population has become an important concern for the Sudan government and humanitarian community. Writing in regard to protracted settings more generally, Long (2011, p. 23) observes, 'compulsory encampment serves to deliberately remove the displaced from the local economy, preventing *de facto* integration. Such groups often remain dependent on aid, effectively becoming the long-term dependents of "humanitarian" donors.' The 2012 UN Work Plan for Sudan offers a similar assessment: 'large segments of IDPs residing in camps have to various degrees, become dependent on external aid. The comparative lack of parallel support for durable solutions within a humanitarian framework in Sudan is one of the key contributors to persistent vulnerability in the country, which needs to be addressed through long term programming and engagement' (UN, 2012: p. 30).

Yet, discourses around dependency often blame the symptom, rather than the cause (Harvey and Lind, 2005). In Darfur, many people continue to rely on relief due to the lack of opportunities for productive work in urban areas, continuing insecurity that prevents return to most rural homes, and the limited capacity of the state to provide services over a wide area. In protracted crises, people rely less on relief than is commonly assumed. In Darfur, most recipients combine relief with other informal social assistance and a variety of survival work, as described earlier. Further, continuing insecurity in many areas and associated restrictions on aid deliveries means that the delivery of relief assistance is irregular in many parts, making it impossible for populations in some areas to 'depend' on humanitarian assistance.

Still, the provision of relief assistance including household food transfers and the delivery of water, health and education services are significant to a large section of the displaced population. The contraction of humanitarian delivery in Darfur since 2009 has underlined the need to strengthen the resilience of IDPs and other populations who are assisted. Levels of basic services in many areas remain below where they were in early 2009. Further, the entwining of relief in the wider economy and politics of Darfur means that any further contractions in external support are bound to negatively affect not only IDPs but also the wider population. For example, Okeke (2011) points to the impact of the aid industry on the growth of the housing sector in Nyala, with many long-time residents near the centre of Nyala renting their homes to officials. The provision of food aid to a wide section of the IDP population, many of whom sell part of their rations for cash to make other purchases, also lowers the market price for staple grains – particularly sorghum –, benefitting poor net consumers (Dorosh and Subran, 2009).

The need for 'durable solutions' is urgent considering that further reductions in humanitarian assistance are likely in the medium-term. Ultimately, 'durable solutions' are achieved when IDPs no longer require any specific humanitarian assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement (UN, 2012: p. 40). However, levels of humanitarian need in Darfur – even if mostly below emergency thresholds – remain substantial. As long as local capacities to cope with the crisis are overwhelmed, people should continue to be able to rely on relief alongside complementary measures to support long-term livelihood security.

Summary

- Declining levels of humanitarian support in the future underline the urgent need to identify durable solutions for the large proportion of the Darfuri population whose lives and livelihoods have been greatly harmed by the conflict.
- 'Dependency' is a misleading way of understanding the persistence of vulnerability amongst the displaced population and others assisted in Darfur. A dearth of options for productive work combined with continuing insecurity and a lack of state capacities to deliver services and assistance over a wide area mean that many turn to relief.
- Development and institutional failures rather than the provision of humanitarian assistance over a long period help to explain why so many people remain deeply vulnerable. This underlines the need for a long-term vision for recovery and the rebuilding of institutions that will help Darfuris to secure livelihoods.

SECURING LIVELIHOODS AMID UNCERTAINTY: TRENDS, DYNAMICS AND IMPACTS

Introduction

There have been two recent attempts at mapping the pattern of livelihoods in Darfur, both of which plot particular mixes of activities in specifically defined areas. In large part these are agro-climatically and topographically determined, with links to rainfall patterns, soil types and the availability of accessible (ephemeral) surface water and shallower groundwater. Overlying these patterns are new, more complex, clusters of conflict areas, post-conflict areas and the emerging urban hubs and interconnecting transport routes between them. The evidence gathered together for this report suggests that there is now a more complicated livelihoods picture in Darfur, with less clarity on where and how specific activities are undertaken, new urban-based (but not necessarily urban-specific) livelihood strategies emerging and shifting patterns of interaction between different areas. There is probably never going to be a full return to the status quo *ante* conflict.

This has implications that stretch far into the realm of current aid programming and into future development planning in the region. There is now far greater fluidity in livelihoods systems than previously (which is born out of necessity, in part) and a stronger emphasis on urban settlement as a basis for livelihood activities (again, born out of persistent insecurity in rural areas). Previous livelihoods categories of farmers, herders, traders, mixed livelihoods systems are far harder to adhere to and potentially dangerously misleading. But the new systems emerging need support where possible, and particularly in terms of the institutional glue that can provide greater certainty for those having to make life or death decisions in many cases about where to deploy meagre household assets, where to move to whether temporarily or permanently and how to plan for the future (from family size and location of members, to who should receive schooling, where to access health services and when to invest in new services such as better water supplies).

Any future programming needs to respond to this new complexity and to a) empower new or pre-existing institutions that play or played an important developmental role in the region and b) to ensure that there is a safety net under which households cannot and should not fall such that they become destitute and unable to lift themselves out of poverty and a future date.

This section is based on a review of available literature produced by a range of organisations and individuals. Relatively little detailed information exists on livelihood strategies post-2005 and that which is available focuses on a small number of case studies. Two, however, (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Young et al, 2005) are more comprehensive in their coverage and we draw extensively upon them. In spite of these important studies, a pressing need remains for an extensive field-based analysis as originally envisaged under this report.

Livelihood groups in Darfur have been categorised in various ways. The livelihood zones illustrated in Map 6 are based on the food economy zones defined by SC-UK using the Food Economy Approach, subsequently re-named the Household Economy Approach. A food economy zone is a geographic area in which households share similar strategies for producing food (based on climate, soil, rainfall and available livelihood assets) and use similar markets for trade, employment and food purchase.

SC-UK developed detailed profiles for each of the six food economy zones identified for North Darfur, describing food and income sources for the different wealth groups defined within each zone, together with seasonal calendars, the factors contributing towards vulnerability, hazards that increase the risk of food insecurity, and people's response strategies.

This zoning is necessarily broad and fails to capture the finely grained differences between strategies pursued by households of different income level, internal make-up and access to different asset types.

Young (2006: 7), who puts forward a more simplified categorisation, based on five rural livelihood strategies, in which there is less emphasis on the differences between zones rather than within zones, and a stronger argument for the similarities between strategies, rather than the differences. Again, an extensive livelihoods and food security survey would be required to explore further these two contending viewpoints. Our argument in this report is that in some ways the situation has already moved on and the fluidity of the relationships between urban and rural livelihoods is more important than exact zoning of earlier livelihood patterns in Darfur.

Categorising different livelihood groups is complicated further by the range of livelihood situations in which many households now find themselves following prolonged displacement from traditional areas. The situation households now find themselves in is more a determinant of their livelihood options (and hence strategies) than are earlier

Map 6. Greater Darfur Livelihood Zones



Adapted from FEWS Net 2011

agro-climatic or soil type factors. In many cases this situation also has both political and ethnic dimensions, particularly where formerly more mixed communities have now been separated along ethnic lines by conflict.

Young et al (various), Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006) and Jaspars and O'Callaghan (2008) incorporate both ethnic and political affiliations into their analysis of livelihood categories, particularly since these affiliations often determine how severely certain groups have been affected by the conflict and the nature of their current situation.

One of the most controversial and confusing terms internally displaced person (IDP) and has been questioned by Borton et al. (2005) and others. In relation to livelihood strategies, the problem of homogeneity of activities that is implied by the categorisation of IDPs can also be applied to other residence categories used for food security monitoring in Darfur. IDPs may in fact represent a range of former livelihood activities and is not synonymous with specific livelihood strategies.

In this analysis we use the categories **IDPs in camps**, **mixed (incorporating IDPs residing outside of camps)** and **resident communities**. In our overall analysis for the region as a whole we have observed a shift towards more diversified income sources for all three groups, as reported by the May 2011 World Food Programme's Food Security Monitoring System. Given the wrench from former areas of access to land and other resources, for many IDPs in camps, the only income-earning option is now selling their labour power. This remains the most important source of income across Darfur at over 40 percent, and reflects the reality of IDPs located in urban areas (or on the periphery) in many respects, but also a wider 'natural' (in the sense of trends existing across sub-Saharan Africa) process of urbanisation that has been accelerated by conflict.

IDPs outside camps continue to rely on relatively diverse income sources in comparison to the camp IDPs, in part through necessity and their relatively lower access to the services that camps provide via aid organisations. Their income sources also tend to differ more depending on the region, for example wage labour ranges from 10-39 percent.

Unfortunately, as with subsequent WFP-VAM Darfur Food Security Monitoring (DFSM) reports (2009-10), the presentation of results does not draw a distinction between urban and rural residence categories. The current DFSM system gathers data from sentinel sites and presents the analysis according to the following community types: IDP camps; mixed communities; resident communities; and refugee camps (for West Darfur only). Details for each sentinel site provide further information about 'livelihood zone'

(i.e. agro-pastoral, wadi, cattle agro-pastoral, etc), allowing a distinction between urban or rural settings in some cases. However, these additional details are not used for analytical purposes. We would suggest further refinements in future that allow for more nuanced analysis and, by extension, more finely-grained targeting of assistance, particularly as volumes of food aid dwindle over time.

Table 5. Main cash income sources in Darfur by residence status (percentage of households), 2008



Source: Humanitarian Aid Commission et al, 2009

Of particular complexity overall, however, is the all too easy-to-make distinction between simple urban and rural categories. What is a rural as opposed to an urban livelihood is not always clear-cut; there are self evidently very important and complicated linkages between the two sectors. This is partly due to the wider hinterlands around towns that IDP camps have generated (for the production and sale of natural capital assets such as wood fuel, charcoal, bricks, grasses, other fodder, etc.) and due to the livelihood strategies that IDPs follow.

In Sudan, urban areas are defined as 'localities of administrative and/or commercial importance or with population of 5,000 or more inhabitants' (United Nations Statistics Division, 2005). One observation in many reports and from consultations with key informants in Sudan is that there is frequently great interaction between urban and

rural areas with regular movement of household members between farming and urban-based livelihoods (e.g. casual wage labour).

For the purposes of this review, we have presented the literature on livelihood strategies according to the population groups as follows: camp IDPs in urban settings; non- camp IDPs in urban settings; urban residents; camp IDPs in rural or town settings; non- camp IDPs in rural or town settings; and rural residents. Although this categorisation does not incorporate livelihood groups or ethnic or political affiliations, it reflects current discourse and is relevant to programming approaches.

As will be seen in the summaries presented in the following sections for each state, whilst the livelihood strategies of some groups can be grouped together (e.g. poor urban residents and non-camp IDPs in urban settings), the livelihood strategies of other groups need to be further disaggregated (e.g. herders and sedentary farmers among the rural residents). By disaggregating data by population group, we can identify different patterns in the three states.

North Darfur

Changes in livelihood strategies

In general this is the most climatically vulnerable part of Darfur and pre-conflict had the lowest levels of agricultural production. The region is low-rainfall and many of the goz soils are only marginally productive. Erratic rainfall during the rainy season can make cultivation a risk-prone strategy. Given the drier agro-ecology of the region, customarily there was a greater emphasis on livestock-keeping in the make-up of livelihoods in North Darfur.

The livelihoods of **camp IDPs in urban settings** have been described by Adam (2007) for the three IDP camps outside El Fasher - Abu Shouk, Al Salam and Zamzam. Livelihood strategies are highly seasonal and differ according to wealth categories: the poorest households rely on sale of casual labour (construction work and brick-making in the main) and may also sell their food rations. Middle income and better-off households depend on salaried labour within El Fasher, petty trade and some agricultural production.

Changes in livelihood strategies after 2005 when the security situation improved were based on greater access to agriculture in rural areas. However, this was dependent on area of origin (and access to land), which in turn determined how badly they had been affected by the conflict. Access to credit or loans for input purchase was also affected by

the presence or not of relatives or connections in El Fasher town. Of key importance was proximity and access to their (original) home areas – both to secure their property and to allow for cultivation whilst based in the camps.

Figure 3. Main cash income sources in North Darfur by residence status (proportion of contribution of each income stream), 2011



Source: WFP, Food Security Monitoring System - Round 11 (November 2011)

The latest data from WFP suggests that wage labour and salaries remains the most important income source, for IDP, mixed or resident communities. IDP households are the most reliant on wage labour (56 percent of household income), showing their susceptibility to income shocks given that wage labour opportunities vary seasonally and also in relation to security conditions. Residents and mixed communities display more diverse income generation patterns. In IDP camps, agriculture related activities (crops, livestock and firewood), though more seasonal in nature, represent about 10 percent of total incomes while among resident communities they still represent 35 percent of the income. Business accounts for a bigger share of the income in mixed communities than either in IDPs and among residents. The implications are important for future programming which focuses on transitions from emergencies to development-oriented programmes. These are spelt out below.

Non-camp IDPs in urban settings may fair better than those in the camps. They tend to have higher levels of education and a wider range of employment opportunities. This is particularly the case in a large urban centre such as El Fasher, where people may work as civil servants, trading agents (especially in *tombac*), and security guards or drivers for humanitarian agencies (hence the vulnerabilities associated with the changing nature of aid presence in such centres). Following the expulsion of NGOs in March 2009, some employment opportunities were lost. Many are also involved in casual labour (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006).

Remittances are also important, but are much less predictable than pre-conflict (ibid.); and have probably fallen further since many Sudanese were forced from Libya during the recent conflict.

In Kebkabiya, as a result of becoming IDPs there has been a shift from more traditional agriculture-based livelihoods to diversified urban-based livelihoods (Young et al., 2009a), again reflecting the necessities wrought by relocation and the wider growth in urban centres. More than 43 percent engaged in casual daily labour (mostly brick-making and domestic work) in 2007, and the relative importance of remittances had increased: in 2007, 25 percent of IDP households reported receiving remittances (Young et al., 2009a). For such populations, there inherently piecemeal and uncertain nature of the wage-labour economy does not provide long-term security and so programming to support skills development, micro-credit for investment in alternative livelihoods and vocation education (in particular) will be of major importance for future livelihoods.

Although the number of IDPs involved in petty trade had initially increased (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006), by 2009 trading opportunities had become constrained by banditry and increased insecurity along the El Fasher–Kebkabiya road related to the fragmentation of the SLA and Arab militia (Jaspars et al., 2010). Petty trading remains an important (and flexible) occupation for many, but runs just the inherent risks involved in insecurity along transport corridors, but also the vagaries of regulation and taxation by local government. Improving the environment for petty trade through stronger regulation in support of traders (e.g. trade association and support mechanisms) could be critical in changing the human security situation of the most vulnerable.

By 2009, some IDPs in Kebkabiya had made arrangements with people occupying their land either to share the harvest or to farm part of their original holding (Jaspars, 2009). The drought of 2009, however, affected agricultural production and also reduced opportunities for brick-making due to the shortage of water (Jaspars et al., 2010). In addition, the NGO expulsions of March 2009 reduced income from INGO salaries and incentives, as well as income from specific interventions (ibid.). These three elements highlight the critical importance of institutional strengthening for future livelihood security. The first highlights how new informal institutional arrangements (new norms and rules between populations sharing assets) can provide important routes out of potentially conflict-laden situation (and avoidance of future conflict), while the second shows how robust institutions are important in water management to increase access to this key resource in drought years. The third example highlights how the aid environment remains institutionally fragile and how the government-agency interface can be improved further, in particular by sharper focus on engaging with and

strengthening local government capacities as part of programme design and implementation.

The livelihoods of the **urban residents** of El Fasher have been affected by changes in markets and trading and the presence of IDPs. There are more livelihood opportunities for petty trade and activities associated with the construction industry, though some traders and workers associated with the livestock, *tombac* and cereal markets have gone out of business or shifted to other commodities. Poor urban residents who are net purchasers of grains and livestock products have been affected by higher commodity prices, particularly during the lean season. The lack of processing facilities (and support for off-season farming) for perishable commodities such as tomatoes resulted in very high seasonal price differences. The price of tomatoes in El Fasher market increased more than 800 percent over an eight-month period, from SDG17 per 20kg box in January to SDG160 per box in August (DDRA, 2011). The rapid expansion of aid service industries since 2004 resulted in new employment and work opportunities for urban residents. In 2008, it was estimated that the humanitarian industry accounted for two-thirds of El Fasher's economy, creating demand for housing and other goods, driving up prices of some commodities and creating an additional 3,000 jobs for locals.[30] However, the impact of the humanitarian industry will have declined since the aid agency expulsions of March 2009, though it is still likely to be substantial. The presence of IDPs (and the associated aid machinery) has both negative and positive impacts: house rents have gone up; daily expenditure has increased for those residents hosting IDPs; some services, especially health care, have increased; and there is a plentiful supply of cheap labour (Adam, 2007). This is a picture of dependence, but also opportunity. The capabilities and skills of the aid community can be part of long-term structural transformation of the same amongst local institutions. Part of the wider transition from emergency to development situations needs to involve stronger transfer of skills to local government and other non-governmental, associational institutions (e.g. farmers' unions, association focusing on environmental management, water resources supplies and development, petty trading, and similar). This is particularly so in these 'normal' urban environments on which – in future – so much development will rest, particularly in terms of future employment.

Livelihood opportunities for **camp IDPs in rural/town settings** depend very much on security and mobility as well. This is illustrated by the case of Kassap IDP camp, just outside the government-controlled town of Kutum. In 2006, security was fragile due to

[30] 'Town thrives thanks to crisis in Darfur'. *Los Angeles Times*. April 30, 2008.

the proximity of SLM/A territory to the northeast and large concentrations of Arab militias to the south and west of the town (IRIN, 2006). Access to Kutum market by Kassap IDPs was controlled by the military, and IDPs had to purchase a one-day permit to go to the market and were only allowed to buy a limited quota of goods.[31] Despite this, petty trading became an important new source of income in Kassap camp, where – in contrast to other camps – prices tended to be higher than in town (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006). However, market data from 2011 showed that cereal prices were 17 to 18 percent higher in Kutum town, partly because the Kassab camp market functioned as a *de facto* tax haven, and because pastoralist groups – key purchasers of cereals – did not have access to the camp market (DDRA, 2011)**.** The other main source of income for the displaced population is firewood and grass collection, which became possible after the AU began regular firewood patrols (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006).

An example of **non-camp IDPs in a rural setting** is provided by the predominantly Fur village of Gara Farajawiya, located to the west of Kebkabiya town in a GoS held area which is tightly controlled by Arab groups. Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006) describe how any livelihood activities carried out by both Fur residents and IDPs require payment for protection to Arab groups, but despite these protection payments the significance of agriculture, livestock, trade and remittances has declined (implying that protection itself is an onerous tax and income received from these activities). Even firewood collection is no longer possible because it is controlled by Arab groups from whom they have to buy firewood. IDPs are now dependent on more precarious livelihood activities including agricultural labour provision and petty trade. Food aid provision was considered very irregular and thus not a major livelihood source. For both residents and IDPs, brick-making has also become a significant source of income, accounting for approximately one-third of livelihood sources. In many parts of Greater Darfur the population-led construction boom continues to push demand for construction materials including wood, which precipitates further reduction in forest cover to fuel brick kilns. The strong interconnections between prevailing security, relationships between groups (and with local government institutions) and critical access to different resources and markets for livelihoods entails a continued focus on detailed, local-level negotiations that can help to achieve 'win-wins' in support of livelihoods, increased income and greater peace-building at a local level.

The 2006 WFP livelihoods study (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006) gathered information from various different groups of **rural residents** in North Darfur, as summarised in Box 1, with additional information provided by Young et al. (2009b) for

[31] 'Tensions still high in Darfur's Kutum town.' *Sudan Tribune*. February 20, 2006.

Box 1. Changes in livelihood strategies of rural residents in North Darfur

***Rural populations in GoS held areas*.** This group, who are mainly Fur, still lived in or near their own land, but their movement was extremely restricted. The sample included mainly Fur residents in Seraf Omra and in villages in Kebkabiya AU. Livestock and irrigation pumps had been looted, and access to land, markets and natural resources such as grass and firewood was severely restricted. Their ability to work on their own farms was also very constrained and usually involved substantial payments to the Janjaweed or to neighbouring Arab groups. In short, many livelihood activities were subject to the payment of protection fees.

***Pastoralists in SLA held areas*.** One of the greatest constraints for this group was restricted access outside SLA-held territory, in particular to markets in GoS-held towns. Limited movement outside SLA held areas also affected livestock migration. The sample included Orchii and Umm Haraz villages in Dar Zaghawa, and Malha in Dar Meidob. Pastoralists were unable to sell livestock and purchase grain, which was their main way of making a living before the conflict. The situation has improved slightly over the past year because of the start of general food distribution and some farming opportunities, coinciding with a good agricultural season. Petty traders and casual labourers increased in Malha, but income had fallen because of the number of people seeking this work.

***Rural farmers in SLA held areas*.** This group was also affected by restricted access to GoS held territory and towns. These restrictions limited their access to a range of livelihood sources including employment and seasonal wage labour (e.g. Saiyah), markets to sell forest products (in Jambolee and Saiyah) and cash crops (Dar Es Salaam and Shengel Tobai). Further, the concentration of livestock around Dar Es Salaam and Saiyah had strained access to water and pasture.

Arab nomads. The Northern Rizaygat are a group of Arabic-speaking, camel-herding nomads living in all three states of Darfur, many of whom have fought among the *Janjaweed*. Their livelihoods have transformed considerably since 2003; in the case of a group of Northern Rizaygat near Kutum, North Darfur, the importance of livestock and trade declined and military salaries increased (Young et al, 2009a). The traditional goals of seeking status and power through camels and camel herding were being replaced with a desire to seek power associated with militarisation and education.

Sources: Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006) and Young et al. (2009b)

the Northern Rizaygat. The key issue affecting rural livelihoods at that time was restricted mobility between SLA and GoS territories, and restricted access to markets,

farms, livestock migration routes, and natural resources such as firewood. Conflict and political events in Libya and Egypt in 2011 also impeded the regional livestock trade, particularly for camels. In the first months of 2011, livestock prices in Tawila and Kutum were 50 and 70 percent higher than neighbouring markets due to shifting and longer trade routes as a direct consequence of the regional conflict dynamics (DDRA, 2011). However, during this time there were very low livestock prices in Malha. Although camel exports to Egypt began to recover later in 2011, some traders had switched to local marketing of sheep and goats because of the suspended trade with Libya (ibid.). In August, cattle prices rose over 50 percent in El Fasher, due to the collapse in the cattle trade between Nyala and El Fasher. This shift in price was caused by government policy that prohibited the sale of meat from Nyala to El Fasher and instead promoted meat exports to the Middle East (ibid.).

Movement and mobility of different types is important to all of these livelihoods. Yet as shown by some of the examples presented above, continuing insecurity impedes the movement of people, livestock and goods. In 2011, transport costs between markets in North Darfur, Seraf Omra a major area of agricultural production and El Fasher a major area of consumption, represented a large and increasing proportion of market prices. In the first six months of 2011 the periodic closure of the El Fasher-Nyala road, sometimes for days at a time, affected the flow of trade between these two state capitals, and the movement of passengers (DDRA, 2011). Ensuring the security and mobility of key livelihood activities should become an integral part of future development planning around the protection and management of development corridors between small and large urban settlements.

Changes in food security

Based on data available from the WFP Food Security Monitoring System, levels of food insecurity increased between November 2009 and November 2011, particularly amongst IDP households. Five percent of IDP households were severely food insecure in November 2009 compared to 30 percent who were severely food insecure in November 2011. A further 30 percent were considered to be moderately food insecure (see Figure 4). The more telling story is the dramatic decrease in the number of food secure camp IDP households, which fell from 70 percent in November 2010 to 36 percent in November 2011. Households in mixed and resident communities have also experienced a decrease in numbers of food secure households (79 percent to 56 percent and 78 percent to 47 percent respectively), but this decrease has not been as dramatic as in IDP

camps. These trends are underwritten by a significant decrease in purchasing power amongst households in IDP camps, 79 percent of whom could afford at least one MHFB

(minimum healthy food basket) at the start of the harvest season in 2010. However, in 2011 only 33 percent could afford this minimum food basket (WFP, 2011). Given that most households in camps, as well as in mixed and resident communities allocate more than half of their total monthly expenditure on food (65 percent, 54 percent and 57 percent of total expenditure respectively), MHFB price volatility can have a drastic impact on purchasing power and consumption behaviour. Increases in prices of firewood and charcoal, and their controlled/limited availability have also adversely impacted disposable income (SAFE, 2009).

Figure 4. Food security by community type in North Darfur (2009-11)



Source: WFP-VAM: DFSM (North Darfur) Round 9-11 (November 2011)

Twenty percent of camp IDP households had a poor Food Consumption Score (FCS) and a further 20 percent were borderline in 2011. Mixed and resident communities have relatively better FCS, with 11 percent and 13 percent respectively of households scored as poor. However, crude mortality and under-5 mortality rates, particularly for IDPs, have both been drastically reduced in North Darfur over the last decade, as detailed below. Furthermore, current MUAC measurements of children in North Darfur reveals only 1 percent are severely malnourished and an additional 6 percent are moderately malnourished. This is an improvement of a few percentage points from measurements taken in 2011. These figures need to be understood in conjunction with the widespread prevalence of food aid, which is provided in camps, and sporadically/seasonally provided outside camps. In November 2011, over 90 percent of IDP camp households receive some form of food aid, while over 70 percent of mixed community households received food aid in the latter half of 2011. By November 2011 however, only 6 percent

of resident households reported receiving food aid. Female-headed households are particularly food insecure and are also less likely to have family members of working age to contribute to household income. This is most evident in IDP camps where only one in five food secure household is female-headed (compared with five out of ten food secure households in mixed communities).

In general, worsening food security indicators in North Darfur relate to reductions in available income sources, as well as to upward trends in market prices and increased insecurity along trade routes. In short people appeared to have less income with which to buy increasingly expensive food staples. Cereal, cash crop and livestock production and movements are also affected by insecurity. A number of trade routes have shifted during the conflict years to avoid insecurity – often less direct – which has entailed higher transportation costs as well as the possibility of new sources of conflict as livestock routes are reconfigured in both direction and timing of movements. Transport costs have been one cause of large price differentials between markets and are an indicator of how insecurity has affected the flow of commodities. The trend of increased prices has been exacerbated by the overall increase in food prices in Sudan and inadequate rainfall in recent years. The resulting increase in food insecurity remains a major concern and highlights the need for more livelihoods diversification, backed up by institutional capacity to support different livelihoods 'niches'. Support to the small niches occupied by different types of poor households will be critical to ensuring coping capacity and to reduce a possible slide into destitution in future.

Overall this is a very worrying picture for North Darfur as a whole, reflecting the overall fragility of the food economy and the urgent need to tie livelihoods support to food market stability, increased access to land and production capacity and stronger targeting of food aid disbursement.

Changes and trends in malnutrition[32]

The populations of North Darfur remain highly vulnerable to malnutrition. According to data presented in Figure 5 and under IPC (2008) classification[33], the communities of North Darfur, whether living in IDP camps, resident or mixed communities, have experienced levels of GAM characteristic of a humanitarian emergency since 2000.

[32] Assessment of malnutrition trends in North, West and South Darfur presented in this report is based on an analysis of findings from 229 surveys that are available in the Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT). The primary analysis was undertaken by Chiara Altare, Debarati Guha-Sapir and Pandora Kodrou at CRED. The surveys in CE-DAT were carried out by UN agencies, NGOs as well as the Sudanese Ministry of Health.

[33] IPC Global Partners (2008). Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Technical Manual. Version 1.1. FAO. Rome, http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/i0275e/i0275e.pdf

Further, there were limitations on the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout 2010 due to insecurity in some areas as well as a lack of access permits. These difficulties led to disruptions in general food distribution as well as in the provision of health services. Besides seasonal food distribution, there was no other humanitarian assistance in some areas at all. Although since 2004 North Darfur has been less affected by intense fighting than other parts of the region, levels of malnutrition have fallen only in IDP camps. In both resident and mixed communities, levels of GAM increased up to 2010 and then fell even though there was an increase in the incidence of fighting in some areas, as explained further below.

Figure 5. Trends in GAM and SAM in North Darfur, 2000-2011



Source: CE-DAT

Levels of global acute malnutrition (GAM) for **resident populations** in North Darfur increased in 2003 but have showed a downward trend since 2009, although remaining above 20 percent with seasonal peaks during the hunger gap. Resident populations may be worse off, particularly if they have poorer access to health services and humanitarian assistance than people in camps. This is especially true in remote areas such as Al Mahla and Umm Keddada, where around one in three children are classified as wasted. The trend in severe acute malnutrition (SAM) confirms the critical situation: SAM has been very high for the entire decade and does not seem to have been affected by the increased humanitarian presence after the conflict.

Surveys from rural and more remote localities portray a critical situation: humanitarian assistance in all these areas is restricted to general food distributions in the lean season or nothing at all. However, whereas levels of GAM reported in rural areas is similar to levels reported in IDP camps, levels of SAM are higher in some rural areas compared to camps, including Ummkeddada, Sereif, and Shangil Tobay. Measles coverage was high in all areas. As severely malnourished children are nine times more likely to die, therapeutic programmes should be initiated urgently.

IDPs in camps in North Darfur have experienced similar patterns in both GAM and SAM: initially both increasing between 2000 and 2005, and then decreasing until 2007, when they stabilised. After 2009, GAM and SAM have increased again and have recently reached very high values (GAM above 25 percent and SAM above 2 percent). The initial increase can be explained by outbreak of hostilities that caused wide displacement and limited access to health care. The situation of displaced populations improved once they reached the camps. Since 2009, nutrition security has worsened again, which might be attributed to the reduced presence of NGOs after the expulsions and continued poor access to sources of income and livelihoods for the displaced population. The poor food security situation will have contributed substantially to overall low levels of nutrition, but may well have been exacerbated by factors including low access to basic health care and clean water supply and adequate sanitation.

GAM remained above 20 percent in almost all surveyed localities. High rates of malnutrition have characterised both IDP populations in camps and mixed communities outside camps. The highest rates of GAM were registered in the new Zamzam camp (27 percent in June 2011, at the beginning of the lean season). Moreover, levels of GAM have been stubbornly high in Zamzam since 2009. Levels of SAM also increased since 2009. Coupled with various aggravating factors this could lead to increased mortality. For example, vaccination coverage is still below 80 percent and there is very high morbidity prevalence. High levels of GAM and SAM are reported in other IDP camps (Abu shock, Al Salaam and around Tawila) although mortality levels are low and the coverage of measles vaccination is satisfactory.

Looking at individual camps, since 2004 GAM decreased in Fata Borna and Kassab camps. Levels of; SAM also decreased until 2007 before increasing again and reaching 1.6 percent in 2010. Levels of GAM and SAM (25 and 1.6 percent, respectively) have declined in Abu Shock and As Saalam camps but remain high. Levels of malnutrition are worryingly high in Zamzam camps, both old and new, where levels of GAM have

increased since their opening.[34] A recent survey amongst new arrivals in Zamzam reports extremely high values (GAM above 30 percent and SAM at 3.9 percent). There was a new influx of internally displaced people in 2011 as populations from Dar el Salam and Kebkabiya fled an increase in fighting. Their very precarious conditions may reinforce the assumption that the situation in rural and remote areas (from where little or no data is available) is extremely serious.

Morbidity has been higher in IDP camps, confirming that overcrowding can have dangerous effects on the health status of the population. In these settings, vaccination coverage is of paramount importance in order to prevent outbreaks. Four out of the six IDP camps in North Darfur reach the 80 percent measles vaccination coverage recommended by WHO. In the other two camps (New Zamzam and Tawila camps) coverage is as low as 54 percent and 75 percent respectively. These rates are worrying not only because large population concentrations and overcrowding facilitate faster disease transmission and leave little time for reaction, but also because a high proportion of children are malnourished and therefore at increased risk of disease. A large proportion of the population is therefore at risk, although theoretically reachable for mass vaccination campaigns.

Like resident communities, **mixed populations** being outside of camps are less likely to benefit from humanitarian assistance and protection. In particular, the IDPs joining a new community are completely detached and lack networks of support. However, it is not easy to clearly define the situation. Over the years, camps may provide some economic benefits to the entire local community through small employment and market opportunities. Also, exposure to diseases can be less serious than among IDPs, as population density is lower. GAM has increased since 2002; only recently has an improvement been recorded (however it remains at a high level). SAM remained stable until 2008 when it increased until 2010 when there was a small improvement.

There is scarce information available on water and sanitation. Yet, even with little information available, differences between rural and urban settings are evident. For example, 71 percent of respondents use pit latrines in El Fasher, compared with only 0.8 percent in Al Malha. Hand washing after defecation is almost universal in Zamzam old (though this is a figure to take with caution), but can go down to 44 percent in Kebkabiya. More than 80 percent of the population in Kutum and more than 90 percent

[34] Several NGOs working in Zamzam camps were not expelled in 2009 – only MSF was. Relief International, Plan, Saudi Red Crescent, Sudanese Red Crescent, and the Spanish Red Cross continued to operate. Yet the situation in Zamzam camps did not improve.

in Umshalaya have access to protected water, though the quantities they can and are using per capita may be very low. Only one survey from Kutum reports water quantity and depicts a deteriorating situation in which 63 percent of the population has less than 10 litres per person per day (in 2010 it was 48 percent). Nineteen percent had between 10 and 15 litres per person per day. It may well be that changes in water availability and affordability have critical multiplier effects on morbidity and nutritional status, precipitating increases in water-washed diseases and intestinal infections. Given the rapid decline in the water table in many of these camp areas not only will costs of water increase (and may be increasingly borne by households rather than agencies), but water quality is likely to deteriorate further.

West Darfur

Changes in livelihood strategies

West Darfur is dominated by the Jebel Marra massif and its very specific agro-climatic zones. It has also been the focus for intense conflict and remains highly insecure.

IDPs in the camps around the urban centres of Geneina, Garsila and Zalingei have had to shift from agricultural-based livelihoods to more diversified urban livelihoods based on less secure sources of food and income. This has had an adverse impact on an already fragile natural resource base. The main livelihood sources in 2006 included food aid, brick-making, firewood collection, charcoal production and some petty trade (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006). The relative importance of each of these sources differed across locations. For example, brick-making and other forms of casual labour in the construction industry are some of the main labour opportunities available in Geneina, which has experienced a construction boom at the outset of the conflict (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006). However, a relatively small proportion of IDPs around Zalingei engaged in casual daily labour because they are largely confined to camps (Young et al., 2009b). Firewood collection remains hazardous for most IDP groups, and in Garsilla and Zalingei firewood collection is controlled by Arab nomads. Access to land is limited for all urban IDPs because of insecurity and the distances involved.

The livelihood opportunities available to both **non-camp urban IDPs and urban residents** are broadly similar in Geneina, where construction has led to an increase in demand for casual labour. This forms a key source of income (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006). It was also reported that many households had a family member working for an international agency which – prior to the aid agency expulsion in 2009 -

represented a significant cash injection into the town's economy (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006). The importance of agricultural production has fallen because many Geneina residents are not able to access their productive wadi farms due to insecurity. The contribution of trade as a source of income for resident households has also drastically declined or stopped completely, though the number of timber traders has greatly expanded with the construction boom (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008), adding to the already adverse environmental impacts of fuelwood collection.

Whilst the rural town of Nyertete in the foothills of the Jebel Mara might be considered urban in terms of overall population numbers a pre-crisis population of 10,000), the livelihood strategies of the IDPs appear to be largely based on rural activities with few opportunities for daily labour. Many of the **IDPs in camps near Nyertete** rely on humanitarian assistance as the main source of food and income, but the new arrivals are excluded from humanitarian assistance, despite repeated efforts to update the registration lists (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008). Other livelihoods strategies include agricultural activities, brick-making, firewood, grass and wild food collection and petty labouring. Opportunities for petty labouring in Nyertete were much less evident than in Zalingei (ibid.). Lack of access to humanitarian assistance was a key determinant of the level of engagement in more risky or less productive strategies, with new arrivals reporting daily firewood collection for income. New arrivals were also more dependent on the collection and sale of wild fruits, which was not mentioned by other groups as a source of food or income (ibid.).

For **non-camp IDPs in rural settings** the cases of IDPs in Habila and Mornei are important, based on data provided by Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006). These authors regard these centres as urban, but the WFP-VAM Food Security Monitoring system classifies them as rural in their profile of sentinel sites (WFP-VAM, 2010). The surrounding countryside is controlled by Arab nomads and militia who exert varying degrees of influence by imposing taxes to control trade activities and demanding protection fees to travel outside of town. In both locations the main change in livelihood sources for IDPs has been the increased opportunity for charcoal production which is sold to traders from Geneina and Nyala travelling with Janjaweed escorts.

The importance of petty trade (mostly the sale of mangoes, citrus and other fruits or vegetables grown in the Jebel Marra agro-climatic zone) has declined over time but still ranks among the top three income sources. In Mornei, employment by NGOs was an important source of income in 2006, as was the sale of food aid, particularly in Habila. The relative importance of food aid varied because ration sizes differed between beneficiaries in different locations. Some IDPs receive remittances which increased in

Mornei with the installation of telephone lines. IDPs in Mornei have also been able to do farm work on wadi farms close to town; and some people went back to cultivate in their home villages, returning to Mornei for food distributions.

The vast majority of the settled rural population in the southern agro-pastoral and West Jebel Marra lowlands was displaced, and many of the abandoned rural villages have since been occupied by nomadic pastoralists (from both West and North Darfur) whose livestock migration routes have been restricted by the conflict (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Olsson, 2010). In describing the livelihoods of **rural residents**, among the occupying pastoralists, the importance of livestock trade as a source of livelihood has declined, and the importance of cultivation has increased. They now have to cultivate because they can no longer purchase cereals (since most farmers have been displaced). In addition to agriculture, some have benefitted from increased incomes as a result of the taxes and protection payments charged to other (particularly Fur) villagers.

The farmers that were not displaced from their rural villages still rely on agriculture as their main source of livelihood, but this is now mostly limited to subsistence: safely accessible land has decreased by two-thirds; production has declined; and most households have lost much of their livestock due to looting (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008; Aklilu and Catley, 2010). Some resident farmers have taken up agricultural labouring on irrigated farms. Other income earning opportunities include brick-making, firewood collection, and charcoal making, but the demand for bricks in rural areas is low, and firewood collection (where it is not controlled by Arab groups) exposes women to severe risks (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006). Restricted movement, particularly for the Fur, remains the main livelihood constraint in the GoS controlled areas. In some areas protection payments are made by the villagers to local Arab militia and the amount paid may form a significant proportion of people's income (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006).

Changes in food security

Figure 6 shows a marked deterioration in food security since November 2010 for IDP, mixed and resident communities in November 2011. Amongst IDP populations, the percentage considered to be food secure decreased from 63 percent in November 2010 to 33 percent in November 2011 whereas those considered to be moderately food insecure increased from 24 percent to 36 percent and those who were severely food insecure jumped to 36 percent from 13 percent. This deterioration in food security is mirrored in data for mixed and resident communities. Amongst mixed communities,

those considered to be food secure dropped sharply from 68 percent in November 2010 to 27 percent in November 2011, while those who were moderately food insecure increased from 25 percent to 38 percent and those who were severely food insecure leaped from 7 percent to 35 percent. Amongst resident populations, those considered to be moderately food insecure increased from 9 percent in November 2010 to 35 percent in November 2011 whereas those who were severely food insecure increased from 3 percent to 11 percent in this period (WFP, 2011).

Figure 6. Food security by community type in West Darfur, 2009-2011



Source: WFP-VAM: Darfur Food Security Monitoring (West Darfur) Round 9-11 (November 2011)

Further, similar to other parts of the region, food security was gendered. In West Darfur, 38 percent of female headed households were severely food insecure in November 2011 compared to 27 percent of male headed households.

The overall food consumption has deteriorated for all population groups. A considerable proportion of households in all population groups have experienced a shift from the acceptable food consumption category, to borderline and poor food consumption categories. Amongst IDP populations, the percentage with a borderline food consumption score increased from 34 in November 2010 to 41 percent in November 2011, while those with a poor food consumption score increased slightly from 5 percent to 8 percent. Both mixed and resident communities show a sharper increase in the proportion of hte population with a borderline food consumption score in this period. For mixed populations, the percentage with a borderline score increased from 30 percent to 51 percent between November 2010 and 2011, while the number increased from 10 percent to 25 percent for resident populations (WFP, 2011). Further, in 16 of 22

locations (representing 73 percent of surveyed areas), the income per person per day was lower than the cost of the MHFB in November 2011 (ibid).

This trend of deteriorating food insecurity between November 2010 and November 2011 reversed improvement in food security for all community types between November 2009 and November 2010, coinciding with favourable rains. According to WFP analysis, declining food security in 2011 was mainly the result of limited income sources, inadequate food consumption and high market prices for essential food items in the MHFB (WFP, 2011). The majority of the locations where resident communities are settled received poor rainfall in the growing season, resulting in a poor harvest and higher market prices in 2011. The poor harvest also meant there were scarce work opportunities on farms. The limited work opportunities constrained households' purchasing power at a time when commodity prices were rising sharply. Monitoring data shows that on average 72 percent of household expenditures were on food items in November 2011, an increase of 20 percent compared to November 2010 (ibid.).

Decreased food assistance also contributed to an increase in severe food insecurity for mixed communities. The significant decrease in food assistance could be attributed to the applied targeting strategy, and also to changes in seasonal support which normally runs from June to October every year in mixed and resident community locations. In order to implement the caseload verification exercise in El Geneina and the food vouchers program, food aid distribution schedules were adjusted.

Figure 7. Main cash income sources in West Darfur by residence status (proportion of contribution of each income stream), 2011



Source: WFP, Food Security Monitoring System - Round 11 (November 2011)

Wage labour and salaries accounted in November 2011 for just under and more than 50 percent (respectively) of income earned by the population, amongst IDPs and mixed communities (WFP did not provide data on resident communities). This is similar to Northern Darfur. In western IDP camps and mixed communities, however, agriculture

related activities (crops, livestock and firewood) represent slightly more than in the North. Business is the second most important source of income both in IDP and mixed communities, more so in the latter case.

Changes and trends in malnutrition

Overall, malnutrition levels are high in West Darfur although the situation is less serious than in North Darfur. The majority of the sites recorded GAM levels between 8 and 14 percent with low mortality rates. Amongst **IDP populations in camps**, levels of GAM decreased sharply until 2007 and then began to increase. Trends in SAM followed a similar pattern, but increased in 2009 though at a slower pace. IDPs at the Mornei camp experienced a significant decrease in SAM; this improvement was less evident for GAM which remains high during the hunger season and is not statistically different from 2004 levels. Only two surveys are available in CE-DAT from the Zalingei camp (conducted in April 2004 and September 2010). These show a deteriorating situation in which GAM has now reached almost 30 percent (the results from the two surveys are however not statistically different). SAM has remained above 4 percent.

The two different trends in GAM and SAM among IDP populations indicate that moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) is increasing in the West, suggesting the need for interventions such as increased rations, preventive and curative health and nutrition services, and behavioural change, as well as for increased coverage of supplementary feeding programmes in order to prevent these children from slipping into severe malnutrition.

While a high-level of malnutrition among children indicates that additional measures are needed to improve the access, availability, stability and diversity of food sources amongst the entire population, as children run a greater risk of dying because of malnutrition than adults, specific measures to reduce GAM amongst children are also needed. **Mixed populations** have reported rather stable GAM values between 10 and 15 percent, although levels of GAM increased since 2010.[35] SAM, on the contrary, registered a steeper decrease between 2004 and 2005; since then they have remained stable (under 2 percent), as shown in Figure 8.

Reductions in the prevalence of GAM and SAM in IDP camps and mixed communities in West Darfur in 2004 were due to a reduction in armed violence. Still, levels of GAM

[35] It was not possible to report trends for resident communities in West Darfur as there were only two surveys in CE-DAT covering this community type in the region.

amongst mixed communities in West Darfur remained at acute food and livelihood crisis levels, as they did amongst IDP populations in camps for most years. In contrast to North Darfur, malnutrition levels were higher in IDP camps compared to other community types. Malnutrition levels in IDP camps were highest during the period of the most intense fighting. Recent increases in malnutrition levels in IDP camps predate the spike in fighting seen in some areas in 2010.

Figure 8. Trends in GAM and SAM in West Darfur, 2004-2011



Source: CE-DAT

Although the situation in West Darfur is better than in North Darfur, pockets of concern remain. The first two are the rural areas of Kulbus and Silea (19.7 percent GAM) and Zalingei camp (29 percent GAM). Kulbus and Silea present a critical situation, with high GAM and relatively low SAM, together with very low measles vaccination coverage (58 percent). On the other hand, these areas have low mortality rates. A possible explanation for the low mortality rate refers to the good coverage of outpatient therapeutic programs (OTP) (60 percent), where improved community outreach seems to be paying dividends. In addition, 85 percent of the population has access to safe water, while only 60 percent of the population use closed sanitary latrines.

The Zalingei IDP camp has also experienced a very high level of acute malnutrition since opening in 2004. Currently more than 150,000 people live in the three camps. Despite

the high level of SAM (4.7 percent) and high level of morbidity (40 percent of children were reported as ill during the two weeks before the survey), mortality rates have remained well below emergency threshold (CMR 0.43/10,000/day and U5MR 0.55/10,000/day). This situation requires attention as several aggravating factors can easily increase mortality rates: access to food remains precarious as food prices are high and supplementary feeding centres (SFC) have experienced recurrent food shortages. In addition, coverage of both supplementary feeding programmes (SFP) and therapeutic feeding programmes (TFP) is reportedly very low, reducing the possibility of preventing moderately malnourished children from becoming severely malnourished (requiring SFP) and to treat severely malnourished children (requiring TFP).

Finally, measles vaccination coverage was reported at 87.9 percent. Although high, this coverage still does not ensure herd immunity[36] in a camp setting. Most surveys do not provide the confidence interval for a measles coverage estimate. However, as only 65.6 percent of the children could confirm their measles vaccination with a card, it is likely that the reported coverage does not ensure herd immunity.

The situation in the Umshalaya refugee camp remains of concern especially with regard to low measles vaccination coverage. Although it has increased since 2007, it remains too low for a camp setting (67 percent). GAM has remained stable over the past four years, whereas SAM has increased. OTPs should be strengthened to counter high levels of child morbidity. The Mornei camps reported typical seasonal values of GAM and SAM; mortality rates remained low, although coverage of measles vaccination is a concern (reported to be below 80 percent).

The situation in El Geneina and the surrounding camp has been somewhat stable since 2008, with GAM increasing during the lean period to above 10 percent. Seasonality in morbidity seems to be stronger as well, with a 66 percent increase in cases during the winter. Diarrhoea, fever and acute respiratory infections are the predominant causes of illness among children under five years. This increase in morbidity may explain the higher mortality rates reported in February as opposed to August 2010 (though they are still below emergency levels). A satisfactory utilisation of health facilities was reported: 65 percent and 78 percent of the ill children were taken to the health facilities in February and August, respectively. In addition, water and sanitation conditions were

[36] The medical term 'herd immunity' refers to the protection of a population from disease transmission by the presence of a large number of immune individuals. In effect they provide a buffer across which disease transmission is difficult.

acceptable, with 85 percent of the population accessing safe water and more than 80 percent using toilet facilities.

The situation amongst **mixed communities in rural areas** is of concern. In Habila and Wadi Salih locality, high SAM was reported in December 2010. Several aggravating factors could exacerbate the already critical under five mortality rate registered in the last 2010 quarter (1.8/10,000/day): morbidity was reported to be very high (50 percent of the children), utilisation of health facilities was low (only half of the sick children were taken to a health facility), and water and sanitation conditions were poor with only a third of the population having access to safe water and 60 percent using covered latrines. Measles vaccination was also very low (at 55 percent), adding a further threat to child health and survival. A similar picture emerged in Krenik locality, whose values are of comparable magnitude.

Water and sanitation conditions vary across the state, and sanitation practices are rudimentary. Some 40 percent of the population does not use closed pit latrines in Kulbus and Selea and in the refugee camp at Umshalaya, where high population density and overcrowding facilitate disease transmission. In these same areas, measles vaccination coverage is very low (58 percent and 67 percent respectively), presenting an additional threat to public health. Around 80 percent of the population in El Geneina (town and camps), Mornei, Rongtaz, Selea and Kulbus have access to safe water. One survey from El Geneina reported the average quantity of water at around 16.7 litres per person per day, which is just above the SPHERE standards.[37]

Infant and young child care practices are still poor, although specific interventions are being provided to improve exclusive breastfeeding until six months (which is still practiced by only one third of the women); early initiation of breastfeeding is currently between 50 and 70 percent. Areas of concern include Abusourj and Kondbay in Sirba locality, and Golol and Keling in Jebel Marra where health and nutrition services are limited, if they exist at all. The situation may have worsened further after the expulsion of the NGO Médecins du Monde in February 2011, one of the few NGOs providing medical assistance in this area. An inter-agency rapid assessment was permitted at the beginning of 2011 to estimate the most urgent humanitarian needs (UNICEF, 2011). Moreover, two SFCs and two out-patient therapeutic feeding centres in Kulbus had to

[37] The Sphere project's handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, is one of the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of common principles and universal minimum standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response.

suspend their operations due to insecurity. Remote areas of the state with poor access remain of key concern.

South Darfur

Changes in livelihood strategies

South Darfur has historically been a richer part of the Greater Darfur area, with stronger transport links (rail, in particular after the 1950s), more rainfall and strong trade links to neighbouring countries and regions.

Literature and individuals consulted on South Darfur suggest that there are differences in the livelihood strategies of **camp IDPs in urban settings** depending on the distance of the camp to Nyala – the regional capital and centre of much of the focus for security and settlement in the region. For many of these IDPs, daily labour is the main source of income, particularly for those close to town: in Direij camp, for example, this is the main source of livelihood for around 70 percent of the population. A common pattern is for IDPs and poor residents to travel into the centre of Nyala to search for casual work each day. IDPs report that they usually find work only for two to four days a week. This option is more difficult for IDPs in camps further away from Nyala such as El Sereif, where IDPs are more likely to face official restrictions on their movements. IDPs in some such camps collect firewood and grass, but these resources are increasingly scarce. In Direij camp, firewood and grass collection accounted for about 70 percent of total livelihood sources in 2006 (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006), although this has since been replaced by casual labour. A number of IDP households have resumed farming, renting farmland close to Nyala and producing mainly horticultural crops for local sale. Some younger IDPs, usually men, have also acquired new artisanal skills in Nyala, for example in metalwork and carpentry. Approximately 40 percent of semi-skilled labourers are IDPs. Training IDPs has been one of the functions of the Artisans' Union, but there is strong competition for work in this semi-skilled labour market. A number of young male IDPs also engage in the valuable informal water vending sector (Nicol et al., 2012).

Livelihoods in South Darfur exhibit greater levels of self-employment, namely business among IDPs and residents as shown in Figure 9. There are also significant agriculture-related activities in mixed and resident communities. South Darfur differs significantly in this sense from that of the other two states; nearly 75 percent of the income from southern IDPs comes from either paid labour (waged and salaried) or business activity. Among mixed communities agriculture related activities account for 44 percent of the income, while in among residents they represent 28 percent, just above the 26 percent

obtained in business activities. Only among mixed communities in the South is wage labour not the main type of income generating activity.

Figure 9. Main cash income sources in South Darfur by residence status (proportion of contribution of each income stream), 2011



Source: WFP, Food Security Monitoring System - Round 11 (November 2011)

Livelihood strategies of **urban residents and non-camp IDPs** in Nyala have been affected by the impact of the conflict on Nyala's economy: demand for unskilled casual labour has risen, whereas formal industrial employment in Nyala's manufacturing sector (previously second only to Khartoum State) appears to have declined (Buchanan-Smith et al., 2011). There has also been considerable growth in urban and peri-urban agriculture, including the emergence of a nascent dairy industry and poultry farming enterprises (Buchanan-Smith et al., 2011; Nicol, et al., 2012).

Most farmers are long-term residents of Nyala who employ IDPs as labourers, either as paid workers or according to share-cropping arrangements. They rely heavily on the availability of water in Wadi Nyala aquifer, which is a resource under growing pressure from domestic supply provision in Nyala town (in particular via the informal water vending sector) (see Nicol et al., 2012). The strategies of poorer residents and IDP households living in or near Nyala have converged over the years, with most being dependent on casual labour as their main source of income (Buchanan-Smith et al., 2011). Poorer residents are also engaged in informal petty trade including the sale of water from donkey carts. In many instances the cash income derived from this low-skilled occupation pays directly for the school fees of children involved (particularly if they are non-camp IDPs) (ibid). Some townspeople claim that humanitarian aid is damaging their businesses: the markets in the camps often provide a cheaper source of

goods, and urban water sellers cannot compete with water delivered free to the camp. Some town residents travel out to the camps to buy the water for consumption or reselling in town, though the extent of this market versus water vending from Wadi wells is not likely to be great (Nugent and Zambakides, 2009; Nicol et al., 2012).

Information on the livelihoods of **camp IDPs in rural settings** is based on the SLA-controlled town of Muhajaria and is taken from the Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006) study; it is necessarily, therefore, more outdated. Insecurity and restricted mobility has reduced the area cultivated and prevented the sale of surplus production in Nyala. Livestock holdings have been reduced, though there is still a busy livestock market which provides an important source of employment for male IDPs who draw water from wells through the night to water animals the following day. Similar to many other IDPs in Darfur, IDPs in Mujaharia are mostly dependent on daily labour, the range of which has gradually expanded since IDPs first became displaced. Unlike many IDPs in GoS-held areas, there are more opportunities for agricultural labouring, including fencing. Reselling relief food is also a significant source of livelihood.

Information presented here for **non-camp IDPs in rural settings** is also taken from the Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006) study and focuses on the settlements of Jad El Seid and Mazroub in Adila, one of the less productive areas of South Darfur with sandy/goz soils and poor water resources. Similar to Muhajaria, the principal sources of livelihood have not changed much since the conflict began, but the restrictions on movement have affected each, probably more so than in Muhajaria. In Jad El Seid, the gradual decline in agriculture has been supplemented in a major way by the collection of firewood and charcoal. In Mazroub only one-third of the pre-conflict area for ground nut production was cultivated in 2006. The reasons were insecurity (attacks in this area took place just before the agricultural season); pest infestation (in the absence of any pest control by government); poor rainfall; and lack of money to hire labourers. Those households with livestock are struggling with the lack of veterinary services and scarce water because local boreholes were destroyed before GoS left the area. Some remittances were reported by households in Jad El Seid, but because of the trade restrictions the money has to be smuggled back from family members in El Obeid and Nyala.

The literature available for **rural residents** in Singita and Angara in the Jebel Marra lowlands (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006) describes how insecurity has had negative impacts on agricultural production, livestock, trade and remittances. Households have resorted to the collection of firewood and *za'af* to make mats, and to making charcoal, in the case of Angara, often taking considerable risks in the process. In Singita, the importance of firewood and grass collection has become even greater since food aid

rations were stopped in October 2005. In Angara village, agricultural labour opportunities now contribute an estimated 50 percent to livelihoods following the arrival of a number of businessmen who are renting land for vegetable production to serve the expanded Nyala market.

Changes in food security

Comparing levels of food insecurity across community types in South Darfur, the proportion of the population that was considered to be food secure in November 2011 was slightly lower amongst IDP communities (58 percent) than it was for resident communities (63 percent) or mixed communities (65 precent) (see Figure 10). Diverging trends are apparent when looking at food security trends for all communities from November 2009 to November 2011. Levels of severe food insecurity were declining for mixed communities in this period but increasing for resident communities over the same period. The proportion of resident households that were severely food insecure jumped from 8 percent in November 2010 to 20 percent in November 2011. This is attributed to soaring food prices and low purchasing power, negatively impacting affordability (WFP, 2011). During this same period, the proportion of households in mixed communities that were severely food insecure fell from 18 percent to 11 percent. Levels of moderate food insecurity increased for both community types in this period: from 8 percent to 17 percent in resident communities and from 14 percent to 24 percent in mixed communities. In comparison IDP communities fared better: levels of severe and moderate food insecurity alike fell between November 2010 and November 2011, from 17 percent to 13 percent and 33 percent to 29 percent, respectively.

As in other parts of the region, purchasing power greatly affects the diverging trends that are observed. Over half of household expenditures across all community types are for food. For those without access to land, their dependency on purchasing grains and other food stuffs from the market underlines their vulnerability to price shocks. For example, the increase in the price of the food basket in South Darfur in May 2011, during the lean season, was due to the price increase of essential food items such as cow meat, sugar and oil. The increase in prices negatively affected the purchasing power of IDPs, residents and mixed communities. Thus, in May 2011, 65, 59 and 46 percent of IDP, mixed and resident households could not afford the cost of one food basket. In November 2011, about 28 percent of IDPs were able to afford over two minimum healthy food basket compared to 10 percent reported in November 2009. IDPs represent the best category in terms of food basket affordability with only 32 percent of households unable to afford the cost of one MHFB (2.07 SDG/person/day), compared to 46 percent in resident communities and 47 percent in mixed communities.

Figure 10. Food security by community type in South Darfur, 2009-2011



Source: WFP-VAM: DFSM (South Darfur) Round 9-11 (November 2011)[38]

Levels of relative food security amongst IDPs in camps were relatively stable over the period between November 2009 and November 2011. In November 2009, 52 percent of IDP households were considered to be food secure, compared with 58 percent in November 2011. There was a spike in the proportion of households that were either moderately or severely food insecure in the lean season (February) in 2011. There was an increase in the proportion of households that have a poor food consumption score, from 5 percent in November 2009 to 11 percent in November 2011. The proportion of households with an acceptable food consumption score declined slightly from 72 percent in November 2009 to 67 percent in November 2011 (WFP, 2011). The relatively stable levels of food security in IDP communities can be attributed in part to constant levels of assistance. According to WFP monitoring data from November 2011, the proportion of camp IDP households receiving food assistance is almost 92 percent. The percentage remained almost the same across the rounds between 2009 and 2011.

There is an improving food security picture for households in mixed communities when comparing the proportion of households that were considered food secure in November 2009, 2010 and 2011. The proportion of households considered to be food secure increased from 34 percent in November 2009 to 65 percent in November 2011. Further,

[38] Due to lack of data, Figure 10 does not display the proportion of households under different food insecurity status for the month of February 2011 among mixed and resident communities.

the proportion of households in mixed communities that are severely food insecure is declining. There are large seasonal differences, however. The proportion of households that are food insecure in the lean season spikes. Further, the food consumption score for households in mixed communities has also improved between November 2009 and November 2011. In November 2009, 33 percent were borderline and a further 15 percent had a poor food consumption score. By November 2011, these figures had decreased to 24 percent and 4 percent respectively (WFP, 2011).

Amongst resident communities, the proportion of households that are food secure has remained relatively stable between November 2009 and November 2011. As explained above, there was a rise in the proportion of households that were severely food insecure between November 2010 and November 2011. There was also a spike in the proportion of households that were considered to be moderately food insecure in the first half of 2011. The food consumption scores for households in resident communities have worsened between November 2009 and November 2011. In November 2009, 11 percent of households were considered borderline whereas 10 percent had a poor food consumption score. In November 2011, these figures increased to 12 percent and 17 percent respectively (WFP, 2011).

Gender has a clear impact on the food security of households according to WFP monitoring data. In November 2011, 22.3 percent of the interviewed households are female headed households. Analyzing the food security situation based on gender depicts a significant difference between female and male headed households; 34 percent of female headed households are severely food insecure compared to 9 percent of male headed households. Monitoring data from the WFP also shows that education has an effect on food security in IDP and resident households, with households headed by someone with higher education more likely to be food secure.

Access to land and the ability to cultivate in support of a household's own consumption is a further factor that contributes to food insecurity. In November 2011, among IDPs, 58 percent of the food secure households cultivated their agricultural land. By comparison, 85 percent of the severely food insecure households did not cultivate in 2011.

Changes and trends in malnutrition

The situation in IDP camps (except for Kalma and Otash camps) is more stable than in mixed communities in rural areas. Camps reported levels of GAM between 10 and 12 percent and SAM below 1 percent, with functioning health services and satisfactory

water and sanitation conditions. Levels of GAM and SAM were nearly double in rural areas. As reported in Figure 11, in South Darfur levels of GAM amongst **IDP populations** remained around 20 percent between 2005 and 2008 and then decreased up until 2010.[39] However, surveys from 2011 report a steep increase. SAM levels decreased consistently until 2010, after which point it began to rise. Kalma and Otash camp remain two hotspots, as the situation is precarious and humanitarian access and health services are limited. Kalma has registered seasonal trends between 2004 and 2008 with high malnutrition rates during the hunger season (May – August), and lower values after the harvest (November – March).[40]

A recent survey from July 2011 reported very high malnutrition rates again (23 percent GAM and 3 percent SAM), levels similar to those recorded in 2004 at the height of fighting. Mortality rates fell sharply since 2004 and remained below emergency levels until 2008. Since then, no reliable data is available in CE-DAT.

Figure 11. Trend in GAM and SAM in South Darfur, 2005-2011



Source: CE-DAT

Otash camp has experienced decreasing malnutrition since 2004. A July 2011 survey reported GAM at 22.2 percent and SAM at 3.5 percent. Although higher than previous

[39] Figure 11 does not display trends for resident populations as only two surveys from this population group are available and, hence, no trend can be generated. These surveys report high levels GAM and SAM, but low mortality rates. However, measles vaccination coverage was low which, in the context of limited health services, represents a serious threat.

[40] No data is available for 2009 and 2010 following the expulsion of NGOs operating in the camp.

rates for the hunger season, the statistical difference is negligible. Mortality rates have decreased since 2006 and remained below the emergency level. Since the beginning of 2011, mortality rates are registering an upward trend. This should be monitored closely, especially since measles vaccination coverage is not high enough for a camp setting (79.6 percent). This disease accounts for one of the top three causes of death among children (Toole and Waldman, 1990, 1997).

Mixed communities have performed slightly better than IDPs but did not experience any significant improvement in their situation over the past six years. Since 2010 their situation has worsened again. Since a spike in fighting in 2010, there has been a deterioration in GAM and SAM both in IDP camps and mixed communities (in preceding years, GAM and SAM values were generally lower in IDP camps).

Several surveys were conducted in 2010 in South Darfur in IDP camps around Nyala, Kass and Gereida towns and in mixed communities from rural areas (Ed Alfursan, Tullus, Adila, Yassin and Mershing-Manwashi localities). No information is available in CE-DAT from Kalma camp for 2009 and 2010. A July 2011 survey reported levels of GAM at 23.7 percent and SAM at 3 percent. Although there is relatively large body of surveys in South Darfur, most of these were conducted in areas nearer to Nyala. There are no surveys currently available covering camps in areas nearer to the Central African Republic or areas bordering South Sudan.

Of note is the measles vaccination coverage, which is very low both in camps and in rural areas, even in areas where 3 percent of the children have been reported to have measles. Although continuous population movements do represent a challenge to universal coverage, more effort is required to attain herd immunity, especially in camps. Irregular humanitarian aid and feeding programmes have managed to keep mortality below emergency levels in both IDP and resident settings, but the warning signals sent by low vaccination coverage and nutritional status are serious and may lead to high mortality in the near future.

Little information is available on infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices from only three surveys. From these surveys, IYCF practices are poorly followed, with exclusive breastfeeding until six months being practiced by between 2 percent and 30 percent of mothers. Reliable data on these practices is practically non-existent, and there is no real evidence of specific interventions in these communities. However, in general, it is widely known that breastfeeding is one of the key factors that affect infant mortality and morbidity and that nutrition for lactating mothers is equally if not more important than during pregnancy. In view of this, special programmes for nutrition for

lactating women, education and training for new mothers and midwives, as well as efforts for better data collection is clearly needed.

Summary

The overall human security of Darfur's population remains highly vulnerable, both geographically and temporally. As the sections above show, the level of security – and the response of populations to this – remains variegated (and since 2011 has continued to change further). This is a region in which the basic building blocks for livelihoods may no longer exist in important swathes of the territory and where fractured communities and the institutional environments which previously provided them with security and access to resources for development need rebuilding.

Basics, such as food, water, healthcare and education have to be – and are being – provided in many case. But 'hotspots' of hunger and malnutrition persist, in spite of feeding programmes. This likely reflects wider complexities in household decision making, the impact of loss of income-earning, poor water and sanitation and lack of access to health and hygiene. A wider set of survey data that combines food security, livelihoods analysis and nutrition data would assist greatly in providing the necessary guidance on how to strengthen livelihoods and ensure that the most vulnerable households can respond robustly to opportunities provided and increase their resilience.

Clearly, the provision of aid will not continue at its current levels given pressures of financing more generally, and the specifics of the Darfur aid environment within Sudan. As a result, there is a pressing need to start establishing (and re-establishing where necessary) the local institutions that will support future livelihood security at all levels. This includes associational institutions in civil society (examples including farmers unions, water vendors, artisanal associations) and the mechanisms and structures of more effective local government, including technical capacity, capacity to understand and respond and financing capacity.

It may well be that a more structural approach to institution building for livelihood security is called for and could succeed in enhancing the impacts of wider improvements in security by removing incentives for recourse to violence and the logic of so-called 'war economies'.

TOWARD A LONGER-TERM APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN LIVELIHOOD SECURITY

Levels of conflict have subsided across much of Darfur and intense fighting is restricted to particular places and times. Yet, the conditions of safety and security that are necessary to promote more secure lives and livelihoods for the majority of people remain elusive. Further, the trend of worsening malnutrition levels and food security in 2011 brings into stark relief that levels of humanitarian need remain great. As long as local capacities to cope with the crisis are overwhelmed, people should continue to be able to rely on relief assistance.

However, a long-term vision for recovery and the rebuilding of institutions that will help Darfuris to secure livelihoods is urgently needed. Continuing insecurity set against the legacies of the conflict – including large population displacement, upturned rural social structures, rapid urbanisation, resource depletion in peri-urban environments, the emergence of new violent institutions, and more rigid relations between different identity groups – present very real difficulties to improve the situations of the displaced population and others assisted in Darfur, across urban, town and rural settings. Conflict legacies are inextricable from deeper and wider trends and changes in population, environment, and marketing and trade linkages within Darfur and to regions beyond. These are problems of development, and a failure over time to establish effective governance to manage change and uncertainty on multiple fronts.

Using evidence presented in Sections III and IV on changing conditions and contexts in Darfur and trends in livelihoods, food security and nutrition within these, this section examines debates around aid responses and longer-term recovery in Darfur. It argues for an overarching programmatic focus on supporting the livelihoods of those who will 'remain' where they have been displaced (local integration) as well as those who will 'return'.

Connecting livelihoods and productive work across urban and rural contexts

The debate on early recovery and longer-term solutions tends to entrench an imagined divide between 'urban' and 'rural' areas, livelihoods and productive activities. The debate is usually framed as pursuing a strategy to support IDPs to locally integrate where there are now (e.g. large towns and cities) or return to their former agrarian and

pastoral livelihoods, implying that they permanently leave urban areas where they have sought safety, security and new livelihoods. An underlying weakness of the debate is that there has been no systematic assessment of IDP preferences.[41] Rather, discussion is informed by what various political actors (including different parts of the UN system, human rights campaigners, other civil society activists, humanitarian agencies, IDP representatives, armed groups, and national and local government actors) assume to be the best option for IDPs and/or as politically expedient. Sections of the IDP population are likely to want to stay in urban areas. Others will want to return to rural ways and livelihoods.

Besides there being no formal assessment of IDP preferences to locally integrate where they are now or to return, a fundamental problem with the debate is the emphasis on 'urban' or 'rural' as separate and distinct categories rather than on the connections between these. As emphasised in this report, such connectivity has long been apparent in Darfuri livelihoods. Regional towns in Darfur were historically important as places for commerce, exchange, administration, and social interaction. Further, the tendency to focus on either 'urban' or 'rural' livelihoods fails to capture the dynamic of small town growth alongside the expansion of the largest cities like Nyala and El Fasher. Small and medium-sized towns across have expanded across the region. For example, Gereida in South Darfur grew from 20,000 to almost 150,000 inhabitants (Seferis, 2010). Mornie in West Darfur grew from an estimated 15,000 before the conflict to 135,000 now.[42] Small towns are centres for livelihood creation, offering numerous opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurs such as running small cafes and lodges, dairying and fattening animals for sale.

According to the 2010 FAO *State of Food Insecurity in the World* report, 'the reality in Darfur is that it has been undergoing a rapid process of urbanization during the crisis years that will not be reversed. What is needed is a vision for the urban economy for the future, and livelihood programming that is aligned to that vision' (FAO, 2010: 21). Any development strategy for Darfur must reflect the transition for many from rural subsistence livelihoods to market-oriented activities in towns and cities such as providing labour, engaging in petty trade, blacksmithing, and running small shops and kiosks. As explained before, recent history in Darfur has been likened to a 'forced and traumatic' urbanisation. Recent rapid de-agrarianisation processes in Darfur raise many urgent challenges and threats to economic welfare, food security and nutrition as well

[41] One of the few studies of IDP preferences, undertaken in Colombia, found that IDPs want things that are very different from what features in typical return programming. See: http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp07.pdf

[42] Personal communication with Darfuri researcher, Nyala. March 8th, 2012.

as political stability. But it must be harnessed with a future oriented strategy that lays the foundation for occupational diversification and specialisation. This will include investing in human capital to increase the capabilities of the new urban population to participate on better terms in growing urban economies. Like former rural dwellers in other contexts that have experienced de-agrarianisation, they require literacy, numeracy, and various occupational and computer skills (Bryceson, 1999). In view of these needs, this report endorses the recommended priority in *Beyond Emergency Relief* to support vocational training and alternative learning opportunities. In general, there is a need for improving training facilities and infrastructure as well as strengthening public policy and institutions – such as trades associations, vendors associations, rural cooperatives – that could support future occupational diversification and specialisation.

Urban growth and development are indispensible not just for strengthening the livelihoods of the displaced that opt to locally integrate and other poor urban inhabitants but also for farmers and herders whose future production will undoubtedly be closely tied to markets and commercialisation processes unfolding from Darfur's large cities. Planned urban development can provide opportunities for market-oriented growth and the expansion of enterprises that add value to agricultural produce from mixed farming systems.

Yet, a more 'back to normal' rural situation is similarly fundamental to development and peace. This invariably will require the perception of restitution for those displaced. It will also necessitate greater and more systematic livelihood support for long-term rural residents who have 'stayed behind'. In the longer-term, support to non-agricultural activities and the absorption of rural labour into activities based in urban areas will ease pressure on land. Any decision to support the permanent return of IDPs would need to identify clear options and opportunities for IDP farmers and herders to re-establish livelihoods and – likely for many – to start new alternative livelihoods. Given the remarkable growth of Darfur's urban areas during the course of the conflict, sustainable livelihood opportunities in rural areas will rest on nurturing trade and marketing links between rural areas, small towns and larger cities as well as supporting Darfur's wider economic links to other parts of Sudan and further afield in north and central Africa. These linkages of course existed before the conflict but given rapid urbanisation and small-town growth as a result of conflict displacement, the importance of these linkages will be even greater to nurturing a vibrant rural sector. In this respect, upgrading and establishing security along Darfur's transport corridors is essential as is the availability of transport within them. Threats against transporters and extortion rackets run by armed groups at checkpoints on the main roads in Darfur are a testament to continuing

insecurity over wide areas and greatly increase the costs for displaced people who move between IDP sites and their rural homes as well as rural residents who might otherwise seek to travel to towns and cities to trade, exchange, access services and visit family and friends. Strategies to effectively police main roads and reduce the number of checkpoints would thus lower transport costs while enabling freer movement, both contributing to more secure livelihoods.

Furthermore, many IDPs who might opt to stay in urban areas will also want to maintain economic and social ties in rural areas to strengthen their livelihoods and productive activities. The tendency of household members to separate in pursuit of options and opportunities in different locations, with some staying in urban areas full-time for casual labour, petty trade and to access health and education services, and others residing in their rural family homes to look after crops and livestock, is likely to be commonplace provided there are improvements in security in rural areas and protection for IDPs who opt to return. Clear land tenure rules and guaranteed prices for farm produce, both contributing to a productive rural sector, would also encourage this practice of dividing household members between rural, town and city contexts.

To be effective, any strategy to promote greater self-reliance of the displaced and others who are assisted, in anticipation of likely reductions in levels of humanitarian assistance in future years, must dovetail with the manifold strategies that aid recipients already pursue crossing urban, town and rural contexts. Greater numbers of IDP households are likely to be persuaded to return if they are assured they can keep a foothold in urban areas. Similarly, strengthening security in rural areas will enable IDPs and other long-term rural residents to pursue farming and livestock-keeping more predictably, thus reducing their reliance on resource-depleting activities such as brick-making, charcoal burning and selling fuelwood. An approach is required that supports 'both ends' of the livelihood spectrum – expanding urban centres as well as remote rural areas – assuming that households are complex, dynamic, capable of achieving benefits in both worlds and are, in effect, mobile and responsive to new opportunities. The following section details elements of a 'remain and return' approach whose aim is to assist displaced populations and others assisted in Darfur to seek opportunities for income, food and health security across urban and rural settings.

Remain and return

While there is a consensus on the need for a longer-term approach to strengthen livelihoods in Darfur, there is uncertainty and lack of an agreed overarching strategy on

how this may be done. *Beyond Emergency Relief*, a publication of the UN Sudan in 2010, provides one potential framework to promote mid- and long-term planning around priorities in the environment, livelihoods, education and human capital, and governance and capacity development. Many of its recommendations cut across the three different options for addressing the situation of protracted displacement: return, resettlement or integration. Strategies and priorities for programming, in turn, rest on the vision of Darfur's future development: should IDPs be encouraged to return to rural areas, should they be supported to settle in new areas, or should they be helped to integrate more productively and justly in the economy, society and governance arrangements of the IDP sites where they currently reside? A further layer of complexity is how can the livelihoods of the chronically poor in rural areas be supported?

Most countries emerging from conflict or mired in protracted crises favour a focus on return as an organising goal for post-conflict development, an objective that is also apparent in most demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programming. Yet, practically there remain considerable challenges in the near-term to return in Darfur, not least continuing insecurity and the limited capacity of the state and international partners to guarantee security over the region's vast rural areas. Globally, only 25 percent of IDPs have returned after almost two decades of displacement (Zetter, 2011). The 2012 UN Work Plan acknowledges the challenges confronting recent returnees 'including a lack of access to basic services, livelihoods opportunities, and agricultural support, particularly in the form of access to arable farmland. The sustainability of future returns will depend upon security and livelihood opportunities, as well as on the provision of basic services including the existence of community infrastructure, such as functioning health centres, schools and markets' (UN, 2012: p. 14). For their part, many IDPs continue to resist any pressure to return.[43] IDPs who want to return are reluctant to do so without security guarantees and restitution of their land rights (IWPR, 2011: p. 11). A further limitation of the emphasis on 'return' in strategy as it is currently conceived is that it risks overlooking the many other types of mobility that exist in Darfur and that have long factored in livelihood strategies in the region. These include pastoral movements with herds for marketing and to access high value fodder, moving between camps and nearby rural areas to farm, seasonal migration to towns and cities for casual work, and migration further afield for work and study opportunities.

Given the tension between official policy and strategy to support return as a way of moving beyond emergency relief, and the preference of many IDPs to locally integrate where they live now, there has been little practical work on implementing durable

[43] 'Kalma, Gereida camps say conference not a priority.' Radio Dabanga. March 20th, 2012.

solutions. Some of the few examples of durable solution programming in Darfur include shelter projects using compressed soil blocks; sustainable livelihoods activities; increased targeting of food and non-food distributions, as well as a shift towards using vouchers for food assistance to promote local livelihoods and food production (UN, 2012: p. 41). These measures are welcome as a shift away from emergency types of support to assistance that might more meaningfully address deeply engrained livelihood vulnerabilities. Still, much of this will necessarily be piecemeal and will not have a transformative impact if undertaken outside of a development framework that has official support from local and national government, armed groups as well as buy-in from the displaced population and others being assisted. Part of what confounds the problem of a lack of an agreed development framework – in addition to the fundamental issues of protection, the establishment of security over wide areas, and resolution of land tenure uncertainties – is the very inflexibility of options that are presented for 'durable solutions'. Zetter (2011, p. 9) notes, 'prolonged displacement is often accepted, albeit reluctantly, as a semi-permanent state of affairs and durable solutions implicitly suggest a fixed, "end-state" solution. Yet ... the rigidity of these concepts fits uneasily with the need for flexible, experimental, and often politically risky modes of intervention.'

An overarching framework

Based on our analysis that suggests a complex, but understandable situation that is a mix of return, local integration and longer-term settlement in urban, town and rural settings, we suggest a 'remain and return' approach to strengthen the human security of people across these different livelihood situations. A major focus of this is to prevent slippage by different groups from poverty to destitution whilst at the same time availing the wider community of Darfur with the institutional strengthening required to underpin more secure livelihood strategies across a range from settled agriculture, to pastoralism, industrial activity and service provision.

The distinguishing feature of this approach is to support the free mobility of displaced peoples and others who are assisted, who move for a variety of reasons associated with the need to find safety, security and opportunity. Micro-level displacements are a deliberate choice, a way to seek minimum protection while also continuing some semblance of former (agrarian) livelihoods. These 'small, local movements appear to be the first line of defence against crisis, an early coping strategy that may offer some hint as to how protracted displacement may be "unlocked"' (Long, 2011: p. 31). As explained earlier, many IDPs living on the edges of smaller towns and camps seek to return

overnight, for a few days at a time and seasonally to work their land when it is safe to do so. Other displaced peoples in camps on the outskirts of Nyala and El Fasher seek to work in town providing wage labour on a variety of tasks-for-cash to supplement relief support. Others from more secure areas will divide up household members, with (typically) men returning seasonally to work the land and women and children remaining in the camps. These various types of mobility are crucial for knitting together different production streams across rural, camp and urban settings, and point to the likely livelihood trajectories for many in the medium-term. Long (2011, p. 7) contends, '"Solving" displacement does not mean movement will stop.' What is required is an end to enforced stasis of IDPs in camps and an approach that favours and supports flexibility and adaptation as a way of promoting greater self-reliance.

Alongside support to the movement strategies of the displaced, more effective support is likely to be provided in ensuring sound urban development and the integration of returnees into urban economies. IDP camps have become permanent urban settlements, with populations reliant on relief assistance and various forms of coping, including petty trade, opportunistic farming outside of camp areas, and various tasks-for-cash such as carrying goods and providing house-help for the better off. The desire of IDPs to locally integrate in camps where they have fled to for safety and security has been widely documented (De Waal, 2009; Tufts-IDMC, 2008; Daum, 2011). Many IDPs have become 'integrated' in their area of displacement, albeit still highly insecure in most situations. Economic and social integration, while important for managing vulnerability, does not necessarily equate with human security let alone secure livelihoods. Many 'integrated' IDPs may still depend on various survival tasks, are subjected to exploitative labour arrangements and face harassment in carrying out work and other domestic duties.

While the Government of Sudan's strategy for Darfur presses for return as the primary long-term solution in Darfur, even providing guarantees of security, relief and livelihood support are in place, a section of the IDP population will not want to return to rural areas. Further, political and policy ambitions to pressure urban IDPs to return create considerable uncertainty for displaced populations, even as many out of necessity continue to seek to expand their economic activity in towns and cities. It also hinders their ability to make longer-term plans and increases their dependence on relief support and services provided by humanitarian agencies.

Given the loss of rural livelihoods for much of the displaced population that has moved to the outskirts of large cities and towns, and because wider trends are to urbanisation across sub-Saharan Africa in general, an explicit focus of aid approaches in Darfur must

necessarily involve strengthening and support of urban IDPs to acquire the assets and skills to incorporate productively in urban economies. A greater focus on urban livelihoods and planning across the range of camps and urban centres that constitute the bulk of IDPs living in Darfur would reflect the shift in the development focus of a large part of Darfur's population away from more rurally-based reliance on access to land, water and inputs to agriculture to a more urbanised, wage-labour and entrepreneurial economy where capacity to supply new services and goods will be critical to long-term household income security.

A focus on supporting stronger urban-based livelihoods does not entail de-emphasising rural livelihoods. However, strategies to support rural livelihoods require a rethink given the considerable and rapid demographic changes in Darfur, which are likely to have long lasting impacts on the relationship between access to and use of resources and the demand-supply relationship in agriculture. Further, changes in the institutions that mediate people's access to land and rural resources that have occurred before and during the course of the conflict mean that many cannot simply 'resume' a livelihood that existed before. Land reform, safety net programming, the extension of rural credit and business planning support, the improvement of markets and delivery of other services including water, health and education are needed to overcome the structural vulnerability of the chronically food insecure population as well as transform rural economies. These measures will strengthen the appeal of return as an option for displaced populations, who point to poor service provision as an important reason why they do not want to return. Supporting productive rural enterprises that link agrarian and pastoral production systems with developing urban economies will reduce push pressures to migrate to large towns and cities. Yet, as emphasised throughout this report, improved security is a fundamental condition for undertaking measures that might promote more productive rural livelihoods.

Experience in Ethiopia, where the Ethiopian government has introduced a national Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), demonstrates that other challenges including remoteness and weak implementation capacities of local government can be overcome in providing more predictable and sustained support to chronically food insecure rural populations (Berhane et al., 2011). Since 2010, the Ethiopian government has extended the PSNP deeper into areas of Afar and Somali Regional States (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2011), which are affected by conflict. Initially, the programme has been extended to areas that are more secure, yet it provides an example for how a safety net and other complementary livelihoods programming may be developed in Darfur (Sabates-Wheeler et al., forthcoming). The purpose of a safety net in rural and urban settings alike would be initially to stabilise the livelihoods of IDPs and other populations that are assisted,

providing predictable transfers of food and cash over many years to food insecure households to prevent slippage into destitution. A public works component of a safety net programme to restore or establish infrastructure could be used to guarantee income opportunities for targeted populations such as youth and demobilised fighters. Conditional transfers, requiring targeted groups to participate in different types of training as a condition to receive food and cash transfers, could be used to provide occupation and skills training to rural residents to support income diversification and adding value to farm, livestock and natural products.

A 'remain and return' approach would move closer to the lived experience and practice of many IDPs to keep a foothold in camps and other areas where displaced persons live, while when conditions permit also moving in search of labour opportunities or to make short visits back to their home areas to cultivate and strengthen claims to their land. It would also acknowledge the need to support others assisted including the poor who are longer-term residents in rural areas, towns and cities. Rather than seek the permanent return of IDPs, when Darfur remains deeply insecure and there is a lack of service provision and livelihood opportunities for a majority of rural populations, an approach is needed to support the current practice of some IDPs to occasionally return for short periods to their former homes, when security conditions allow. The appeal of this approach is that it seeks to leverage what many IDPs do anyway. The obvious danger is that it will simply enshrine as strategy what are essentially crisis coping strategies, however inventive these might be, when what is required is an approach that will promote transformative change. Yet, it politically neutralises this contested area of programming and sensibly responds to realities on the ground. Further, it is a workable approach providing there are further (and significant) security improvements in rural areas, as well as progress in addressing land tenure insecurities and extending basic services to returnees and resident communities, including the provision of security.

Priorities for action

This report proposes the following priorities to contribute to strengthening the human security of the displaced and others who are assisted across diverse and changing livelihood situations in Darfur:

1. **Further rigorous empirical analysis of what livelihoods are available and their effectiveness,** including detailed analysis of the institutions through which people access resources to support their livelihoods. The body of works on livelihoods, food security and health in Darfur is thin and patchy in its geographic

coverage. Many available reports are based on data collected in localised settings and/or from a limited number of households and key informants. There is a lack of systematic data collection, which could provide a clearer picture of the directionality of livelihoods in the region overall and enable comparisons of income, food security and health trends and conditions across different livelihood situations. This is necessary to make informed judgments about targeting humanitarian assistance when future levels of funding are uncertain and in a context in which there exist pockets of acute need.

2. **The development of a common intervention framework** based on concepts of asset strengthening of households, but also linking households more coherently to wider policy and other decision making frameworks including local institutions that mediate people's access to resources (and ensure that there is two-way information flow so that better knowledge on what households are doing can inform decision making). This common framework should be agreed across all agencies through convening a workshop in the coming six months.

3. **Strengthening and consolidating a safety nets programme in rural and urban areas** to prevent a slide into destitution of food insecure households. Drawing on the livelihoods data presented in this report, and also current levels of humanitarian need, it is clear that many people are unable to meet their needs for income, food, water, and health without external support. A safety net programme is needed to provide support over several years, incorporating both public workfare projects and training to increase individual capabilities (such as in literacy, numeracy, infant feeding) as well as direct support for the most vulnerable, including the disabled, expecting and new mothers, female and child-headed households and the elderly. A safety net in urban areas would focus on upgrading facilities in camp areas while providing IDPs and others assisted with regular support and training in various occupations and skills, such as constructing sustainable shelter and business planning.

4. Alongside support to strengthen the livelihood resources of the poorest, **strengthening institutions** that support decision-making on how, where and when individuals and households deploy their livelihood assets. These structures have substantially changed since 2005, but are now emerging as critical agents of change across Darfur. They may include local government, associational structures of civil society and traditional leadership groups. In urban settings, strengthening institutions could entail support for the establishment of artisanal

associations that help address the needs and capacities of providers of particular goods and services (e.g. water vendors, brick makers and other occupations) and seek to institutionalise greater income protection for these groups.

5. **Formulating particular interventions to support the livelihoods of the urban poor** (the displaced and others who are assisted including longer-term urban residents who are poor) to incorporate these groups more productively into urban economies. A three-pronged approach should focus on the following:

    a. *Strengthening the artisanal skills base of the poorest communities and specifically the most youthful section of the population*: this could be in the construction industry (carpentry, building, non-environmentally-destructive brick-making, for example), in metal working (producing tanks for water vending, and related activities where there is demand), motor mechanics, and other related sectors such as electrical engineering.

    b. *Education*: Developing basic skills in literacy, numeracy and languages, balancing the need for income generation (e.g. water vending) with access to education (e.g. many vendors in Nyala are school-age boys and use income earned to pay school fees (Nicol et al., 2012)).

    c. *Protection*: Attention to the wider policy and institutional environment in which the protection of basic livelihoods in urban contexts can be strengthened. It should also include business skills development that helps to support new initiatives through micro-credit provision (one of the greatest gaps in livelihood support at present in urban areas).

6. **Strengthening a focus on maternal and infant welfare** across 'bundles' of action in support of food, health and income security. There is a distinct lack of knowledge on maternal welfare, which is needed to better understand problems around child health and development. A focus on maternal and infant welfare should include:

    a. child nutrition (infant feeding in particular) and early motherhood support;
    b. supporting specific improvement in safe water and sanitation provision for children (including a specific child focus in planning, design and

implementation), possibly linked to a strong educational development programme;

c. improvements (and ramping up where necessary) of immunization programmes (prioritising measles vaccination, particularly in South Darfur where coverage is low) and other health-related activities including hygiene education.

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