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## The art of truth: The architecture of 19th -century American allegory

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**THE ART OF TRUTH: THE ARCHITECTURE  
OF 19<sup>TH</sup>-CENTURY AMERICAN  
ALLEGORY**

by

**Gary Brian Bennett**

**Bachelor of Arts  
California State University, Fullerton  
1989**

**Master of Arts  
California State University, Fullerton  
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**A dissertation submitted in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements  
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ABSTRACT

**The Art of Truth: The Architecture  
Of 19<sup>th</sup>-Century American  
Allegory**

by

Gary Brian Bennett

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The current study, in its broadest scope, explores the nature of literary art primarily as a moral experience. Specifically, it addresses ironic allegory—a genre of fiction born during the American Renaissance of the mid-nineteenth century. As an amalgam of two other oblique genres, Gothic fiction and Puritan allegory, ironic allegory was originally the product of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s moral imagination and tragic sensibility; consequently, its primary themes are the properties of time, the problems of tragedy, the process of transformation, and the preeminence of truth. Focusing exclusively on the architectural metaphors in Cooper’s Templeton trilogy, Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables, and Melville’s Pierre, the current study discusses the capacity of the edifice to mystify us with protection, possession, permanence, and ultimately pride. It also highlights key moments of irony, when detachment from an edifice leads to a demystifying Fall.

**It is the aim of the current study to promote a greater understanding, and thus appreciation, of America's great ironic allegorists by clearing up the confusion and cultural bias underlying the symbol/allegory debate among literary critics. Far from a static, dogmatic mode of expression, ironic allegory is in fact a dynamic, poetic literary genre that bridges the gap between romanticism and modernism. As the art of truth, it unflinchingly explores the doubleness of human experience; it celebrates art founded in morality, and beauty edified by truth.**

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**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

**To the Houses of Bennett, Miller, Crady, and Mendoza**

**. . . and to our Great Architect**

## PROLOGUE

*I wonder . . . whether the world is anchored anywhere;  
if she is, she swings with an uncommon long cable, though.*

Melville

Literary criticism of the *art* of fiction inevitably entails an exploration into the *heart* of humankind, for in reading the story of all-inclusive humanity, we struggle to understand the context of our own experiences. Are there, we wonder, absolute standards of truth by which to measure ourselves, or was Protagoras correct when he concluded that man himself is the measure of all? In our search for ultimate significance, we soon discover that complete knowledge eludes us. What trips us up, time and again, is the medium of thought itself: language. At this point the line between philosophy and fiction blurs; ontology gives way to epistemology and then, finally, to analytical linguistics as we realize that we can know nothing except through language, which is characteristically metaphorical. Thus absolute truth tantalizes us, lurking just beyond our grasp behind the “pasteboard mask” of symbolic expression. To our chagrin, the path to meaning circles from the literal text to its philosophical context and then back again. When the art of fiction is understood in this way, as both the text and the context of human experience, we call it allegory.

Central to our discussion here are three basic assumptions: that language is fallen, that ambiguity is a primary source of artistic beauty, and that failure often leads to moral growth. To confirm that language is fallen, we need look no further than the word *allegory* itself. As John Whitman points out, the Greek term *allegoria* has two components: *allos*, meaning “other,” and *agoreuein*, originally meaning “to speak in the assembly (agora).” By combining these components, we end up with a composite definition of allegory as “speaking other.” Indeed, the common notion of allegory, similar to that of irony, is that it “turns its head in one direction, but turns its eyes in another. In the traditional formula, it says one thing, and means another” (Whitman 2).

By its very nature allegory is ambiguous; yet the same can be said of all fiction, which “tries to express a truth by departing from it in some way” (Whitman 1). When we say that language is fallen, then, we are speaking of the separation of words, or text, from their context—of the difference between fiction (the story of truth) and meaning (the source of truth). In the end, we should not lament this separation for two essential reasons. First, ambiguity is an essential component of true art. What makes literature beautiful is the freedom of expression and interpretation that metaphor allows. Second, literary narratives, inevitably products of failed correspondence, hold the keys to redemption (*felix culpa*), for they cultivate in those of us open to the experience an enhanced moral awareness and a refined tragic sensibility. And so, given our three basic

assumptions, we can say that allegory is the art of truth—the meeting of truth and beauty through the medium of language.

Whitman perceptively distinguishes between two traditions of allegory: allegorical composition, a grammatical and rhetorical approach where the emphasis is on *saying* other than what is *meant*, and allegorical interpretation, a philosophical and exegetical approach where the emphasis is placed on *meaning* other than what is *said*. Deborah Madsen also recognizes these two traditions, though she replaces the term “allegorical composition” with the term “narrative allegory.” Even more enlightening, however, is her distinction between allegory as metaphor (fabulism) and allegory as metonymy (figuralism). Pointing to the essential confusion about allegory, Madsen reveals that the term can both “speak other” and “speak of the Other”; it can name “both the quest for normative meaning and the meaning that is posited as normative” (RA 29). The metaphoric fable “speaks other” in the sense that arbitrary and extrinsic meaning is imported to an encoded text, while the figure “speaks of the Other” in the sense that intrinsic and mystical meaning is embedded in the text by God and then extracted by divinely inspired readers. As Madsen rightly concludes, “these two approaches to the concept of allegory define the entire set of radical oppositions that mark the subsequent history of the term and the genre” (RA 3).

Radical oppositions within allegory are so strong that the genre often seems at odds with itself. In fact, in the two conflicting demands of divergence and correspondence, Whitman sees both the birth and the

death of allegory. “The more allegory exploits the divergence between corresponding levels of meaning,” he writes, “the less tenable the correspondence becomes. Alternatively, the more it closes ranks and emphasizes the correspondence, the less oblique, and thus the less allegorical, the divergence becomes” (2). Allegory, therefore, is highly dynamic. Never achieving perfect correspondence, it continually shifts between temporary states of equilibrium and disequilibrium. In this way, the process of allegorical writing reflects the nature of human experience. In an ambiguous, uncertain, and changing universe, we search for truths that perpetually elude us. Perfect correspondence is impossible, we realize, because of the fallen nature of language, so we must settle for the illusion of stability—the consolation of art. In recreating the quest for meaning, allegory tells the story of humanity; it reveals the truth and beauty of the human condition. Indeed, “it encourages its readers not only to aspire toward some world of perfect fulfillment, but to direct attention to the limited world of which they are part” (Whitman 13).

Critics of allegory often reject the notions of a limited world and of a fallen language. In the nineteenth century, for instance, Romantic writers such as Samuel Coleridge argued that perfect correspondence between subject and object is both possible and desirable. In an attempt to avoid the central confusion of allegory (and thus the paradox of experience), the Romantics transformed the allegorical genre by renaming figuralism “symbolism” and fabulism “allegory.” In its original

context, *allegoria* includes both *symbolon*, which refers to a shift in reference, and *eikon*, which refers to a more direct correlation. Yet the Romantics seem to have equated “allegory” with static “icon,” and so they privileged dynamic “symbol.” Consequently, what was originally an internal opposition of modes within a single genre became a battle of two opposing genres. The internal paradox of allegory seems to have been lifted, but the Romantic renaming of allegory and symbol only solidified the terminological confusion that has plagued the allegory-symbol debate ever since. As it turns out, symbolism is just as confusing a term as allegory. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the very different manners in which the post-Romantics Baudelaire and Mallarme treated the symbol.

In its most narrow usage, the term *symbolistes* refers to a group of minor French poets, led by Moreas, who separated themselves from the *decadents*; however, in its most broad usage symbolism refers to metaphorical poetry in general. In between these extremes is the idea of symbolism as a post-Romantic literary tradition, starting with Baudelaire, that stresses the problems of language and unity of being. As we can see, definitions of symbolism vary, but the true source of confusion lies in the nature of the isolated symbol. Like allegory, symbolism leaves us with two alternatives:

**Mallarme’s barren and ascetic concentration of a consciousness that has to learn to face the irrevocable division of being, and to find in this knowledge the power for**

its own growth—or Baudelaire’s dangerous promise that unity can be restored, in spite of the growing realization that this unity would merely be a form of immediate death.

(DeMan, RCC 161)

Speaking here of the double aspect of symbolism, Paul de Man reduces the opposition of Baudelaire and Mallarmé to a choice between poetry as being and poetry as becoming, respectively; yet this opposition represents but a reworking in modern terms of the allegorical dilemma of correspondence and divergence. If nothing else, the dilemma of the post-Romantic poets teaches us that word games—like the Romantic renaming of allegory and symbol—cannot alter fundamental truths about language and about human experience. Whether we conceive of allegory as a mixed genre with opposing fabulistic and figural elements or we set up fabulistic allegory and figural symbolism as opposing genres, the fact remains that language is fallen; and even if perfect correspondence were possible, it would be no more desirable than complete divergence, for both conditions amount to nothing less than oblivion.

If, as we suspect, the labels *allegory*, *symbol*, *icon*, *figure*, *fable*, *metaphor*, and *metonymy* are arbitrary, then why has the debate over allegory been so intense? Madsen’s own work, especially Rereading Allegory, proves that the genre can be analyzed without crippling complicity. She shows us that it is possible for literary critics to avoid paradox and contradiction by qualifying broad terms and constructing a subtle and precise critical lexicon. What her contributions ultimately

.

reveal is that the allegory-symbol debate is confusing because we seem to prefer it that way, in fact to need it to be that way. Tracing the historic development of allegory, Madsen concludes that “there emerges clearly the consistent use of genre to appropriate textual rhetoric to a specific definition and set of meanings as part of an authoritative response to the trauma of cultural change” (Madsen, RA 2). In other words, each shift in cultural values generates a crisis that leads to changes in a genre. This can be seen in the Romantic and post-Romantic responses to crises in European culture. Coleridge developed his organic theory as a response to the trend in Biblical exegesis toward a metaphoric rather than metonymic conception of language, while Baudelaire and Mallarme responded to the cultural shift toward modernism and its prevailing mood of nihilism. Clearly allegory, as with most genres, is necessarily arbitrary and even confusing because only in this way can it adapt to cultural changes and thus remain viable.

Madsen is correct in defining genre as a style of cultural expression, yet we must keep in mind that conflicts of values can often distort our understanding of a genre. In such extreme cases, cultural expression becomes cultural bias. Since the end of the nineteenth century, for example, such bias—both for and against allegory—has perpetuated terminological confusion and promoted the use of pejorative language. Literary critics, accepting Coleridge’s division of allegory and symbol, have become entrenched in opposing theoretical camps. In a manner consistent with history, cultural preference in the twentieth

century has vacillated between fabulism (with its threat of abstraction) and figuralism (with its threat of solipsism). Calling to mind Whitman's argument about the birth and death of allegory, we can construct a useful metaphor to better understand this cultural shift. If truth were the sun and we the earth, then our search for absolute meaning would take on the pattern of planetary motion. Circling close to the sun (figuralism) we risk conflagration, yet too far from the sun (fabulism) and we risk congelation; and so we settle into orbit (allegory) and take solace in the perpetual changing of the seasons (the beautiful ambiguity of art). The orbital pattern described here, often called the hermeneutic circle, appears in literature as the allegory of interpretability.

With regards to the cyclical movement in cultural responses to allegory, Cleanth Brooks has remarked that the shift toward allegory "is perhaps the first attempt which man makes to unite the intellect and the emotions when they begin to fall apart" (qtd. in Mathiessen 246). This was the case during the American renaissance. Sparked by such diverse influences as European Romanticism, Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, and the theologies of the Calvinists, Swedenborgians, and Unitarians, the American authors during the first half of the nineteenth century exploded with poetic energy and creativity. For men such as Emerson and Thoreau, writing became a spiritual process in which the poet seeks unity with nature through the word; yet American writers never fully embraced the organic, metonymic view of language. Emerson, for example, was often frustrated by the irreconcilable contradictions of his

own writing. Hawthorne and Melville, especially, remained skeptical about perfect correspondence and equally fearful of the destructive, nihilistic potential of purely subjective experience. Americans, perhaps more than their European counterparts, seemed content to leave the paradox of knowledge and experience unresolved. In fact, they often made this paradox the central theme of their works and exploited the nature of ambiguity for its poetic effect.

Sensing that the intellect and emotions were indeed “falling apart” as a result of Romantic idealism, American writers continued the allegorical tradition they inherited from Puritan ancestors such as Bunyan and Milton. Despite their Puritan heritage, however, nineteenth-century American allegorists did not simply imitate Puritan allegory but instead expanded and transformed the earlier form in response to an evolving cultural climate. For this reason, authors such as Hawthorne and Melville, in writing allegory, cannot be accused of the type of backsliding and uninventiveness disparaged by Emerson in “The American Scholar.” Critics who do make this accusation often mistakenly equate allegory with pure fabulism, especially in its most basic form, personification; they arbitrarily divide allegory and symbol—labeling the former abstract, artificial, static, and didactic and calling the latter concrete, dynamic, and organic. Such is the legacy of Coleridge. Clearly the confusion and bias surrounding the allegory-symbol debate prevent an accurate understanding, and thus an accurate appreciation, of America’s greatest allegorists. It is therefore the purpose of this study

to promote our appreciation of nineteenth-century American authors by analyzing their allegorical treatment of the architectural metaphor.

The edifice is perhaps the most appropriate symbol for the study of American allegory because its tendency to give men false feelings of protection against, possession of, and permanence within nature often leads, if left unchallenged, to excessive human pride—to a major mystification, in which a central character, sensing that he controls nature, comes to believe he can conquer time itself. And since this pride eventually leads to a Fall, to a moment of demystification when proper relations between man and nature are restored and the inevitability of death is established, the allegorical use of the edifice parallels human experience itself. By isolating the architectural metaphor, we see convincing evidence that American allegory is a significant literary movement forming an important link between Romanticism and modernism; it blends the moral profundity of earlier figural allegory with the concrete, poetic imagery of later fabulistic allegory in order to achieve an ironic effect which reveals both the truth and the beauty of mankind's tragically ambiguous position in the universe.

Chapter One of our discussion, "Foundation: The Elements of Allegory," will address the historical and philosophical basis as well as the major categories of allegory, the properties of ironic allegory, and the importance of the architectural metaphor. Chapter Two, "Construction: Civilization Building," will discuss Cooper's theory of civilization and his

treatment of the edifice in his Templeton trilogy consisting of The Deerslayer, The Pioneers, and Home as Found. The focus here will be on Cooper's pastoral ideal, his allegorical desire for balance between wilderness and civilization, myth and history, and on the qualities of protection, possession, permanence, and pride. Gaston Bachelard's Poetics of Space and Eric Sundquist's Home as Found will provide a theoretical framework for the study of Cooper's imagery. Chapter Three, "Deconstruction: The Structure of Irony," will analyze Hawthorne's House of the Seven Gables and Melville's Pierre. Here the focus will be on the synchronic and diachronic theories of time, the nature of irony, and the processes of mystification and demystification. In this chapter Paul de Man's Blindness and Insight and Roy Male's Hawthorne's Tragic Vision will provide a critical basis for the treatment of the *felix culpa* theme and the tragic sensibility. The Epilogue will summarize the main assertions of the dissertation and will anticipate future study of nineteenth-century allegories such as Edgar Allan Poe's "The Masque of the Red Death" and "The Fall of the House of Usher," George Washington Cable's "Belles Demoiselles Plantation," and William Dean Howells' The Rise of Silas Lapham, as well as twentieth-century allegories such as William Faulkner's Absalom! Absalom! and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man.

## CHAPTER I

### FOUNDATION: THE ELEMENTS OF ALLEGORY

*It is a great mistake to try to put  
our best thoughts into human language.*

Hawthorne

Comparative studies are often useful because they allow us to make observations and to draw conclusions with some degree of objectivity and authority. In our analysis here, for example, we can go a long way toward minimizing critical subjectivity by placing nineteenth-century American allegory and culture in historical perspective. If we limit our definition of “cultural values” to mean only the major philosophical trends of a given time and place, we can then trace the evolutions of allegory and philosophy to show how the genre has adapted to changing cultural values. At the very least, a brief comparative study of philosophy and allegory will help us to establish a critical lexicon based on historical accuracy and to support our claim that allegory is a diverse and dynamic literary genre. Through comparative study, we can distinguish between eight basic types of allegory, each with fabulistic and/or figural elements: classical, Jewish, Patristic, Protestant, Romantic, intellectual, modern, and ironic. Of these, ironic allegory is

the predominant narrative genre of the American renaissance and thus the focus of our study. As we shall see, Hawthorne's "The Artist of the Beautiful" provides one of the clearest illustrations of ironic allegory, while the architectural metaphor emerges as one of the most significant elements of the genre.

If we are to understand how allegory has evolved in response to cultural changes, we should perhaps start with matters of origin. The beginnings of allegory date back to ancient Greece, at a time when philosophers, searching for truth, began to question classical mythology and to assert a generally metaphorical approach to literary interpretation. Since the time of Thales of Miletus, the first philosopher of historical record, Western philosophy has been characterized by a fundamental debate over man's capacity to know reality. Under the branch of metaphysics, this recurring debate has been represented by two antithetical theories: materialism and idealism. According to the materialists, all forms of existence can be reduced to matter; while the idealists, though acknowledging the external world, allow for the existence of non-material, abstract forms, such as religion and art, which they attribute to the workings of active minds, or even to a divine mind. Under the branch of epistemology, the reality debate has been represented by the opposing theories of rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists advocate an *a priori* conception of knowledge, in which understanding is obtained through reason, whereas the empiricists adhere to an *a posteriori* conception of knowledge that comes through

sense perception. To these broad categories can be added a neutral category that includes philosophical skepticism, which expresses profound doubt about the existence of reality altogether, and epistemological skepticism, which expresses doubt not in the existence of reality itself but in man's ability to know a reality inevitably beyond human perception.

Three basic approaches to these theoretical categories are monism, dualism, and pluralism—the belief in one, two, or many irreducible universal elements, respectively. Various applications of these three approaches to the six theoretical categories have led to the many comprehensive theories in the Western intellectual tradition. Despite its many variations, philosophy in the West, under close scrutiny, betrays a fundamental preoccupation with a single truth: the doubleness of things. Indeed, the central ambiguity of human experience emerges as the common bond between philosophy and allegory. Both philosophers and allegorists contemplate fundamental human Truths, such as the dilemma of unity and diversity. For example, the oppositions between metaphysical materialism and idealism and between epistemological rationalism and empiricism clearly parallel the literary opposition between fabulism and figuralism. As we shall see, though, obliqueness can be a source of beauty when worked out in literary language, but in rational language irreconcilable paradox often leads to intellectual frustration.

Among the first disciplined philosophers to consider the paradox of human experience were those of the Ionian, or Milesian, School—materialistic monists who shared a firm belief that all natural phenomena are different forms of a single primary substance. For Thales of Miletus the primary substance was water, while for Anaximenes it was air. Anaximander, however, pointed to an intangible and infinite substance that he called The Unlimited, which is divided into four basic opposites—hot and cold, and wet and dry. Anaximander's conception of the universe as a battleground of opposites, a force in perpetual motion, seems to contradict the notion of *kosmos* as universal order. Indeed, the evolution in thinking within the Milesian School, from universal stability to universal change, represents one of the earliest cultural responses to the paradox of unity and diversity. Along with the evolution from monism to pluralism came the transition from materialism to idealism, for the great thinkers of the Western world increasingly rationalized their positions as they struggled to reconcile the countless contradictions that plagued their own logical speculations. Some insisted that the universe is stable, that all paradoxes originate in the mind, but others argued that the reality of the universe is change, that only relative stability is possible—a kind of universal harmony in which human and divine reason unite.

Among those waging the debate over unity and diversity in early Greece were the Heracliteans and Pythagoreans on one hand and the Eleatics on the other. The philosophers of the Heraclitean School

asserted that stability is an illusion. Much like Anaximander, Heraclitus, in claiming fire as the primary substance of the universe, described the world as a scene of conflicting opposites; yet he differed from the Milesian in his rational approach to change. According to Herbalists, fire, since it is the most fluctuating of all substances, is the reality of the universe. He defined two essential movements of this substance, upward and downward, and concluded that a relative stability between these movements is achieved in the One, the idea of God as an all-ordering reason. Combining his views of conflicting opposites with those of the One, Herbalists developed the Logos Doctrine, which established that man could know reality by looking at the world from the perspective of Universal Reason; thus, he was one of the first philosophers to assert that we cannot rely wholly on our powers of observation, that our senses often trick us. Herbalists' major contribution to philosophy was the concept of unity in diversity, of the One as Many.

Similar to the Logos Doctrine of Herbalists is the Pythagorean philosophy called the transmigration of souls, the belief that each soul comes from God and is therefore the cause of order in man, just as God is the cause of order in the universe. Both the Heracliteans and Pythagoreans defined a metonymic relationship between man and God, part and whole, but Pythagoras went so far as to quantify this relationship in terms of numerical ratios, which he derived from the musical scale. He associated beauty and goodness with harmony, which he claimed results from correct proportions between the whole and its

part. The Pythagorean concept of the “music of the spheres,” for example, describes a relative universal unity, or harmony, in which numbers are correctly proportioned. In defining the musical nature of the universe, Pythagoras challenged the early Milesian belief in stability. The Milesians reduced all reality to material substance, yet Heraclitus suggested that maybe our senses cannot be trusted to tell us about reality. Pythagoras attempted to avoid this dilemma by shifting the focus from the nature of reality to the structure of reality; and in doing so, he highlighted the distinction between matter and form that would eventually divide the great philosophers Plato and Aristotle.

Even though Heraclitus claimed fire as the first substance of the universe and Pythagoras claimed number as the first substance, both men described a universe in flux and both suggested that true stability, therefore, is an illusion; yet in developing their ideas of harmony and of the logos, they did allow for states of relative unity, or dynamic equilibrium, which resulted from the structuring of human reason and Universal Reason. In contrast, the Eleatic philosophers, said to have founded the science of logic, argued in favor of universal stability and unity. Zeno of Elea, for example, achieved great fame by proposing a series of logical paradoxes in order to prove that all references to change are self-contradictory. He concluded that change is an illusion, a by-product of limited human reason. Another Eleatic, Parmenides, once a pupil of Pythagoras, attributed the limits of human reason to the flaws of language. He claimed that because reality (Absolute Being) cannot be

experienced by the senses, the material world is not real. Thus it was Parmenides who completed the split between sense and reason, appearance and reality, and divided philosophy into two major camps: materialism and idealism. He also influenced the young Socrates, who after hearing Parmenides speak, developed the theory of rational idealism.

With the complete split between appearance and reality, the relationship between unity and diversity became a full-blown paradox. Materialistic, skeptical, and idealistic responses to this paradox were put forth by the Pluralists, Sophists, and moral philosophers, respectively. First of all, the Pluralist Empedocles, in trying to reconcile the concepts of change and Being, broke from the monistic approach of his predecessors and suggested that the world is composed of four irreducible elements: earth, air, fire, and water. The essence of each element remains constant, but various combinations of elements create diversity. Stability results from the balance between two external forces, Love and Hate, which work to combine and separate the elements in an eternal cycle. This dynamic equilibrium between Love and Hate parallels the up and down movements of fire described by Heraclitus and the numerical ratios of Pythagoras. Unlike these earlier philosophers, Empedocles did not attribute balance to human or divine reason, but the Pluralist Anaxagoras did. According to his theory of cosmic evolution, the world was formed by the action of an eternal intelligence on chaos to create order. This intelligence he called the Mind; and thus it was he

who first articulated the debate over existence in terms of mind and matter.

A second approach to the paradox of human existence was the skepticism of the Sophists. Extremely practical, the Sophists were more concerned with human nature than with the nature of reality. Though not all of them professed doubt about the existence of absolute reality, they did doubt man's ability to know this reality. They claimed that because change is the law of life, sensual experience at one moment becomes obsolete the next; thus they concluded that there are no objective standards or values. Science and theology are useless, they argued, because they have no practical value in the present. This led the famous Sophist Protagoras to proclaim, "Man is the measure of all things." Applying their relativistic ethics to the human condition, the Sophists replaced the old opposition between mind and matter, appearance and reality, with a new opposition between convention and nature. Most of the Sophists valorized nature, but they condemned society for different reasons. Some complained that civilization disrupts the natural equality of man by making some men slaves of others, while other Sophists regretted that social laws interrupt the natural struggle for survival between the fit and the unfit. As we can see, these two approaches to convention and nature anticipate nineteenth-century Romanticism and naturalism.

Unlike the Pluralists and Sophists, finally, the moral philosophers defended a fundamentally idealistic position. This third group of

intellectuals can be further divided into two camps: the rationalists and the empiricists. Rational idealism began with Socrates, who taught that every person has an innate knowledge (“inner voice”) of absolute truth within the soul, and who concluded that the philosopher’s mission, therefore, is to help people discover truth by encouraging conscious reflection. Plato continued the work of Socrates by contemplating the nature of truth itself, and he eventually developed the theory of Ideas, a pantheistic philosophy that attributes ultimate reality to the Absolute Idea of the Good, which includes all lower Forms. This theory has a dualistic aspect as well, for Plato distinguished between the realms of sense and reason. Inheriting many of his beliefs from Parmenides, through Socrates, Plato felt that the world of the senses is unreal, that physical objects are imperfect copies of Ideas. Sensory experience leads to contradiction, he believed, while abstract forms such as mathematics lead to absolute knowledge.

Plato’s own pupil, Aristotle, criticized his master’s separation of form from matter and maintained that Ideas are contained within the physical objects themselves. According to Aristotle’s theory, known as rational empiricism, the only immutable and pure forms, transcending the sensory world, are human and divine reason. Aristotle’s definition of God as the “prime mover” (first cause) of the cosmos blends elements of the theories of Heraclitus and Pythagoras, while his advances in the science of logic follow the Eleatic tradition. His belief in pure forms echoes the idealism of Socrates and Plato, but his emphasis on biology

instead of mathematics, sensory perception instead of reason, parallels the materialism of the Pluralists. Thus, while the materialists reconciled the split between appearance and reality in favor of matter, and the rational idealists in favor of human reason—and while the skeptics avoided the reality debate altogether—Aristotle, in blending natural science and moral philosophy, empiricism and formalism, developed a comprehensive philosophy that provides a convincing response to the seeming paradox of human knowledge and existence.

By the time of Aristotle's death in 322 BC, all of the major components of Western philosophy had been systematized into various theories: materialism, skepticism, and idealism; rationalism and empiricism; and monism, dualism, and pluralism. Later philosophical theories would be imitations or combinations of ancient theories. Most of the theories from the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC to the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD, for example, represent watered-down versions of previous philosophies. The Epicureans reworked pluralist ideas in order to allow for the element of chance, and thus a physical basis for free will. The Stoics drew from the Heraclitean doctrine of the One as Many in order to form the doctrine of natural law, which makes human nature the standard for evaluating laws and social institutions. The Skeptics, of course, continued the Sophist tradition of pursuing happiness by suspending absolute judgment, and the Neo-Platonists combined Plato's theory of Ideas with religious beliefs to construct a hierarchical view of reality with the trinity of the One, the Logos (Platonic forms), and the World Soul at the top,

human souls and natural forces in the middle, and physical objects at the bottom. Not until the emergence of Scholasticism in the Middle Ages would the debate over human existence and knowledge regain its earlier seriousness and intensity.

As Greek philosophy evolved from the Milesian speculation about the primary substance to the Heraclitean-Eleatic debate over unity and diversity to the rational and empirical oppositions of Plato and Aristotle, the status of Greek literature altered considerably. Since the scientific and intellectual theories of the natural and moral philosophers challenged the validity of classical mythology, men such as Xenophanes objected to the literal interpretation of Homeric literature. Others defended the works of Homer by claiming that the gods and goddesses dramatized by Homer are merely symbolic representations of natural phenomena—that in fact the immortal beings never existed—while still others defended the Homeric epics as representations of moral virtues. It is here, in the shift from the literal to the fabulistic interpretation of Homer, that classical allegory was born. Inspired by the Homeric apologists, Greek philosophers began to use the old myths to teach new doctrines; they formed from the old legends elaborate fables by which to illustrate moral lessons. According to Madsen, an example of “myth allegorized by doctrine” (RA 31) is the Heraclitean interpretation of line 14 from Book One of the Iliad (“Ocean, the birth of gods, and Tethys their mother”), which calls to mind the Heraclitean Logos.

Originating with Homeric apologetics, classical allegory came to represent the symbolization of doctrine as critics began interpreting entire texts, word by word, in relation to extrinsic philosophies. About this type of pure fabulism Plato had strong opinions. Centuries before Coleridge, he defended his own theories of rational idealism by disparaging the arbitrary nature of allegorical interpretation; he condemned allegory for its obliqueness, for its tendency to hide truth. Given our understanding of Plato's ideal forms, we can suspect that Plato would have preferred a metonymic conception of language. Drawing on Plato's objections, however, the Stoics pushed forward the notion that literature is "an expression of the fundamental knowledge of the poet, which is hidden behind a veil of words that only the philosopher can remove" (Madsen, RA 33). The efforts of the Stoics contributed to the shift from the defensive stance of the apologists to the more positive function of allegory, and by the close of the classical period, the fabulistic approach to allegory, which "assumes a direct signifying relationship between textual signs and an extrinsic system of ideas" (Madsen, RA 34), was firmly entrenched.

Like classical allegory, early Jewish allegory is characterized by a shift from a defensive to a positive function, yet whereas classical allegory is fabulistic, Jewish allegory is a composite form blending fabulism and figuralism. The difference between the two approaches to the genre reflects the different attitudes of the two cultures. Unlike the Greeks and Romans, who for the most part conceived of literary texts as

the arbitrary constructions of poets, the Jews believed the Old Testament to be the word of God. At first, Jewish apologists defended the Pentateuch against the external threat of Greek philosophy, yet later rabbinic exegetes adopted a positive strategy in order to reconcile the Law with internal changes in Jewish culture. This new approach to interpretation is called midrash, which can be divided into halakah (legal interpretation) and aggadah (religious and national interpretation). When we speak of Jewish allegory, we mean aggadic midrash, a somewhat free interpretation of Scripture which avoids textual contradictions by allowing for multiple meanings. As Madsen points out, midrash generates “a punning style of interpretation that reveals a polyvalence of significance.” According to the Rabbis, “there was no contradiction between conflicting interpretations of a given passage of Scripture because the normative power, the ‘truth,’ of Scripture was considered to be rich enough to sustain many different expressions” (Madsen, RA 37). Although both fabulism and midrash allow for free interpretation, the former leads to the arbitrary replacing of one meaning for another, while the latter explores multiple facets of a single, divinely inspired Truth.

While classical and Jewish apologists defended Homeric poetry and the Old Testament, respectively, early Christian apologists faced the double challenge of defending the Bible against Hellenistic philosophy and reconciling seeming contradictions between the Old and New Testaments. In light of this double jeopardy, it is no wonder that

Christian exegetes adapted allegory to their purposes, for “allegorical interpretation provided a well-established method of reconciling conflicting cultures; it was shared by Greek philosophy and Jewish theology and so was an obvious basis upon which to answer criticisms of Christianity” (Madsen, RA 41). Unlike classical and Jewish allegory, though, Christian allegory is thoroughly metonymic in its Christic depiction of the interior relation between Scripture and the individual soul. The essence of Christian figuralism is described in the following comprehensive passage:

The individual reading subject [enabled by the grace of the Holy Spirit] is linked to the entire exegetical scheme by the concept that Christ, as the spiritual sense of Scripture, corresponds to the image of God that resides in the individual soul. This represents a new style of allegorism—derived ultimately from St. Paul—a figural form that is the Christian counterpart to classical fabulism. Underlying this figuralism is the idea of God as an absolute being, the creator, and active ruler of the world; recognizable through His creatures and comprehensible through the *logos*; incarnate in the flesh, the Church, and the Bible. In each of these forms the mystery of Christ is “figured” and it is this Christic “figure” in the soul that makes this mystery apprehensible to man. The substitutive metaphoric referentiality characteristic of pagan allegorism is replaced

with intrinsic metonymy—*symbolisme* of a sort—whereby Christ as the *logos* forms a kind of Transcendental “Tenor” to a number of temporal metonymic “vehicles”: the Bible, the Church, the earthly life of Christ, and the Christic figure possessed by every human soul. . . . As the one who transmits God’s view of the world, the prophet can communicate only in figures. Every detail of Scripture is thus allegorical: the purpose of exegesis therefore is to discover the Savior’s reality beneath every letter by investigating every figure and correspondence as a potential “vehicle” to the Christic “Tenor.” (Madsen, RA 50, 51)

By speaking of Scripture in metonymic rather than metaphorical terms, the early Christians seem to have successfully met the challenges of their Hebrew and Hellenistic critics, yet by conceiving of Christ, the blending of physical and spiritual, as the *logos* that links the two testaments, Biblical exegetes opened up an entirely new controversy; for if the New Testament fulfills the Old Testament, then what fulfills the New Testament? The two generic responses to this dilemma of referentiality are Patristic allegory, which gives priority to the Church, and Protestant allegory, which prioritizes the individual sanctified soul.

Returning to our discussion of philosophy, we can see that Patristic allegory emerged to some degree in response to a cultural shift during the Middle Ages toward the need for authority in theological and philosophical speculation. Attempting to reconcile the Greek emphasis

on reason with the emphasis on religious emotion in the teachings of Christ and the apostles, medieval philosophers carried on the ancient materialism-idealism debate that began with the Milesians and culminated with Plato and Aristotle. St. Augustine took a Platonic approach to reconciliation, while Scholastics such as St. Thomas Aquinas favored Aristotelian philosophy. Like the Neo-Platonists, St. Augustine maintained a somewhat anti-intellectual stance. Believing that God is the absolute standard for all truth, he concluded that man's knowledge of reality depends on God's grace. Anticipating Descartes, Augustine asserted that the very act of thinking confirms man's reality and the existence of absolute certainty, but he also maintained that intellectual knowledge of this certainty is impossible. According to Augustine, knowledge begins in the mind through God's illumination; and then, as one draws closer to God, knowledge leads to wisdom and ultimately truth, which exists only in the soul, not in the mind. Thus, the epistemology of Augustine is characterized by the distinction between mind and soul and by man's dependence on God's grace and illumination for knowledge.

In the 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, the authority of Augustinian philosophy was challenged by the Scholastics, who nurtured an intense concern for logic even though they did continue to valorize revelation over reason. The Scholastics waged an intellectual battle over the nature of reality. The logical realists such as William of Champeaux sided with Plato in arguing for the independent existence of universal abstractions,

while the nominalists such as Roscellinus sided with Aristotle in the belief that only objects are real and that universals are merely names. Applying realistic and nominalistic concepts to the subject of the Trinity, Abelard, the famous pupil of both Roscellinus and William of Champeaux, developed the doctrine of conceptualism, which states that although universals have no external reality, they are more than merely names because they exist as ideas in the mind.

Another response to the realism-nominalism conflict is the double truth doctrine first introduced by Averroes. Attempting to overcome the contradictions between Aristotelian philosophy and revealed religion, he distinguished between two separate systems of truth, a scientific body of truths based on reason and a religious body of truths based on revelation. St. Thomas Aquinas argued against the Averroists that the truths of faith and the truths of reason cannot conflict but rather apply to different realms. Aquinas believed that the truths of natural science and philosophy can be discovered by reasoning from facts of experience, whereas the tenets of religion, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, are beyond rational comprehension and must be accepted on faith. Consequently, Aquinas combined Aristotelian science with Augustinian theology; he distinguished between sense and intellect, and between acquired knowledge and revealed knowledge.

By the end of the Middle Ages, the integrated system of thought developed by Aquinas, which can be called natural theology, replaced that of Augustine as the authoritative philosophy of the Catholic church.

Yet both men were representative of the Middle Ages, and both favored the Patristic approach to Scripture. Wrestling with the concepts of revealed and acquired knowledge, the debate between realism and nominalism, and the distinctions between mind and soul, they concluded that matters of religion are beyond rational comprehension and must therefore be accepted on faith. Because of our inability to know truth, they argued, we must conform to the sacraments established by the Catholic Church; we need the Church to validate sacred texts since the individual soul lacks the authority and ability to do so.

According to the Patristic view defended by Augustine and Aquinas, direct communion with God, without the mediation of the Church, is impossible. And so in Patristic allegories we can expect to find mediating figures, visible signs and ecclesiastical structures, that stand for the Church and serve to establish normative continuity. In Piers Plowman, for example, many of the personifications represent an ideal, grace-endowed Church. In contrast to this type of ecclesiological approach, Protestant allegories such as The Faerie Queen and Pilgrim's Progress take a strictly Christological approach. Redcross rejects the House of Pride, with its promise of objective validation, in favor of the House of Holiness, where he gains an awareness of Providence and thus learns to rely solely on God.

Similarly, Christian learns, in the House of the Interpreter, that certitude of election can neither be objectively validated nor actively earned; that only through the subjective interpretation of Scripture and

experience, revealed *a priori* and guided by faith, can the individual come to know the meaning of his own destiny. In the distinction between Church and soul, then, we see the Patristic and Protestant approaches to the problem of allegorical desire, the search for perfect correspondence. In Patristic allegory the emphasis is on gaining or losing salvation (*quid agas*), whereas in Protestant allegory, especially Puritan allegory, the focus is on the workings of grace in the soul (*opus Dei*) and on the individual's search for the certainty of election (Madsen, RA 107).

Like Augustine and Aquinas, Protestant exegetes such as Martin Luther emphasized man's inability to know God's reality and his subsequent dependence on grace, yet whereas Patristic exegesis allows for the objective validation of grace by the ecclesiastical institution, Protestant exegesis, in making no such allowance, valorizes uncertainty in interpretation. In one sense, the transition between Patristic and Protestant allegory represents a literary response to a significant cultural shift, beginning during the Renaissance, away from the objective authority of the Church—and with it the divine right monarchies—toward a conception of authority that is increasingly more subjective. In literature, this cultural shift is reflected in the move from Patristic to Protestant to Romantic to modern allegory. In theology it is seen in the slow death of God—as Catholicism and Protestantism gave way first to Deism and then to Atheism. Finally, the intellectual evolution from medieval to modern philosophy is characterized by the move from Scholasticism to Cartesian dualism to existentialism. As we shall see,

dualistic philosophical theories emerge as the clearest expression, in logical language, of what we call here allegorical desire.

Western philosophy in the ancient and medieval periods, we remember, was characterized by binary oppositions founded on the metaphysical paradox of unity and diversity and on the epistemological paradox of knowledge and existence. Even the Sophists, who tended to avoid matters of absolutes, demonstrated dualistic thinking in their separation of convention and nature. Indeed, though most ancient and medieval theories were fundamentally monistic or pluralistic, many did contain strong dualistic elements. The Milesian Anaximander, for example, explained his concept of the Unlimited in terms of two essential conflicts—between hot and cold, wet and dry—and in forming his Logos Doctrine, Heraclitus argued that the One is affected by the up and down movements of the primary substance, fire. Pythagoras reduced the universe to numerical ratios, and the Pluralist Empedocles, though he allowed for four irreducible elements (earth, air, fire, and water), described an eternal cycle between the opposing forces of Love and Hate.

Another Pluralist Anaxagoras distinguished between mind and matter, which led to further distinctions by the idealists between sense and reason, appearance and reality. The opposition of rationalists such as Plato on one side and empiricists such as Aristotle on the other continued in the Middle Ages in the form of the realism-nominalism conflict. In addition to this metaphysical debate, medieval thinkers, disagreeing about the relation between philosophy and theology, waged

an epistemological battle over revelation and reason. Undoubtedly, the influence of medieval theology on philosophy gave rise to theories with significant dualistic elements. Most notable among these are Augustine's distinction between mind and soul, the Averroist double truth doctrine, and the comprehensive theories of Aquinas.

As the medieval view of God as the source of all truth gave way to the modern view of the world as a vast machine governed by physical laws, experience and reason became the sole standards of truth. But this fundamental change represents a return to classical origins rather than an exploration into uncharted intellectual territory. Even though Bacon did develop a new scientific method and was among the first to formulate rules of induction, and even though Galileo did create the science of mechanics, the two men were not so much scientific pioneers as successors of the Greek natural philosophers; they were in a manner descendants of the Milesians. In the same way, the dualism of Descartes represents a reworking of many ancient and medieval ideas. Like Anaxagoras, Descartes distinguished between mind and body, and as with Aristotle he took a scientific approach to knowledge. In direct imitation of Augustine he deduced the reality of his own existence, and the existence of God, from the act of his own reasoning—to which his famous axiom *cogito, ergo sum* testifies—and he accepted the traditional religious doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Finally, like Averroes he advocated a doctrine of double truths while offering no theories as to how these truths can be reconciled.

When we speak of modern philosophy in terms of Cartesian dualism, then, we must keep in mind the classical roots of the materialism-idealism conflict. More importantly, we should realize that dualism is in essence the philosophical counterpart to interpretive and narrative allegory, for each of these represents a profound response to the human paradox. It must be admitted, however, that whereas the artistic approach to paradox often leads to the poetic beauty of ambiguity, the logical approach can lead to frustration, discord, and endless debate. Modern philosophers have continued the age-long search for reconciliation of the paradox of human existence. Materialists such as Hobbes attempted to solve the mind-body dilemma by reducing the mind to the internal motions of the body. Spinoza, in his theory known as psychophysical parallelism, explained that the mind and body, as two forms of the same substance, seem to affect one another without actually doing so. Locke blended the Cartesian division between mind and body with the mechanistic description of nature to form his theory of modern empiricism; he claimed that sensation provides the material for *a posteriori* knowledge of the external world and reflection the material for *a priori* knowledge of the mind.

By emphasizing the role of the mind, Locke made epistemology the principal concern of modern philosophy, and thus introduced an element of skepticism; for the world outside the mind, he argued, cannot be proven with certainty. Expanding on Locke's empiricism, Berkeley developed the idealistic theory known as phenomenalism, the idea that

sensory phenomena are the only objects of knowledge, while Hume, taking Locke's skepticism to the extreme, used Berkeley's own beliefs against him in order to argue that knowledge of both the external world of matter and the internal world of the mind is impossible. In an attempt to reconcile the conflict between empiricism and rationalism, Kant developed a comprehensive system of philosophy similar to the earlier integrated systems of Aristotle, Averard, and Aquinas. According to Kant, knowledge comes from experience itself, but the mind imposes forms (such as causality, substance, space, and time) on this experience to give it order. Kant's major contribution to philosophy is his distinction between the phenomenal world of human experience, which can be tested scientifically, and the noumenal world that transcends human experience and can be understood only by the mind. Like his medieval predecessors, then, Kant defined two types of knowledge; yet whereas the Scholastics valorized knowledge revealed to the soul over empirical knowledge, Kant remained essentially agnostic, allowing only for deductive and limited inductive knowledge.

Kant's critical idealism, also known as Transcendentalism, was challenged by various philosophers who pointed out a fundamental flaw in the concept of *Ding an sich* ("the thing in itself"). Jacobi, for example, observed that one cannot get into Kant's system without the *Ding an sich* and that with it one cannot stay in the system. And so, as with Hume's response to Berkeley, Jacobi and others used Kant's own words against him. Kant had argued that investigation of the human capacity for

knowledge should precede investigation of the world, but following this same logic, his critics pointed out that investigation of our capacity to know should be preceded by an investigation of our capacity to investigate. Pointing to the self-contradictory nature of the thing-in-itself, and the paradox of form and content, the post-Kantians, like the Romantics, stressed the importance of faith, emotion, and art. Their own philosophy, absolute idealism, represents an optimistic attempt to escape the fundamental absurdity of Kantian philosophy. Hegel's dialectic, for example, presents an optimistic approach in which conflict and contradiction are essential elements of truth, and in which truth itself is regarded as a process. According to Hegel, cosmic reason, the ultimate source of reality, develops from the abstract to the concrete through a dialectical process of triadic stages, each containing a thesis, an antithesis, and a higher state of synthesis. By equating the processes of thought to those of nature and history, Hegel revived the rationalist claim that absolute knowledge of reality can be obtained.

During the nineteenth century, the philosophical speculations of Kant and Hegel had a tremendous influence on literary artists. Writers of the Enlightenment had valorized the painted image as an imitation of nature, a sign of universal order. Stressing subject matter as the basis for aesthetic judgment, they maintained that the purpose of art is to make the invisible visible, to convert non-sensory feelings and thoughts into concrete presences. The mimetic imagination dominated the eighteenth century, and the poetic image served a key role in the process

of associative analogy. In contrast to the artists of the Enlightenment, those of the nineteenth century valorized metaphor over mimesis, and the organic conception of imagery replaced the idea of symbol as representation. European Romantics such as Goethe and Samuel Taylor Coleridge conceived of metaphor as dialectical between subject and subject, rather than between subject and object. For them, the purpose of art is not just translucence, as with associative analogy, but also synthesis—an intersubjective, interpersonal unity between mind and nature. Because of this distinction, critics often use the terms *sympathy* or *affinity* rather than *analogy* when defining the role of the Romantic image.

Just as Plato had condemned the arbitrary nature of classical allegory, Coleridge criticized the fabulistic elements in the Biblical exegesis of his day. Disparaging what he called the “hollowness of abstractions” and the “contagion” of mechanic philosophy, Coleridge believed that the Scriptures are the “living *educts* of the imagination,” which give “birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors” (660). In the Scriptures, he writes, facts and persons have two-fold significance (past and future, temporary and perpetual, portrait and ideal). This metonymic vision of truth and language, akin to the absolute idealism of the post-Kantian philosophers and constituting the foundation of Coleridge’s organic theory of poetry, presents an appealing alternative to a “comfortless religion” that “recognizes no medium between *literal* and

*metaphorical.*” When no such medium is allowed, faith is either “buried in the dead letter” or it is “usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with allegories” (Coleridge 661).

According to Coleridge, allegory “is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principle being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot.” On the other hand, he writes that symbol “is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual or of the general in the especial or of the general in the universal. Above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.” In other words, symbol “abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative” (Coleridge 661). Coleridge’s association of allegory with mechanical understanding is unfortunate because in ignoring the double aspect of the genre, with its fabulistic and figural elements, he seems to contradict his own assertions regarding the two-fold significance of Scripture. And as we have already noted, the Romantic renaming of allegory and symbol created a fundamental debate about the nature of the poetic image that has dominated literary criticism ever since.

Ultimately, Romantic allegory can be distinguished from Protestant allegory by its radical subjectivity. Coleridge and other Romantics substituted the mystically inspired imagination of the poets for the inner voice of the moral philosophers and for the revealed knowledge of the

Biblical prophets. By valorizing the poetic genius, they contributed to the general erosion of the Bible's privileged status in society as the ultimate standard of truth. In this respect, the transition from Protestant to Romantic allegory reflects the larger cultural shift to a less doctrinal and a more literary approach to religion. The new approach, expressed poetically in Romantic allegory, preached a somewhat pantheistic message, for God, in the presence of Nature, replaced Christ as *logos*, and secular literature replaced the Bible as proof-text. Reminiscent of the Milesian preoccupation with the primary substance is the Romantic notion of God as the originary One, the absolute Transcendental signified—the fulfillment of allegorical desire.

When the allegorical desire for unity and perfect correspondence is worked out in rhetorical rather than poetic language, as it was during the American renaissance, the result is a form of dialectic, similar to Romantic allegory, called Transcendental or intellectual allegory, which emerged as a direct response to the Calvinist legacy. In seeming to reconcile the ancient and Christian senses of general and singular identity, respectively, Calvinism placed the burden of interpretation on one's ability to find identity in the face of God (Hansen 62). Drawing on this tradition, Ralph Waldo Emerson linked philosophy and aesthetics to develop the idea of truth as metaphor. Believing the self to be a necessary contradiction, Emerson maintained that language needs to be highly metaphoric in order to allow for mediation between interior and exterior. Here the mediator is the Transcendental image.

Unlike the Romantic image, which suggests a mutual relationship between fact and symbol, the Transcendental image suggests continuation; for if every fact is a symbol, Emerson points out, then we must choose from an infinite number of symbols to achieve a coherent image of one world. "In rhetorical terms," Madsen notes, "this sequence could be described as a serial attempt to transform metaphor into metonymy, whereby the vehicle would become an integral part of a Transcendental tenor" (RA 86). As we can see, Emerson's allegorical thought—the conceptualization of symbolic continuation in the search for truth—is in essence the artistic expression of the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

Substituting for dialectic the term allegoresis, Olaf Hansen describes the process by which Emerson, Thoreau, and other American Transcendentalists approached the paradoxical condition of man through "the conscious structuring of a specific experience in a series of tropes and rhetorical configurations" (48). In Aesthetic Individualism and Practical Intellect, perhaps the finest critical work on the uniquely American genre intellectual allegory, Hansen writes that the "central force" of Emerson's concept of identity is the assumption that the self includes not only the possibility but also the necessity of self-contradiction. It was Emerson, then, who "introduced the idea of self-reference as a rationally and philosophically inevitable foundation of a possible sense of self and identity" (Hansen 64). In the tradition of Emerson's essays, Thoreau's journals, masterpieces of self-reference,

compile the artist's efforts to keep the human paradox in motion. The "dualism between self-denial and self-reference," revealed in Thoreau's most private observations, is the "logical consequence of working out the structure of the paradox in question" (Hansen 136).

Taken together, Emerson's essays and Thoreau's journals, prime examples of allegoresis, highlight both the possibilities and the limitations of rhetoric that relies on the logic of metaphor (Hansen 64). For the reader, the journals and essays can be as exhausting and discouraging as chasing the horizon. Every synthesis promises completion, satisfaction, but delivers instead new oppositions at every turn. We grasp for the truth but it eludes us—always beyond our reach. The experience of the American Transcendentalists teaches us that perfect unity between the self and Nature, subject and object, can never be achieved. We can never recover the lost Eden. Yet the artistry of intellectual allegory lies in the beautiful frustration of unfulfilled allegorical desire. If the Transcendental poets fail to lead us back to paradise, they do succeed in unmasking the tragic nature of the human condition. With each metaphor they create a "momentary balance between the universal truth and its only possible realization in the shape of fluid personal experience" (Hansen 104). They open for us, if not a door, at least a porthole, through which we glimpse the face of God.

By the dawn of the twentieth century, the pantheism of the Romantics and Transcendentalists, as well as the Patristic, Protestant, and Deistic approaches to Truth and divine being, were beginning to be

replaced by a more limited, secular, and fundamentally existential conception of relative truth in which amoral history, not God or Nature, serves as the measure of all human experience. After Kant and Hegel, Western philosophy branched into two major directions—one stressing emotional, irrational, and subjective experience, the other stressing rational and objective experience. The rational path was taken primarily by American philosophers, who continued the empiricist tradition by stressing induction and experimental science. They formulated the theory of pragmatism, which claims that the value of a concept depends on the predictions that can be made by use of the concept and that can be verified by future experience. William James, for example, maintained that all truth should be evaluated according to its usefulness in solving problems, while Dewey's theory of experimental naturalism emphasized the biological and social basis of knowledge.

Objective intellectual theories such as pragmatism and experimental naturalism are reflected in the literary traditions of realism and naturalism. Modernism, however, is more closely associated with the subjective theories pursued by European philosophers. Rejecting Hegel's optimistic faith in reason and progress, for instance, Schopenhauer maintained that both nature and humanity are products of an irrational will, from which people can escape only through art and through philosophical renunciation of the desire for happiness. Nietzsche carried Schopenhauer's theories further by making the will-to-power the source of all value and stressing the values of individual self-

assertion, biological instinct, and passion. In the same manner, Kierkegaard attacked the Hegelian emphasis on reason, and his defense of feeling and subjectivity laid the foundation for modern existentialism.

Contemporary philosophy, finally, has been dominated by linguistic concerns. Santayana and Adams stressed intellectual and, like Schopenhauer, aesthetic values; and Husserl returned to epistemological considerations in his theory of phenomenology. But analytic philosophy has had the most lasting impact on post-modern thought. Practitioners of this approach, which is also called linguistic analysis, attempt to avoid ambiguous language by identifying the meaning of words with their common usage. This linguistic approach breaks with traditional epistemology and is more closely linked to literary critical theory. Our current study of allegory is in some ways a form of linguistic analysis because in exploring the quest for truth in terms of literary expression and interpretation, we are in fact linking epistemology, linguistics, and aesthetics.

Critical theory in our day seems to have swallowed up philosophy and theology. Ancient and medieval thinkers made little distinction between philosophy, theology, and science, for all three disciplines addressed issues of ontological significance. Theologians of the Renaissance and Enlightenment continued the quest for meaning, though their emphasis changed from the ecclesiastical to the Christological; while scientists, freed from questions of being by the proliferation of Deistic attitudes, pursued a more methodical exploration

of mechanical and physical principles. Modern philosophers, in the meantime, were heralding the epistemological age. With the shift in importance from being to knowing came the pre-eminence of the Cartesian paradox between subject and object. In the early nineteenth century, philosophers and theologians seem to have joined forces once again, this time in opposition to the scientists, matching their pantheistic religion of organic Nature against the mechanical and artificial encroachments of human invention.

Romantic and Transcendentalist writers embraced the absolute idealism of the post-Kantians, believing ultimately that the human paradox could be resolved by the mystic capacity of the written word and the special insight of the poet. They privileged the Imagination as a way to escape the solipsism of subjectivity by shaping experience into reality. Yet the claims of the Romantics and Transcendentalists that “Scripture is essentially *poesis* produced by the kind of inspired vision that the poet possesses in greatest degree” (Madsen, RA 120) reduced the Bible to the status of inspired poetry and led post-Romantics to challenge the “notions of a unitary subject and a unitary end to history” (Madsen, RA 123). And so whereas the nineteenth century began with the shift in cultural emphasis from the divine inspiration of the prophets to the individual poetic genius, it ended with a new shift away from the individual toward the impersonal cultural forces that shape artistic tastes. In place of a figural subject, the modern form of “fabulistic allegory draws upon the supplementarity of a reader who supplies

conventional signifieds for indeterminate metaphoric signifiers. . . . the individual genius valued by Romanticism gives way to the culturally constituted discursive subject prized by poststructuralism” (Madsen, RA 123).

Today the linguistic age has overthrown the epistemological age. The transition in authority from Scripture to secular texts to history has marked the demise of logocentrism. Language, in other words, has been cut loose from the anchor of being. Attempting to avoid the moralism of theology and the Cartesian paradox of modern philosophy, critical theorists of the twentieth century have preached instead a form of secular pantheism, in which language itself is the prime mover, the universal One. The New Critics, who sought to maintain the autonomy of poetic language against vast socio-political theories such as Marxism, privileged symbol over allegory, while for the post-structuralists, allegory, “by assuming the priority of language over experience, is valued as a less ‘mystified’ method of figuration” (Madsen, RA 122). Contemporary critics have resisted what they call the totalitarianism of symbolism; they have discouraged closure and celebrated emancipation through the play of language.

Perpetual play, so important to the post-structuralists, is clearly a distinguishing mark of allegory. Protestant allegory, we recall, is distinguished from Patristic allegory by its valorization of the uncertainty of interpretation, and the American Transcendentalists engaged in both oral and written dialectic. Modern allegory represents a blending of these

two forms with elements of classical allegory. Like intellectual allegory, modern allegory presents a form of dialectic, yet whereas the former is based on the essentially idealistic belief in the possibility of poetic unity, the latter form has a decidedly skeptical foundation. In this sense it resembles Protestant allegory, though it differs in its metaphorical approach to language. For the Protestants, divine grace mediates between the soul and the external world and allows the individual to gain certainty of election. In the same way, the Transcendentalists conceived of the inspired Imagination as a link between interior and exterior. Modern allegorists, however, make no allowances for such intrinsic revelation.

In valorizing metaphor over metonymy, fabulism over figuralism, modern allegory is linked with classical allegory. Despite their common ground on textual matters, however, classical and modern allegorists diverge on matters contextual. The language of Homer's epics may be arbitrary, with extrinsic meaning imported to an encoded text, but the ancient philosophers maintained that the truths behind, or rather beyond, the words are nonetheless absolute. And so they used the fables to instruct their readers, to expound moral doctrines. In contrast, their modern counterparts, coming from an existential perspective, suggest that if written text is arbitrary then maybe its context is as well. They tend to see all truths as relative, beyond the text perhaps but never beyond the mind of the composer. Thus, modern allegory, metaphorical in nature, is an existential and skeptical form of classical allegory. It

exhibits the linguistic play of Jewish and intellectual allegory, but its polyvalence ceases to be a means to an end and becomes simply the end in itself. And finally, like Protestant allegory, it valorizes uncertainty, although now the focus is not on the assurance of election but rather on the post-structural ethics of justice and freedom.

Ironically, in discouraging closure and celebrating freedom, the post-structuralists have in fact pinioned humanity. Just as political correctness breeds conformity where it would promote diversity, so, too, does contemporary critical theory risk dehumanization, as the reality of the self is lost in the play of language. If we are released from the “oppressive morality” of an absolute, or at least a culturally shared, value system, then we are immediately trapped within an equally oppressive system of language. As Madsen notes, the “metonymic trope of figural allegory has assimilated the dual functions of part and whole; the narcissism implicit in Emersonian symbolism is realized by this allegorical self-absorption” (RA 126). Since language is both part and whole, and the Transcendental signified is therefore absent, history is reduced to a series of random, disconnected events (Madsen, RA 126,127). It is this very conception of amoral history that is represented in modern allegory—a self-defining genre, marked by its series of arbitrarily related signs, that echoes the mood of twentieth-century society, which struggles with the modern crisis of reference as it seeks to define itself in the absence of absolute standards of truth.

Negotiating between oppression and liberation, correspondence and divergence, modern allegory creates a necessary balance which Walter Benjamin calls demystification. Since man is shackled by language, Benjamin asserts, and thus can never know reality, then we must abandon the quest for a single and totalizing normative meaning and seek instead to reclaim shared cultural values from marginalized history. Paul de Man, on the other hand, seems to reject the possibility of shared values. Working against both individual and cultural idealism, he puts forth a “post-structural doctrine of linguistic indeterminacy” (Madsen, RA 129) that focuses not on the past, as with Benjamin, but on the existential present. For de Man, demystification is a process of disruption that reveals the void between language and objective reality, a referential gap that ultimately reveals the paradox of human experience and the resulting irony of normative discourse.

So far we have traced the evolution of Western philosophy from materialism to idealism to existentialism and the parallel development of allegory from fabulism to figuralism and then back to fabulism. For ancient philosophers, metaphorical literary language, though arbitrary, provided a necessary medium with which to explore doctrinal certainties, while for the Jewish and Christian prophets it was divinely inspired Scripture that mediated between God and the individual soul. The European Romantics and the American Transcendentalists of the nineteenth century privileged the organic, metonymic relationship between language and the poetic Imagination, whereas twentieth-century

authors have employed metaphorical language as a way to balance the oppressiveness of historical discourse with the nihilistic potential of total personal freedom. In our brief comparative study, we have seen that the seven types of allegory discussed to this point—classical, Jewish, Patristic, Protestant, Romantic, intellectual, and modern—reflect different cultural approaches to the nature of truth and the problem of reference; however, not all allegorical works, we must admit, fit neatly into these seven categories. The short stories and novels of Hawthorne and Melville, for example, exhibit mixed metaphorical and metonymic elements. For this reason, we must define an eighth type of allegory, ironic, which thrived in nineteenth-century America.

Ironic allegory is perhaps more closely associated with Jewish allegory than with any of the other six types of the genre. Midrash, we remember, combines the metonymic view of language with a freedom of interpretation characteristic of fabulism. In the same way, ironic allegory is a form of mixed narrative. The fundamental difference between the two kinds, however, is that rabbinical exegetes used the play of language to illustrate the complexity of God, as revealed in the written word, whereas ironists promote free interpretation in order to expose the ambiguity of the universe. Another way to understand ironic allegory is by recalling the distinctions between intellectual and modern allegory. The Transcendentalists employed rhetorical dialectic in the quest for poetic unity, while their successors have used dialectic as a way of resisting closure. Ironic allegory represents a bridge between nineteenth-

century and twentieth-century allegory, for even though ironists do make use of poetic dialectic, they maintain a critical stance by resisting both the idealistic optimism of the Romantics and Transcendentalists and the existential freedom of the modernists.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that ironic allegory thrived in America during the middle of the nineteenth century. Half way between Romanticism and modernism, and just prior to the Civil War and the pre-eminence of literary realism and naturalism, writers of the American renaissance found themselves caught in the middle of sweeping historical and cultural changes, such as the establishment of the railroad, the split between northern industry and southern agriculture, and the general transition from rural to urban society. From this “middle” perspective, Nathaniel Hawthorne no doubt noted the dangerous, self-absorbing idealism of his Romantic predecessors, just as he anticipated the equally dangerous, self-neglecting pragmatism of his Gilded Age successors. In many ways, therefore, the overriding ambivalence of his work appears to be the product of an artistic sensibility that simply would not allow him to choose between the lesser of two evils, both of which would amount to oblivion. Caught as he was in the hermeneutic circle, Hawthorne remained true to the human heart.

When writing of the human heart, Hawthorne seems to have meant something quite different than the reality of human experience. In his preface to The House of the Seven Gables, for instance, he writes that although the writer of romances may take liberties with verisimilitude, he

“sins unpardonably so far as [he] may swerve aside from the truth of the human heart” (Hawthorne, House vii). Hawthorne’s apparent distinction here between truth and fact seems to echo the medieval Scholastic distinction between revealed and acquired knowledge, as well as the double truth doctrine of Averroes. This is not surprising when we consider the important impact of Kantian philosophy—derived from Aquinas among others—on nineteenth century art. If we can say that the Romantics adopted the absolute idealism of the post-Kantians, and Transcendentalists such as Emerson and Thoreau borrowed from Hegel the rhetoric of dialectic, then we can also say that the writings of Hawthorne and other American ironists such as Melville and Poe represent the artistic expression of Kant’s critical idealism.

Kant’s separation of noumena and phenomena and his awareness of the limitations of acquired knowledge clearly match Hawthorne’s divisions of scientific knowledge (facts) and heart knowledge (truth), as well as the author’s fundamental skepticism about man’s capacity to know anything except through faith. For Hawthorne the aesthetic value of allegory lies in its very obliqueness, in the qualities of ambiguity and irony. The literary artist, working within the medium of language, strives for perfect correspondence—complete unity between subject and object, part and whole—yet with each metaphor he is frustrated by failure; and so the chain of metaphors is drawn out into allegory, but leading where? The irony of his delusion, his mystification, soon becomes apparent as the failures mount. He sloughs off the robes of absolute idealism and

slips reluctantly into the more sobering mantle of self-awareness. In this way, failed correspondence creates irony, which leads first to demystification and then to moral growth. This, we remember, is the essence of Mallarmean symbolism defined by de Man, though Mallarme, of course, came after Hawthorne.

Ultimately it is the focus on moral growth, on the tragic sensibility that emerges through repeated failures of correspondence, that distinguishes ironic allegory from the other seven basic types. For this reason, ironic allegory could also be labeled critical, tragic, or moral allegory. One of the most representative works of this genre is Hawthorne's "The Artist of the Beautiful." In many ways the story is a critique of both Romanticism and realism. Owen Warland seems to be the artistic equivalent of a Romantic poet, for in his idealism he seeks fulfillment through an organic relationship with nature. His Celtic name, Owen, suggests something artistic and magical, whereas his last name, Warland, warns of something unnatural. In contrast, Robert Danforth's Saxon name hints at the blacksmith's physical strength. Danforth is the embodiment of the material world, just as Peter Hovenden is the mouthpiece of a cultural value system based not on beauty but on utility. Hawthorne's own critical stance seems to hover somewhere between Owen's ethereal subjectivity and Danforth's brutish objectivity.

In the "Artist of the Beautiful," as in many of his other allegories, Hawthorne explores the properties of time and light. Time, in fact, is the single most essential element of ironic allegory, for demystification is a

process in which previously disrupted temporal relationships are restored. It is no wonder, then, that Owen Warland and Peter Hovenden are watchmakers—and no surprise that we begin the story just outside Owen's shop, the window of which is filled with imitation gold clocks, "all with their faces turned from the street, as if churlishly disinclined to inform the wayfarers what o'clock it was" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 159). Here the apparent incivility of the clocks, as well as their ersatz exteriors, alludes to their deceptive and even malevolent intentions. The effects of time, after all, are nothing short of the decay, ruin, and ultimate death of mankind.

If the clock is the instrument of time, then so too is time the instrument of death; and so it is ironic that Peter Hovenden, like the common lot of humanity, regulates his life according to the heartbeat of the city clock. Time is so important to him that he cannot tolerate that Owen, more often than not, seems to be oblivious of its passing. And so when Annie suggests to her father, just outside the shop window, that Owen is inventing a new kind of timekeeper, Hovenden answers, "He would turn the sun out of its orbit and derange the whole course of time, if, as I said before, his ingenuity could grasp any thing bigger than a child's toy!" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 160). This observation is right on the mark. That Owen is a maker of timekeepers is significant because he literally attempts to keep time, to create immortality, through his artistic endeavors. The truth of the matter is, however, that human ingenuity is

relatively incapable of grasping anything bigger than a child's toy—and human beings cannot overcome their own mortality.

A second key ingredient in Hawthorne's allegory, aside from the theme of time, is the contrast of light and dark, which he beautifully manipulates to create ambiguity. Appropriately, we move directly from the orderly watchmaker's shop to the blacksmith shop, a chaotic domain of heat and intensity, of firelight and dancing shadows reminiscent of hell, as in William Blake's song of experience "The Tyger." The forge blazes up, the breath of the bellows is inhaled into leather lungs, and "in the momentary gloom the fire seemed to be glimmering amidst the vagueness of unenclosed space . . . where the bright blaze struggled with the black night, as if each would have snatched his comely strength from the other" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 160). Red and black, glare and alternate dusk, day and night—the advance and retreat of light and darkness play out the allegorical dilemma of correspondence and divergence. For the allegorist, each revolution of the earth traces a hermeneutic circle as the daily struggle of night and day is perpetually renewed, and with each orbit about the sun, the cosmic battle of good and evil runs its course like clockwork.

Amidst the scattering sparks and swirling steam of the blacksmith shop, Robert Danforth stands like a dark devil, pounding iron with a massive hammer, his muscular body equally solid and imposing. His firm connection with the material world is confirmed when Hovenden approvingly notes to Annie that the blacksmith "spends his labors on a

reality" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 160). This sharply contrasts Owen's ethereal, or "unreal," machinations. Owen spends much of his time carving wooden figures of birds and flowers with delicate ingenuity. He also toys at the hidden mysteries of mechanism, yet always for aesthetic rather than utilitarian purposes. He is like a Romantic poet, so much so that others suppose he is "attempting to imitate the beautiful movements of Nature" due to his "love of the beautiful, such as might have made him a poet, a painter, or a sculptor" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 161). Like Blake, Owen praises natural beauty and abhors the ugliness of steam engines and other forms of regular machinery.

By first juxtaposing the scenes at the watchmaker's shop and the blacksmith's, Hawthorne establishes a temporal framework against which he introduces Owen. This allows us almost immediately to recognize the nature of the young man's mystification. Caring "no more for the measurement of time than if it had been merged into eternity," Owen is unfit to "lead old blind Father Time along his daily course." He is mystified, intent on mastering time, "so that all the harsh dissonances of life might be rendered tuneful, and each flitting moment fall into the abyss of the past in golden drops of harmony" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 162). What better artistic expression of allegorical desire? Owen's absolute idealism disrupts his relation to time. In seeking harmony, perfect correspondence with nature, he denies his own mortality, his humanity. He isolates himself from society, and when the people protest that "time

was not to be trifled with," he withdraws even further into the "absorbing dream of his imagination" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 162, 163).

Left to himself, Owen focuses all of his time and energy attempting to spiritualize machinery, and the success of his endeavors, the strangely beautiful mechanical butterfly, becomes the central metaphor of the story. A perfect image for ironic allegory, the butterfly is an allusion to the Greek myth of Psyche (the soul), who by some accounts had butterfly wings. Chasing butterflies, then, represents the search for spirituality, for an absolute Transcendental signified. But as the narrator admits, the chase is doomed to tragic failure:

Alas that the artist, whether in poetry or whatever other material, may not content himself with the inward enjoyment of the beautiful, but he must chase the flitting mystery beyond the verge of his ethereal domain and crush its frail being in seizing it with a material grasp. Owen Warland felt the impulse to give external reality to his ideas as irresistibly as any of the poets or painters who have arrayed the world in a dimmer and fainter beauty, imperfectly copied from the richness of their visions. (Hawthorne, "Artist" 166)

Owen Warland's mechanical butterfly flutters about in the twilight region between the ethereal and the earthly, between the beautiful and the practical, symbolizing finally the absurd and contradictory nature of human experience. In fashioning the butterfly, he attempts to create an object of beauty that should attain the ideal, yet recognizing that Nature

herself falls short of the ideal, he concludes, "It was a dream such as young men are always mystifying themselves with" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 171). As a young man, he admits, he was mystified by the dream of unity between mind and nature, but a long series of setbacks, in which his attempts at perfection are continually thwarted, leads to his demystification. The first setback comes when Owen, seemingly unnerved by Robert Danforth's brute force, loses his delicate touch and crushes the butterfly. This produces a moment of irony as the narrator laments, "Thus it is that ideas, which grow up in the imagination and appear so lovely to it and of a value beyond whatever men call valuable, are exposed to be shattered and annihilated by contact with the practical" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 164).

For awhile Owen's affection for Annie anchors him in the real world, providing a much needed remedy for the moral cold of the isolated poet or prophet, but when Annie accidentally destroys his second butterfly, he reprimands her and sends her away. Thus, in his self-absorbed pursuit of the ideal, he loses his chance for happy solace, warm affection, and lasting love. He withdraws completely now, with no further interruptions save one. When he hears of Annie's engagement to Robert Danforth, he once again shatters the butterfly with his own hands, a sign of his mounting frustration. By the time he at last triumphs in fashioning the butterfly, however, Owen understands that any lasting unity between subject and object is impossible, that the mechanical butterfly is but a beautiful illusion.

Annie gives birth to her first son just as Owen succeeds in fashioning the butterfly. Unlike the butterfly, which flutters from Owen's imagination, the boy "had come mysteriously out of the infinite, but with something so sturdy and real in his composition that he seemed molded out of the densest substance which earth could supply" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 173). A connection is made between the boy and the butterfly in the image on the jewel box containing the miniature treasure, for it depicts a boy chasing a butterfly, which becomes a winged spirit and flutters toward heaven. In presenting the butterfly to Annie, now a belated wedding gift, Owen actually gives her his own self. "In the secret of that butterfly," we learn, "and in its beauty,—which is not merely outward, but deep as its whole system,—is represented the intellect, the imagination, the sensibility, the soul of an Artist of the Beautiful!" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 174).

At first it seems that Owen has triumphed over time and nature, that in spiritualizing machinery he has achieved perfect correspondence, absolute unity of being. Even Danforth exclaims, "Well, that does beat all nature!" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 175). Yet once Annie's child had compressed the mechanical butterfly in his hands, "the mystery of beauty had fled forever." Despite his earlier prediction, though, Owen is not dispirited by the loss. At the outset of his enterprise he promised, "If my labor be thus thwarted, there will come vague and unsatisfied dreams, which will leave me spiritless to-morrow" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 162), but now his spirit soars as he looks "placidly at what seemed the

ruin of his life's labor, and which was yet no ruin. He had caught a far other butterfly than this" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 177). For Owen the reality of the butterfly is of little worth since the true value of art lies in its lasting effect on the spirit. He has created a brief moment of success, the illusion of balance through art. Though a failure in the end, his efforts have led to increased awareness, to demystification and eventual moral growth. At this point the "fallen Owen Warland" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 171) seems to possess a tragic sensibility of the unbreachable gap between subject and object. He has come to the realization that so "long as we love life for itself, we seldom dread the losing it. When we desire life for the attainment of an object, we recognize the frailty of its texture" (Hawthorne, "Artist" 171).

"The Artist of the Beautiful" illustrates one of Hawthorne's greatest themes: the relation of art to science and nature. In the tale, the artist Owen Warland seeks a balance between his ethereal imagination and the concrete reality of science and nature by creating a mechanical butterfly. The allegorical treatment of the butterfly image is ultimately ironic, for Owen realizes in the end that a belief in the possible union between mind and nature constitutes a major mystification. For him the mechanical butterfly has value—not because of any utilitarian notion of its physical form but because of its effect on his spirit. Though ethereal and illusory, art is valuable because the created object of beauty demystifies us by revealing the ambiguity of the universe. Nathaniel Hawthorne's treatment of the butterfly image in "The Artist of the Beautiful" is

certainly not excessively abstract or dogmatic, and neither is it unpoetic. Indeed, Hawthorne's ironic allegory is poetic, vivid, and dynamic.

Though a perfect metaphor for ironic allegory, Nathaniel Hawthorne's butterfly is but an ephemeron lost within the vast landscape of American literature, a flitting, fleeting specimen of delicacy and intangible beauty engulfed by the looming shadows of what is perhaps the most prominent and powerful image of ironic allegory: the edifice. The architectural metaphor, a literary construction conspicuous in its intricate and grand design, stands as the premier emblem of American allegory, and American authors from Cooper to Faulkner have tapped its symbolic and thematic potential. In the nineteenth century, especially, American writers, influenced by the Gothic tradition, found in the arched windows, locked chambers, and dark passageways of the timeworn mansion the blueprints of human anatomy. Pointing to man's abnormal attachment to houses and other structures, nineteenth-century American writers established the edifice as a monument of human pride, as an elaborate facade that disrupts man's proper relation to nature and time.

Mystification, we recall, represents a state of delusion, in which the subject exaggerates his own importance to the point that he falsely believes in his superiority over both nature and time. Demystification is of course the reverse of this state, in which the subject, having achieved self-awareness, defines himself within a temporal framework. In American allegory, the architectural metaphor serves an invaluable

purpose, for it provides a concrete, poetic image against which the processes of mystification and demystification are played out. In the first act of this human drama, the subject confronts the elements of nature: wind, rain, snow, heat, and cold. His clothes provide little defense against the assault, so he constructs a crude shelter. Walls to break the wind, a roof to deflect rain and snow, windows to filter heat and light, and a door for easy access. More improvements increase his control over nature. Shutters defy daylight and a fireplace neutralizes the cold. As the curtain falls on the first act, our subject sits warm and safe before the fireplace of his new abode—door locked, shutters fastened, fire blazing—oblivious to the snow flurries just outside in the cold winter night.

With the arrival of spring, nature takes on a more friendly aspect, so our subject emerges from the protection of his four walls and surveys the landscape. He decides to farm the fertile land, so he clears the trees with his ax and burns out the stumps. He erects a barn for the plow horses and cows, a hen house for the chickens, and a pen for the pigs, and then he plants his crops. But rabbits and deer strip his crops, foxes raid the hen house, and a pack of wolves bring down one of his prize pigs, so he lines the perimeter of his land with an opposing and impenetrable fence. Now it is *his* land, you see. Those are *his* fields, after all, just on this side of the fence he put up with *his* own two hands. Those are *his* animals there in the pen, and that is *his* farmhouse in the center of everything. He owns this land. He is the master. Years pass

and the farm proves fruitful. Each harvest yields a staggering sum, and the master grows wealthy. He hires an architect to design his new family manor and then a team of men to demolish the crude old shelter. As the mansion is built, another crew is busy clearing and planting more fields and erecting more fences, so that by the time the edifice is complete, it sits proudly as the showpiece of the largest estate in the district.

Sadly our master's prosperity is short-lived, for it is a common condition of men to grow old and to die. The master's son buries his father beside his mother in the family plot behind the manor house and so inherits the great estate. Yet the new master never forgets his father's parting words of wisdom. "Never sell the estate," the old man said. "It is your birthright and shall be passed to your son and to his son, from generation to generation. Look on the family seat and be proud of your name." The family takes the words of the patriarch to heart, and the estate is passed down through the ages until it becomes such a permanent fixture of the landscape that the neighbors come to associate the family with the mansion itself. As the importance and permanence of their house becomes apparent, the family pride swells with each successive generation. So self-absorbed are they, in fact, that no one seems to notice the hair-line cracks in the mansion's foundation or the plaster just beginning to peel under the eaves near the great stone chimney.

Time passes and the weather-beaten mansion begins to show its true age. The roof leaks, the soaked floors warp, and chips of masonry

break free at every turn. The fields are no longer as fertile as they once were, and the family, suffering from bad investments overseas, must sell off the outer lands. Heavy winds one year uproot the family tree and it topples, splintering one of the mansion's crossbeams, and then, just as the repairs to the beam are complete, a solitary ash from the neglected fireplace floats out into the parlor and ignites a stack of papers. The charred house is unsalvageable, and since they cannot afford to rebuild, the family must auction off the remainder of the estate. For years they held themselves above their neighbors, and so a scarcity of marriages has dwindled the once prosperous family to a paltry remnant. Now, homeless and with their fortunes spent, they must descend at last from their pedestal of pride.

In the closing scene of our drama, we see a young lad, the last descendant of the original master, standing near the skeletal remains of his former home. As he overturns a smoldering stone with the toe of his boot, he cannot help but smile, for the irony of his family's fall overwhelms his sensibility. They had held themselves too high, he realizes; they had separated themselves from their fellow men and judged themselves superior because of their wealth. With the collapse of the house and the loss of their possessions, their illusion of permanence crumbled as well. The house, after all, proved no real protection against the ravages of time. Like Owen Warland, the lad sees, in a moment of epiphany, that the ruin at his feet is no ruin. His fall has been fortunate, for it has given him self-awareness and moral maturity. With his proper

relation to time and nature restored, he leaves the estate of his forefathers behind him and takes up residence among the community of humankind.

What the preceding example illustrates is the tremendous capacity of the edifice to mystify us with its properties of protection, possession, and permanence—as well as the nature of demystification, which begins with an ironic fall from pride and leads finally to redemption, or *felix culpa*, in which self-awareness and moral growth nurture the tragic sensibility. Because of the integral relationship of the edifice to the themes of irony and tragedy, the architectural metaphor is a key element of ironic allegory. So important is the edifice to the genre that it is a wonder no one has yet completed a thorough investigation of its use by American allegorists. As a matter of fact, few critics have even recognized ironic allegory as a legitimate American genre. Paul de Man, most notably in Blindness and Insight, investigates the properties of irony and allegory, yet he limits his discussion primarily to European poetry. Olaf Hansen provides a comprehensive analysis of American allegory in Aesthetic Individualism and Practical Intellect, but he discusses only intellectual allegory. Richard Chase, in his survey of American fiction, The American Novel and its Traditions, focuses on various elements of ironic allegory, but because of his acceptance of the Romantic bias for symbolism, these elements are absorbed into the general term “romance-novel.”

Unlike the previous critics, Deborah Madsen, in Allegory in America, does acknowledge the American tradition of ironic allegory. Her intentions in this work are more theoretical than analytical, however, and so even though she provides a useful framework for the treatment of the genre, she does not isolate and dissect poetic images or explore the thematic relationships of allegory, irony, and tragedy. Roy Male and Eric Sundquist, on the other hand, offer two outstanding critical examinations of nineteenth-century American literature, even though (like Chase) they refrain from linking romance and allegory. In Home as Found, Sundquist explores the theme of the psychological home as a Freudian attempt, or Oedipal struggle, to recover the lost Eden. He also studies the nature of tragedy and irony and the mystifying potential of the home, including the qualities of protection and possession. Despite his exhaustive discussion of genealogical conflict and the problems of representation, however, Sundquist's psychological criticism of Cooper, Thoreau, Hawthorne, and Melville falls short because he does not acknowledge the architectural metaphor. In other words, as Sundquist investigates the "home" he overlooks the "house."

A much more satisfying treatment of poetic imagery is Male's work Hawthorne's Tragic Vision. Here Male points out that a proper appreciation of Hawthorne depends on an understanding of his medium, which he rightly notes is a "rare combination of poetry and fiction" (Male 5). He also asserts that Hawthorne's fiction "remains valuable chiefly because of its penetration into the truths of the human heart . . . the

problem of moral growth" (Male 6). To the traditional romance, writes Male, Hawthorne added the dignity of his moral imagination, the power and beauty of his tragic vision. We can apply these statements to ironic allegory in general, for it is precisely my contention in this study that as an amalgam of poetry and fiction, imagination and tragedy, nineteenth-century American ironic allegory is indeed the art of truth.

Male's criticism of allegorists such as Hawthorne and Melville (in three chapters at least) focuses, like Sundquist's, on the quest for home, though Male does not miss the architectural metaphor. In fact, at one point he writes:

If a study of the house as symbol in American literature were undertaken, certainly one conclusion would be that the home has consistently represented, whether consciously or not, an attempt to build an integrated, functioning religious experience: a fusion of time and space, investment and speculation, past and present. (Male 41)

Given that the desire for fusion discussed here by Male amounts to nothing less than allegorical desire, we can at last see why a thorough investigation of the architectural metaphor is so crucial to our understanding and appreciation of nineteenth-century American allegory, and thus why the current study is needed. My intentions for this study, then, are synthetic. In the coming chapters I will draw primarily on Madsen's and de Man's theories of allegory and irony—as well as Sundquist's and Male's treatments of home and tragedy—to

construct a survey of American ironic allegory with the breadth of Chase's work on the romance-novel and the depth of Hansen's analysis of intellectual allegory.

As we shall see, Hawthorne's The House of the Seven Gables and Melville's Pierre are two works of ironic allegory about the mystifying power of the edifice, the nature of personal and family pride, and the tragedy of man's Fall. Yet long before towers crumble and collapse they must first be erected, and so before we discuss demystification, irony, and moral growth, we must address the process of mystification itself. Construction follows foundation; therefore, to better understand the process by which protection, possession, and permanence build up pride, we turn now to Cooper.

## CHAPTER II

### CONSTRUCTION: CIVILIZATION BUILDING

*Eden is that old-fashioned House*

*We dwell in every day*

*Without suspecting our abode*

*Until we drive away*

Dickinson

When writing about James Fenimore Cooper's *Leatherstocking Tales*, literary critics often refer fondly to the great American myth of the New World as a second Eden—as a chance to escape the tainted past of the Old World and to start fresh—and they elevate Natty Bumppo to a legendary status as the epitome of the isolated American hero. R.W.B. Lewis, for instance, calls Natty Bumppo “an individual emancipated from history, happily bereft of ancestry, untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances of family and race; an individual standing alone, self-reliant and self-propelling . . . Adam before the Fall . . . the American as Adam” (5). The mythic qualities of the *Leatherstocking Tales* have even led some critics to dub Cooper the American Homer; yet Cooper is more than a mythographer, and his novels are more closely associated with Sir Walter Scott's *Waverly* novels than with the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. Since myth is

in many ways the antithesis of history, the mythic elements embedded in Cooper's historical novels take on an ironic character that is often overlooked by critics.

Our tendency to reduce the Leatherstocking Tales to simple fables can be traced in part to D.H. Lawrence, who writes in his Studies in Classic American Literature about Cooper's "yearning myth" (56). Lawrence revels in the beautiful wish fulfillment of Cooper's work, especially The Deerslayer, but he ultimately repudiates him for his retreat from the realities of the American experience. America is a serpent, Lawrence informs us, sloughing its skin like a "torn divided monster," and even though Cooper did imagine "the gorgeous American pattern of a new skin," he stayed comfortably within the old skin (58, 59). It is true that Cooper wrote much of the Leatherstocking Tales from the wrong side of the Atlantic, if you will, but Lawrence's own acknowledgment of Cooper's duality, in which "the white man is divided against himself" (68), reveals a fundamental contradiction in Lawrence's argument, especially in his analysis of The Deerslayer. He admits that the American myth breaks down in the novel ("lurid sin and Judith, imbecile innocence lusting, in Hetty, and bluster, bragging, and self-conscious strength in Harry"), but then he immediately dismisses this disintegration by focusing on Hawkeye alone as the central mythic figure, "an isolate, almost selfless, stoic, enduring man, who lives by death, by killing, but who is pure white" (Lawrence 68, 69).

Though Lawrence's criticism of Cooper reveals much about America and about Americans, in the end it says little about the Leatherstocking Tales themselves or about Cooper's art in general. Only through selective interpretation, or convenient amnesia, does Lawrence manage to sustain his thesis about the American myth. He takes the mythic elements of the novels out of context, glibly brushing aside their equally important historical and ironic elements. To evaluate the true nature of Cooper's literary craft, we cannot isolate a single character, for instance Natty Bumppo, or even a single novel. As Donald Ringe points out, critics must view Cooper's work as a whole in order to understand his broad vision of life and to appreciate his impressive accomplishment (126). When reading The Deerslayer, for instance, we cannot simply erase from our minds the other tales. Our foreknowledge, acquired during careful reading of the novels in the order in which they were written, allows us to recognize the "enormous ironic rift between the nostalgic wilderness and the settled Templeton" (Sundquist 12).

By the time we first meet the young Deerslayer and Chingachgook on the shores of Glimmerglass, we already know of Natty Bumppo's later death on the desolate prairie and of the death of the last surviving Mohican, Indian John, in the city of Templeton. We also foresee the raping of the virgin land as settlers push west from New York. More importantly, perhaps, we know that Natty's mythic role as the autonomous and absolutely moral hero will be compromised when, in middle age and longing for youth, he proposes marriage to his surrogate

daughter, Mabel Dunham. At the end of The Pathfinder, Natty comes across as an aging bachelor who questions the value of his own independence when, one by one, his friends marry and start families. Feeling excluded from familial bliss, he comes to see the irony of his predicament—that his choice for personal freedom has imprisoned him within the seclusion of his own being. Indeed, Mabel's rejection of Natty reveals the loneliness and impotence of his solitude. This we cannot forget if we are to appreciate fully the dramatic irony of The Deerslayer. Glimmerglass, after all, reflects the illusion of the American myth.

Despite the insinuations of Lawrence and other critics, Cooper's works are more than pure myth since the longing for prelapsarian Eden expressed in their pages is balanced by a desire for social and historical context. Born in the eighteenth century and raised in the nineteenth century, Cooper seems to have had one foot planted in the age of reason and one foot in the Romantic era; and his resulting ambivalence is evident in the *Leatherstocking Tales*. Like Henry James, who would come after, Cooper explored the American-European theme, concluding at last that neither Old World experience nor New World innocence was a very appealing alternative—and it is this fundamental ambivalence regarding history and myth that completes the duality of his vision. In the American experience he saw the possibilities and limitations of humanity itself; free from and bound to the past, we vacillate between perfect correspondence and utter divergence. Calling to mind the

hermeneutic circle, we realize that the *Leatherstocking Tales* comprise in many ways the fullest expression of Cooper's allegorical desire.

Even though Cooper's writings clearly display elements of the uniquely American form of ironic allegory (a preoccupation with truth, a critical approach to the problem of representation, and a pervading skepticism about the possibility of unity), we hesitate to call him an allegorist. Cooper's classical sensibility, in contrast to Hawthorne and Melville's tragic sensibility, often diminishes the effect of his irony. Nowhere is this more evident than in his use of poetic imagery. As Paul de Man points out, eighteenth-century aesthetic theory was based on the idea of imitation, or mimesis, whereas nineteenth-century aesthetic theory focused on metaphor. Stressing subject-matter as the basis for aesthetic judgment, classical poets, characterized by their use of associative analogy, established the symbol as a medium between the mind of the subject and the object of nature; thus eighteenth-century writers favored the painted image as the model of representation, and they conceived of their narratives in terms of spatial scenes. We can see the legacy of eighteenth-century aesthetics in Cooper's literary landscapes.

"Pictures! Some of the loveliest, most glamorous pictures in all literature" (Lawrence 61). This is how Lawrence describes Cooper's pictorialism, and in many ways he is correct. Cooper himself developed the parallel between writing and painting, as in *The Deerslayer* when the narrator makes reference to the "pictures" he is about to "sketch"

(Cooper, Deer 10). Throughout the Leatherstocking Tales nature serves as a kind of backdrop, canvas, or tapestry against which the scenes are played out. Yet if we focus too closely on Cooper's "still life" images we miss the larger picture, so to speak. Just as a strictly mythic interpretation of the tales obscures their historical and ironic elements, so, too, does a narrow reading of Cooper's pictorialism diminish his true artistry. Whereas classical "eighteenth-century theories of representation persistently strive to reduce music and poetry to the status of painting" (De Man, BI 124), this does not exactly hold true for Cooper, who was highly conscious of historical context. Certainly more complex than it originally appears, his imagery is both spatial and temporal, synchronic as well as diachronic, and for this reason his writing does not fit neatly into the category of eighteenth-century aesthetics. How, then, are we to understand Cooper?

H. Daniel Peck offers a unique approach to Cooper's landscapes by applying Gaston Bachelard's phenomenology. Though he recognizes that "it would be impossible to impose on Cooper's fiction a Bachelardian framework," Peck does admit to an increased sensitivity, after reading Bachelard, of the "patterns of motion" in the novels (80). In The Poetics of Space, Bachelard makes a crucial link between temporal and atemporal poetic elements by acknowledging that "space contains compressed time"; however, he seems to subordinate time to space when he claims that "memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are" (8, 9). His concept of reverie, in

which the poetry of the past is maintained through the “permanent childhood” of nostalgia, is nothing more than mystification. He himself concedes this when he writes that a house “constitutes a body of images that give mankind proofs or illusions of stability” (Bachelard 17).

In Bachelard’s assertion that “there is ground for taking the house as a *tool for analysis* of the human soul” we find validation of the architectural metaphor’s efficacy, for indeed our “soul is an abode. And by remembering ‘houses’ and ‘rooms,’ we learn to ‘abide’ within ourselves” (Bachelard xxxiii). What this suggests is that images are an integral part of moral thought, but Bachelard writes of this integration in non-allegorical terms. “In arguing for the primacy of the image, Bachelard dislodges it from its place in symbolic or allegorical systems, and divorces it from idea or theme” (Peck 83). For Bachelard, then, houses are more specifically products of space than products of time, and for this reason his approach to poetic imagery is only partially useful to a study of allegory. Topographical analysis provides a satisfactory point of departure for an analysis of imagery, but the important point is that we must depart. To appreciate Cooper we must get moving. From the depot of Bachelardian phenomenology, Peck sets the train in motion by comparing the relationship between the poetic image and the overall work of art to that between the overtone, or harmonic, and the musical score (83).

As with music, language is a “diachronic system of relationships, the successive sequence of a narrative,” whereas associative analogy, like

painting, is essentially synchronic and spatial; therefore, reducing literature to the status of painting by isolating images from the overall work of art, text from context, leads to mystification. To prevent this we must replace the “misleading synchronism of the visual perception” with diachronic structures such as music, melody, or allegory, which are “favored over pseudo-synchronic structures such as painting, harmony, or mimesis because the latter mislead one into believing in a stability of meaning that does not exist” (De Man, BI 131-133). In The Poetics of Space, Gaston Bachelard is guilty of reductionism, for he examines only detached images. In his own words, he leaves aside “the problem of the *composition* of the poem as a grouping together of numerous images” (Bachelard xx). Even though he does admit that an “entire past comes to live in a new house” (Bachelard 5), he ultimately claims that the power of the poetic image separates us from the past and from reality. “The house shelters daydreaming,” he argues, “the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one to dream in peace” (Bachelard 6).

By comparing literature to music, Peck adds to his Bachelardian study of Cooper’s imagery a temporal element that establishes an important connection between poetry and fiction. Recognizing the diachronic nature of narrative, he studies patterns of images rather than detached images, as with Bachelard; but in retaining Bachelard’s belief in the primacy of the poetic image, he underestimates the significance of Cooper’s ironic approach to his own material. Peck suggests that critics are perhaps “uncomfortable with the spatial metaphor” (83), though it

seems that critics are more often at ease with the illusions of spatial metaphors than with the temporal realities of allegory. Writing of reverie as a medium between language and myth, for example, Peck exposes his own bias for synchronic representation. "This particular mediation was of crucial importance to me," he writes, "for it reinforced one of my most basic convictions about Cooper: that his appeal, particularly in works like The Deerslayer, lay in his ability to evoke a timeless vision of childhood wonder" (Peck 87). Here we see the legacy of D.H. Lawrence alive and kicking. Wish fulfillment.

Cooper's vision of childhood, wonderful and appealing as it is, is certainly not the primary source of his power as a novelist. Indeed, a close look at the "composition" of Cooper's imagery reveals not a timeless vision but a profound and highly ironic perception of mankind's complex position within time, in which we eternally struggle to reconcile past and future. Cooper's imagery, we find, is more symbolic than it might first appear. Peck is right that Cooper's symbolism has a different quality than that of Melville's pasteboard mask, but he errs in reducing Cooper's art to a simple merging of classical analogy and Romantic imagination; thus, even though he does depart from Bachelard in his treatment of the "patterns of motion" present in Cooper's writing, he hits the brakes as soon as the train leaves the station. Michael Clark gets us rolling again by pointing out that Cooper used architecture as metaphor and symbol to an extent that often goes unnoticed by critics.

Drawing from Thomas Philbrick, Clark argues that Cooper took great care to prevent his “mass of description” from “splintering into a succession of set pieces and genre sketches” (227). One of the ways in which he organized his novel was by “his numerous architectural references, many of which act as musical counterpointing” (Clark 227). Like Peck, then, Clark describes the musical quality of Cooper’s art, but he also diminishes the significance of Cooper’s architectural metaphors by depriving them of their function as products of time. Quoting Peck, Clark writes that Cooper’s work “exhibits not the impulse toward flight but the desire to arrive at a still point of the imagination, a place from which he will never have to leave.” For both critics, Cooper’s houses are “still places” that add to the “realistic sense of temporality” only to the extent that they counter other scenes in the novels (Peck 232). Clark develops this notion of counterpoint by contrasting Cooper’s treatment of man’s architecture and God’s architecture.

In response to the landscapes of The Pioneers, Clark writes that the “grandeur of these scenes seems to reflect the author’s belief in a divinely ordered purpose; the predominant image of the temple suggests both that a religious ideal is embodied in nature and that ancient classical architecture serves as Cooper’s model” (228). Here we can see that Clark reduces Cooper’s architectural imagery to associative analogy. Such is the case as well with Clark’s treatment of Templeton, which he calls the antithesis of nature’s temple. Judge Temple’s house, especially, becomes for him a model of both classical architecture and classical

virtues. The problem with setting in opposition the “architecture” of nature and society in this way is that it masks the author’s fundamental ambivalence. Peck and Clark are correct that Cooper expressed a deep nostalgia for the home of his childhood, but his classical sensibility was checked by a prevailing mood of skepticism; he knew that the past, like nature and society, can never be separated from the context of time. For this reason, Cooper’s architectural metaphors are not still places within a mass of description, but resonant, dynamic notes enriching his literary orchestrations.

“The field of music is time, that of painting space” (De Man, BI 129). Unlike the stable, synchronic sensation of painting, therefore, music cannot rest in the stability of its own existence. If, for example, we pause to savor each note of a musical score, the meter of the overall composition collapses. Literature stands between painting and music, for it contains both synchronic and diachronic components. We see the words on the page, and we visualize images in our minds, but the process of reading is linear and decidedly temporal. After all, the fundamental element of narrative, what E.M. Forster calls “story,” is the sequential telling of events. (This happens, then this, then this . . .) Allegory, especially, can be called a “fictionally diachronic narrative” (De Man, BI 135). Describing allegory in terms of literary music, we can say that ironic allegories are compositions in which the many components form interrelated motifs that together create an overall mood of irony.

The composer may express an allegorical desire for perfect correspondence, but this refrain is incorporated into the larger work.

Despite our reservations, then, we must conclude that Cooper was indeed a writer of ironic allegory, for he expresses allegorical desire in his nostalgia for his original home, and in his treatment of nature and society he reveals his own ambivalence. To understand and appreciate Cooper's allegorical technique, we will trace the architectural metaphors and references in The Deerslayer, The Pioneers, and Home as Found, three novels that comprise what we will call the Templeton trilogy. By taking the architectural metaphors in these three novels neither as detached images, as with Bachelard, nor as still places counterpointing patterns of motion, as with Clark and Peck—but rather as connected, musical, and therefore diachronic structures—we can see that Cooper did not simply paint a timeless vision of childhood. Neither did he celebrate the American myth, as Lawrence and Lewis suggest. In the edifice we find the key to Cooper's irony. Fooling the dreamer with illusions of protection, possession, and permanence—and Cooper was most definitely a dreamer of houses—the edifice becomes a monument of human pride. Such pride precedes the fall, and even though Cooper did not fully explore the tragic consequences of this fall, as did Hawthorne and Melville, the duality of his vision establishes him as a predecessor of America's greatest allegorists.

Justification for linking the two Leatherstocking tales The Deerslayer and The Pioneers with the white novel (to use Lawrence's

term) Home as Found into a unified trilogy can be found in Home as Found itself, in which the narrator divides the progress of society into three ages: pastoral, middle, and final (Cooper, HF 162-166). As a defender of Jeffersonian agrarian values, Cooper established the pastoral age as his ideal, which he describes as a time of good fellowship and a uniquely American balance between nature and civilization. The happy pastoral age is replaced in the middle age by a period of expansion and greed. Here the balance between nature and civilization is lost as the forests are cleared for roads and towns, while good fellowship among men and women gives way to the love of money. During the middle age, respect for authority breaks down and the old names are forgotten as settlers push in from the east. Jacksonians drive away Jeffersonians as mob rule deposes the landed gentry. In contrast to this age of disruption, Cooper looked forward to the final age of society, in which cultural harmony would be restored and legitimate authority would be rescued from the common citizenry and returned to the educated and landed elite.

To the ages of civilization detailed in Home as Found we can add a fourth age, preceding the other three and characterized by the primacy of nature. Ian Marshall acknowledges this primitive, pre-society stage in his comparison of Cooper's works to Cole's "Course of Empire" paintings. Marshall notes that the evolution recorded in the paintings—from Savage State to Pastoral State, then to Consummation, Destruction, and Desolation—parallels the progress of civilization in Cooper's novels.

Clearly the savage state is described in The Deerslayer, while the aftermath of consummation (destruction and desolation) are treated in Home as Found. The double marriage at the end of the latter novel also anticipates Cooper's final age. The Pioneers holds the special middle ground in the evolution of civilization. The savage age is represented here by Natty Bumppo, Chingachgook, and even Major Effingham (all remnants of pre-Revolutionary America), while Judge Temple defends the pastoral age. Men such as Hiram Doolittle and Richard Jones herald the middle age of consummation and destruction, which we see in the cutting of the maple trees and the massacre of the pigeons, and the stage of desolation is foreshadowed in the burning of Natty's hut and the burning of the forest.

The Deerslayer, The Pioneers, and Home as Found present us with the unique opportunity to trace the evolution of a single society from savage age (with Muskrat Castle isolated at the center of Glimmerglass) to the pastoral and early middle ages (with the village of Templeton nestled along the shores of Ostego Lake) to the late middle age and the dawning of the final age (with the sprawling city of Templeton dominating the landscape). Because of their thematic and contextual unity, these novels do in fact form a Templeton trilogy, and by examining a common thread weaving them together, the architectural metaphor, we can begin to recognize the grand scale of Cooper's design, a design that encompasses the birth, death, and rebirth of civilization. Throughout the trilogy we find convincing evidence of Cooper's skepticism toward

America, both as a second Eden and as an emerging economic powerhouse. From this evidence we can see that while Cooper was perhaps most at home in the quiet frontier village, somewhere between untamed nature and suffocating mob democracy (mobocracy), his art places him within the tradition of American allegory, rather than within the traditions of neo-classicism or Romanticism.

Cooper's irony and artistry are perhaps at their best in The Deerslayer, the last written of the Leatherstocking Tales. Following his publication of various satires, travel pieces, and other types of non-fiction (and after a brief retirement as a novelist), Cooper returned to pure fiction by taking up once again the subject that first brought him acclaim: the savage age. The American reading public had recently vilified him as an aristocratic expatriate because of his harsh criticisms of democracy, but now, as in The Last of the Mohicans, he achieved a degree of subtlety and delicacy that his social novels lack. When confronting American society head on, his critical voice is often curt and even sardonic, but his artistic voice, cloaked by the verdant canopy of the unspoiled wilderness, is richly allusive. Cooper's skills as a novelist are so refined in The Deerslayer, in fact, that many critics overlook the ironic force of its poetry. By examining its architectural metaphors, therefore, we can see that the novel does not represent Cooper's retreat from the realities of American life into the wish fulfillment of myth, but rather a return to an ironic and allegorical approach—instead of a satirical and logical approach—to the American theme.

What makes Cooper's irony so easy to miss is his classical tendency to describe nature in terms of static, though elaborate, scenes. The unspoiled wilderness framed in The Deerslayer is clearly that of the savage age, for as Judith notes, "Neither rock, shore, tree, nor lake seems to have ever held a human form" (Cooper, Deer 141). The "deep tranquility" and "mirrorlike surface" of Glimmerglass, especially, present a "picture of calm solitude" (Cooper, Deer 133, 134). At first glance, it does indeed seem that Cooper treats the wilderness more as a pretty picture than as a thriving environment. We see evidence of this in the following passage:

. . . the hand of man had never yet defaced or deformed any part of this native scene, which lay bathed in the sunlight, a glorious picture of affluent forest grandeur, softened by the balminess of June and relieved by the beautiful variety afforded by the presence of so broad an expanse of water.

(Cooper, Deer 28)

At times it even seems that Cooper is painting landscapes in oils on canvas rather than writing a novel. In describing the lake and the surrounding forest, for example, he refers to the "Rembrandt-looking" scenery (Cooper, Deer 28), and later he describes fires in the forest as tapers in a church, "a picture that Salvator Rosa would have delighted to draw" (Cooper, Deer 268).

Pictures! They are certainly lovely in The Deerslayer, yet we should not make too much of the novel's pictorialism. Cooper wrote at a time

before the inventions of photography and cinematography, and for this reason it only seems natural that his visual perceptions as a novelist should be attuned to the art of his day, especially to landscape painting and portraiture. In the same way, Stephen Crane and other writers at the end of the nineteenth-century adapted to their poetry impressionistic elements derived from photography, and contemporary writers have been heavily influenced by motion pictures. There were no films in Cooper's time, of course, but from the example of the live stage he no doubt learned to plot his own stories in terms of acts or scenes. As a result, the still images in the novel form backdrops against which the drama is played out. Blending elements of the visual and dramatic arts, then, Cooper's pictures and sets tell us much about his artistic sensibility; but they do not paint the whole picture. More important to our understanding of his literary craft are the novel's architectural metaphors.

Greatly influenced by the architect Horace Greenough, Cooper was one of the first American authors to explore the symbolic potential of the edifice. As Clark points out, Cooper often uses architectural metaphors to describe nature, so much so that the forest itself becomes a single, colossal edifice. The "high and gloomy vaults" of this structure are supported by the trees, which are "tall, large, and so free from underbrush" that they resemble "vast columns, irregularly scattered, upholding a dome of leaves" (Cooper, Deer 107). In descriptions like this, Cooper establishes a significant link between God's architecture and

man's architecture, for as he suggests, some of man's greatest architectural achievements came from nature itself. It was probably from nature, he writes, "that the mind of man first got its idea of the effects of Gothic tracery and churchy hues; this temple of nature producing some such effect, so far as light and shadows were concerned, as the well-known offspring of human invention" (Cooper, Deer 453).

Church imagery abounds in the descriptive passages of the novel. The pines, for instance, rise with the "stature of church steeples" (Cooper, Deer 52) and resemble "tall, straight, rustic columns, upholding the usual canopy of leaves" (Cooper, Deer 271) and forming occasional arches through which the bays glisten (Cooper, Deer 38). By describing nature in terms of a Gothic cathedral, complete with arches, domes, and columns, Cooper acknowledges God as the divine architect of nature's temple, yet he also establishes God as the Supreme Ruler by blending church imagery with castle imagery, as in his depiction of Round Rock. Long before the arrival of European settlers, the native inhabitants used the stone as a royal throne:

. . . a tall pine overhung it in such a way to form a noble and appropriate canopy to a seat that had held many a forest chieftain during the long succession of unknown ages in which America and all it contained existed apart in mysterious solitude, a world by itself, equally without a familiar history and without an origin that the annals of man can reach. (Cooper, Deer 139)

Despite its use by the native inhabitants, Round Rock is clearly older than even they. It stands beneath the “vault of heaven” (Cooper, Deer 250) like “an isolated stone which had obtained its shape from the action of the elements during the slow progress of centuries” (Cooper, Deer 139). The implication here is that Round Rock, as with all of nature, is God’s earthly throne. God is the monarch of the world, the architect of nature, and all creation must submit to His will.

Even though Cooper did believe the universe to be highly structured, his views went far beyond the impersonal logic of Deism. More important to him than the simple ordering of matter were the Christian virtues represented in his tales by Natty Bumppo’s Moravian doctrine. Throughout the novel, Deerslayer maintains a firm belief in the grand design of nature. Approaching Glimmerglass with Hurry Harry, he says that the forest “will not deceive you, being ordered and ruled by a hand that never wavers. . . . there is a law, and a lawmaker, that rule across the whole continent” (Cooper, Deer 19, 21). In speaking about the “ordering of the Lord,” Deerslayer appears to take a mimetic approach to the materials of the wilderness, so that Glimmerglass becomes for him a natural mirror that reflects God’s truth. “The lake,” he says, “seems made to let us get an insight into the noble forests, and land and water alike stand in the beauty of God’s providence” (Cooper, Deer 28, 29).

From the many descriptive passages in The Deerslayer, we can conclude that Cooper did make use of associative analogy—there is no denying this—and yes, he created glamorous pictures and scenes. True

enough. But once again, let us not reduce the novel to detached images. Also, we should not set God's architecture in opposition to man's architecture, as Clark does. Cooper did not privilege nature or society as would a Romantic or a neo-classicist. Instead, he established a comprehensive vision in which both wilderness and society are subordinate to divine will. "Fundamental to Cooper's work is a moral view of the world and of men that has its social aspects, to be sure, but which is basically concerned with man's relation first to the God revealed in the order of nature and only then to his fellows in an ordered society" (Ringe 120). As we shall see, man-made architecture becomes suspect only when it disrupts men's proper relation to God, to nature, and to their fellow men.

For the individual isolated within the wilderness of the savage age, proper relations with God and nature seem manageable enough, but when individuals gather together into families, clans, tribes, villages, towns, cities, and nations, issues of legitimacy arise that complicate the matter significantly; for disruption occurs when conflicting claims are made on the land. When this is the case, order can only be restored by establishing the party with absolute authority of possession. It was thus Cooper's firm belief that property rights are key to social harmony. As he writes in The American Democrat, "Social station, in the main, is a consequence of property. So long as there is civilization there must be the rights of property . . . As property is the base of all civilization, its existence and security are indispensable to social improvement." Issues

of possession were paramount for Cooper, and for this reason he developed in his art the “moral aesthetics of property” (Lawson-Peebles 52). A significant ingredient of his moral vision is the ethical consideration of property and settlement, and this is a major theme in his novels as well.

What ultimately breaks the peaceful serenity of the land near Glimmerglass—and gets us moving beyond the pretty pictures of the wilderness—is the conflict over possession. The land is claimed by both the Mingos and the Mohicans, but the strongest claim comes from Tom Hutter, who asserts his right to the property solely because of his lengthy inhabitation. As Hurry Harry tells Deerslayer, “Floating Tom Hutter . . . claims the lake as his own property, in vartue [sic] of fifteen years’ possession, and will not be likely to give it up to either Mingo or Delaware without a battle over it” (Cooper, Deer 15). Hetty confirms this, saying that the land belongs to her father, “he who owns the castle and the ark, and who has the best right to be thought the owner of these hills and that lake, since he has dwelt so long, and fished so long among them” (Cooper, Deer 180). Deerslayer immediately recognizes a problem with Harry and Hetty’s justifications, for he knows the Colony claims the land as well. “And what will the Colony say to such a quarrel?” he asks Harry. “All this country must have some owner, the gentry pushing their cravings into the wilderness, even where they never dare to ventur’, in their own person, to look at the land they own” (Cooper, Deer 15).

Hurry Harry admits that the king of England is the legitimate owner of the land, but because he lives so far from the New World his claim has little effect on Hutter. Besides, Harry rationalizes, Hutter cannot be called a true squatter since he lives on the lake and not on land. For this reason, Harry calls Hutter a floater instead of a squatter. In addition, Harry dismisses the rights of the Indians and the trappers since they never stay long enough in one location in order to stake a legitimate claim. Harry seems to associate possession with permanence alone, but Cooper suggests that there needs to be a proper transfer of property so that conflicts of legitimacy can be quelled. Apparently this transfer should entail a legal and binding contract, for Cooper makes frequent reference in his fiction to Indian deeds, in which the native inhabitants of the New World pass the authority of its possession over to the European settlers. Hurry Harry has learned from Hutter that such deeds do exist. "The old man tells me that some sharp ones have been wheedling the Mohawks for an Indian deed in order to get a title out of the colony," he says to Deerslayer, "but nothing has become of it" (Cooper, Deer 30).

Even though nothing has become of the deed, we already know, having read The Pioneers, that the proper deed will one day fall into the hands of the Effinghams. But now Hutter must battle for possession of the land. In the course of this fight, he and those in his company find themselves trapped in the middle of Glimmerglass while Indians, camped in huts along the shore (Cooper, Deer 174), besiege Muskrat Castle.

Standing on piles in the center of the lake and fortified with strong timber and an arsenal of weapons, the castle itself is a marvel of home security. Hutter's attention to security arose from his having been robbed during some of his many absences from home. Also, the castle has already been burnt out three times by Indians and hunters, and Hutter's only son has been killed. The current home, however, seems to be an impregnable island fortress, perfectly safe from thieves and arsonists. Only the castle's roof is combustible, and buckets and ropes are ready to put out flames, so fire-tipped arrows pose a minimal threat. In addition, attacks by day and by canoe are unlikely, since the attackers would be exposed to gunfire. The Indians could approach at night on rafts, but since they are not familiar with the ax, they would have great difficulty penetrating the barred gate, the palisades, and the massive staple and stout lock on the trap door. "As everything was massive and strong, and small saplings were used as bars, it would have been the work of an hour or two to break into the building," even if unresisted (Cooper, Deer 132).

Muskrat Castle can only be approached by water, and its formidable sides are composed of logs that are "two feet thick in their thinnest parts." Vertically arranged and wedged together, these logs can only be separated by a "deliberate and laborious use of human hands, or by the slow operation of time" (Cooper, Deer 32). Here we find an important foreshadowing of future events, for as we soon learn, the castle falls first at the hands of the Indians, and then, more convincingly, by

the ravishes of time. This hint of things to come is significant, for it allows us to understand the true nature of Tom Hutter and Harry's mystification, which is directly linked to the island fortress itself. So great is their hubris, in fact, that Ringe calls them "lawless egoists" who are "totally devoid of humility" (123). This accusation may be a bit severe, but it cannot be denied that both men overestimate their own security in the face of the Indian assault. Confident within the walls of the castle, they acquire a "false feeling of protection" (Cooper, Deer 320), which eventually leads to complacency. "There isn't a jail in the Colony that has a more lock-up look about it than old Tom's *chiente*" (Cooper, Deer 314), Harry says, and this proves ironic, for in the course of battle the combatants are "literally caged" (Cooper, Deer 321). In a sense trapped by their own pride, their ultimate defeat leads to a process of demystification that culminates when, despite all precautions, Hutter is scalped (Cooper, Deer 341).

In addition to their false feelings of superiority over the Indians, Harry and Hutter both exhibit an unsympathetic attitude toward nature. This attitude becomes apparent when we compare it to Deerslayer's reverence for the wilderness. Take, for instance, their very different reactions to the castle and its environs. We can see Deerslayer's sympathetic attitude in the following passage:

As he approached the building of old Hutter, Deerslayer thought, or rather felt, that its appearance was in singular harmony with all the rest of the scene. Although nothing

had been consulted but strength and security, the rude, massive logs, covered with their rough bark, the projecting roof, and the form would contribute to render the building picturesque in almost any situation, while its actual position added novelty and piquancy to its other points of interest.

(Cooper, Deer 199,120)

Whereas Deerslayer is in tune with the “singular harmony” of the scene, Harry and Tom are decidedly tone deaf, as the following lines illustrate:

Only one solitary object became visible, in the returning light, that had received its form or uses from human taste or human desires, which as often deform as beautify a landscape. This was the castle, all the rest being native and fresh from the hand of God. That singular residence, too, was in keeping with the natural objects of the view, starting out from the gloom—quaint, picturesque, and ornamental. Nevertheless, the whole was lost on the observers, who knew no feeling of poetry, had lost their sense of natural devotion in lives of obdurate and narrow selfishness, and had little other sympathy with nature than that which originated with her lowest wants. (Cooper, Deer 311, 312)

Of the three men, Harry is clearly the most proud (Cooper, Deer 308), and like the surveyors who “never come into the forest but to lead the way to waste and destruction” (Cooper, Deer 212), he represents the breed of men who will usher in the middle age of civilization.

By comparing Harry and Hutter to Deerslayer, Cooper seems to be commenting on the inherent contradiction in the American experience itself, which is characterized by opposing idealistic and pragmatic impulses—the desire to escape the past and the inescapable fate of repeating it. In this respect, Tom Hutter is indeed a representative man, the American not as Adam but as Noah. For both Hutter and Noah, the ark serves as a vehicle of escape from a corrupt world and a transport to a new world of purity and promise. Noah hoped that the flood would cleanse the land of human depravity, but as soon as he found his second Eden, he himself fell, disgraced before his three sons by his own nakedness and drunkenness. Ham sinned as well, disrespecting his father by failing to cover him. Noah and his family could not escape corruption because they carried it in their own hearts. (In the same way, Moses would later be denied entry to the promised land because of his own anger.) We can see a definite parallel between Noah and the pilgrims of Plymouth. The Mayflower was their ark, carrying them from the corruption of the Old World to the pristine wilderness of the New World. They sought a clean break from the past and a chance to start anew, but they discovered that unspoiled landscape was no refuge from human nature.

Tom Hutter is distinctly American, and his desire to flee his past, or at least to lock up his old secrets in the family chest (Cooper, Deer 195), constitutes a major mystification. Of the treasures secured within the chest, the ivory pistols and surveyor's tool are perhaps the most

indicative of his earlier life, and so they are the items best forgotten. Hutter's ark, reminiscent of the Mayflower and Noah's original ark, becomes an important symbol of his longing to flee and to forget, and Glimmerglass, therefore, becomes a microcosm of America; for if Hutter seeks refuge in the virgin land, his own selfishness and pride rape the very innocence he craves. Despite his attempts to break from history, he is doomed to repeat it—and his ultimate demise, including the destruction of his ark and castle, merely completes a tragic enterprise. Clearly this is not wish fulfillment or timeless childhood vision. Cooper's treatment of Glimmerglass is charged with irony, for like Hawthorne, he realized that paradise, or innocence, cannot be regained once it is lost.

Despite his best efforts, Hutter cannot hide his past from Judith and Hetty, and their struggle to push on after his death simply represents the growing pains of youth as they reconcile the limitations of the past with the promise of the future. In the aftermath of their ordeal, Hetty asserts their rights to the land. It is their responsibility, after all, to ensure the permanence of their father's claim. "I don't like the settlements," she tells Judith, "they are full of wickedness and heartburnings, while God dwells unoffended in these hills! I love the trees, and the mountains, and the lake, and the springs—all that His bounty has given us . . ." Judith, however, is more practical-minded than her sister, and so she asks Hetty, "Yet where is the man to turn this beautiful place into such a Garden of Eden for us?"(Cooper, Deer 362). The answer to her own question is obvious enough to Judith;

Deerslayer, “a man of strong, native, poetical feeling,” is just the man to make the transformation:

He loved the woods for their freshness, their sublime solitudes, their vastness, and the impress that they everywhere bore of the divine hand of their Creator. . . . and never did a day pass without his communing in spirit, and this, too, without the aid of forms or language, with the infinite source of all he saw, felt, and beheld.

(Cooper, Deer 267)

Judith knows that she and her sister are too weak to carry on alone, and so she proposes marriage to Deerslayer, not out of love, though she certainly holds great affection for him, but out of a somewhat desperate attempt to preserve the memory of Hutter and her mother.

In many of Cooper’s tales, marriage is a convenient tool for maintaining legitimate possession over nature and permanence within time as property is handed down from generation to generation. In such cases, marriage offers an illusionary synthesis, a false sense of closure. It both preserves social context and seems to free the individuals from the past. Such is the case in the arrangements between Oliver Effingham and Elizabeth Temple, Duncan Heyward and Alice Munro, and Duncan Middleton and Inez de Certavallos. The marriage between Mabel Dunham and Jasper Western, however, is starkly different. Dunham turns down Arrowhead and Natty, and her marriage to Western is bound by history and social context. There is no illusion here of freedom,

especially since Natty, in his isolation, ceases to be the hero. Also, there is no sloughing of the old for the new but rather historical continuity. In the same way, history marches forward in The Deerslayer. There can be no easy resolution between wilderness and civilization, and so marriage between Judith and Deerslayer is impossible.

Coming from different worlds, Judith and Deerslayer are clearly incompatible. She is obviously ill suited for life on the frontier. "I should be a thousand times happier to live nearer to civilized beings," she admits to Deerslayer, "where there are farms and churches, and houses built as it might be by Christian hands, and where my sleep at night would be sweet and tranquil! A dwelling near one of the forts would be far better than this dreary place where we live!" Though Deerslayer shares many of Judith's Christian values, he can find no virtue in civilization. As he tells Judith:

If forts are good to keep off inimies, they sometimes hold inimies of their own. . . . I'm afeard you are a little too near as it is. . . . what comfort can a man look for in a clearin' that he can't find in double quantities in the forest? . . . where are you to find your shades, and laughing springs, and leaping brooks, and venerable trees a thousand years old in a clearin'? You don't find *them*, but you find their disabled trunks, marking the 'arth like headstones in a graveyard. . . . Neither forts nor churches make people happier of themselves. Moreover, all is contradiction in the

settlements, while all is concord in the wilderness. Forts and churches almost always go together, and yet they're downright contradictions, churches being for peace and forts for war. No, no—give me the strong places of the wilderness, which is the trees, and the churches, too, which are arbors raised by the hand of natur'. (Cooper, Deer 254, 255)

Concord and contradiction. Here, in Deerslayer's own words, we find the essence of Cooper's double vision. Nature may be perfectly harmonious, but independent of human beings it lacks significance because God, Cooper believed, created the world for human inhabitation. We must keep in mind that Cooper did not privilege nature over society, as did the Romantics. For him, a retreat into pure nature would constitute a retreat from humanity itself, and so his treatment of nature is highly ironic. In highlighting the prelapsarian ingenuousness of the wilderness, he reveals, by contrast, the fallen state of men. Judith and Deerslayer's incompatibility for marriage is a poignant reminder that synthesis is impossible—and that contradiction, therefore, is inescapable.

Since Judith can find no proper suitor, she must forfeit her claim to the land and abandon the frontier altogether. Hetty's own claim ends, of course, with her death, and with so many colonial forces swarming about, the Indians move on to safer ground. With no one left to inhabit Glimmerglass, the area is enveloped once again by the peaceful serenity of the savage age. This serenity is deceptive, however, for we are not

witnessing a return to Eden (a regress into a timeless, mythic moment) but a fleeting respite from the inevitable advance of civilization. The westward push of the settlers ceases for a time, but time itself marches on with clocklike predictability. Cooper's masterpiece ends on a decidedly ironic note, and the novel's most allegorical elements can be found here in his treatment of temporality. As if defining allegory, the narrator acknowledges that a tale, "unless it be strictly narrative," contains "some searching truth that is applicable to the condition of every human heart, as well as to the temporal state of its owner, either through the workings of the heart or even in a still more direct form" (Cooper, Deer 345,346). Because of his concern for temporality and its relation to the truths of the human heart, Cooper falls within the American allegorical tradition, and his artistic application of the architectural metaphor in the closing pages of The Deerslayer resonates with the ironic force of the tradition's greatest masters.

Fifteen years after the struggles at Glimmerglass, Deerslayer finds that time has swept away all evidence of human inhabitation:

. . . the remains of the castle were still visible, a picturesque ruin. The storms of winter had long since unroofed the house, and decay had eaten into the logs. All the fastenings were untouched, but the seasons rioted in the place, as if in mockery at the attempt to exclude them. The palisades were rotting, as were the piles, and it was evident that a few more recurrences of winter, a few more gales and tempests, would

sweep all into the lake and blot the building from the face of that magnificent solitude. (Cooper, Deer 532,533)

The ironic tone of this passage is palpable, to say the least. Like the worm-eaten, rotting European castles of Gothic fiction, Hutter's American castle has withered and crumbled from the relentless barrage of the seasons. Time seems to be mocking Hutter's prideful attempts to fortify his home. His castle provided inadequate protection against human assault, and so, too, has it failed to repel the ravages of time. In a moment of epiphany, or demystification, we see the irony of Hutter's mystified confidence in the protection, possession, and permanence of his abode.

Once again, Deerslayer's presence seems to reinforce the novel's ironic rather than mythic qualities. It is Deerslayer, after all, who makes the important thematic link between the fall of Hutter's material "house" and the fall of his genealogical "house." The clock within the castle, we remember, retained the habit of striking the wrong hour, and now we see that this symbolizes Hutter's false relation to time and to history. As Deerslayer surveys the ruins of the castle, it becomes apparent that proper temporal relations have been restored, for death is indeed the great leveler (Cooper, Deer 351). After Hutter passed away, his body was placed in the ark, and "this singular habitation of the man whose body it now bore to its final abode, was set in motion" (Cooper, Deer 351). In this way, the ark, originally Hutter's link to Noah and the sign of his

ambitions to start a new life, became his own grave—a metaphor for the disillusionment of the American dream. As *Deerslayer* notes:

The graves could not be found. Either the elements had obliterated their traces, or time had caused those who looked for them to forget their position. The ark was . . . itself fast disappearing before the action of the elements. The scow was filled with water, the cabin unroofed, and the logs were decaying. . . . Accident or tradition had rendered it again a spot sacred to nature, the frequent wars and the feeble population of the colonies still confining the settlements within narrow boundaries. . . . Time and circumstances have drawn an impenetrable mystery around all else connected with the Hutters. They lived, erred, died, and are forgotten.

(Cooper, *Deer* 532, 533)

Time seems to have swallowed up all traces of the Hutters, though there are hints that Judith may live with a Sir Robert Warley on his paternal estates in England. The irony of the name “Hutter” becomes apparent when we realize that the fates of the abode and of its inhabitants are the same. All fall to the great leveler: time.

Tom Hutter’s demise and the passing of his familial line expose the fate that awaits all men. Yet the ending of *The Deerslayer* marks but the beginning of American civilization. We know that the colonial wars will cease, the populations will explode, and society will eventually evolve to the pastoral age, as in *The Pioneers*, and then to the middle age, as in

**Home as Found**. By continuing to trace this development, we will see that the mystification of men will only grow as feelings of protection, possession, and permanence increase. Throughout the Templeton trilogy, we find that Cooper is faithful to the themes of truth and temporality, and so the fate of American civilization, we can expect, will parallel that of the Hutterers. We can also expect that architectural metaphors will continue to play key roles and that these metaphors will follow the model of Hutter's castle, for Cooper's allegorical treatment of Muskrat Castle remains one of the novel's greatest artistic achievements. Indeed, after a thorough investigation of the novel's architectural metaphors, we can agree with Ringe:

**[The Deerslayer] may well be considered Cooper's masterpiece, for it unites in one well-executed whole the dual streams that had been developing in his work: the sense of the American past in both its temporal and spatial aspects and the question of values as they were developing in contemporary American life. (69)**

If the merit of Cooper's novels can be determined in part by his execution of dual streams of thought, then a strong case can be made for **The Pioneers**, a novel that, like **The Deerslayer**, explores the themes of American values and the American past. Also, if we can believe **Deerslayer** that nature is concord and that civilization is contradiction, then we can expect the amount of concord to decrease and the amount of contradiction to increase as settlements spring up in the wake of the

retreating frontier. This premise seems to be supported in the Templeton trilogy, but since Home as Found is clearly not Cooper's finest novel, we cannot assume that greater contradictions automatically lead to greater art. One of our original assumptions, we recall, was that ambiguity can be a source of beauty; yet in evaluating the allegorical elements of Cooper's novels, we should not focus merely on the nature of their contradictions, but also on the artist's execution of them. In other words, we should question whether or not the author's dual vision results in cacophonous imagery and poetic disunity. It is safe to say that Cooper, at least in The Pioneers, does successfully unify the themes of temporality and truth through his allegorical use of spatial detail.

About forty years have passed since Hutter's death, and all traces of his ark and castle have disappeared completely. The Indian huts are long gone as well, and in their place stands the village of Templeton, a growing settlement nestled in the pastoral age. The villagers seem to have achieved a delicate balance between nature and civilization, but this apparent equilibrium is misleading. If we look closely, we can see signs of the consummation and destruction we normally identify with the middle age of society. Most of the trees of the wilderness have been cleared away, and those few that remain, along with the many stumps of pine scattered about, display the scars of misuse. In descriptions reminiscent of the ruins of Muskrat Castle, we see "unsightly remnants" of trees that have been partly destroyed by fire "rearing their black, glistening columns twenty or thirty feet above the pure white of the

snow.” In addition to these stumps, which abound in the fields near the village, we also see the occasional “ruin of a pine or a hemlock that had been stripped of its bark, and which waved in melancholy grandeur its naked limbs to the blast, a skeleton of its former glory” (Cooper, Pion 45). Images such as these disrupt the harmony of the idyllic scene, for they give us the unsettling impression that Templeton has been built over a burial ground. The “skeletons” of the trees, we cannot help but notice, lie about like the bodies of fallen soldiers after battle.

So thoroughly has the wilderness been stripped that poplars have been brought from Europe to ornament the grounds, and willows and other trees have gradually sprung up near the dwellings. In such landscaping efforts we find proof of the growing mystification of the villagers. Indicative of the villagers’ desire to domesticate, and thereby to dominate, nature is the opinion of Richard Jones, the county sheriff, that there are “trees enough for us all, and some to spare” (Cooper, Pion 109). This same unsympathetic attitude toward nature is the motivation behind the massacre of the pigeons and the over-fishing of Ostego Lake, for as we see, “the illusion of dominance that some of the characters acquire leads to wanton, immoral waste of the resources they possess” (Ringe 127). Even here in Templeton, during what is supposed to be the pastoral age, the consummation of the villagers threatens to destroy what is left of the surrounding wilderness. Both Judge Temple and Natty Bumppo agree, therefore, that such waste must be stopped if the precious harmony of nature and civilization is to be maintained.

For better or worse, then, the area around Ostego Lake bears little resemblance to the pristine shores of Glimmerglass. “Five years had wrought greater changes than a century would produce in countries where time and labor have given permanency to the works of man” (Cooper, Pion 46). The changes in the landscape are indeed remarkable, for “surely nothing could look more like civilization, than a city, even if it lay in a wilderness!” (Cooper, Pion 58). The rapid progress of Templeton can be attributed in part to men such as Sheriff Jones, who plans to systematize the county by dividing it into districts, laying out new streets, felling all the trees, and building a fine civilization. As he tells Elizabeth, “We must run our streets by the compass, coz, and disregard trees, hills, ponds, stumps, or, in fact, any thing but posterity” (Cooper, Pion 183). In his efforts to systematize nature, Jones calls to mind the surveyor’s tool in Hutter’s locked chest, as well as the surveyors in Satanstoe and other prideful men such as Hurry Harry, Aristabulus Bragg, and Steadfast Dodge. With his nose to the compass, and with total disregard for the natural curves of the landscape, Jones insists that the village be “formally laid out, into the streets and *blocks* that resembled a city” (Cooper, Pion 99). Clearly Jones represents the callous breed of men that thrive in the middle age of consummation and destruction.

In addition to the increased sense of protection against and dominance over nature enjoyed by the inhabitants of Templeton, the settlers have also achieved a sense of permanence, a feeling of

dominance over time as well. As the yeoman replaces the pioneer, trees are cleared, stumps burned out, and fences erected. The farmers tame the land to make it fruitful. They tend crops and raise livestock, and when they grow too old for labor they pass the land on to their sons. Thus, the “expedients of the pioneers who first broke ground in the settlement of this country, are succeeded by the permanent improvements of the yeoman, who intends to leave his remains to moulder under the sod which he tills, or, perhaps, of the son, who, born in the land, piously wishes to linger around the grave of his father” (Cooper, Pion 16). These lines remind us of William Cullen Bryant’s “Thanatopsis,” in which the poet laments:

. . . Earth, that nourished thee, shall claim  
 Thy growth, to be resolved to earth again,  
 And, lost each human trace, surrendering up  
 Thine individual being, shalt thou go  
 To mix forever with the elements,  
 To be a brother to the insensible rock  
 And to the sluggish clod which the rude swain  
 Turns with his share, and treads upon. (ln 22-29)

Just as Hutter’s island home becomes his grave, so, too, does the land become the yeoman’s “resting place for life” (Cooper, Pion 39). As we shall see, The Pioneers concludes on an ironic note, for as in The Deerslayer, the grave takes on added significance as mankind’s final

“abode,” an important symbol of temporality and of the truth of American experience.

Despite his development of the themes of protection and permanence, the most important issue for Cooper in the opening chapters of The Pioneers seems to be the legitimacy of possession. During the savage age, the land near Glimmerglass had been claimed by the Mingos and Delawares and by Tom Hutter, who battled for possession in the absence of a proper deed. Now, in the pastoral age, Marmaduke Temple holds the proper deed to the land near what is now called Ostego Lake; yet there is still some doubt about his claim, so he must resolve this problem of legitimacy. The story of Temple and Effingham does not end with this resolution, however. In Home as Found, we shall see that Temple’s and Effingham’s descendants, despite their right to the land, will one day have to defend their claim vigorously against the challenges of the egalitarian public. Judge Temple himself never battles openly for the land, as do Hutter and Temple’s descendants, but instead, through careful maneuvering, he obtains the deed with virtually no exertion whatsoever.

Marmaduke inherited from his father a small estate, but his schoolmate, Edward Effingham, inherited from his father, Major Effingham, a significant sum of money, the town and country residences, and valuable farms and tracts of wild territory. Temple was given a mercantile house established in Pennsylvania, though the profits were privately shared with Edward so as to maintain pride in the Effingham

name. The friendship between Edward and Marmaduke was disrupted by the Revolutionary War, which, on a larger scale, presented a crisis in legitimacy as loyalists were stripped of their lands and possessions. As a descendant of a gallant soldier, Effingham remained loyal to the crown, while Temple, a man with a clear head and independent mind (and a descendant of a persecuted follower of Penn), defended the rights of the people. For safe keeping, Edward transferred all of his possessions to Marmaduke, who, following passage of the Acts of Confiscation, appeared in New York and purchased extensive possessions at comparatively low prices. The people resented Temple for this, but because of his wealth and services, and their own transgressions, this sentiment was soon forgotten. After the war, Temple turned from commerce to the settlement of his lands, aided by his money and his strong and practical reason.

By the time we first meet Judge Temple in the opening passages of The Pioneers, he has surpassed his ancestors in wealth and social status. In fact, his appointment as judge of Templeton during the pastoral age of American society represents the pinnacle of his family's history, which, like the progress of civilization outlined by Cooper, endured a painful process of birth, death, and rebirth. After achieving high rank in Europe, the Temples fell to low position upon immigrating to America before rising once again to the upper levels of society:

The posterity of Marmaduke did not escape the common lot of those, who depend rather on their hereditary possessions than on their own powers; and in the third generation, they

had descended to a point, below which, in this happy country, it is barely possible for honesty, intellect, and sobriety, to fall. The same pride of family, that had, by its self-satisfied indolence, conduced to aid their fall, now became a principle to stimulate them to endeavour to rise again. . . . It was the father of our new acquaintance, the Judge, who first began to re-ascend in the scale of society. . . ." (Cooper, Pion 31)

Here we can see that the catalyst for the Temples' fall and subsequent rise was family pride; thus, to understand the constitution of Judge Temple's mystification, as well as that of his entire line, we must note the source of his family pride, a false feeling of importance based first on "hereditary virtues" (Cooper, Pion 69) and then on the authority of ownership. The association of the name "Temple" with family pride serves an important purpose for our allegorical study by alluding to the mystifying properties of the edifice. Also, by calling to mind nature's temple, described so eloquently in The Deerslayer, the name reminds us that like the Hutterers, the Temples are doomed to fall once again.

Aside from its connection to the theme of pride over nature, the family name "Temple" provides an important historical link to King Solomon. Just as an understanding of the parallels between Tom Hutter's ark and Noah's ark is essential to our appreciation of The Deerslayer, so, too, does our appreciation of The Pioneers demand a comparison between Judge Temple's mansion and Solomon's temple and

palace in Jerusalem. Whereas in the former novel, Cooper comments on American innocence (the myth of the second Eden), in the latter novel he criticizes American idealism (the myth of the new Jerusalem); but in both works the references to the Old Testament deprive us of the luxury of a purely mythic interpretation. The Biblical allusions provide an historical context that cements the fictional events within a temporal framework. And once again, it is the architectural metaphor that completes the allegorical connection between truth and time. The collapse of Muskrat castle, for example, mirrors Noah's disillusionment following the flood, when his own drunkenness led to division among his own sons. In the same way, the absurdity of Temple's manor house reminds us that despite Solomon's wisdom, his extravagance led to civil war among his own people.

Like the history of the Temple family, the record of the early Hebrews before Solomon followed a cyclical pattern from birth to death to rebirth. The Hebrews rose to high position with Joseph in Egypt but then fell into a period of slavery that lasted for centuries. Moses initiated the process of rebirth, which was then carried on by Joshua, the judges ending with Samuel, and the kings Saul and David. Solomon's anointing as heir to King David was the "crowning" achievement in the Hebrews' long rise from slavery, and the jewels of their new kingdom were his temple and palace in Jerusalem. These glorious structures were icons of the Hebrew golden age and soon became key metaphors of Solomon's wealth and wisdom. We read in I Kings 5,6 that Solomon's temple was a

unique and magnificent edifice, an earthly home worthy of God. Designed in the artistic and elegant Syro-Phoenician style, it was constructed with sturdy cedar from Lebanon, and white limestone was added so that the exterior of the temple would sparkle in the sunshine and moonlight. The interior chambers were lined with bronze and gold, and sunshine streamed through high windows to complete the radiant effect. From within and from without, the temple of Jerusalem shone like a beacon to the world, a light upon a hill, and along with its reputation, Solomon's fame spread to the neighboring kingdoms.

In contrast to the temple in Jerusalem, the homes of the common Hebrews were designed for convenience rather than for taste. The commoners gathered the materials closest at hand and constructed simple shelters to protect themselves (and their animals as well) from the hot sun. The houses were generally built of stone and consisted of one main room and sometimes a central courtyard. Their flat roofs were mostly made from clay, and the floors were made of mud. Open slits in the walls served as windows. Like these crude abodes, many of the homes in Templeton are simple in design. Most of the structures in the village, some fifty wooden buildings, have been hastily constructed. Little thought has been given to matters of taste, and most of the buildings appear only half finished. Only their facades are finished in expensive colors, "while their economical but ambitious owners had covered the remaining sides of the edifices with a dingy red" (Cooper, Pion 41). Most of the villagers, it seems, have limited themselves by

necessity to matters of function rather than form. Refinement is a luxury they simply cannot afford.

Some of the inhabitants of Templeton are wealthy enough to ornament their homes, but the uncovered beams that can be seen through their second story windows show that “either the taste or the vanity of their proprietors had led them to undertake a task which they were unable to accomplish.” The implication here is that in designing their village, many of the proprietors have been more concerned with posterity than with convenience, and so they have merely aped the streets of the larger cities with little awareness of their own abilities—and with even less sympathy for their natural surroundings. As a result, some “three or four of the better sort of buildings, in addition to the uniformity of their color, were fitted with green blinds, which, at that season at least, were rather strangely contrasted to the chill aspect of the lake, the mountains, the forests, and the wide fields of snow.” Ironically, the wealthier inhabitants of Templeton seem to be recreating the very system of aristocracy they rebelled against only decades earlier. For instance, the young saplings before the doors of the “pretending dwellings” look like “tall grenadiers on post near the threshold of princes. In truth, the occupants of these favored habitations were the nobles of Templeton, as Marmaduke was its king” (Cooper, Pion 41, 42).

If Temple is the lord of the realm, then his home is indeed his castle. Modeled after Cooper’s actual Manor House, which his father, Judge William Cooper, built after founding the settlement near Ostego

Lake in 1786, the Temple mansion is one of the most important architectural metaphors in the novel. It began as a mere shelter, a “tall, gaunt edifice of wood, with its gable towards the highway”; now it towers above the neighboring structures like a European castle and seems already to have acquired an air of antiquity. Many of the fruit trees on the estate were left by the Indians, and now they have begun “to assume the moss and inclination of age, therein forming a very marked contrast to the infant plantations that peered over most of the picketed fences of the village” (Cooper, Pion 41, 42). This disparity between Temple’s estate and the homes of the other villagers parallels the marked contrast between Solomon’s temple and palace and the common homes near Jerusalem. Like Solomon, Temple is held in high esteem by the populace, and his public image is magnified by the splendor of his edifice.

Similar in both family history and social prominence, Solomon and Temple, king and judge, are inevitably linked through Cooper’s allegorical treatment of the architectural metaphor. It is no coincidence, therefore, that one of the mansion’s architects, Hiram Doolittle, bears the name of a significant figure in the construction of Solomon’s temple. King Hiram of Tyre was in some respects an overseer of the ambitious project, for he provided cedar from his kingdom, as well as laborers and other essential materials. In the same way, Cooper’s Hiram oversees the construction of the mansion. Richard Jones is the original designer, but Hiram greatly influences the tastes of Mr. Jones “by exhibiting a few soiled plates of

English architecture, and talking learnedly of friezes, entablatures, and particularly of the composite order.” According to Mr. Doolittle, the composite order “was an order composed of many others, and was intended to be the most useful of all, for it admitted into its construction such alterations as convenience or circumstances might require” (Cooper, Pion 42, 43).

“Composite order” is simply the term Hiram applies to rationalize or perhaps to disguise his own inept attempts to blend form and function into a work of singular harmony. With their eyes on posterity rather than convenience, Jones and Doolittle must repeatedly compromise their “ambitious tastes” to accommodate basic conditions of construction. Time and again they must learn the valuable lesson that “convenience frequently frustrates the best regulated plans” (Cooper, Pion 145); consequently, in their struggle for architectural unity, they can be associated with artists in general, who, like Owen Warland, are limited by the material substance of their medium. When they are unable to negotiate any sort of compromise with the stone faces of the mansion walls, for instance, they must seek refuge in the porch and the roof. It is indeed ironic that they find the stone too “obdurate” for their own liking, for it is their own pride—their refusal to submit to the will of nature—that blinds them to their own limitations. The porch and roof, poorly designed and nearly obsolete, become important symbols of the architects’ mystification—absurd monuments of foolish human pride.

Even more than Mr. Doolittle, Mr. Jones seems unwilling to compromise, and matters of necessity are like personal insults to him. For him, a roof is but an "excrement in architecture" that is to be tolerated only because of its usefulness, and in his opinion, the "chief merit in a dwelling" is not to provide shelter but to "present a front, on whichever side it might happen to be seen," so that "there should be no weak flank for envy or unneighborly criticism to assail." If the home must have a roof, Jones decides, then it should at least be flat, with four faces. The more inconspicuous the better. When Judge Temple protests that a flat roof would likely collapse after a heavy snow, the "facilities of the composite order" happily allow for a compromise. The rafters are lengthened to provide a sufficient slope, but because of an error in measurement, the roof becomes the most obtrusive part of the edifice. No opportunity is found for detecting the error before the roof is erected because Hiram insists on working by the "square rule," rather than by direct observation of the materials laid out before him. And so with each shingle that is placed on the roof the effect of his miscalculation becomes more apparent. In addition, the chimneys, originally intended to sit low so as to "resemble ornaments on the balustrades," have to be raised so that the smoke can be carried away. To Richard's horror, the chimneys become four extremely conspicuous objects on top of an entirely too conspicuous roof.

**Ironically, in designing and constructing the roof, Richard Jones and Hiram Doolittle achieve exactly the opposite effect they were aiming**

for. Whereas Tom Hutter, concerned with only the functional aspects of his castle (strength and security), built a uniquely quaint yet picturesque edifice in singular harmony with nature, the architects create an eyesore by privileging form over function. Rather than acknowledge the problem, and start again, Mr. Jones suggests that they cover their mistake with paint. In the following passage, we can see how paint becomes symbolic of his mystification:

Richard essayed to remedy the evil with paint, and four different colors were laid on by his own hands. The first was a sky-blue, in the vain expectation that the eye might be cheated into the belief, it was the heavens themselves that hung so imposingly over Marmaduke's dwelling; the second was what he called a cloud-color, being nothing more nor less than an imitation of smoke; the third was what Richard termed an invisible green, an experiment that did not succeed against a background of sky. Abandoning the attempt to conceal, our architects drew upon their invention for means to ornament the offensive shingles. After much deliberation and two or three essays by moonlight, Richard ended the affair by boldly covering the whole beneath a color that he christened "sunshine," a cheap way, as he assured his cousin, the Judge, of always keeping fair weather over his head. (Cooper, Pion 43-45).

Richard's bold confidence in the properties of paint is reminiscent of William Dean Howell's Silas Lapham, who claims that a layer or two of his special paint would do much to improve nature itself. The paint is indeed a mystifying agent, for even though the roof of Temple's mansion is a noticeable fiasco, the judge and the other inhabitants of Templeton are fooled into believing it a triumph of the composite order. "Thus it is ever with fashion, which even renders the faults of the great subjects of admiration" (Cooper, Pion 45).

If the faults of the mansion's roof are subjects of admiration, then the porch is downright awe-inspiring. It should be noted, however, that in this case nature conspires with human error to achieve such marvelous deformity. In describing the porch, Cooper alludes to Solomon's palace in Jerusalem. We read in I Kings 7 that the Palace of the Forest of Lebanon, as it was called, was built upon four rows of cedar pillars, with cedar beams upon the pillars. There were windows in three rows, and all the doors and posts were square with the windows. In front was the porch of judgment, or portico, which was accessed by a series of steps and covered with cedar from one side of the floor to the other. All this was secured by the foundation, which was fashioned from carefully measured and hewn stones. The Biblical references to the palace's pillars, porch, and steps provide a convenient link to Temple's home, for on the mansion's stone platform "reared four little columns of wood, which in their turn supported the shingled roofs of the portico—this was the name that Mr. Jones had thought proper to give to a very

plain, covered entrance” (Cooper, Pion 60)—and stone steps provide ascent to Temple’s portico.

Despite the likeness between King Solomon’s palace and Judge Temple’s mansion, there are some important distinctions. The ancient edifice was constructed from the sturdiest and costliest materials in the land and its design was seamless, while the American edifice is poorly designed and made from readily available materials. Most importantly, the palace was meticulously assembled by skilled craftsmen, while the mansion is carelessly put together with little attention to detail. This is especially true of the foundation. The steps were hastily laid together, and so now the frost has begun to move them from their symmetrical positions. The results of this unfortunate combination of cold climate and superficial construction can be seen in the following passage:

As the steps lowered, the platform necessarily fell also, and the foundations actually left the superstructure suspended in the air, leaving an open space of a foot between the base of the pillars and the stones on which they had originally been placed. It was lucky for the whole fabric that the carpenter, who did the manual part of the labor, had fastened the canopy of this classic entrance so firmly to the side of the house, that, when the base deserted the superstructure in the manner we have described, and the pillars, for the want of a foundation, were no longer of service to support the roof, the roof was able to uphold the pillars.

Here was, indeed, an unfortunate gap left in the ornamental part of Richard's column; but, like the window in Aladdin's palace, it seemed only left in order to prove the fertility of its master's resources. The composite order again offered its advantages, and a second edition of the base was given, as the booksellers say, with additions and improvements. It was necessarily larger, and it was properly ornamented with mouldings: still the steps continued to yield, and, at the moment when Elizabeth returned to her father's door, a few rough wedges were driven under the pillars to keep them steady, and to prevent their weight from separating them from the pediment which they ought to have supported.

(Cooper, Pion 60)

Having pulled free from their bases, the pillars of the porch appear to levitate. Such separation between foundation and superstructure seems to symbolize the dangerous consequences of American idealism, for in detaching themselves from the solid realities of life, idealists tend to lose proper perspective of the order of nature. This is indeed the case with Mr. Jones and Mr. Doolittle; as a result of their egoism, the base of the porch has deserted the superstructure, the pillars are in want of foundation, and the conspicuous roof now upholds the pillars.

By most accounts, Judge Temple's mansion is a complete architectural disaster, a building that pales in comparison to the great edifices of antiquity such as Solomon's temple and palace. In aping the

classical styles, Richard Jones and Hiram Doolittle have achieved only distortion and disunity. Nevertheless, the townspeople admire the edifice, just as the subjects of the fairytale emperor venerate his “invisible” new clothes. Because of Temple’s wealth and social prominence, the people soon forgot his underhanded accumulation of land after the war, and for the same reasons they now overlook the faults of the judge’s new home. Apparently, the two architects “had not only erected a dwelling for Marmaduke, but they had given a fashion to the architecture of the whole county.” Just as Solomon’s temple and palace inspired the surrounding kingdoms, “the castle, as Judge Templeton’s dwelling was termed in common parlance, came to be the model, in some one or other of its numerous excellences, for every aspiring edifice within twenty miles of it” (Cooper, Pion 43). This is certainly true, for many of the houses in Templeton are modeled after the mansion, and the Bold Dragoon and Templeton Coffee House are just two of its more prominent imitators.

Given the amount of time and detail dedicated to the layout and construction of the Temple mansion, we can certainly conclude that it is one of the most important architectural metaphors in The Pioneers. As we shall see, the second crucial metaphor in the novel is Natty Bumppo’s hut, which receives virtually no attention whatsoever because of its apparent simplicity. This is significant, for the villagers ignore the hut throughout most of the story, and we are tempted to overlook it as well. Yet even though it is not described in detail, it is just as important as the

mansion. Whereas Temple's elaborate edifice represents social and individual pride, Natty's crude shelter symbolizes humility, harmony, and isolation. Before we analyze the full allegorical significance of the wilderness hut, though, we should conclude our discussion of Templeton by addressing the town's most distinguished public buildings: New St. Paul's and The Academy. These structures provide a final glimpse into the mystification of the townspeople, and The Academy in particular serves as an appropriate pulpit for the novel's moral voice, Mr. Grant.

New St. Paul's is a new brick edifice built to replace the long room of The Academy. The plans for the building are of course provided by Richard Jones, while the labor of supervising their execution is delegated once again to Hiram Doolittle. Given Mr. Jones' papal air (Cooper, Pion 103), it is no wonder that he decides, in the interest of "architectural beauty," that the church windows should have the Roman arch. Richard and Hiram seem intent on infusing the edifice with their own religious views, and so the church becomes the unfortunate arena of their dispute. Jones hides his plans for the windows as long as possible, but then Doolittle seems to retaliate by sabotaging the project: "As the right to plan was duly delegated to Mr. Jones, no direct objection was made in words, but numberless unexpected difficulties arose in the execution." First, Hiram complains of the scarcity of materials for the frames, but Richard simply adjusts the blueprints to accommodate him. Then Hiram protests that the project is too expensive, but Richard reminds him that Judge Temple is funding the construction and that Richard is his

cousin's treasurer. Eventually, "after a silent and protracted, but fruitless opposition, the work was suffered to proceed on the original plan" (Cooper, Pion 118).

As with the mansion, Richard Jones completes his designs for New St. Paul's by imitating older and greater works of architecture. He models the steeple, for example, after that of the London Cathedral, yet the imitation turns out to be "somewhat lame, it is true, the proportions being but indifferently observed" (Cooper, Pion 118). This lack of attention to proportions provides an important comparison between New St. Paul's and The Academy, which stands, "in all its beauty and proportions, the boast of the village, the study of young aspirants for architectural fame, and the admiration of every settler on the Patent" (Cooper, Pion 100). In contrast to the church, the pride of the older building is its steeple, along with the second-story window over its entrance. The main difference between the two structures, however, is not their proportions or their steeples and windows but rather their varying degrees of artifice. In fact, Cooper associates the Long Room with simple and natural Christianity, while he relates the elaborately designed church with the strained and synthetic qualities of American sectarianism.

Protestant sects such as the Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians are potentially disagreeable, according to Cooper, because they tend to distort pure Christianity, as expressed in the "Sermon on the Mount." Controversies over doctrine and dogma tend to

promote pride, discord, and mistrust rather than love, humility, and compassion. Because of their sectarian differences, for example, Richard Jones and Hiram Doolittle become somewhat manipulative and combatant while designing the interior of the new church. Richard wants to put in a reading desk and chancel, but as with the windows, he must be subtle because he knows that these items are common only to his sect, the Episcopalians. He also insists that the spot in front of the pulpit remain vacant, while Hiram has reserved the space for the deacon's box. Finally, the two architects debate about the name of the church, and Hiram only agrees to the name St. Paul's if the word *New* is added, so as to clarify that the church is named after the London cathedral rather than after the saint. Trivial disputes such as these, so characteristic of man-made religion, are noticeably absent when the focus shifts from outward display to genuine, private devotion to God.

In contrast to New St. Paul's, the Long Room, symbolic of simple Christianity, displays but a few marks of human artifice. Admittedly, the building is sanctioned by the Freemasons—and Richard, as master of that ancient honorable fraternity, lays the first cornerstone—so some degree of debasement can be expected. In addition, Hiram's "square rule" is once again put to the test of experiment. Yet even though Richard is "a good deal addicted to carrying everything to excess" (Cooper, Pion 103), the Long Room remains essentially an "inartificial temple" (Cooper, Pion 122). There are no accidents this time, as with Temple's roof and porch, though the fact that the horses often fall as the

laborers return home in the evenings does suggest something unnatural in their over exertion. Also, the edifice offers “but a small obstacle to a full view of the rising sun.” It is in truth a “very comfortless open place,” through which the daylight shines with “natural facility” (Cooper, Pion 100). What these descriptions suggest is that the Long Room, in its degree of balance between nature and society, is a fitting emblem of the pastoral age, and therefore a counterpart to Temple’s mansion.

With its lack of shutters and its miserable candlelight, its pine branches and hemlocks stuffed in fissures for insulation, its large fireplace for warmth, and its coarse benches for comfort, the Long Room not only serves as a symbol of the pastoral age, but it also provides an ideal setting for Mr. Grant’s sermon on humility. Nature’s temple in The Deerslayer has been replaced in The Pioneers by a more civilized house of worship, and it is from here, in the Long Room, that the reverend first addresses the people of Templeton. Standing behind a rough, unpainted box that is nothing but an “apology for a pulpit” (Cooper, Pion 122), Mr. Grant speaks of men’s vulnerability and vanity in a manner reminiscent of Michel de Montaigne in “The Apology of Raymond Sebond.” Often referred to as “the divine,” the reverend seems to be a mouthpiece for God, a moral voice that both convicts and consoles:

It is a blessed consolation to be able to lay the misdoubtings of our arrogant natures at the threshold of the dwelling-house of the Deity, from whence they shall be swept away, at the great opening of the portal, like the mists of the morning

before the rising sun. It teaches us a lesson of humility, by impressing us with the imperfection of human powers, and by warning us of the many weak points, where we are open to the attacks of the great enemy of our race; it proves to us, that we are in danger of being weak, when our vanity would fain soothe us into the belief that we are most strong; it forcibly points out to us the vain-glory of intellect, and shows us the vast difference between a saving faith, and the corollaries of a philosophical theology; and it teaches us to reduce our self-examination to the test of good works.

(Cooper, Pion 129)

In its distinction between faith and philosophy and in its indictment of mystification, this sermon seems directed at Richard Jones specifically, which is ironic because Richard has by this time tip-toed from the room. The sermon has not fallen completely on deaf ears, however, for Elizabeth Temple is captivated by the words of the reverend. As we shall see, Elizabeth, as the heir of the Temple family pride, will soon learn a valuable lesson about humility.

After the sermon, Elizabeth Temple challenges Mr. Grant on the issue of civilization. Echoing the words of Judith, she tells the reverend, "Society is a good, not to be rejected on account of cold forms, in this wilderness" (Cooper, Pion 131, 132). Society for her is a type of security blanket that she wraps about herself for warmth and protection. This is especially true of her father's house. At one moment we see that "the

warmth and brilliancy of the apartment produced an effect that was not unlike enchantment” (Cooper, Pion 67), and the morning after a night of heavy snowfall, Elizabeth revels in the reassurance that she is “sheltered in the warm hall of her father’s comfortable mansion” (Cooper, Pion 208). These lines remind us of Gaston Bachelard’s observation that the edifice shelters the daydreamer. Indeed, Elizabeth’s pride, characterized by a false feeling of protection against nature, stems from her abnormal attachment to the mansion. This contrasts with Mr. Grant’s attitude toward his own modest accommodations. Again pointing to the necessity for humility and simplicity, the divine tells Miss Temple that “a clergyman must not awaken envy or distrust, by dwelling under so splendid a roof as that of Judge Temple” (Cooper, Pion 132). Not until her unnerving ordeal in the forest, however, when she almost loses her life, does Elizabeth understand the full significance of Mr. Grant’s faith lesson.

Cooper is at his best in his narrative of Elizabeth Temple and Louisa Grant’s wilderness excursion, for it is here that we witness the full cycle from mystification to demystification to redemption—from self-deception to true “edification.” Proof that the girls’ pride is bolstered by their dependence on the mansion is their lack of concern for the threat of wolves. As Louisa points out, “the riches of Judge Temple have given him too many safeguards, to leave room for fear in this house” (Cooper, Pion 212), and Elizabeth agrees that the “enterprise of Judge Temple is taming the very forests!” Elizabeth then throws off her covers and half-

rises in bed, two gestures that indicate her growing confidence. In one sense, the action of throwing off her covers represents her abandonment of social conventions and security as she prepares to venture into the untamed forest. "How rapidly is civilization treading on the footsteps of nature!" she says, but then "her eye glanced over not only the comforts, but the luxuries of her apartment, and her ear again listened to the distant, but often repeated howls from the lake" (Cooper, Pion 212). This is a highly effective moment of the narrative, for her eye is on the interior picture of opulent society, while her ear is attuned to the exterior music of nature; thus, through his subtle combination of synchronic and diachronic elements, Cooper creates a satisfying moment of poetic unity. Here we see the elements of the art of truth.

Whether or not she is responding to the call of the wild, Elizabeth is overcome by the desire to visit Natty's hut. Mr. Edwards offers to escort her, but she claims that her mastiff, Brave, is enough protection, though she expects no complications. In her disregard for danger and her refusal of Mr. Edwards' offer, Elizabeth is as adamant as Milton's Eve, who insists that she and Adam separate in the Garden despite his warnings about Satan. Like Eve, she is perhaps over-confident as she sets out for the wilderness hut. Cooper's heroine does not meet a serpent, but her encounter with a panther does prove deadly. Brave is killed while attempting to defend her, and she soon finds herself at the mercy of the beast. Her prayers for salvation are answered, though, when Natty arrives and kills the panther. Brave's demise symbolizes

Elizabeth's fall from lofty self-assurance, while the death of the panther represents her rebirth: "The death of her terrible enemy appeared to Elizabeth like a resurrection from her own grave" (Cooper, Pion 309). Elizabeth and Louisa return to Templeton a little more humble and a little more cautious than when they first set out. They cling to one another, fearful but thankful to be alive. Their experience has certainly been eye opening, a true process of demystification that restores their self-awareness and their proper respect for nature. Mr. Grant could not have written a more fitting parable.

Aside from its significance to the novel's themes of pride and humility, the scene in the wilderness serves a practical function as a convenient plot device, a bridge between the events in Templeton and those around Natty's hut. We accompany Elizabeth and Louisa as they leave the village behind and trek beyond the stumps and clearings into the established forest. The wildlife here still retains some of its tranquil beauty, and there are still signs of nature's temple. The Vision, especially, stands like an altar for private devotion, for "the rock sweeps like mason-work . . . a spot to make a man solemnize" (Cooper, Pion 294). The church imagery continues later, when during the fire, the flames there seem to "dart from heap to heap, as the fabulous fire of the temple is represented to relumine its neglected lamp" (Cooper, Pion 407). Apart from nature's temple, the only significant human habitations in the forest are Natty's hut and cave. No architectural features of the hut are described, for its one distinguishing feature is the way it blends with

the landscape (Clark 228). A rough, secluded cabin built against the foot of a rock, Natty's simple abode provides a fitting emblem of what Gaston Bachelard calls the "hut dream"; it becomes a locus of "centralized solitude, for in the land of legend, there exists no adjoining hut" (Bachelard 32). Yet if the hut represents the myth of the isolated hero, Cooper's irony is even stronger than we might suspect, for the edifice is reduced to ashes by the hero's own hands.

"In burning his hut . . . Natty in effect acknowledges the essential incompatibility of these two world visions and removes himself from the society he threatens" (Scheckel 143). Literally "hounded" by the villagers (led by Richard Jones) for assaulting a magistrate and resisting the execution of a search warrant, Natty destroys his own dwelling rather than surrender. His incineration of the hut is like an act of self-defacement, a type of suicide that deadens his spirit. He tells the mob:

You've driven me to burn these logs, and to mourn the ashes under my feet, as a man would weep and mourn for the children of his body . . . and now, when he has come to see the last brand of his hut, before it is melted into ashes, you follow him up, at midnight, like hungry hounds on the track of a worn-out and dying deer! (Cooper, Pion 356, 357).

So connected to the hut is Natty that its destruction is like an amputation or the loss of a child. Elizabeth promises to rebuild the hut, but he answers, "Can ye raise the dead, child! . . . You do not know what 'tis to lay your head for more than forty years under the cover of the

same logs, and to look on the same things for the better part of a man's life." Elizabeth then promises that he will live in the new house "in ease and plenty," but he tells her, just as he told Judith decades earlier, that he could never be happy among the clearings and skeletal stumps of civilization. His response confirms his contempt: "Ease and plenty! house!" (Cooper, Pion 386).

When Leatherstocking rejects Judith's proposal in The Deerslayer, he retains his guarded solitude by simply pushing west in advance of the expanding frontier. In The Pioneers, however, it becomes apparent that this option will not always be available. Ironically, pioneers such as Natty Bumppo, in exploring new territory, consume the very remoteness they seek; their own penetration into the wilderness opens up a path for the settlers who follow them. Eventually, no path of escape remains. In The Pioneers, the self-defeating impulse of the pathfinder is symbolized by the incineration of Natty's hut, which calls to mind the burning of Muskrat Castle in The Deerslayer and foreshadows the burning of Wall Street in Home as Found.

Throughout the Templeton trilogy, conflagration serves as a catalyst for demystification. Flames allow for a catharsis through which society is purged of evil as human pride and self-deception are stripped away. This idea of social punishment is common with Cooper: "In novel after novel, the feeling of community is no sooner achieved than it falls apart from greed, bigotry, and the weakness of its leaders, and the community is punished" (MacDougall 157). Fire, then, is like a judgment

from God, and Reverend Grant's words hint at divine admonition.

"Humility and penitence are the seals of Christianity," he preaches, "and without feeling them deeply seated in the soul, all hope is delusive, and leads to vain expectations" (Cooper, Pion 420). As we will see, Mr. Grant's moral voice will be replaced in Home as Found with the didactic speech of the narrator himself.

The primary conflagration in The Pioneers is of course the forest fire. To understand and appreciate the full significance of this event, we can examine Cooper's use of architectural metaphors. By comparing the excavations of Natty and Jotham Riddel, specifically, we can see that Jotham seems to be punished for his raping of nature's treasure, while Natty is apparently saved because of his reverence for Mother Earth. Jotham ignores Natty's warnings to flee the mountain since in his greed he cannot give up his search for the precious ore he believes to be hidden nearby; as a result, he is trapped in a "grave of his own digging" (Cooper, Pion 415) and fatally burned. His simple excavation, nothing more than a hole in the ground, becomes a "receptacle of guilt" (Cooper, Pion 425), an important metaphor of the deadly consequences of overweening pride.

Unlike Jotham Riddel, who perishes on the mountain, Natty, Indian John, Oliver Edwards, Major Effingham, Benjamin, Elizabeth, and eventually Mr. Grant all find sanctuary in the cave. In essence, they are all saved by Natty's faith—just as Jotham is destroyed by his own disbelief. This association of the cave with faith is supported by Mr. Grant's reference to the Rock of Ages (Cooper, Pion 421).

Both excavations into the side of Mount Vision are representative of the men who made them, and so Natty's cave is predictably uncomplicated yet somehow extraordinary:

An examination of the exterior of the cavern, left the Judge in doubt whether it was one of nature's frolics that had thrown it into that shape, or whether it had been wrought by the hands of man, at some earlier period. . . . the roof of the cavern was a natural stratum of rock, that projected many feet beyond the base of the pile. Immediately in front of the recess, or cave, was a little terrace, partly formed by nature, and partly by the earth that had been carelessly thrown aside by the labourers. . . . The whole was wild, rude, and apparently incomplete . . . (Cooper, Pion 323, 324)

From this description we can see that Natty's cave is an important architectural metaphor that contrasts with the elaborate structures of Templeton, especially with Judge Temple's mansion. Obviously, the roof, portico, and foundation of the cave correspond to those constructed by Richard Jones and Hiram Doolittle.

As Michael Clark points out, Jones and Doolittle, in trying to reproduce the illusion of nature, only succeed in "intensifying the contrast between man's productions and nature's," whereas the cave and hut blend with nature (232). Despite his humility and reverence for nature, however, Natty finds himself alone following the death of Chingachgook, with both his self-made dwelling and his larger "home" in

the forest reduced to ashes. Clearly it was Cooper's intention to use the metaphors of the hut and cave, as well as the symbol of fire, to highlight Natty's ironic position as the self-defeating pioneer. At the same time, though, the conflagration initiates a type of social catharsis through which the past and future of Templeton seem to be reconciled.

Like The Deerslayer, The Pioneers ends where it begins, with the development of the theme of permanence and legitimacy through marriage; yet where Natty and Judith come from different worlds—and are thus incompatible—Elizabeth and Oliver are united by their common past and their common future. “By playing on Oliver's adopted relation to Chingachgook, Cooper finds a way to bring together in one family lineage America's Indian and English forebears” (Scheckel 132). In adopting Native American names, Major Effingham (Fire-eater) and Oliver Edwards (Young Eagle) seem to adopt as well the legitimate possession of the land, a fact that is endorsed by the legal deed that Temple returns to its proper owner. This transfer of ownership is agreeable to Judge Temple, since his own heirs will inherit the land. In fact, nearly everyone seems happy about the marriage except Natty, who can find little cause for celebration while mourning the loss of his good friends. And so after the marriage between Oliver and Elizabeth, Natty attends to the graves of Chingachgook and Major Effingham.

Ironically, Natty's own hut has become a graveyard, yet not his own grave like Tom Hutter's ark, which doubles as a tomb—or like Jotham Riddel's excavation and funeral plot—but the grave of a way of

life, of the entire savage age. In the middle of the burial ground, a sacred circle of ashes surrounded by mason-work, the bodies of Oliver Effingham and Chingachgook lie side-by-side, facing opposite directions, with the Major's head to the west and the Mohican's to the east. There is a decorated urn and a marble headstone, but Chingachgook's name has been misspelled—a final insult for the now extinct Mohican tribe. Along with these men, the old way of pre-Revolutionary America is laid to rest. Natty longs for eternal peace as well, but even though he is weary of life, he cannot join his comrades. He cannot truly leave them either, for as we will see in Home as Found, his ghost will be observed roaming the land near Glimmerglass, never able to break free from the sacred ground. His attempts to remain aloof thus do not lead to emancipation, but instead they reduce him to a “servant of time” (Sheckel 150). He is not firmly part of the nation's past, nor can he be part of its future, and so he refuses to help Oliver and Elizabeth build a new home and chooses instead to drift for the remainder of his life.

It is significant, finally, that The Pioneers ends in a graveyard, for “the new order is built upon the graves of the old, and it is through mourning that the transition between past and future is stabilized and legitimized” (Scheckel 125). We must remember, however, that moments of transition do not provide true stability. After all, the present is not fixed, but is instead a perpetually shifting point along a temporal continuum. Given this, we should think of the pastoral age as an era of dynamic rather than static equilibrium, a time when the Adamic myth

collapses and the savage age gives way to the middle age. For the same reason, we need to consider both the spatial and temporal aspects of the hut. With regards to the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, Natty's hut is significant as both "grave and womb, where the new order is born out of the death of the old" (Scheckel 146,147). In other words, the hut is a grave, or a "still-place," only in terms of its spatial details, while it is a womb in its more essential temporal role as a link between past and future. Functioning both synchronically and diachronically, the hut illustrates the dual aspect of allegory and reveals the fundamental ambivalence of Cooper's vision.

Natty Bumppo's paradoxical relationship to history is a manifestation of Cooper's ambivalence as an artist. Cooper knew that we cannot regain prelapsarian Eden, but he was also aware that progress always comes at the expense of the usable past, that Americans tend to view the past as an obstacle to advancement. It is not long, for example, before Hiram Doolittle finds that "neither his architecture, nor his law, was quite suitable to the growing wealth and intelligence of the settlement" (Cooper, Pion 446). Here in Templeton he has become an obstacle, and so he moves farther west. Because of his ambivalence, then, Cooper can be accused of wish fulfillment only in the sense of his allegorical desire for unity between past and future, civilization and nature. Just like the character Petya in Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard, Cooper seems to argue that true progress is only possible when we first reconcile the past, for in disregarding history, Americans are like Dr.

Todd, who rears “on this foundation of sand, a superstructure, cemented by practice, though composed of somewhat brittle material” (Cooper, Pion 74). To build a foundation of solid stone, we must maintain a proper relation with nature and with time. We must not allow the elaborate facades of our own construction to mystify us with false feelings of protection, possession, and permanence. This is the paramount refrain of the Templeton trilogy, especially in The Deerslayer and The Pioneers, where architectural metaphors like Hutter’s castle and ark, Temple’s mansion, Natty’s hut and cave, and New St. Paul’s and The Academy resound like motifs within a musical score.

As a literary orchestration, the Templeton trilogy is uneven at best, especially in its final movement, Home as Found, a novel of vacant imitations and fading echoes. In this satirical novel, Cooper is often dogmatic and his autobiographical content is thinly veiled; consequently, the work does not achieve the same degree of poetic unity as The Deerslayer and The Pioneers. Despite its lack of artistic economy, though, Home as Found does provide an appropriate conclusion to the Templeton trilogy. The harmony of nature has diminished completely, and the contradictions of society have reached a crescendo. The middle age has supplanted the pastoral age, and the growing mob has crowded out “not only the fading dream of Natty Bumppo but Cooper’s dream of cultural aristocracy as well” (Sundquist 7). Most importantly, the central figures of the novel, the Effinghams, are treated here with the same degree of ambivalence as is Natty Bumppo in the Leatherstocking Tales.

As a hero in space and removed from time, we remember, Bumpo becomes isolated to the point of impotence and thus completely irrelevant to history. He is steamrolled by the advance of time and reduced to an apparition following the burning of his hut.

Bumpo's sterility and celibacy are comparable to the Effingham's incestuous preservation of their line, for they become artificial by remaining aloof and resisting social change. Their attempts to remain still within the movement of life reveals the extent of their pride and the irony of their mystification. "The wall of manners and breeding thrown up by the Effinghams barely keeps out the surrounding chaos, and it does so only by cutting them off into a restricted world where purity comes to equal artificiality in the most disturbing fashion" (Sundquist 8). By addressing the elements of incest in Home as Found, Sundquist highlights an essential link between Cooper, Hawthorne, Melville, and Poe. The peculiarly close relationships between the Pyncheons in The House of the Seven Gables, the Glendinnings in Pierre, and the Ushers in "The Fall of the House of Usher" are the direct result of family pride, of what Sundquist describes as a desire to found a lasting home; yet in our analysis of these works, we do not have to limit ourselves to Sundquist's Freudian model, for in each case, as with the Effinghams, the family's abnormal ties to its genealogical "house" is manifest in their unnatural attachment to a physical house. Because of this, an analysis of architectural metaphors is perhaps more fruitful than purely psychological criticism.

Once again, the central metaphor in Home as Found is Judge Temple's mansion; yet whereas in The Pioneers the Temple mansion was balanced by Natty Bumppo's wilderness hut and cave, there is no similar counterbalance here. The home stands like an island fortress at the very heart of the city, and in another sense it occupies the center of the novel itself, for all of the characters converge on the spot as if drawn by a powerful magnet. The meaning of the book's title becomes apparent when we realize that the narrative leads us straight from the docks of New York to the Wigwam, an edifice that serves as the locus of Effingham authority. It is ultimately ironic that the home they have found(ed) stands in the middle of town because throughout the novel they criticize the middling effect of Jacksonian democracy; they complain that egalitarian values promote imitation and mediocrity, but their own estate is a monument of artificiality and compromise. They may rationalize that their imitation is now an established tradition, but this only confirms their mystification. Calling to mind the absurd manner in which the mansion was constructed, with its conspicuous roof and its feat of levitation, we get a clear picture of just how insubstantial is the foundation upon which the Effinghams base their claim of superiority.

By holding themselves in high esteem, the Effinghams have separated themselves from the rest of American society, a condition that has only intensified because of their long absence from the country. Upon returning to the New World, they are shocked by the drastic changes. Like Rip van Winkle, they seem to have slept while time

marched on. Rip wakes to find that his quiet "Dutch" village has grown into a noisy "English" town, that federalist America has replaced colonial America. In similar fashion, the Effinghams return to find that Jacksonian America has supplanted Jeffersonian America. This homecoming is of course autobiographical, for Cooper made a similar discovery after his sojourn in Europe. The America of his childhood was transformed, and in terms "both of Cooper's Jeffersonian vision of a stable, agrarian democracy, and of the standards of culture and manners he had learned to appreciate in Europe, most of this change was for the worse" (MacDougall 158).

Just as Cooper probably did in real life, the Effinghams lament that the good fellowship of the pastoral age has been consumed by the growing tyranny of populist mediocrity, commercial and speculative greed, and the mad rush westward. Perennial movement seems to be the way of the new society, but as soon as the Effinghams return home, they circle the wagons and prepare to hold their ground. In this respect at least, they parallel Tom Hutter as he fights off the Indian siege and Natty Bumppo as he guards his hut against the sheriff's posse. When founding a home, it seems, self-defense simply comes with the territory.

There may be no hostile band of Indians and no organized mob in Home as Found, but the threat of the nameless, faceless populace poses a serious threat to the Effingham's way of life. Here, in the final work of the Templeton trilogy, we see that issues of legitimacy and possession have still not been resolved, and after reading of the Three-Mile

controversy, we must conclude that perhaps they never will. This, according to Cooper, is because men such as Aristabulus Bragg and Steadfast Dodge will continue to thrive in society. Steadfast Dodge is a lot like Hawthorne's Judge Pyncheon. "Swollen with 'the conceit of a vulgar and inflated man,' he is 'so far blinded . . . as to think his opinion of importance" (Leary xviii). As the narrator points out, he is a "hypocrite by nature, cowardly, envious, and malignant; and circumstance had only lent their aid to the natural tendencies of his disposition." Aristabulus Bragg, on the other hand, is not as malignant as his counterpart, and the narrator even concedes that under different circumstances, with better breeding, he would have been a gentleman and a scholar. But as his name implies, Bragg is a proud man, "bold, morally and physically, aspiring, self-possessed, shrewd, singularly adapted to succeed in his schemes where he knew the parties, intelligent after his tastes, and apt" (Cooper, HF 222). As we shall see, these qualities will reemerge in The House of the Seven Gables in the character Holgrave.

As a champion of egalitarian values, Bragg is like Eve Effingham's alter ego. Whereas he is liberal, she is conservative. He loves progress, she tradition. The contrasts between the two are especially clear in their disagreement about American architecture, which Eve considers "generally so simple and pure." Bragg is deliberately tactful as he speaks to Eve, but he seems to be seething with resentment. In discussing the Effingham mansion, for example, he vigorously defends the public opinion. He admires the home, but he tells her that many others feel

cheated for having not been consulted about its improvements. "I can understand that one would wish to see his neighbors use good taste," she answers, "but the man who should consult the whole neighborhood before he built would be very apt to cause a complicated house to be erected . . . or, what is quite as likely, apt to have no house at all." He assures her that such is not the case, for many private and public edifices have recently been erected, all conforming to the public sentiment in favor of the Grecian school. To this he adds, "A friend of mine just built a brewery on the model of the Temple of the Winds" (Cooper, HF 14,15).

Alarmed by Bragg's apparent vulgarity, Mr. Effingham inquires about the residents of Templeton, which he affectionately calls "ol' Ostego." In doing so, however, he takes great care to distinguish between the region's "permanent families" and its "floating inhabitants." Thus, Cooper's own voice comes through loud and clear as Mr. Effingham expresses a deep concern that, without permanence, the serenity and stability of the old ways will be cast aside and total chaos will ensue. This view of permanence is supported by another member of their entourage. Sir George Templemore—whose name is shamelessly similar to Judge Temple's—becomes one of the novel's strongest voices of conservatism and legitimate authority. He is an ambassador of the Old World and greatly admired by Eve and Mr. Effingham. "We love to continue for generations on the same spot," he says. "We love the tree that our forefathers planted, the roof that they built, the fireside by

which they sat, the sods that cover their remains.” To this Bragg can only marvel that such immobility must put a great strain on business operations, but Sir George assures him that ancestry, history, and traditions are far more important (Cooper, HF 22, 23).

Bragg is not convinced by Mr. Effingham and George Templemore’s conservative pleas for tradition, and now, dropping his mask of feigned reverence, he boldly states:

Why, sir, in the way of history, one meets with but few encumbrances in this country, but he may do very much as interest dictates, so far as that is concerned, at least. A nation is to be pitied that is weighed down by the past, in this manner, since its industry and enterprise are constantly impeded by obstacles that grow out of its recollections. America may, indeed, be termed a happy and free country, Mr. John Effingham, in this, as well as in all other things.

(Cooper, HF 23)

To emphasize his point, Bragg notes that a human being is not a cat, a creature that loves locality above all else. He even admits, with great pride, that his own house was pulled down shortly after he was born, and he insists that improving the Effingham mansion has been a waste of time and money. In his opinion, or what he calls the “general opinion” (for the two are indistinguishable), the home would be far more valuable if sold as scrap, especially if a new street were run through the property. The party’s reaction to these brash statements is perhaps best expressed

by Eve herself, who tells Bragg, "Sir, I am a cat, and like places I have long frequented" (Cooper, HF 25). From this, we can conclude that "Eve is Cooper's most poignant, if sometimes unbearable, voice of an aristocratic mixture of refinement and nostalgia" (Sundquist 21).

Before moving on to Templeton, the members of Eve's group first make a tour of New York. On this excursion, Eve, Mr. Effingham, Aristabulus Bragg, and Sir George Templemore are joined by Grace von Cortlandt, an American girl as naive as Daisy Miller, and Mademoiselle Viefville, a European lady. The tour itself is nothing more than Cooper's ploy to run the theme of permanence into the ground, for the ensuing discussion focuses on the merits of houses, such as those owned by the prominent Mrs. Hawker and Mrs. Houston. In contrast to the "migratory population," Mrs. Hawker is as well established as any American possibly could be at such a moment in the young nation's history. Sir George, associating grand facades with high social status, immediately presumes that she is a fine lady simply because of the stature of her edifice, and he acknowledges that a "town which can boast of a half dozen such houses need not accuse itself of wanting society." Yet Grace must confess that it "would be too much to say we have even a half dozen such houses" (Cooper, HF 58). This is confirmed later when they visit Mrs. Houston's home. "The rooms are so crowded," Sir George observes, "one wonders that the same contracted style of building should be so very general in a town that increases as rapidly as this, and where fashion has no fixed abode, and land is so abundant." To this Eve can only answer that

“these houses are types of the social state of the country, in which no one is permitted to occupy more than his share of ground” (Cooper, HF 63).

In contrast to Sir George, Bragg feels that, “in the way of republican comfort,” Mrs. Houston’s modest accommodations would be preferable to Mrs. Hawker’s embellishments. Comparing Mrs. Houston’s home to those of English noblemen, he concludes that “Apsley House is a toll-gate lodge compared to this mansion! I doubt if there be a dwelling in all England half as magnificent—indeed, I cannot imagine anything more brilliant and rich” (Cooper, HF 75). This is a shameless boast, of course, but it raises an interesting point about Cooper’s intentions here. Bragg’s pragmatism seems to be on trial, whereas in The Pioneers, practicality and simplicity are celebrated. This apparent contradiction can be averted by recognizing that Bragg is not impressed with convenience and comfort so much as he is with public opinion. Lacking substantial property himself, he must justify his own position in relation to the consensus in order to gain authority. The Effinghams, on the other hand, need no such external validation. Their land is all the endorsement they need. What Cooper is doing here is using architectural references to develop his notions of truth. As we have already discussed, Cooper believed that social values should be anchored to permanent property, but when the “value” of that property begins to fluctuate, then social values also become relative. Truth itself is then opened to speculation.

Given Cooper's stance on the dangers of speculation, it is no surprise that Eve's tour of New York culminates on Wall Street, where property and land prices rise and fall according to popular whim. In this scene the case of Volkert Van Brunt's farm parallels the history of America itself. For over a century, the Van Brunts work their dairy farm for a modest sum. Then Peter Feeler buys the land for five thousand dollars (one hundred dollars per acre). Feeler sells to John Search for \$25,000, Search sells it to Nathan Rise for \$50,000, Rise sells it for \$112,000 without even seeing the farm, and a company finally auctions off lots for \$300,000. As a farm it would fetch only a farm's price, but once it is surveyed and mapped it rises in value. In Cooper's mind, this "fearful delusion of growing rich by pushing a fancied value to a point still higher" has the potential to tear the superstructure of society free from its very foundation. As Effingham points out, the obvious truth, "a truth which is as apparent as any other law of nature," is that "nothing can be sustained without a foundation" (Cooper, HF 102). These lines seem to be contradicted in The Pioneers by the porch of the Temple mansion, which is supported by its roof rather than by its base. Even though the porch's pillars have lifted off the ground, however, the mansion itself does retain sufficient contact with its foundation to remain standing.

Both in The Pioneers and in Home as Found, Cooper uses the metaphor of the foundation to represent the basic principles of civilization, such as national honor, permanent security, the ordinary

rules of society, the law, the constitution, etc. Apparently these values can break down both at the top and at the bottom. In The Pioneers, for example, individual idealism threatens the social framework, whereas in Home as Found it is the pragmatism of the masses that poses the danger. According to Cooper, the masses present a much more serious threat because of their collective force. Richard Jones and Hiram Doolittle may distort the foundation with their abstract notions of a composite order, but the Wall Street surveyors can obliterate it. Despite Cooper's growing abhorrence of mob rule, though, we must remember that in the Templeton trilogy Cooper the artist remains essentially ambivalent. The aristocracy and mobocracy differ only in degree, not in kind, and both groups are to be condemned when their human pride distorts truth.

Cooper's condemnation of human pride in the Wall Street scene of Home as Found is indeed harsh. Here he seems to have abandoned his art altogether and reverted to the acrimonious voice of his social satire. In what amounts to nothing less than moralizing overkill, Cooper implements a threefold attack in which he uses the elements of plot, dialogue, and narration. In each case the key subjects are the mystification and subsequent fall of civilization. First of all, on the level of plot, Cooper recycles the conflagration from The Pioneers to reinforce the theme of divine retribution. Echoing the burning of Natty's hut and of Mount Vision—and looking forward to the Templeton Fun of Fire—The Wall Street blaze takes on symbolic significance because of the link

between the speculators and the warehouses. The men are certainly mystified, for they “live like the fool who says there is no death,” and the warehouse are “a part of the same lamentable illusion . . . the ephemera of the same widespread spirit of reckless folly” (Cooper, HF 105).

The warehouses stand as monuments of human pride and greed, and so the conflagration of the warehouse district constitutes a form of demystification. Just as in the closing pages of The Deerslayer, where the very seasons seem to mock Hutter’s delusions of permanence, nature seems to delight here in the destruction of Wall Street:

There was something frightful in this contest of the elements, nature appearing to condense the heat within its narrowest possible limits, as if purposely to increase its fierceness. The effects were awful; for entire buildings would seem to dissolve at their touch, as the forked flames enveloped them in sheets of fire. (Cooper, HF 107)

The implication here is that speculation is unnatural, and thus offensive to God. Only through a fall, such as catharsis by fire, can mankind be purified of its pride and restored to proper humility.

Rather than rely solely on the descriptions of the Wall Street fire to convey his meaning, Cooper turns to his characters for backup. Before the start of the blaze, for example, Mr. Effingham blatantly predicts that a terrible blow will soon wake the town “to a sense of its own illusion” (Cooper, HF 103), and following the catastrophe, Sir George must state the obvious. “Here is a fearful admonition for those who set their hearts

on riches," he says. "What, indeed, are the designs of man, as compared with the will of Providence!" (Cooper, HF 107). Unwilling to leave well enough alone, Mr. Effingham throws in a final word of prophecy that this is the beginning of the end, that with "one pin knocked out of so frail and delicate a fabric, the whole will become loose, and fall to pieces" (Cooper, HF 108). Comments like these seem unnecessary and obtrusive. We do not need Effingham's predictions, for instance, because from the beginning the Templeton trilogy has been leading up to this climactic event. Also, it seems ironic that Templemore, an English aristocrat whose very authority depends on his possessions, should voice such derision. One cannot shake the impression that Templemore and Effingham, like many of the other characters in Cooper's lesser fictions, simply talk too much.

The third level of Cooper's attack, finally, comes from the novel's narrator. Even more intrusive than Effingham and Sir George, the narrator capitalizes on the Wall Street fire to pontificate about the fall of prideful men:

That Exchange, which had so lately resembled a bustling temple of Mammon, was already a dark and sheeted ruin, its marble walls being cracked, defaced, tottering, or fallen. It lay on the confines of the ruin . . . house crumbled to pieces after house, under the dull explosions, happily without an accident. . . . Weeks, and even months passed, however, ere the smouldering ruins ceased to send up smoke, the fierce

element continuing to burn, like a slumbering volcano, as it might be in the bowels of the earth. . . . The day that succeeded this disaster was memorable for the rebuke it gave the rapacious longing for wealth. Men who had set their hearts on gold, and who prided themselves on their possessions, and on that only, were made to feel its inanity; and they who had walked abroad as gods so lately, began to experience how utterly insignificant are the merely rich, when stripped of their possessions” (Cooper, HF 108,109).

The narrator’s sermon here seems a bit patronizing (for we readers should be trusted to interpret the meaning of the fire) and certainly redundant, but it does contain some essential elements of the allegory. Stripped of their possessions, for example, the men experience a process of demystification in which they shed their prideful illusions of their own permanence and come to realize the truth of their own insignificance.

More importantly, the narrator develops the theme of time when he points out that one “consequence of a state of rapacious infatuation . . . is the intensity of selfishness which smothers all recollection of the past, and all just anticipations of the future, by condensing life, with its motives and enjoyments, into the present moment” (Cooper, HF 110). In other words, mystification disrupts proper temporal relations. The problem with passages like this, however, is that the narrator’s direct language lacks the obliqueness of allegory. As a result, the final effect of

the novel is not irony but satire, a lighter form of irony that speaks to the intellect instead of the soul.

What is decidedly missing in the Wall Street scene, and in much of the rest of the Templeton trilogy as well, is the moral growth that follows demystification. In ironic allegories, admittedly, many of the characters themselves never make this transition. It is instead left to the readers to grow through these fictional tragedies, for we have the larger picture and thus can recognize their ironic import. Such is the case with The House of the Seven Gables and Pierre—and arguably with “The Masque of the Red Death” and “The Fall of the House of Usher”; however, Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun, William Dean Howell’s The Rise of Silas Lapham, and George Washington Cable’s “Belles Demoiselles Plantation” present special cases in which the central characters fall and rise again.

In Cooper’s Templeton trilogy, only Elizabeth and Louisa experience a type of *felix culpa*, and only Natty Bumppo achieves true tragic awareness. For the people of New York there is no lasting transformation following the disaster on Wall Street. As the narrator relates:

A faint voice was heard from the pulpit, and there was a moment when those who remembered a better state of things, began to fancy that principles would once more assert their ascendancy, and that the community would, in a measure, be purified. But this expectation ended in disappointment” (Cooper, HF 109).

We can guess that the faint voice is that of Reverend Grant, whose sermon on humility from the pulpit of the Long Room, sadly, seems to have been all but forgotten. At this point in the narrative, Cooper seems to be flirting with cynicism, and he has all but abandoned the hope for the final, redemptive age of civilization. So complete and disheartening to Cooper was the transformation from Jeffersonianism to Jacksonianism.

To illustrate further the vast changes in the American social landscape, Cooper draws on the Rip Van Winkle myth. The party in New York moves inland now, and as they tour the country, the Effinghams awake from their “hibernation” in Europe to an awareness of the country’s transformation. The problem with this scene, however, is that the plot breaks down completely. As in Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun, where essays on art and morality are interspersed with narrative, the country tour scene in Home as Found is nothing but a debate over aesthetics. Grace initiates the discussion by calling the Capitol “one of the finest edifices of the world” (Cooper, HF 112), but the Mr. Effinghams, Eve, and Mademoiselle Vieffville consider St. Peter’s, the Cathedral at Milan, the Louvre, and the palace at Versailles formidable rivals. The main focus of the debate is the current American fascination with Greek architecture, which seems to Mr. Effingham “better suited to heathen worship than to domestic comfort.” As we can see from the following passage, the issue once again is form over function:

The fault just now is perhaps to consult the books too rigidly, and to trust too little to invention; for no architecture, and especially no domestic architecture, can ever be above serious reproach, until climate, the uses of the edifice, and the situation, are respected as leading considerations. Nothing can be uglier, per se, than a Swiss cottage, or anything more beautiful under its precise circumstances. (Cooper, HF 113).

Mr. Effingham regrets that imitation is taking the place of instruction, and that as a result of such vulgar pretension, many of the buildings are obviously disproportioned (Cooper, HF 117). The irony of this stance becomes apparent when we recall that the Effingham mansion itself was originally a vulgar product of pretentious imitation.

In contrast to the proliferation of Greek architecture in the countryside near Templeton, there is a distinct scarcity of Dutch architecture—another sign of the times. As John Effingham informs his guests, “Our towns pass away in generations like their people, and even the names of a place undergo periodical mutations, as well as everything else. It is getting to be a predominant feeling in the American nature, I fear, to love change” (Cooper, HF 117). This is certainly true of Templeton, a kind of microcosm of America that offers “a fair specimen of the more regular advancement of the whole nation in its progress towards civilization” (Cooper, HF 126). From the vantage point of Mount Vision, they can see proofs of the ravages of mankind. The land is now

covered with farms and comfortable dwellings, cultivated hills, and winding roads. Templeton appears “beautiful and map-like,” though the streets are sufficiently relieved from “precise delineation to prevent a starched formality” (Cooper, HF 127). There is no tavern in town, but there are shops, lawyers’ offices, respectably sized inns, and about twenty wealthy homes, six or eight with lawns and carriage sweeps.

Without a doubt, Templeton has changed much in the 50 years since The Pioneers. “No cats, as Mr. Bragg would say” (Cooper, HF 118). Perhaps the most telling change in Templeton is the accumulation of churches of various denominations. As with his comparison of the Academy and New St. Paul’s in The Pioneers, Cooper, in his catalogue of the Templeton churches, makes architectural references to develop the theme of social values. The simple, rustic Long Room of the Academy is gone, though New St. Paul’s (the Episcopalian, orthodox house known for its windows) still stands. The Methodist church is a dark, gloomy building, while the First Presbyterian, the old standard, is a very good house similar to New St. Paul’s but with two rows of regular square-topped windows. It has a new bell that weighs 100 pounds more than St. Paul’s and has the better sound. The county courthouse and jail, a yellowish-looking building with a heavy wall around it and a belfry, accommodates every religion but Judaism. The Universalists have a Gothic tower in wood, the Baptists a Grecian edifice, not yet painted, and the Quakers and other sects of Presbyterians worship at home.

By making frequent architectural references, such as those relating to the church alterations, Cooper is able to describe, in material terms, the effects of rampant egalitarianism. The Effinghams, for example, are disturbed by the plan of the townspeople to lower the pulpit, to raise the floor amphitheater fashion, and to replace the pews with slips. Eve, especially, finds the idea of slips vulgar and unorthodox, for it seems to elevate the sinner and depress the saint, yet Bragg assures her, "It is very popular, Miss Eve. This fashion takes universally, and is getting to prevail in all denominations." Once again we see that for Bragg, the majority opinion is always correct; however, in this case his words do ring true. The old arrangement was unjust, he argues, since the people were "kept unnaturally down" and since "nobody had a good lookout but the parson and the singers in the front row of the gallery." He tells her that the purpose of the new plan is to achieve just equality—to place all, as near as possible, on the same level.

Steadfast Dodge confirms Bragg's point with a forceful defense of populism:

Why, Miss Effingham, the people will rule, and it is useless to pretend to tell them that they shall not have the highest seats in the church as well as in the state. Really, I see no ground why a parson should be raised above his parishoners. The new order churches consult the public convenience, and place everybody on a level, as it might be . . . I must say I am a supporter of liberty, if it be only in the

pews. . . . To my notion, gentlemen and ladies, God never intended an American to kneel. (Cooper, HF 187-190)

Clearly Dodge seems to confuse liberty with license, freedom with permissiveness; he seems to advocate a direct form of democracy bordering on anarchy. Yet the Founding Fathers, and gentlemen such as Cooper, favored a representative democracy. They envisioned a meritocracy, not a mobocracy. They believed in equal *opportunity*, sure enough, but for them this did not mean the elimination of social classes; it meant simply that all free men (through education, hard work, and fortune) should be able to rise to positions of power and prestige.

Up to this point in the narrative, Cooper has waged an all-out assault on Bragg's and Dodge's pragmatic, materialistic, and egalitarian views, but when the party at last arrives at the Effingham estate, the focus of the satire shifts, and the Effinghams themselves fall into the line of fire. To begin with, their affectionate name for the mansion, the Wigwam, establishes an ironic connection between them and Natty Bumppo, whose spirit is said still to inhabit the land near Ostego Lake. Like Natty in The Pioneers, they have become isolated and obsolete because of their idealism. They seem to lack Bumppo's humility, though, and hold themselves proudly above their fellow men.

The Wigwam, then, establishes an important link to the past of the Savage and Pastoral ages; yet it is also a monument of the Effingham family pride—a symbol of their irrelevance in the present and their futile

resistance to the tides of change. This resistance is manifest in John's attempts to "de-modernize" the edifice:

It is true, the cloud-colored covering had disappeared, as had the stoop also, the columns of which were so nobly upheld by their superstructure; the former having given place to a less obtrusive roof, that was regularly embattled, and the latter having been swallowed up by a small entrance tower that the new architect had contrived to attach to the building with quite as much advantage to it in the way of comfort as in the way of appearance. . . . There was not a column about it, whether Grecian, Roman, or Egyptian; no Venetian blinds; no veranda or piazza; no outside paint, nor gay blending of colors. On the contrary, it was a plain old structure, built with great solidity and of excellent materials, and in that style of respectable dignity and propriety.

(Cooper, HF 151)

Despite these changes, Eve finds the home an "odd jumble of the Grecian and Gothic," a typical byproduct of a country where "imitation governs in all things immaterial, and originality unsettles all things sacred and dear" (Cooper, HF 149). In addition, Mr. Effingham cannot help but wonder if the castellated roof is not ill suited to the deep snows of the mountains. (This observation hits the mark, for that very winter had demonstrated the unsuitability of the roof.)

John Effingham's alterations of the family estate are significant, for they indicate a marked transformation in the mansion's role as a social beacon. In The Pioneers, the Temple mansion is compared to Solomon's temple and palace in Jerusalem, for it stands as a proud emblem of the Judge himself. The villagers recognize Temple's legitimate authority, and so in constructing their own edifices, they conform to the composite order. In Home as Found, however, the townspeople no longer look to the upper class for validation. As John recognizes, "Men will have idols, and the Americans have merely set up themselves" (Cooper, HF 240). Rather than dictating the aesthetic values of society, the Effinghams now move against the popular current, and the architectural differences between their estate and the other structures in Templeton merely exaggerate the vast social gap that separates them from the townspeople. This gap becomes almost unbreachable during the Three-mile Point controversy.

Keeping within the tradition of the Templeton trilogy, Home as Found focuses on the theme of possession. Indeed, the Three-mile Point controversy, based on Cooper's own experience, represents a crisis in the Effinghams' legitimate authority. For this reason, Eve vigorously defends her family's claim to the land. "What power—human power, at least—can dispute the lawful claim of an owner to his property?" she asks. "That Point has been ours ever since civilized man has dwelt among these hills; who will presume to rob us of it?" The answer, of course, is the public, "the all-powerful, omnipotent, overruling, law-making, law-

breaking public . . .” (Cooper, HF 205). While the Effinghams sojourned in Europe, the townspeople adopted Three-mile Point as their own, and they are not about to surrender their new acquisition without a fight. This battle for possession parallels the skirmish between Hutter and the Indians and Natty’s standoff with the villagers. This comparison does not bode well for the Effinghams since Hutter, we recall, loses both his castle and his life, and Natty’s abode burns to the ground. The Effinghams do manage to maintain possession of their land, but at what price? By setting themselves apart, and above, the rest of society, the Effinghams become isolated and obsolete; they risk complete self-destruction.

Ironically, the very methods by which the Effinghams attempt to hold back the march of progress become the means of their inevitable downfall. This is especially true of the marriage between Paul Blunt Powis Assheton Effingham and Eve Effingham. At first the match seems perfect, for “the discovery of Paul’s identity in Home as Found is a last-ditch effort at *founding* a true and lasting *home* that will withstand the turmoil of mob democracy” (Sundquist 15). Since Paul is John’s legitimate heir, his marriage to Eve consolidates the family’s position. All legal questions about succession and possession are thus avoided. As Eve tells Paul, “Now that it is known that you are the great-grandson of Edward Effingham, I think your chance of possessing the Wigwam would be quite equal to my own, even were we to look different ways in quest of married happiness” (Cooper, HF 396). As we can see, the marriage

between Eve and Paul serves the same purpose as that between Elizabeth Temple and Oliver Edwards. The difference is that the earlier union resolves a crisis of legitimacy by joining two separate families, whereas the later, semi-incestuous union fuses two branches of the same family. Ultimately, this fusion will lead to the perversion rather than the preservation of the Effingham line, for the children of Eve and Paul will have to marry outside the family or risk impotence through full-blown incest. We can only speculate about future generations of Effinghams, but as we will see in the next chapter, Hawthorne and Melville, in their treatment of incest, pick up where Cooper leaves off.

Incest, then, is the two-edged sword with which the Effinghams choose to defend themselves against the encroaching rabble. Descendants of the pioneers, these new "aristocratic settlers are no longer exactly in a wilderness, and they must protect themselves not from satanic Indians but from their own mad countrymen. The risk they run, however, is of a suffocating inbreeding" (Sundquist 21). This process of perdition through gradual suffocation represents an inversion of the post-Edenic situation, in which incest among the children of Adam and Eve was a necessary means of propagation. Adam and Eve's descendants multiplied, but the Effingham line seems to be dwindling, even dying out. They seem to be going the way of the Hutterers, the Mohicans, and even Natty Bumppo, who were swallowed up by time. By returning to the Edenic myth at the end of the Templeton trilogy, Cooper manages to rescue his art from the quicksand of cynicism and detached

aesthetic observation that consumes much of Home as Found. Once again, he finds his ironic voice, and his allegorical treatment of Eve and Paul's marriage—in contrast to his laborious handling of the Wall Street fire and Point controversy—is one of the novel's most redeeming aspects.

Paul and Eve Effingham clearly represent a post-lapsarian Adam and Eve. The fact that Paul is not called Adam is unimportant since Eve's name makes the association obvious. Also, Paul's connection to Adam is reinforced by Cooper's characterization of him as a reincarnation of Leather-stocking, an American Adam. The likeness between Paul and Natty becomes apparent when Mr. Effingham, Eve, and Paul take a walk through the "great tabernacle of nature" (Cooper, HF 131). There, by the shores of Ostego Lake, Mr. Effingham invokes the spirit of Natty Bumppo. Longing for a return to the Savage Age, when the solitude and peacefulness of the wilderness was undisturbed by the passions of man, he expresses a sincere wish that the forest would have no inhabitants but those who have a feeling for its perfection. Eve has no such feeling, and in this sense, at least, she seems to be corrupted by European influence, just as the first Eve was corrupted by Satan. This "corruption" is evident in her love of antiquity, for when she looks at Ostego Lake she says, "Fancy the shores of this lake lined with villas, church-towers raising their dark heads among these hills; each mountain crowned with a castle or a crumbling ruin, and all the other accessories of an old state and society, and what would then be the charms of the view!" And later, when she observes the Silent

Pine, she cries, "Here, then, is at last an American antiquity!" (Cooper, HF 136).

Expressing a preference for the structures of civilized society, Eve echoes Judith's claim that she should be a thousand times happier living among the farms, churches, and forts of civilized beings than on the dreary frontier. In the same way, Paul's response to Eve parallels Deerslayer's argument to Judith that the concord of the wilderness, with its shade, springs, brooks, and trees, is preferable to the contradiction of civilization, with its clearings and disabled trunks (Cooper, Deer 254,255). Paul, the nature poet, tells Eve that the charms of the forest, with all of the "accessories" of an old society, would be "less than they are to-day," and he says, "Were we to think less of the artificial and more of our natural excellences, we should render ourselves less liable to criticism" (Cooper, HF 202). By linking Paul and Eve to Deerslayer and Judith in this manner, Cooper forces us to abandon any optimistic, idealistic treatment of the Effingham wedding and to adopt instead a critical stance. The allusion jogs our memory; it establishes a temporal context in which to measure the historical significance of the marriage. Throughout the Templeton trilogy, Cooper resists the temptation of an easy resolution between innocence and experience, new and old, wilderness and civilization. Can we imagine, then, that he will succumb in the end? Certainly not.

So far we have been discussing two essential factors regarding the Effingham marriage: that Eve and Paul—representing the Old World and

New World, respectively—are incompatible and that their union is semi-incestuous. Another distinguishing factor is the symbolic setting of their proposal. Given the allusions to Adam and Eve, it is no surprise that the proposal takes place in a garden, but the English-style grounds cultivated by John, with their maze of hedges, present a distorted image of Eden (Cooper, HF 319). Located in the middle of town, the garden is perhaps the novel's most important metaphor, for it symbolizes the Effingham's self-imposed isolation within the very heart of society; and by reinforcing the sense of enclosed space that the architectural metaphors develop, it becomes the perfect emblem of family pride. "As clearly as Natty's wilderness, the virgin territory defiled by settlement, the Effingham garden stands for a nostalgic protection and a sentimental view of possession, not least because it contains an idealized partner which Adamic Natty could never allow himself to have" (Sundquist 21). The *permanence* of this *possession* and *protection* is threatened from within by the gradual suffocation of the Effingham line through intermarriage, but there is a serious external threat as well. And once again the harbinger of destruction is fire.

Outside the walls of the Effingham garden, fireworks burst in the sky as the nation celebrates its independence. By thus staging the proposal scene on the Fourth of July, Cooper links the fate of the Effinghams with American destiny; he creates an allegory of America in which the garden serves as a type of preserve for the ebbing wilderness and a reservation for the fading Jeffersonian values. Beyond the

boundaries of the garden, the forces of change run rampant, threatening to pervert the meaning of true liberty with notions of total license. The fireworks symbolize the paradox of American democracy itself.

Expansive, brilliant, booming, and colorful, they represent the great potential of American resourcefulness, ingenuity, industry, and diversity. Yet because human nature is fallen, these same qualities can explode like fireworks. The destructive potential of the fireworks is confirmed when stray rockets fly into the Effingham garden, nearly setting it on fire. This action immediately calls to mind the flame-tipped arrows that assault Hutter's castle in The Deerslayer, the burning of Mount Vision and of Natty's hut in The Pioneers, and the Wall Street fire earlier in Home as Found. Like time and death, the great levelers, fire in the Templeton trilogy serves as a central agent of demystification, threatening to consume the infrastructure of human idealism and pride.

Finally, the last two distinguishing characteristics of the Effingham marriage are the double wedding ceremony at the Wigwam and the hasty flight of the newlyweds to Europe. The Templemore marriage constitutes an inversion of the Effingham marriage, for in the former case it is the groom, Sir George, who represents Old World experience, while in the latter case it is the bride, Eve. Paul, with his affinity for nature, and Grace, naive and simple, represent the New World. Eve and Sir George seem to be the most compatible, especially considering her love for antiquity, and so the "mixed" nature of the marriages only provides further evidence of Cooper's fundamental ambivalence. "What

continually haunts Cooper,” we recall, “is that too far outside society is lawlessness and anarchy, but too deep inside it is denial of freedom if not downright suffocation” (Sundquist 8).

The double wedding at the Wigwam seems to provide an escape from this dilemma, for whereas the Effingham union seems to lead to suffocation, the Templemores seem to carry with them the promise of the Final Age, the hope that “time, and a greater concentration of taste, liberality, and knowledge than can well distinguish a young and scattered population” will repair the evil of mob rule, and that their children “will reap the harvest of the broad fields of intelligence that have been sown . . .” (Cooper, HF 317). Until this time comes, both the Templemores and the Effinghams seem content to remain in comfortable exile across the sea, for their enthusiastic departure from the New World leaves us with some serious doubts that they will ever return.

Unlike the marriages in traditional novels proper, the marriages at the end of Cooper’s Home as Found represent not reconciliation and wish fulfillment, but instead only sustained ambivalence and irony. Cooper no doubt foresaw two futures for America—one of hope and promise, the other of despair—and the double wedding and honeymoon, along with the fireworks in the garden and Paul and Eve’s incompatible and incestuous relationship, reinforce this sense of doubleness. Opening in concord and closing in contradiction, the Templeton trilogy is from beginning to end the product of Cooper’s allegorical desire, and the most poetic expression of this desire is the architectural metaphor. Crowding

the frontier between myth and history, the edifices in the Templeton trilogy are key metaphors of American democracy, which for Cooper “promised the means for uniting stability and change in one social order” and which depended on “the proper spirit of humility,” a perception of one’s own insignificance “that man might achieve by living among the immensity and power of untouched nature” (Ringe 124). Also essential was an adherence to proper Christian principles, which were not subject to the will of the congregation (Ringe 125). The churches and other structures in Cooper’s Templeton trilogy are thus allegorical because they are cemented in moral principles and negotiate the threshold between stability and change, space and time, past and future.

Admittedly, The Deerslayer, The Pioneers, and Home as Found lack the “cruel iron of reality” (Lawrence 61)—and for this we can place Cooper among conservative romancers such as Simms, who were followers of Scott. Yet because of the essential doubleness of Cooper’s vision, with his ambivalent treatment of history and myth, we can also place him with experimental romancers such as Brown, Hawthorne, Poe, and Melville. At the very least, the Templeton trilogy is a precursor of ironic allegory. What ultimately distinguishes the dark Romantics from Cooper, however, is the power of blackness, the tragic sensibility which, as we shall see in the next chapter, could only emerge from an artistic temperament forged in the shadows of the Gothic tradition and refined in the convicting light of the Puritan legacy.

## CHAPTER III

### DECONSTRUCTION: THE STRUCTURE OF IRONY

*The flame consume my dwelling place.*

*And when I could no longer look,*

*I blest His name that gave and took,*

*That laid my goods now in the dust.*

Bradstreet

During the mid-nineteenth century, at the dawn of the American renaissance, American writers publicly declared their own emancipation from the European literary tradition, but American literature had perhaps always been fundamentally subversive. As we saw in the last chapter, for instance, even generally conservative authors such as Cooper betrayed an affinity for ambiguity and a reluctance to reconcile paradox. Some critics, including D. H. Lawrence, might argue that the state of American letters during the colonial and federal periods was more reactionary than revolutionary; yet because of America's geographical isolation from Europe, early American authors did enjoy an outsider's point of view that allowed them to nurture a critical perspective of European art and culture. Not until the American renaissance, however, did this fresh perspective achieve a sufficient level

of refinement to constitute a national literary movement. The primary catalysts for America's literary awakening were the Transcendental poets, who tempered the subjectivism of the Romantic poets with a new emphasis on dialectic, democracy, and the American landscape; but it was perhaps the fiction writers who implemented the greater literary innovations of the era. Expanding on the European Gothic tradition, itself a reactionary genre, America's experimental romancers created a uniquely American genre with tremendous potential for ambiguity and irony.

Irony is not unique to Gothic literature, of course, but is instead characteristic of diachronic fiction in general. For example, in the novel, a form that can be said to originate in the "Quixotic tension between the world of romance and that of reality" (De Man, BI 55), moments of irony result from the inevitable structural discontinuities that arise when thematic duality is played out within the temporal framework of narrative. Ultimately, it is the musical quality of narrative, the "uninterrupted and irresistible flow of time" within a work of fiction, that "gives homogeneity to the disjointed parts, by putting them in a relationship that, although irrational and ineffable, is nevertheless one of unity" (De Man, BI 58). Because of its integral relationship to time, then, irony is the determining and organizing principle of the novel. The essential contribution of Gothic fiction is the way it uses this organizing principle to expand the limits of objectivity.

European Gothic writers such as Horace Walpole turned from the objective, public world of the early sentimental and social novels and from the subjective, private world of the Romantic poets to create instead a dualistic system, both public and private, objective and subjective. Ann Radcliffe blurred the distinction between fact and fancy through manipulation of the picturesque, while Matthew Lewis presented the supernatural as a function of private experience. Of the early Gothicists, Charles Maturin succeeded most in creating a dualistic system. By detailing personal reflections on terror and simultaneously preserving the objectivity of the inner narrator, he created confusion about the nature of reality. In this way, his subjective horror took on an objective force (Haggerty 391). Early Gothic romances may have been crude and sensational, but they paved the way for later Gothicists by rejecting the conventions of fictional form. These writers only began to resolve the “paradox of public and private experience by means of internal narrators and suspended tales.” It remained for later Gothicists, specifically America’s experimental romancers, to “find the means of reaching outward from this interiority to produce a powerful new form” (Haggerty 391). The “powerful new form” suggested here by Haggerty is ironic allegory.

Just as the American Transcendentalists diverged from the Romantic tradition through the influence of pantheistic religion and idealistic philosophy, so too can America’s experimental romancers be distinguished from Europe’s Gothic writers by the nature of their moral

imagination. As a part of the legacy of Puritan allegory, American allegorists inherited a doctrine of religious dualism—a skeptical approach to truth revealed thematically in the story of Adam and Eve, the Garden of Eden, and the tragic Fall. Yet whereas allegories such as Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress and Milton's Paradise Lost maintain firmly established hierarchies of value, which define or give meaning to the progress of the characters, American allegories maintain thematic ambivalence. Their “ambivalent personification, though framed in a religious dualism whose doctrinal base has crumbled, seems to measure the distance that exists between the world of appearance, chance, and self-deception, and the world of reality, order, and truth” (Honig 117).

Aligned with Puritan allegory in its dualistic approach to the themes of truth, the Garden, the Fall, and Original Sin—and aligned with Gothic fiction in its ambivalent approach to the themes of space and time—American ironic allegory can perhaps best be described as a hybrid of these two oblique genres. The purest expression of this union can be found in the works of Nathaniel Hawthorne, whose artistic sensibility fused and refined the thematic ambivalence of the Gothicists and the moral imagination of the Puritan allegorists to yield his one great subject: the truth of the human heart. Hawthorne's understanding of humanity represents a significant departure from neo-classical and Romantic notions. Like the neo-classicists, he believed that mankind is fallen; yet unlike his 18<sup>th</sup> century predecessors, he took this to mean that men are double by nature, not essentially evil. In addition, Hawthorne,

influenced by the Romantics, conceived of the universe as organic and dynamic; and like Emerson and Thoreau he maintained that moral reform must come from within. But the efforts of his contemporaries at "transformation without tragedy he branded with their own favorite term of opprobrium: 'mechanical'" (Male 36).

It is Hawthorne's tragic vision of dual humanity, finally, and of the necessity of sin and suffering for moral transformation that distinguishes him as America's first great ironic allegorist. With "ambiguity of meaning and clarity of technique" (Male 76), he wrote of the central paradox that lies at the heart of tragedy and Christianity: the ambiguous mixture of good and evil. He realized that men are half angels and half demons. As Male points out:

[this truth] can only be grasped in its total living context; and since this comprehensive view is impossible from any single human perspective, the closest we can come to it is through "expression"—art, symbol, gesture, or parable—a showing of "some trait" from which the totality may be inferred. (117)

For Hawthorne, art, or more specifically tragic art, provided a means for moral growth. For this reason, we can indeed call him an artist of truth.

According to Hawthorne, moral transformation begins when one becomes involved with life, with art, and (unlike Natty Bumppo, the hero in space) with time; it occurs "only when action and passion, head and heart are fused in the fiery crucible." The crucible can take different

forms (the blacksmith's fire, the scientist's elixir, etc.), yet in each case Hawthorne uses the "vessels of purification . . . as ambiguous agents of destruction and creation." The most prominent crucible is the human heart, especially, as in The Scarlet Letter, the woman's heart. Like Adam before him, Arthur Dimmesdale comes, through passionate physical, emotional, and ultimately spiritual contact with Hester Prynne, to a more complete understanding of his dual nature. This of course results in an initial fall—for transformation without tragedy is impossible—but in the end he is born again and rises to a new position of moral awareness. Indeed, the "heart is a foul cavern; but for the man it is the source of life, the great converter" (Male 16).

In Hawthorne's fiction, then, the union of the sexes, usually in the form of marriage (though not in the case of Hester and Dimmesdale), often plays a key role in the process of moral transformation. In such cases, the relationship between man and woman is presented as a dialectical exchange between masculine speculation and feminine investment:

The woman must become curious about man's providence of knowledge; the man must become passionately attracted to the woman and through this attraction become involved with time, sin, and suffering. The fruit of their union will be, like Pearl, at once a token of sin and a promise of redemption.

(Male 9)

In this passage, Male describes the complementary relationship between masculinity and femininity; in isolation, each presents but a half-truth, an incomplete picture of the human heart, but when united, the picture is complete. Thus, through marriage, man and woman mature.

Given that the human heart is the primary crucible in which many of Hawthorne's characters confront the fires of tragic experience, it is interesting to note that in The House of the Seven Gables, the Pyncheon mansion itself seems to pulse like a great human heart, a vessel of moral transformation. In fact, so much of "mankind's varied experience had passed [through the house]—so much had been suffered, and something, too, enjoyed—that the very timbers [are] oozy, as with the moisture of a heart." Also, the house itself is "like a great human heart, with a life of its own, and full of rich and somber reminiscences" (Hawthorne, House 18); and the great kitchen fireplace, especially, serves "all the better as an emblem of the mansion's heart" (Hawthorne, House 172). By establishing a link between heart and house, architectural imagery such as this reinforces a key theme in Hawthorne's allegory: that in the search for a lasting home, as with marriage, one finds both the potential for ruin and the promise of salvation.

In The House of the Seven Gables, allegorical desire—the hope for heaven—is depicted as a search for home, a "fusion of time and space, investment and speculation, past and present" (Male 41). This theme of the house as a crucible of ambiguity, of good and evil, is shared by both Hawthorne and Melville. As we shall see, Hawthorne's The House of the

**Seven Gables and Melville's Pierre are two allegories about the mystifying power of the edifice, the nature of personal and family pride, and the tragedy of man's Fall. Specifically, both authors explore the relationship between time and irony. Hawthorne, in his allegory of the Pyncheon mansion, distinguishes between present time and the "great world clock of time" (House 215). Melville, in his allegory of Saddle Meadows, the Apostles, and the prison, distinguishes between earthly time and celestial time. Ultimately, we will find that it is the intention of each author, by employing architectural imagery, to develop the theme of time, to create an allegory of America itself. Hawthorne's allegory portrays an America torn between conservative and democratic impulses, whereas Melville's allegory portrays an America torn between absolute idealism and virtuous expediency. Despite these differences, the two allegories, both distinctly American, leave us with the lasting impression of a nation faced with ambiguity and irresolvable contradictions.**

American ironic allegory, we recall, was born out of the union between Puritan allegory and Gothic fiction. Of Hawthorne's greatest works, **The Scarlet Letter and The House of the Seven Gables display, in their most extreme forms, the two major components of American ironic allegory. The Scarlet Letter, of course, draws on the tradition of Puritan allegory, while The House of the Seven Gables clearly falls within the Gothic genre. There is, for example, the essentially Gothic plot: the revelation of the wrongs of past generations and the setting right of those wrongs by marriage after slow exposure to them over time. And there is**

certainly no shortage of Gothic conventions. The Pyncheon house, a dark and relatively isolated old mansion, stands as an American version of a gloomy, deserted European castle, and the typical Gothic crime is represented by Colonel Pyncheon's persecution of Wizard Maule, Jaffrey's persecution of Clifford, and Matthew Maule's hypnotism of Alice Pyncheon.

Blood and deformity, two common Gothic conventions, can be seen in Wizard Maule's curse on Colonel Pyncheon, the broad crimson stain on Jaffrey's white neck cloth, and Hepzibah's scowl. Natural phenomena (such as the easterly storm that blackens the roof and walls of the old house) play an important role in the novel, as do supernatural phenomena, such as Wizard Maule's apparent magic powers, Matthew Maule and Holgrave's experiments with hypnotism, and the procession of ghosts that assembles at midnight in the mansion's parlor. Two more conventions are the presence of feudal knights and the use of artwork. Outside the house there is a political parade, an American version of a feudal procession, while inside the house there is a domineering portrait of Colonel Pyncheon, behind which lies the missing deed. A final Gothic convention, and a favorite of Hawthorne, is the manuscript. As in The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne uses the manuscript device in The House of the Seven Gables to convince his readers that his story has been handed down to him from the past.

When examining the Gothic conventions in The House of the Seven Gables, we must understand that Hawthorne does not simply regurgitate

the work of 18<sup>th</sup> century European Gothic novelists; instead, he reworks established conventions in a new way, drawing on his moral imagination to blend elements of Gothic fiction and Puritan allegory into a new form. We must resist the temptation, therefore, to fall back on simplistic notions of these genres. Hawthorne's use of allegory, especially, must be understood as a "mimetic mode of representation in which fiction and reality . . . coincide" (De Man, RT 218). As an accomplished allegorist, Hawthorne goes beyond mere personification and iconography in order to create artistic ambiguity. Such ambiguity serves two essential functions: it keeps the author from being found out and it creates irony.

First, by blurring the gap between fiction and reality, Hawthorne prevents the reader from discovering the nature of his allegorical devices. This is important because the effectiveness of his narratives would cease if the devices were discovered. Hawthorne explains this in his preface to The House of the Seven Gables: "The author has considered it hardly worth his while, therefore, relentlessly to impale the story with its moral as with an iron rod—or, rather, as by sticking a pin through a butterfly—thus at once depriving it of life, and causing it to stiffen in an ungainly and unnatural attitude" (House viii). From this passage we can see that Hawthorne clearly idealized dynamic, organic art, not the type of mechanical didacticism that Coleridge attributed to allegory.

Certainly, a "good allegory, like a good poem, does not exhibit devices or hammer away at intentions. It beguiles the reader with a continuous interplay between subject and sense in the storytelling, and

the narrative, the story itself, means everything” (Honig 5). A second benefit of allegory—the one central to our discussion here—is that its very obliqueness provides the ideal vehicle for irony. In The House of the Seven Gables, for example, Hawthorne’s allegory of the Pyncheon mansion reveals the irony of man’s prideful yet futile attempts to overcome nature and time. Hawthorne pokes fun at the Pyncheon family, who attempt to overcome their own mortality through materialism and the creation of a dynasty.

Hawthorne’s “architectural allegory” is divided into three basic parts; the first focuses on the legacy of the Colonel, Gervayse, and Jaffrey, the second on the somewhat incestuous relationship between Clifford and Hepzibah, and the third on the courtship and marriage of Holgrave and Phoebe. In each section, Hawthorne takes special care to construct metaphors linking the Pyncheons to the house they inhabit. The connection between family and home is established below:

[The mansion’s] splendid halls, and suites of spacious apartments, are flooded with a mosaicwork of costly marbles; its windows, the whole height of each room, admit the sunshine through the most transparent of plate glass; its high cornices are gilded, and its ceilings gorgeously painted; and a lofty dome—through which, from the central pavement, you may gaze up to the sky, as with no obstructing medium between—surmounts the whole. With

what fairer emblem could any man desire to shadow forth  
his character? (Hawthorne, House 176)

In this passage, we can see that the “splendid halls” and “lofty dome” of the mansion correspond to the Pyncheon family’s opulence and pride. Yet no amount of sunshine or gold can completely eradicate the shadows that lurk in every human heart, and the Colonel’s sin against Maule, we can be assured, resides perpetually in some dark corner:

Ah, but in some low and obscure nook—some narrow closet on the ground floor, shut, locked, and bolted, and the key flung away; or beneath the marble pavement, in a stagnant water puddle, with the richest pattern of mosaicwork above—may lie a corpse, half decayed, and still decaying, and diffusing its death scent all through the palace!

(Hawthorne, House 176)

In addition to his use of architectural metaphors, Hawthorne draws on the diachronic properties of allegory throughout The House of the Seven Gables in order to establish a key thematic connection between time and tragedy. Unlike symbols, which are fixed in time, allegories represent temporal difference. As De Man puts it, symbol postulates the possibility of identity or identification, whereas allegory “designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin.” By placing the subject within the context of time, allegory “prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self” (De Man, RT 210).

It is important to note that symbol cannot exist apart from allegory. The two are not mutually exclusive; all symbols fall immediately within the context of time. For example, the looking glass and the well at the Pyncheon mansion, important metaphors (such as Cooper's Glimmerglass) of perception and reflection, fall within the context of the temporal narrative. This holds true as well for the mansion's sun dial, which is a perpetual reminder throughout the story that the "shadow [of death] creeps and creeps, and is always looking over the shoulder of the sunshine!" (Hawthorne, House 146). Other symbols that develop the theme of time are the procession of ghosts, Jaffrey's pocket watch, the political procession, and the boy Ned Higgins. Ned Higgins and the political procession—ambassadors of the world beyond the Pyncheon house—are important catalysts in the transformations of Hepzibah and Clifford, respectively, while the pocket watch and the procession of ghosts are key allegorical elements accenting the novel's high point of irony: Judge Jaffrey's death.

As in "The Artist of the Beautiful," Hawthorne manipulates properties of time in The House of the Seven Gables in order to establish irony as the organizing principle of his fiction. According to De Man, irony is "laughing at a mistaken, mystified assumption . . . a false feeling of pride . . . an intersubjective feeling (of superiority)" where man "comes to believe that he dominates nature, just as he can, at times, dominate others." This false sense of identity De Man calls "major mystification," and the moment of demystification, also called the Fall, reminds the self

of the “purely instrumental, reified character of his relationship to nature” (RT 213). In simpler terms, moments of irony arise when a subject’s delusions of superiority over nature (in the form of time) are dissolved. It is precisely this interpretation of irony as demystification that will guide our discussion of the three central figures of the Pyncheon dynasty: the Colonel, Gervayse, and Jaffrey.

Regarding the Pyncheon patriarchs, John Caldwell Stubbs finds two major types of mystification: pride and sensual appetite. Pride is the product of their hopes to make themselves immortal by establishing a claim as a head of some kind of dynasty. Unfortunately, they abuse sex (their only real chance for immortality) and choose instead to fix themselves to material objects such as the House of the Seven Gables. We can see a legacy of sensuality from the Colonel, who wears out three wives, to Gervayse, who destroys his own daughter, to Jaffrey, whose wife also dies; indeed, the Pyncheon line nearly dies out because of their denial of their own temporality. This denial constitutes the major mystification of the Colonel, Gervayse, and Jaffrey, and throughout the novel we experience moments of irony (demystification), which Hawthorne weaves into his allegory through the use of architectural metaphors. By understanding the link between the house and its inhabitants, we can anticipate the ultimate Fall of the house of Pyncheon.

The link between the Pyncheon family and their house is established, of course, by the original owner, Colonel Pyncheon, who

himself is described in masonry terms, as we can see in the following passage:

Endowed with common sense, as massive and hard as blocks of granite, fastened together by stern rigidity of purpose, as with iron clamps, he followed out his original design [of the house], probably without so much as imagining an objection to it. (Hawthorne, House 4)

This common bond is represented by the Colonel's portrait, which is "supposed to be so intimately connected to the fate of the house, and so magically built into its walls, that, if once it should be removed, that very instant the whole edifice would come thundering down in a heap of dusty ruin" (Hawthorne, House 151). Whether or not we accept the magical properties of the portrait, we can see that Colonel Pyncheon's personal pride is firmly founded on his possession of the mansion.

In its treatment of the themes of pride and possession, The House of the Seven Gables parallels Cooper's Templeton trilogy. Calling to mind Natty Bumppo's hut, for example, is Matthew Maule's "hut, shaggy with thatch . . . [a] rude hovel . . . hewn out of the primeval forest, to be his garden ground and homestead" (Hawthorne, House 2). In place of Maule's "humble homestead" Colonel Pyncheon sets out to erect a family mansion that is "spacious, ponderously framed of oaken timber, and calculated to endure for many generations of his posterity" (Hawthorne, House 3). In this endeavor, Colonel Pyncheon reminds us of Judge Templeton. The Judge, we remember, acquires the deed to his land by

unethical means following the Revolutionary War, but because of his wealth and social status, he manages to avoid the contempt of the people. In the same way, the townspeople soon forget that Colonel Pyncheon, for all intents and purposes, steals his land from Matthew Maule. It is, in fact, Matthew Maule who suffers at the hands of the townspeople, for after cursing the Pyncheons he is accused and then executed for witchcraft. Despite Matthew Maule's curse, Colonel Pyncheon manages to acquire Maule's land and to claim proprietorship, with no public record of dispute, based on a grant from the legislature.

Aside from the theme of possession, played out in similar plots involving questionable land acquisition, Hawthorne and Cooper develop the theme of permanence in ironic passages about the design, construction, and inheritance of a family mansion. First of all, in both the Templeton trilogy and The House of the Seven Gables, architects play key roles, for they are in a sense responsible for the faulty foundations of the homes. Richard Jones and Hiram Doolittle design and construct a house so absurd that the pillars of the porch lift off their foundation and suspend in the air; and it is suggested that Thomas Maule, the son of the doomed Matthew Maule, works his father's curse into the very blueprints of the Pyncheon mansion.

Second, just as the town of Templeton is built over the graves of Effingham and Chingachgook, the Pyncheon house is constructed over the "unquiet grave" of Matthew Maule; and as a result, the "terror and ugliness of Maule's crime . . . darken the freshly plastered walls, and

infect them early with the scent of an old and melancholy house.” Colonel Pyncheon can build his stately edifice on any site he chooses, but because of his pride he is stubbornly determined to lay “the deep foundations of his mansion, on the square of earth whence Matthew Maule . . . had first swept away the fallen leaves.” Because of this, Nature itself seems to revolt against the project. Reminiscent of The Pioneers, in which workhorses mysteriously fall during the construction of The Academy, the water of Maule’s well loses the “deliciousness of its pristine quality,” becoming “hard and brackish” as soon as the workmen begin excavation (Hawthorne, House 4).

Finally, the Templeton and Pyncheon mansions both stand like beacons on hills, edifices of such stature that they take on the religious significance—in the opinions of their owners, at least—of Solomon’s great temple of Jerusalem. Compared to a gray feudal castle, for example, the Pyncheon mansion is “a specimen of the best and stateliest architecture of a long-past epoch” (Hawthorne, House 5), but through the use of church imagery, Hawthorne transforms the house into a type of cathedral. Ironically, the housewarming celebration, which begins as a type of coronation mass for Colonel Pyncheon, becomes a requiem instead. As we shall see, Hawthorne uses the same type of reversal in the chapter “Governor Pyncheon,” one of the novel’s high points of irony.

On the day of the housewarming celebration, the guests arrive at the Pyncheon mansion like a “congregation on its way to church,” looking up at the “imposing edifice.” Indeed, a “ceremony of

consecration, festive as well as religious, was now to be performed . . . [a] prayer and discourse from the Rev. Mr. Higginson, and the outpouring of a psalm from the general throat of the community . . .” (Hawthorne, House 5,6). Adding to the church atmosphere is the house itself; its gables rise like cathedral spires, Gothic figures ornament the exterior, and “the principal entrance . . . [has] almost the breadth of a church door” (Hawthorne, House 6). Food aromas and “belching” smoke fill the air like incense, while codfish, fowl, a roasted ox, and the carcass of a deer are prepared like sacrifices at an altar. Church imagery such as this exaggerates the importance of the celebration and raises Colonel Pyncheon nearly to papal rank; as a result, the irony of the Colonel’s Fall is heightened, and its impact on us readers more keenly felt.

As in Poe’s “The Masque of the Red Death,” death arrives at the Colonel’s housewarming celebration like an unwanted guest. This is not surprising, for death is “the only guest who is certain, at one time or another, to find its way into every human dwelling” (Hawthorne, House 9). At the moment of death, clock time runs out for the deceased, and so in Poe’s tale the irony of Prospero’s Fall from pride is marked by the chiming of an ebony grandfather clock; likewise, the Colonel’s demise, and his subsequent passage from symbolic to allegorical time, is marked by the mansion’s sun dial. At this point, Reverend Higginson, who had been preparing a benediction, delivers a eulogy instead; however, unlike Cooper’s Mr. Grant, who delivers a foreboding sermon about the evils of

vanity and pride, Reverend Higginson praises the Colonel's efforts to secure his legacy:

His duties all performed, the highest prosperity attained, his race and future generations fixed on a stable basis, and with a stately roof to shelter them, for centuries to come—what other upward step remained for this good man to take, save the final step from earth to the golden gate of heaven!

(Hawthorne, House 10).

Preaching of “prosperity,” “shelter,” and “future generations,” Reverend Higginson describes the three central ingredients of family pride: possession, protection, and permanence. Certainly, at the moment of the Colonel's death, the family seems “destined to as fortunate a permanence as can anyway consist with the inherent instability of human affairs” (Hawthorne, House 10), but unfortunately the Colonel dies before he can finalize his claim through an Indian deed, and confirmed by a grant of the General Court, to a tract of Eastern lands as extensive as a prince's territory. As a result of this misfortune, the missing deed becomes the Pyncheons' primary source of mystification:

The impalpable claim, therefore, [results] in nothing more solid than to cherish, from generation to generation, an absurd delusion of family importance, which all along [characterizes] the Pyncheons. It [causes] the poorest member of the race to feel as if he inherited a kind of

nobility, and might yet come into the possession of princely wealth to support it. (Hawthorne, House 11).

The Pyncheons' only legitimate possession is the estate itself, and so from "father to son, they [cling] to the ancestral house with singular tenacity of home attachment" (Hawthorne, House 12).

Even death itself seems incapable of breaking a Pyncheon's attachment to the family estate. It appears, for instance, that Colonel Pyncheon retains possession of the home from beyond the grave. As Hawthorne's narrator suggests, the Colonel's "character, indeed, might be traced all the way down [the line of descendants], as distinctly as if the Colonel himself, a little diluted, had been gifted with a sort of intermittent immortality on earth" (Hawthorne, House 12). Through genetic inheritance, then, the Pyncheons achieve a type of immortality. Unfortunately, the family begins to die out as—with each passing generation—priorities shift away from the human legacy toward material wealth. The clearest example of this inversion of values is the Colonel's grandson, Gervayse Pyncheon, who sacrifices his own daughter, Alice, in an effort to acquire more land.

As with the Colonel—and also with Jaffrey—Gervayse Pyncheon's character is closely associated with the house itself. The Pyncheon mansion seems to wear Gervayse's cheery expression of comfortable activity, "while the great chimney in the center should symbolize the old fellow's hospitable heart" (Hawthorne, House 145,146). In addition, the home reflects Gervayse's sensual opulence. The parlor, especially,

presents an adequate picture of his tastes. It is filled with elegant and expensive furniture, most of it from Paris, and the floor is covered with rich carpet. A marble statue, some paintings, and an ebony Venetian cabinet inlaid with ivory complete the decorations. The connection here between dweller and dwelling is ironic, however, for Gervayse himself claims no attachment to the house, having discovered there as a small child the corpse of his grandfather. Now, after witnessing some of Europe's ancestral halls and marble palaces, he looks with contempt on the house. Envious of the European landed gentry and anticipating fulfillment of the Indian deed, he has ambitions for a greater edifice, a castle.

Once Gervayse's possession of the deed is assured, he plans to purchase the "elevated dignity" of a British earldom and return to England. After all, how "could such a magnate be expected to contract his grandeur within the pitiful compass of seven shingled gables?" (Hawthorne, House 152). This dream of greater wealth and prestige is a major mystification, and once again, Hawthorne draws on the architectural metaphor to develop the irony of Gervayse's relation to the House of the Seven Gables. Returning to our discussion of the parlor, we can see that despite its elaborate furnishings and splendid artwork, the room still shows signs of its base design and construction:

Through all this variety of decoration, however, the room [shows] its original characteristics—its low stud, its crossbeam, its chimney piece, with the old-fashioned Dutch

tiles—so that it [is] the emblem of a mind industriously stored with foreign ideas, and elaborated into artificial refinement, but neither larger, nor, on its proper self, more elegant than before. (Hawthorne, House 147, 148)

In this passage, Hawthorne hints that Gervayse, no matter how far he may travel, cannot escape the truth of his human heart.

If Gervayse cannot run from himself, neither can he escape his family history. This is suggested by two important objects in the parlor: the map and the Colonel's portrait. The map, a surveyor's plan of a tract of land, is soiled with fingerprints and dingy with smoke. Here the fingerprints symbolize the ambitious grasp of the Pyncheons, while the dinginess symbolizes the family's inevitable decay because of it. The portrait, of course, is that of the Colonel, "a stern old man, in a Puritan garb, painted roughly, but with a bold effect, and remarkably strong expression of character" (Hawthorne, House 148). Always does the portrait loom over the parlor, a constant reminder of the old Puritan's "original sin" and of Matthew Maule's curse. Not surprisingly, it is here in the parlor that Gervayse meets Matthew Maule, the grandson of the original Maule, to solicit cooperation in his efforts to acquire the Indian deed. Through an allegorical treatment of the parlor's interior, with its blend of elaborate and old-fashioned furnishings, Hawthorne delineates the doubleness of Gervayse's heart and prepares us for his Fall from the pedestal of pride.

So proud is Gervayse that he fails to recognize the sinister nature of Maule's machinations. When Maule proposes a transfer of sale, for example, Gervayse simply laughs—amazed that the carpenter's terms are so “ridiculously easy” (Hawthorne, House 154)—and pours himself a glass of sherry. This potent wine becomes symbolic of Gervayse's mystification, his blindness of insight. Apparently drunk, or perhaps poisoned, Gervayse grants Maule an audience with his daughter, Alice Pyncheon, despite his concerns for her safety. Alice is as proud as her father; thus she allows herself to be hypnotized, all the while maintaining a false impression of her own impenetrability. Gervayse begins to suspect Matthew Maule of witchcraft, but then, with his mind filled with “imaginary magnificence,” he rationalizes that he is merely carrying out his daughter's will. In his efforts to acquire the deed, he seems to hand Alice over to the devil himself. Turning away, the “ambitious father almost [consents], in his heart, that, if the devil's power were needed to the accomplishment of this great object, Maule might evoke him” (Hawthorne, House 156).

Only after his attempts to revive Alice fail does Gervayse realize the horrible truth that he has turned his daughter over to the revenge-minded grandson of the original Mathew Maule. He ignored her cries for help, and now it is too late. He calls out her name, presses her hand to his, kisses her, and even shakes her in a gust of anger, but she merely relapses into her trance. He curses Maule, then, and calls him a villain, but Maule responds:

Is it my crime if you have sold your daughter for the mere hope of getting a sheet of yellow parchment into your clutch? There sits Mistress Alice quietly asleep! Now let Matthew Maule try whether she be as proud as the carpenter found her awhile since. (Hawthorne, House 157, 158)

Maule does bring Alice back from her trance, but she remains his slave until, on his wedding night, he releases her from bondage. She awakens from an “enchanted sleep . . . no longer proud—humbly, and with a smile all steeped in sadness . . .” (Hawthorne, House 160). Saddest of all is that Alice dies just a short while later. Maule, who sought only to humble Alice, instead succeeds in killing her.

The brief story of Gervayse and Alice Pyncheon and Matthew Maule occupies an interesting place in The House of the Seven Gables. Like a parable, it cautions against pride and sensual opulence, but it also warns that revenge can harden our hearts and rob our humanity. As we shall see (in our discussion of Holgrave), the descendants of the wizard Maule are not without sin, but the central subjects of Hawthorne’s tragic vision are of course the Pyncheons, and chief among them Judge Jaffrey. The irony created by the Pyncheons’ false sense of greatness culminates in the chapter “Governor Pyncheon,” in which Judge Jaffrey Pyncheon passes, at the moment of his death, from symbolic real time into allegorical grand time. The irony of Jaffrey’s death, as we shall see, emerges as one of the Hawthorne’s finest achievements as an allegorist.

Indeed, Jaffrey represents the culmination, or the *climax*, of the Pyncheon line, having inherited from the Colonel and Gervayse an immense personal pride and insatiable sexual appetite. Everywhere we are reminded of his “ogre-like appetite” (Hawthorne, House 210) and “fleshly effulgence” (Hawthorne, House 87). He is even associated with the Pyncheon bull, and the narrator notes that Jaffrey’s gold-headed cane, obviously phallic, is an adequate representative of its master (Hawthorne, House 41). Many of the characters are repelled by Jaffrey’s aggressiveness. For example, when he tries to kiss his young cousin Phoebe, she draws back, feeling that “the man, the sex . . . was entirely too prominent” in him (Hawthorne, House 88). Jaffrey’s sexual appetite represents a total disregard for the procreative power of sexuality. (Jaffrey, remember, quite literally wears out his wife.) One gets the sense that he is so used to getting what he wants—in regards to both sex and wealth—that he begins to feel he is immortal. Jaffrey’s immortality complex constitutes a “major mystification,” and so his death becomes a major point of irony in the book.

Before analyzing Jaffrey’s Fall, it is important that we first make some key distinctions between hypocrisy, sin, and innocence. First of all, it cannot be denied that Judge Pyncheon is frequently depicted as a hypocrite. From the very moment he is introduced to us, we are told that his character goes “no deeper than his station, habits of life, and external circumstances” (Hawthorne, House 41), and later, when a frown and a smile pass simultaneously across his face (Hawthorne, House 42), we

suspect a certain duality in his character. When Jaffrey meets Phoebe, the narrator comments that an ill-natured observer might suspect that the smile on Jaffrey's face is "a good deal akin to the shine on his boots" (Hawthorne, House 87), and after Jaffrey dies, he calls him a "worldly, selfish, iron-hearted hypocrite" (Hawthorne, House 216).

The chapter "The Scowl and the Smile" focuses on the theme of hypocrisy. It is here that Hepzibah accuses Jaffrey of being a hypocrite and liar; however, the narrator takes a different view. He questions the validity of her judgment by pointing to Jaffrey's high rank in society. So buried in the "solid realities" of society, Jaffrey, says the narrator, cannot help but build up a "tall and stately edifice" (Hawthorne, House 176), a "pedestal of imaginary rank" (Martin 130), which in the view of others, and ultimately in his own view, is no other than the man's character, or the man himself. In other words, Jaffrey cannot help but take his idea of himself from "the mirror of public opinion" (Hawthorne, House 178); consequently, "his conscience [bears] an accordant testimony with the world's laudatory voice" (Hawthorne, House 175). He never doubts his identity because there is enough "splendid rubbish in his life to cover up and paralyze a more active and subtle conscience" than he was ever troubled with (Hawthorne, House 176). As a result, Jaffrey's psyche is never delineated for us. Never is there any sign that he struggles with guilt. Without such a struggle, says the narrator, there can be no true self-knowledge, except through loss of property and reputation (Hawthorne, House 178).

Lacking true self-knowledge, the Judge can be said to be innocent (of hypocrisy, at least), but this does not mean that he is without sin. In fact, Jaffrey seems to be guilty of the unpardonable sin, which is indicated by a deliberate and irreversible hardening of the heart and a heart-attitude of disbelief and unrepentance. Also, if we view the search for identity as an “original sin” (Moore 80), we can say that the Judge repeats the original sin of his ancestors by identifying with the worthless relics of a worn out dynasty (gold, real estate, etc.) instead of with the real source of immortality: offspring. Because the relics are worthless (i.e. unable to escape their own temporality), Jaffrey’s identification leads to an “artificial identity” (Moore 119). That his claim to superiority is illusory is shown by the missing deed, which, according to Stubbs, becomes a symbol of the Pyncheon’s “absurd delusion of family importance” (88).

When Jaffrey tries to obtain the deed from Clifford, he no doubt *believes* that what he is doing is best for the Pyncheon dynasty; he *believes* in the *goodness* and the *rightness* of his actions, even if those actions may be called evil. And so, even if Judge Pyncheon can be called a sinner, he remains innocent—or in DeManian terms, mystified—because of his complete lack of self-awareness. Knowing this, we can now turn to an analysis of his demystification and of the irony of his Fall, for as Clark Griffith points out, the “most effectively sustained ironies in [The House of the Seven Gables] work out at various places where those

who take the greatest pride in their substantiality are reduced to shadows" (18).

The chapter "Governor Pyncheon," certainly, is a place of shadows. Here we see the contrast between Jaffrey's love for solid forms and his own formlessness as a ghost. Keeping in mind the distinction between symbol and allegory, we can now see that the former corresponds to Jaffrey's *solid forms*, while the latter represents his formlessness within time. By highlighting the irresolvable contradictions between the two, we can come to a better understanding of how irony is created at the moment of Jaffrey's death.

The theme of temporality in the chapter "Governor Pyncheon" is developed through association with the Judge's watch and with the procession of ghosts. According to Richard Brodhead, the "focus on the watch emphasizes how inaccessible present time is to him" (86). This implies a distinction between two kinds of time: present time—synchrony—and the "great world clock of Time" (Hawthorne, House 215)—diachrony. Synchronic (horologic) time is represented by the Judge's pocket watch. That the time piece is a pocket watch is significant because it reveals Jaffrey's mystified belief that he controls time, that he in fact keeps time in his pocket.

Ironically, Jaffrey's last words are "Time flies," and his last act is to remove the watch from his pocket to monitor its progress (Hawthorne, House 183). This act is ironic because he never believes for a second that his time will run out, that his watch will stop ticking. Yet the

ticking watch—"this little, quiet, never-ceasing throb of Time's pulse, repeating its small strokes with such busy regularity, in Judge Pyncheon's motionless hand" (Hawthorne, House 211)—parallels the beating of Jaffrey's heart. As the ticking and beating run down, wind creeps into the house like death, and one of the city clocks chimes midnight; thus, in opposition to the pocket watch, the city clock represents diachronic (chronometric) time. Here we are reminded that even though Jaffrey's earthly time runs out, the "great world clock of Time still keeps its beat" (Hawthorne, House 215).

Jaffrey's desire to control time becomes a subject of irony when the narrator relates, in detail, the Judge's carefully planned schedule of engagements. Jaffrey must see Clifford about the deed, check on his wife's tombstone, and attend a gubernatorial nomination banquet in his honor. But of course he cannot make any of these engagements because, through death, he loses control of time. The exact moment he loses control is when he fails to wind his watch, and thus allows his time to run out. Time, all at once, becomes "a matter of no moment with the Judge!" (Hawthorne, House 207). The present time of symbol gives way to the grand time of allegory. Here, the contradictions between the two are revealed to us in a moment of epiphany or demystification, which constitutes Jaffrey's Fall. This Fall does not lead to a moment of self-awareness for the Judge; therefore, Jaffrey's Fall becomes our own Fall as we readers gain self-knowledge, laughing along with Hawthorne at our previous mystification. At this moment of demystification, we laugh

not so much at Judge Pyncheon but at our own self-delusions and artificial identities.

Once Jaffrey falls, he enters into the allegorical realm of temporal difference. This world is represented by the procession of ghosts. Processions and parades are common in Hawthorne's tales. In The Scarlet Letter, for example, a procession of officials, soldiers, and clergymen passes by Hester and Pearl. In The House of the Seven Gables, a parade of ghosts, including the Colonel, Gervayse, and the Judge, marches by the portrait of Colonel Pyncheon. As they pass, the ghosts try to peer behind the portrait to see the missing deed. Their efforts are futile, though, because through death they have entered, like Jaffrey, the temporal world of allegory—and are thus unable to return to the symbolic, atemporal world of present time. Their position is an ironic one for they, like we, are caught in the irresolvable contradictions between symbol and allegory. Here, symbol becomes allegory as we come to realize our own position within the context of time and thus come to a fuller understanding of the Pyncheons' artificial relation to the House of the Seven Gables.

As we can see, Hawthorne uses ghost imagery, a convention of Gothic fiction, to develop his themes of time and irony. In addition, by depicting the Pyncheons as ghosts, he delineates their unnatural, even supernatural, attachment to their home. In order to reinforce this connection, Hawthorne draws on another Gothic convention: personification. For instance, at the hour of Jaffrey's death, the great

moment of irony in The House of the Seven Gables, the house makes a “bellowing in its sooty throat” that parallels the gurgling of blood in Jaffrey’s throat (Hawthorne, House 212). Earlier, in the opening lines of his tale, the narrator makes use of Gothic personification to establish the bond between the Pyncheons and their house:

The aspect of the venerable mansion has always affected me like a human countenance, bearing the traces not merely of outward storm and sunshine, but expressive, also, of the long lapse of mortal life, and accompanying vicissitudes that have passed within. (Hawthorne, House 1)

The connection between dwellers and dwelling developed in this passage is symbolized by the relationship of the “two antiquities”: the Pyncheon House and the Pyncheon Elm. “[R]ooted before the door” of the “weather-beaten edifice” (Hawthorne, House 1), the elm—both literally and figuratively the family tree—reminds us of the Pyncheons’ “rootedness” in time; their attachment to the mansion (a product of time) is a mystified attachment to the past.

Ghost imagery and personification, two important Gothic conventions, work together in The House of the Seven Gables to reveal the irony, even the tragedy, of the Pyncheons’ pride. As our discussion of the family patriarchs has shown, this “hereditary pride” (Hawthorne, House 24) is passed on from generation to generation, from the Colonel to Gervaise to the Judge. In a more thematically concentrated form, however, this pride germinates in the relationship between Clifford and

Hepzibah—a semi-incestuous union reminiscent of Roderick and Madeline Usher. Like Poe, Hawthorne reveals that a family seeking to keep itself “pure” will inevitably become impotent—and thus, with no further means of carrying on, will pass away.

In order to describe the “downright plunge which, sooner or later, is the destiny of all families, whether princely or plebian” (Hawthorne, House 17), Hawthorne sets up a comparison of the Pyncheon House and its chicken coop. Indeed, the “chicken itself [is] a symbol of the life of the old house” (Hawthorne, House 115). At one time the hens were “the size of turkeys,” but now they are “scarcely larger than pigeons, and [have] a queer, rusty, withered aspect . . . It [is] evident that the race [has] degenerated, like many a noble race besides, in consequence of too strict a watchfulness to keep it pure” (Hawthorne, House 66). This passage parallels the narrator’s observation that the Pyncheon “breed [has] not thriven; it [appears] rather to be dying out” (Hawthorne, House 15).

The slow death of the chickens (and by comparison the Pyncheons) is represented by their inability to bear offspring. Earlier generations of hens laid eggs the size of an ostrich’s, but now the two remaining hens seem to have lost the ability to lay eggs altogether. Ironically, when one of the hens finally does manage to lay an egg, Hepzibah cooks it up for Clifford’s breakfast: “Thus unscrupulously did the old gentlewoman sacrifice the continuance, perhaps, of an ancient feathered race, with no better end than to supply her brother with a dainty that hardly filled the bowl of a teaspoon” (Hawthorne, House 116)! The implication here is

obvious; in their efforts to remain perched on their pedestal of high rank, the Pyncheons commit familial suicide by completely disregarding the normal and necessary processes of procreation.

Chanticleer, the two hens, and the chicken, though useful parallels to the Pyncheons themselves, are drawn out with a bit of a heavy hand, so that the scenes at the hencoop approach tediousness. Hawthorne's narrator himself admits, "We linger too long, no doubt, beside this paltry rivulet of life that flowed through the garden of the Pyncheon House." Even if we, like the narrator, "deem it pardonable to record these mean incidents and poor delights" (Hawthorne, House 116), we must acknowledge that Hawthorne provides a more artistic, allegorical delineation of Hepzibah's and Clifford's characters through the use of ghost imagery and architectural metaphors.

As Roy Male points out, two symbols dominate the narrative of Clifford and Hepzibah: the "organic, temporal, and feminine" house and the "essentially mechanical, spatial, masculine" street (128). As we shall see, the conflict of these symbols is played out for Hepzibah in her cent shop, while Clifford's portal between the house and street is the arched window. The true extent of the pair's spectral aspects are later revealed in the climax of their narrative, when, following Jaffrey's death, they attempt to flee the mansion, only to be drawn home once more by an unseen, seemingly supernatural force.

Hepzibah Pyncheon clearly represents the "old gentility" (Hawthorne, House 26). Alone in the house much of her life, she

consequently suffers from the burden of upholding the family's 800-year-old name, even as the house itself slowly collapses about her. Heir to the Pyncheon estate—which is bolstered by antique portraits and furniture, pedigrees, coats of arms, records, and traditions—Hepzibah is forced to take on a renter and is reduced to the status of a store clerk. Is it any wonder, then, that she presents such a “grim image of family pride” (Hawthorne, House 28)? Of course she resists the intrusion of the outside, plebian world into her inner sanctum, and it is understandable that this “born lady, after sixty years of narrowing means, is fain to step down from her pedestal of imaginary rank” (Hawthorne, House 27); yet the moment she throws open the door of her cent shop her barricade against the world is demolished.

At first Hepzibah is overwhelmed by the sharp difference between her past life and her present reality, by the “mighty contrast” symbolized by the street:

On one side of the street this splendid bazaar, with a multitude of perfumed and glossy salesmen, smirking, smiling, bowing, and measuring out the goods. On the other, the dusky old House of the Seven Gables, with the antiquated shopwindow under its projecting story, and Hepzibah herself, in a gown of rusty black silk, behind the counter, scowling at the world as it went by!

(Hawthorne, House 35)

Despite Hepzibah's initial dread, however, her contact with the public seems, over time, to affect a positive change. As her renter, Holgrave, concludes, her Fall from high status certainly appears fortunate—a demystifying experience that takes her from cold aloofness to unity with mankind (Hawthorne, House 32).

Unlike the Judge, whose Fall ends in death, Hepzibah experiences a type of *felix culpa* characterized by a new, demystified perception of time: “Never before had she had such a sense of the intolerable length of time that creeps between dawn and sunset” (Hawthorne, House 49). With this fresh outlook, Hepzibah seems to undergo a process of moral growth. Perhaps she truly has been “enriched by poverty, developed by sorrow, elevated by the strong and solitary affection of her life, and thus endowed with heroism, which never could have characterized her in what are called happier circumstances” (Hawthorne, House 100). Male picks up on this point in his treatment of Hepzibah, suggesting that her “pathetic failure as an ‘aristocratic hucksteress’ is overshadowed by her love for Clifford, her kindness to Phoebe, and her staunch resistance to the Judge” (131).

Hepzibah's adversarial relationship with Jaffrey Pyncheon certainly distinguishes her from her cousin, yet as with the Judge's, her true nature—her heart—is metaphorically linked with the house. For example:

Phoebe's wasted, cheerless, and dusky chamber  
 . . . resemble[s] nothing so much as the old maid's

[Hepzibah's] heart; for there [is] neither sunshine nor household fire in one nor the other, and, save for ghosts and ghostly reminiscences, not a guest, for many years gone by, ha[s] entered the heart or the chamber.

(Hawthorne, House 53)

The connection here between Hepzibah and the Pyncheon House is not surprising given that she has lived in the home her entire life. She has, in fact, become a “mildewed piece of aristocracy” (Hawthorne, House 39) by dwelling “too much alone—too long in the Pyncheon House—until her very brain [has been] impregnated with the dry rot of its timbers” (Hawthorne, House 43).

Just as Hepzibah's decay parallels the erosion of the House of the Seven Gables, so, too, does her own Fall anticipate its ultimate disintegration. The exact moment of her Fall seems to be when she accepts money from the boy Ned Higgins, her first customer at the cent shop. As the transaction is completed, an “irreparable ruin” is wrought: “The structure of ancient aristocracy [has] been demolished by him, even as if his childish gripe [has] torn down the seven-gabled mansion” (Hawthorne, House 37). It is clear that the boy, with his all-devouring appetite, becomes an emblem of old Father Time (Hawthorne, House 8), and Hawthorne's use of architectural imagery hints once again to the Fall of the house (pedigree) of Pyncheon.

Even though Hawthorne uses both architectural and ghost imagery in his treatment of Hepzibah (and of the three patriarchs, as well), he

achieves a more artistically satisfying blend of the two Gothic elements in Clifford's two important scenes: his mad desire to leap from the arched window and his flight, with Hepzibah, on a speeding train. What is especially interesting about these passages is that whereas Hepzibah, the Judge, Gervayse, and the Colonel are characterized by their "attachment" to the family estate, Clifford is unique in his initial "detachment" (and his yearning for permanent "detachment") from it. Having been the victim of Jaffrey's subterfuge—and downright criminality—Clifford spent much of his life in prison. Cut off from the blessed solace of human contact, he withered in dark isolation; his heart chilled and his intellect dimmed.

Once Clifford returns home from prison, his isolation, or detachment, is immediately apparent. No longer physically removed from the brotherhood of mankind, he nevertheless suffers from a type of spiritual separation. In the following passage, we can see that Clifford seems to be waking from a dream as he struggles to reestablish himself once more in the land of the living:

The guest [Clifford] seated himself in the place assigned him, and looked strangely around. He was evidently trying to grapple with the present scene, and bring it home to his mind with a more satisfactory distinctness. He desired to be certain, at least, that he was here, in the low-studded, cross-beamed, oaken-paneled parlor, and not in some other spot, which had stereotyped itself into his senses. But the effort was too great to be sustained with more than a fragmentary

success. Continually, as we may express it, he faded away out of his place; or, in other words, his mind and consciousness took their departure, leaving his wasted, gray, and melancholy figure—a substantial emptiness, a material ghost—to occupy his seat at table. Again, after a blank moment, there would be a flickering taper-gleam in his eyeballs. It betokened that his spiritual part had returned, and was doing its best to kindle the heart's household fire, and light up intellectual lamps in the dark and ruinous mansion, where it was doomed to be a forlorn inhabitant.

(Hawthorne, House 78)

Here the “other spot, which had stereotyped into his senses” is probably his former cell, and we can imagine that as Clifford looks about the room, he mistrusts his own perception of the real world. Even the term “guest” testifies to his precarious position. He cannot believe he is truly a free man. In this state, he is indeed a “material ghost.” Even though his body lives, he is “doomed” in the sense that his mind, or spirit, remains trapped in an internal prison.

In the previous passage Hawthorne clearly links prison and ghost imagery to reinforce the theme of physical and spiritual isolation. Light imagery, on the other hand, represents the heat of living. Clifford's heart, for example, is a type of “household fire” that needs to be “kindled,” and his mind is like a lamp or candle that needs to be lit. Interestingly it is not Hepzibah but Phoebe who warms Clifford's heart

and brightens his mood. Phoebe's very name denotes natural sunlight, and she seems to spread "sunshine" throughout the gloomy Pyncheon House. Clifford has been so deprived of this "natural light" that he desires little more than to sit about the garden with Phoebe and soak it in.

Even Phoebe's freshness and youthful optimism, though, fails to eradicate Clifford's melancholy. Fixed in a state of semi-consciousness, he continues to doubt the reality of his predicament; he just cannot shake out the cobwebs from his brain:

Mingled in [Clifford's] countenance with a dreamy delight, there was a troubled look of effort and unrest. He was seeking to make himself more fully sensible of the scene around him; or, perhaps, dreading it to be a dream, or a play of imagination, was vexing the fair moment with a struggle for some added brilliancy and more durable illusion.

(Hawthorne, House 82)

Half way between sleeping and waking, Clifford revels in the delight of the open window, the warm sunshine, and beautiful, fragrant flowers. Phoebe herself, with her young, cheerful face, is like a blooming flower. Clifford concludes, finally, that this must all be a dream—a fleeting diversion from "the four stone walls" of his cell. With this realization the light recedes:

His face darkens "as if the shadow of a cavern or a dungeon [has] come over it; there [is] no more light in its expression

than might have come through the iron gates of a prison window—still lessening, too, as if he were sinking farther into the depths.” (Hawthorne, House 82)

Not until Clifford fully awakens to the truth of his own heart, and thus to the precise nature of his imprisonment, will he be prepared to make a successful escape.

Clifford’s first attempt to “break out” of the House of the Seven Gables occurs at the arched window of the mansion. Like a great human eye (Hawthorne, House 121), the window negotiates the interplay between house and street; it functions as a portal between internal subjectivity and external objectivity. By studying the efficacy of the window as an allegorical element, we can come to a more precise understanding not only of Clifford’s motivation, but also of Hawthorne’s central position between romanticism and realism. As we have already discussed, Hawthorne received the Romantic legacy with tremendous skepticism. He was especially mistrustful of the Romantic promise of unity, of its faith in transformation without tragedy; nevertheless, he did share with the Romantics distaste for the materialism and mechanism that would dominate the world of the realists in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is precisely this kind of philosophical ambivalence, tempered by his artistic sensibility and moral imagination, that is at work in the scene at the arched window.

Certainly one possible reading of the window scene is that the mansion’s interior represents the potential self-absorption and spiritual

isolation of the Romantic promise. This same absorption, we recall, afflicts Owen Warland in “The Artist of the Beautiful.” In contrast, the potential for self-abandonment and mechanistic objectivity inherent in realism (reminiscent of Robert Danforth) is symbolized by the public procession. As the narrator observes, individuals in a parade tend to lose their identities, for as they sweep by the spectators, their faces and bodies blend together. This effect is even more dramatic when one watches the parade from above. For instance, as Clifford looks down from the arched window, the animated political procession (unlike the ghostly procession of the Pyncheon deceased before the Colonel’s portrait) transforms into a single rush of humanity:

. . . [the procession] melts all the petty personalities, of which it is made up, into one broad mass of existence—one great life—one collected body of mankind with a vast homogeneous spirit animating it. . . . a mighty river of life, massive in its tide. . . . (Hawthorne, House 126)

Clifford longs to join this wave of energy, this atmosphere of electricity, yet he clings to a “shivering repugnance at the idea of personal contact with the world” (Hawthorne, House 125); and so, like a voyeur peering from a veil of secrecy and seclusion, he seems content for the moment simply to watch the “dance of life” (Hawthorne, House 124).

In the words of Eve Effingham, Clifford Pyncheon is by nature a conservative “cat,” satisfied to frequent familiar places. This preference for seclusion was no doubt reinforced by his confinement in a barred cell.

As the “rush and roar” of the political procession overwhelms him, however, Clifford is “seized” by a “powerful impulse” to plunge “into the surging stream of human sympathies” (Hawthorne, House 126). He puts his leg up on the windowsill and strains toward the balcony, yet Hepzibah and Phoebe, realizing the consequences of such a plunge, wisely restrain him. In doing so they probably save Clifford’s life, for his “escape,” if carried out, would probably have been suicidal. Indeed, the most likely outcome of his self-imposed Fall would have been nothing short of complete self-destruction.

Whether or not Clifford could have survived the drop from the balcony to the ground below is ultimately irrelevant when the allegorical import of his near Fall is taken into consideration. As Clifford strains toward the window, he is simultaneously pulled in opposite directions. Hepzibah and Phoebe, of course, urge him backwards, yet he also feels drawn forward, as if “by a natural magnetism, tending towards the great center of humanity” (Hawthorne, House, 126). Seemingly locked between opposing gravitational forces, Clifford is, within the allegorical framework, caught in the middle of the dual promises of Romantic subjectivity and realistic objectivity. Seen in this light, Clifford’s near suicide represents not so much a desperate attempt at self-destruction, but a profound wish to break free from the stalemate of ambivalence and to pass through to what lies beyond.

It is not the Fall that intrigues Clifford but the potential to rise after the Fall. In other words, Clifford seeks a type of religious baptism,

through which he can die to his self, “renew the broken links of brotherhood” (Hawthorne, House 127), and be reborn. After all, if Hepzibah’s shop door—unbolted and thrown open to the world—can restore a portion of her humanity, Clifford’s arched window certainly holds the same promise; and like his sister, Clifford desperately needs restoration. As the narrator points out, he needs “a shock; or perhaps he require[s] to take a deep, deep plunge into the ocean of human life, and to sink down and be covered by its profoundness, and then to emerge, sobered, invigorated, restored to the world and himself” (Hawthorne, House 126,127). Despite this basic need, Hepzibah and Phoebe determine, in their wild panic at the arched window, that Clifford’s physical safety is paramount; thus, for right or wrong, they thwart his escape.

From the events at the arched window, we learn that Clifford’s motivation to flee the Pyncheon House is grounded in a deep need to be washed clean and restored to full humanity. What he truly seeks is spiritual freedom, not physical. Who or what, then, actually holds him back? Certainly not Phoebe. The answer lies within Clifford and Hepzibah themselves. Following the political procession, after Clifford has calmed, Phoebe bids them farewell and strolls up the street toward the church. Realizing that it is indeed the Sabbath, the brother and sister decide to attend the service, having not been to church in years. Like two children they rush upstairs and change into their Sunday clothes, then descend once more, open the front door, and step across

the threshold. At this moment, though, they both freeze with agoraphobic dread. The sunshine actually makes them shiver, and their hearts shake at the thought of stepping outside.

No physical hand restrains Hepzibah and Clifford, yet they still cannot flee; it seems that “their jailer ha[s] but left the door ajar in mockery, and [stands] behind it to watch them stealing out. At the threshold, they [feel] his pitiless gripe upon them.” There is no real jailer, of course. Hepzibah and Clifford are self-enslaved. After all, “what other dungeon is so dark as one’s own heart! What jailer so inexorable as one’s self” (Hawthorne, House 129)! Restrained only by the fear and residual pride in their own hearts, the pair linger in the doorway as if paralyzed by conflicting impulses to retreat into their dim, musty chambers and to advance into the fresh sunlight. “We are ghosts!” Clifford at last cries out. “We have no right among human beings—no right anywhere but in this old house . . . which . . . we are doomed to haunt!” (Hawthorne, House 129).

Unwilling, or perhaps truly unable, to commit to a course of action and claim their place in the real world, Clifford and Hepzibah appear instead to fade away. As Gaston Bachelard so eloquently expresses, it is thus, “on the threshold of our space, before the era of our own time, [that] we hover between awareness of being and loss of being. And the entire reality of memory becomes spectral” (58). Speaking here in the language of spatial metaphysics, Bachelard, like Hawthorne, draws on the threshold metaphor to describe the interplay between the internal

and the external; interestingly, though, the two authors employ the same means for opposite ends. Both acknowledge the temporal as well as spatial aspects of houses, yet as we have already discussed, Bachelard writes of the “compression” of time as memories become securely fixed in space. In contrast, Hawthorne writes of the expansion of time as one is freed from abnormal attachment to the past.

Clearly Bachelard’s notions of reverie, “motionless memories,” and the nostalgia of “permanent childhood” (8, 9) are ill fitted to Hawthorne’s time-drenched tragic vision. It is true that Hawthorne does highlight Clifford’s childlike nature. We are told, for instance, that Clifford has been “a child for the whole term of his existence” and that “his life seem[s] to be standing still at a period little in advance of childhood . . .” (Hawthorne, House 129). It is also true that Clifford is prone to daydream of his youth. The important point here, though, is that for Hawthorne, Clifford’s prelapsarian innocence (symbolized by his blowing soap bubbles) is a type of mystification, a defense mechanism that “seldom let[s] realities pierce through . . .” (Hawthorne, House 130). Locked in such a state of perpetual childhood, Clifford would have no hope of the moral transformation his soul so desperately craves.

As readers we cannot discard Hawthorne’s use of Gothic ghost and dungeon imagery in our analysis of Hepzibah and Clifford. In the process of remaining recluses, isolated in space, the two have also become “time-stricken” relics of a forgotten age (Hawthorne, House 194); thus their only hope for redemption lies not in nostalgic attachment to

the house but in complete separation from the house and total immersion in the living waters of reality. For much of their lives fear and pride have held them back, but with Jaffrey's death the darkness momentarily lifts, and the two old owls finally take flight. Swept up at last into "the great current of human life" (Hawthorne, House 196), Clifford and Hepzibah begin to taste the fruits of freedom.

Outside the Pyncheon House, the weather has turned cold and windy. Dark gray storm clouds block out the sun, and pools of rainwater glisten on the sidewalks. This gloomy weather, certainly an anomaly for summer, is an ambiguous symbol holding a dual promise of hope and of doom. In one sense, the falling precipitation is like a baptismal sprinkling that washes away the mud and grime of the city streets. The foul weather also aids their escape, for few people have ventured outside, and those that have are hidden behind jackets, hoods, and umbrellas. In this sense, then, the storm is a godsend, for it offers the practical hope of expedient escape and the more profound hope of spiritual renewal. In the second sense, however, the summer storm is a potential bane. The bitter cold numbs Hepzibah and forces her to retreat inwardly. So lost is she, in fact, within her garments that if any of the passengers did bother to glance her way, they would see but a floating cloak and hood. Thus, because of the storm, a "feeling of indistinctness and unreality [keep] dimly hovering round about her . . ." (Hawthorne, House 195).

Unable to feel her own hands, and cut off from the certainty of her chambers, Hepzibah struggles to verify her own existence; she cannot

discern if she is dreaming or awake. Only by exposing her face to the brisk wind can she confirm the reality of her predicament. "Clifford! Clifford! Is this not a dream?" she murmurs in her brother's ear. "On the contrary," he answers, "I have never been awake before" (Hawthorne, House 196)! Thus we see the primary difference between the brother and sister during their flight. Representing feminine investment, in which the woman plays the "role of mending and conserving traditional values" (Male 72), Hepzibah, the "recluse of the Seven Gables" (Hawthorne, House 196), is continually haunted by the unshakeable impression that the Pyncheon House is following her. In contrast, Clifford represents speculation, "the masculine function of penetrating into space, rending timeworn structures, gambling on something new" (Male 72).

By implementing Male's conception of investment and speculation, we can conclude that it is Clifford alone who desires escape; Hepzibah is simply along for the ride. Also, using Male's notion of the house as a "womb of time" (125), we can recognize that Hawthorne's depiction of Clifford's "penetration" into space is charged with sexual connotations that reinforce the theme of rebirth. It is no accident, for example, that Clifford makes his exodus from the Pyncheon House through the stone arch of the train station. Clearly the arch can symbolize a birth canal, and the phallic nature of the train itself symbolizes Clifford's newfound, masculine vigor. The train, ultimately, is an important allegorical element because in addition to its capacity to thrust into space, it also

reminds us of time's "common and inevitable movement onward . . ." (Hawthorne, House 197).

The train's power of locomotion parallels the dynamic, diachronic properties of narrative in general and allegory in particular; for this reason, we can conclude that the train, as Hawthorne's narrator asserts, is a symbol of "life itself" (Hawthorne, House 197). In this respect the train compares to Pyncheon Street. Hawthorne no doubt intended to create, through his descriptions of both the train and the street, microcosms of the world with all of its diversity and activity. A common link between the two is the potential of motion to broaden our human perspective—to give us a panoramic or God's-eye view. During the political procession, remember, individual participants blend into a single human tide. This same blending effect, of course, is even more dramatic as the train charges across the landscape:

. . . looking from the window, [Clifford and Hepzibah] could see the world racing past them. At one moment, they were rattling through a solitude; the next, a village had grown up around them; a few breaths more, and it had vanished, as if swallowed by an earthquake. The spires of meeting houses seemed set adrift from their foundations; the broad-based hills glided away. Everything was unfixed from its agelong rest, and moving at whirlwind speed in a direction opposite their own. (Hawthorne, House 196)

Especially significant here is the illusion of buildings lifting (like the porch of the Temple mansion in The Pioneers) right off their foundations. Even more telling, though, is that this effects a similar change in Clifford, who himself seems to be uprooted from his conservative footing and to float freely in a state of transcendence.

With a flash of Emersonian optimism and idealism, Clifford suddenly sees the railroad as a vehicle for redemption, “destined to do away with those stale ideas of home and fireside, and substitute something better.” This “something better,” according to Clifford, depends on a renewed understanding that human progress is not so much a straight line as it is a circle, or more precisely, an ascending spiral. “While we fancy ourselves going straight forward,” Clifford says, “and attaining, at every step, an entirely new position of affairs, we do actually return to something long ago tried and abandoned, but which we now find etherealized, refined, and perfected to its ideal.” Here Clifford seems to describe the process of allegoresis characteristic of American intellectual allegory, in which temporary states of synthesis punctuate an ongoing dialectic between subject and object, mind and matter. The train facilitates this process with its propensity to “give us wings” and to “spiritualize travel” by allowing for an easy transition from place to place. In the claim that trains “annihilate the toil and dust of pilgrimage,” however, we can hear the echoes of the Romantic promise of transformation without tragedy (Hawthorne, House 198, 199).

Clifford's lengthy sermon on the train, delivered to a reluctant congregation of but a single old gentleman passenger—constitutes the climax of *Hepzibah* and Clifford's narrative. In it Clifford praises not only locomotion, but also mesmerism and electricity for their powers to transform matter into spirit. The old man is told, for example, that mesmerism will work "towards purging away the grossness out of human life" and that, "by means of electricity, the world of matter has become a great nerve, vibrating thousands of miles in a breathless point of time" (Hawthorne, House 202). Clifford even goes so far as to call the electric telegraph an "almost spiritual medium" (Hawthorne, House 203). Today we can see this same type of Gnostic embrace of technology in the computer gurus who envision a time when individual human consciousness (atman) will be freed (etherealized) from the shackles of the flesh and united in a type of virtual nirvana, in which the internet functions as a type of universal over soul (Brahman).

In contrast to his extolling of locomotion, mesmerism, and electricity, Clifford condemns permanent, artificial, and static structures, especially the Pyncheon House, which he finds particularly despicable. Calling the house a "rusty, crazy, creaky, dry-rotted, damp-rotted, dingy, dark, and miserable old dungeon," Clifford admits finally that it would be a relief to him "if that house could be torn down, or burnt up . . . ." (Hawthorne, House 200, 201). Here Clifford, the consummate conservative, seems to adopt an attitude of liberalism; he takes on a radical view similar to that of Cooper's Aristabulus Bragg, who raises the

status of homelessness to an ideal. Reflecting on mankind's first rude and temporary huts, Clifford anticipates a return to the nomadic way of life. "Why," he wonders, should a man "build a more cumbrous habitation than can readily be carried off with him? Why should he make himself a prisoner for life in brick, and stone, and old worm-eaten timber" (Hawthorne, House 199). At this point, we can affirm that Clifford is beginning to struggle with the notion of self-enslavement, but can we say that he is truly demystified? Or does he simply substitute one type of blindness for another?

If nothing more, we can at least admit that Clifford seems to have flown from one extreme to the other. It has not been long, after all, since he and Hepzibah stood frozen at the threshold of their home, unable to cross over to the outside world. Now he seems intent on the complete demolition of not just the Pyncheon House, but also all man-made structures. Apparent in the following passage, the edifice—no longer innocently cumbersome or even miserably suffocating—has become for Clifford an emblem of utter evil:

It is clear to me the greatest possible stumbling blocks in the path of human happiness and improvements are these heaps of bricks and stones, consolidated with mortar, or hewn timber, fastened together with spike nails, which men painfully contrive for their own torment, and call them house and home! . . . it is my firm belief and hope that these terms of roof and hearthstone, which have so long been held to

embody something sacred, are soon to pass out of men's daily use, and be forgotten. Just imagine, for a moment, how much of human evil will crumble away, with this one change! What we call real estate—the solid ground to build a house on—is the broad foundation on which nearly all the guilt of this world rests. (Hawthorne, House 200-201)

Yes, Clifford the agoraphobic has given way, if only temporarily, to Clifford the claustrophobic. Are we prepared to concede, then, that all traces of his nostalgia, his reverie, have evaporated? No longer is Clifford a dreamer of houses. In speaking here of stumbling blocks, torment, crumbling, guilt, and human evil, he proclaims his own self-  
emancipation from the time-drenched monuments of the past. But once again we are left to wonder if his newfound freedom is genuine.

Ironically, just as Clifford's flight of fancy seems to have run its course, the train slows down and stops at a solitary way station. Clifford and Hepzibah get off, and the train then continues on, leaving the pair alone. Here, at the culmination of the escape from the Pyncheon House, we realize that even though Clifford has experienced physical and intellectual release, he has not yet achieved true moral transformation. Both his conservative attraction to stability and his liberal desire for change have been mystifications, blinding him to his fallen (double) nature. Once the rush of locomotion ends, and Clifford's contemplative fervor subsides, the two old, weary travelers confront the reality of their predicament. Their true moment of demystification occurs here, for as

they look about the countryside, they spot two dark and dilapidated edifices that restore their proper awareness of time.

The first of the two structures is, appropriately, “a wooden church, black with age, and in a dismal state of ruin and decay, with broken windows, a great rift through the main body of the edifice, and a rafter dangling from the top of the square tower.” The second structure, farther off, is an old farmhouse, “in the old style, as venerably black as the church, with a roof sloping downward from the three-story peak, to within a man’s height of the ground” (Hawthorne, House 204). The two decayed buildings, their inhabitants long gone, are drenched as much by time as by the falling rain; and both the “great rift” and the “roof sloping downward” call to mind Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher.” Sobered by the sight of these two antiquities, Clifford slumps to the ground and surrenders to Hepzibah, who, despite the horror that awaits them, leads him back to the Pyncheon House. Thus, like two ghosts doomed by some supernatural force to haunt familiar ground, they abort their escape. The trip is not fruitless, however, for Hepzibah kneels right there on the station platform and prays for the first time in years: “O God—our Father—are we not thy children? Have mercy on us” (Hawthorne, House 204).

Not until the final scene of Clifford and Hepzibah’s narrative, in the last chapter of the book appropriately called “The Departure,” do we find evidence of profound, positive, and permanent change within their hearts. Whereas the Judge dies still with “delusion in his mind”

(Hawthorne, House 242), Clifford achieves redemption through his restored connection to his family. What he needed, after all, was simply “the love of a very few.” With Jaffrey dead and buried, he at last abandons his morbid preoccupation with the past and discovers that real joy, apart from illusory happiness, is indeed attainable:

The shock of Judge Pyncheon’s death had a permanently invigorating and ultimately beneficial effect on Clifford . . . The first effect of freedom, as we have witnessed in Clifford’s aimless flight, was a tremulous exhilaration. Subsiding from it, he did not sink into his former intellectual apathy. He never, it is true, attained to nearly the full measure of what might have been his faculties. But he recovered enough of them partially to light up his character, to display some outline of the marvelous grace that was abortive in it . . . He was evidently happy.

(Hawthorne, House 240)

Like her brother, Hepzibah also achieves redemption through restored relationships. Apparently her prayer on the railroad platform is more than a mere cry of desperation, for as she prepares to leave her lifelong home, no traces of her former pride can be found. When we first meet her, she is a dour recluse repulsed by human contact, and even on the crowded train she feels no connection to the people around her; yet at the end of the story, she chats and laughs with her family. Even more telling is that when she once again meets the boy Ned Higgins, her first

dreaded customer at the cent shop, she gives him silver. An additional proof of Hepzibah and Clifford's restored spiritual health is that Chanticleer's two hens begin laying eggs again. The most convincing evidence of moral transformation, however, is that the brother and sister evacuate the Pyncheon House and head for the countryside without trepidation. Clifford and Hepzibah bid "a final farewell to the abode of their forefathers with hardly more emotion than if they had made it their arrangement to return thither at teatime" (Hawthorne, House 244). No longer ghosts, but instead substantially human, they are free to go where they will.

So far our discussion of The House of the Seven Gables has centered on two basic narratives: in the first, the family patriarchs (the Colonel, Gervayse, and the Judge) are doomed by their strict conservatism and stubborn, selfish pride; in the second, the two siblings (Hepzibah and Clifford) find redemption by falling away from prideful self-absorption and embracing a more liberal attitude toward humanity. Thus the ideological shift of the Pyncheon family as a whole, especially following the Judge's death, is from conservative right to liberal left. In contrast, the Maule family, represented in the end by Holgrave, moves from left to right. Even though Hawthorne's characters gravitate toward opposing poles, however, the overall effect of the entire work is a profound movement inward toward an ambiguous center.

Hawthorne's allegory achieves a state of dynamic equilibrium as its interwoven motifs vacillate between extreme conservatism and extreme

liberalism, yet it is important to note, as well, that as these motifs collide, the allegory is continually rocked by the shockwaves of irony. One of the high points of irony, as we have already discussed, is Jaffrey's death in the chapter "Governor Pyncheon." A second high point occurs at the end of the work, when the Maule and Pyncheon family lines come together through the engagement and subsequent marriage of Holgrave and Phoebe. At this point, Matthew Maule's descendant, a consummate liberal for most of his life, seems to become an entrenched conservative. By first analyzing Holgrave's character before he "falls" for Phoebe, we can come to a better understanding of his transformation—and thus to a deeper appreciation of the controversial conclusion to Hawthorne's ironic allegory.

At first, Holgrave resembles Aristabulus Bragg in his egalitarian views. Homeless and without reverence for the fixed, Holgrave has the young man's desire to tear down the "moss-grown and rotten Past" (Hawthorne, House 37). Just like Clifford, Holgrave concludes that all the wrongs of the past are enshrined in houses; consequently, he believes that each permanent man-made structure should be "purified with fire—purified till only its ashes remain" (Hawthorne, House 140)! This echoes Phoebe's earlier concern, expressed to Hepzibah, that Holgrave might someday set the house on fire (Hawthorne, House 63). Phoebe's concern is well founded; for during Holgrave's confrontations with her, he often comes across, in his passionate articulation of his

vision for the future, a bit like an overzealous, even dangerous, anarchist. Such is the case in the following passage:

Just think a moment, and it will startle you to see what slaves we are to bygone times—to Death, if we give the matter the right word! . . . we live in dead men's houses . . . But we shall live to see the day, I trust . . . when no man shall build his house for posterity. . . . I doubt whether even our public edifices—our capitols, state houses, courthouses, city hall, and churches—ought to be built of such permanent materials as stone or brick. It were better that they should crumble to ruin once in twenty years. (Hawthorne 139,140)

Here, in his heated sermon to Phoebe, Holgrave certainly sounds adversarial; and in this respect, at least, he does appear to fit D. H. Lawrence's characterization of the American democratic spirit as something destructive rather than reconstructive. Unlike Aristabulus Bragg's brutish disdain for aristocrats, however, Holgrave's irreverence can be attributed to youthful innocence.

Innocence, as we have already seen, is a form of mystification; yet according to Hawthorne, such naïve optimism is the natural condition of youth. Because Holgrave is young and inexperienced, therefore, his mystification, which would otherwise be unpardonable, is understandable and even forgivable. The specific nature of his blindness "lay in supposing that [his] age, more than any past or future one, is destined to see the tattered garments of Antiquity exchanged for a new

suit, instead of gradually renewing themselves by patchwork” (Hawthorne, House 137). He also “imagines that the earth’s granite substance is yet not hardened” and is therefore a substance he can “mold into whatever shape he likes” (Hawthorne, House 136). The images here of the suit and the stone reveal much about Holgrave’s immaturity. We cannot simply discard the past like an old suit because, unlike the future, it truly is (to mix metaphors) set in stone. The best we can hope for is to weave the patches of our current generation into the fabric of those that came before us. Such is the lesson of time that Holgrave, an apt pupil, must learn.

Given his position in relation to houses and to the past, Holgrave is as much a hero in space as Natty Bumppo. Certainly nomadic, he has no permanent home and no permanent job. “His present phase, as a daguerreotypist,” we are told, is “of no more importance . . . than any of the preceding ones” (Hawthorne, House 135). Hawthorne’s clearest example of sheer masculine speculation, divorced from feminine investment, Holgrave must become, through marriage, involved with life and time if he is to have any chance of moral transformation. He must pass through the fiery crucible of a woman’s heart, and this woman, of course, is Phoebe.

Before his engagement to Phoebe, Holgrave seems just as impotent as the Colonel and the Judge. With his masculine energies misdirected, he seeks no permanent family ties. As he tells Phoebe, planting a family is “at the bottom of most of the wrong and mischief which men do.” He

goes on to explain that just as edifices should be razed every twenty years, family “houses” (lines) should also be destroyed:

The truth is, that, once in every half century, at longest, a family should be merged into the great, obscure mass of humanity, and forget all about his ancestors. Human blood, in order to keep its freshness, should run in hidden streams, as the water of an aqueduct is conveyed in subterranean pipes. (Hawthorne, House 141)

Once Holgrave falls for Phoebe, though, he abandons this line of thinking. Betraying the optimism of his youth, he calls his past life “lonesome and dreary” and his future “a shapeless gloom” (Hawthorne, House 234). This radical change is at first confusing, but when, in his next breath, he professes his love for Phoebe, we begin to get the picture.

Surrendering to his budding infatuation, Holgrave admits that all of the world’s progress results from the ill ease and restless impulses of men. “The happy man,” he says, “inevitably confines himself within ancient limits.” Phoebe worries that Holgrave will make a nomad of her, but he comforts her with the assurance that her “poise will be more powerful than any oscillating tendency” of his (Hawthorne, House 235). He even shares with her his expectation that he will soon be planting trees, setting fences, and maybe even constructing a house for future generations. What a difference from his previous attitude! So sudden, in fact, is Holgrave’s change of heart that we are left to wonder if this a true transformation or simply the foolish talk of young love.

Skeptical of the temporary insanity defense, many readers find Holgrave's quick conversion unconvincing; they feel that Hawthorne, giving in to wish fulfillment, sold out for a warm and fuzzy ending that is, to say the least, weak and unsatisfying. Part of the problem here is that following Jaffrey's great Fall and Clifford and Hepzibah's dramatic regeneration, Phoebe and Holgrave's development is by comparison minor. This becomes understandable, though, when we take into consideration the couple's age. Relatively innocent, Phoebe and Holgrave simply do not have enough life experiences to sustain any real sense of tragedy. Phoebe grows up a little and Holgrave wakes up a little, but beyond this, no profound change is detectable. For this reason, we might be tempted to conclude that the pair will live happily ever after. A close reading of the text, however, does not allow for this interpretation.

Some degree of Holgrave's abrupt change of heart, we must admit, can be attributed to the emotion of the moment. The narrator himself gets caught up in the fervor and even goes so far as to claim the two lovers have "transfigured the earth, and made it Eden again"; but then, regaining his grip on reality, he laments, "But how soon the earth dream settled down again" (Hawthorne, House 235). The point here is that each couple falling in love for the first time recreates the tragic story of Adam and Eve. They start off innocent enough, but inevitably fall into suffering and sin. They are human, after all. With the Fall, though, comes the possibility of growth—for the man and woman carry in their hearts the dual potentialities of perdition and paradise.

The conclusion of The House of the Seven Gables is but the beginning of Phoebe and Holgrave's story; the rest is to be written. Even though the novel ends on a high point, therefore, we must not forget that with sunshine come shadows. One such shadow is the sudden death of Jaffrey's only son. What this means is that since Clifford, Hepzibah, and Uncle Venner are all aging and childless, Phoebe and Holgrave stand to inherit a tremendous fortune. With so much wealth comes the potential for pride; thus it is not too much of a stretch to imagine a future Judge Maule or even Governor Maule. This possibility is suggested by Holgrave's ironic observation about Judge Pyncheon's country manor:

The country house is certainly a very fine one, so far as the plan goes . . . But I wonder that the late Judge—being so opulent, and with a reasonable prospect of transmitting his wealth to descendants of his own—should not have felt the propriety of embodying so excellent a piece of domestic architecture in stone, rather than in wood. Then, every generation of the family might have altered the interior, to suit its own taste and convenience; while the exterior, through the lapse of years, might have been adding venerableness to permanence which I consider essential to the happiness of any one moment. (Hawthorne, House 241)

Can this be true? Does Holgrave actually protest that Jaffrey Pyncheon was not conservative *enough*? The answer lies in our reading of the words *interior* and *exterior*. Calling to mind the metaphors of the suit and

the stone, we can see that Holgrave's observation establishes what is arguably the most important architectural metaphor in the allegory.

As a mystified youth, we recall, Holgrave supposes that he can mold the granite substance of the world to his own liking. He also believes he can discard the past like an old tattered suit. In his discussion of the country house, however, Holgrave is no longer mystified. By asserting that permanent happiness can only be found within solid stone walls, he actually makes a morally mature observation, for here the stone exterior represents the unalterable past, while the interior represents the constantly changing present. Only by confronting and reconciling with the past, Holgrave concludes, can one truly live in the present. Each generation must sew its patches into the fabric of Antiquity. In architectural terms, it must alter the interior to its own fancy. Playing on the properties of exterior and interior, then, Holgrave's observation of the country house establishes a key metaphor with a "structural emphasis upon the book's theme—the interpenetration of the past and the present" (Male 138).

Certainly there are enough shadows in the conclusion to The House of the Seven Gables to warrant a reinterpretation. Indeed, how can we call the ending weak when Hawthorne, in one brief passage, achieves such a profound moment of irony. At the same time, he artistically blends the spatial and temporal properties of the house into an allegorical framework that is paradoxically grounded even as it is dynamic. This passage is followed immediately by the last major point of

irony in the book: the opening of the old Colonel's portrait. With the flip of a spring, Holgrave reveals not only his true identity as a descendant of Matthew Maule, but also the location of the missing deed. Learning that the deed is now worthless, the last of the Pyncheons realize that in grappling for Maule's meager land, their family forfeited their claim to vast territory. Thus is the nature of pride.

Throughout our discussion of Hawthorne, we have seen that conservatism, in the form of family pride and a false sense of superiority, is a type of mystification. Yet while a move toward liberalism would constitute a process of self-knowledge and demystification, it is equally true that extreme liberalism is also a mystification; thus, torn between two opposing alternatives, Hawthorne concludes his allegory not with reconciliation, but with ambiguity. In this respect, The House of the Seven Gables resembles Cooper's Templeton trilogy. Both works end with either a marriage or an engagement, yet they escape the simple resolution usually afforded by the wedding plot by drawing on the Edenic myth to reveal the inherent tragedy in the allegorical desire to found a lasting home.

Cooper, we recall, brings together Old World experience and New World innocence in a double wedding at the Wigwam. The Templemore wedding offers the hope of an ideal blending of conservatism and democracy; however, this hope is immediately undermined by the semi-incestuous Effingham marriage. In the same way, our optimism for Phoebe and Holgrave is tempered by the potential for incest among their

offspring. The branches of their family trees have fallen away, and so their children will one day face the choice (as did Clifford and Hepzibah) of sacrificing the purity of their blood or clinging to one another in sterile isolation. As we shall see, the theme of incest as a mystified response to the crises of possession and permanence, so fully developed by Cooper and Hawthorne, is also taken up by Herman Melville in Pierre. Melville, though, explores the dark side of allegory by showing that moral transformation, when divorced from the hope of heaven, can lead to despair.

As with Cooper's Templeton trilogy, and Hawthorne's The House of the Seven Gables, Melville's Pierre achieves the obliqueness of allegory through the tension of opposing genres. Certainly, Melville's dual vision of epic and pastoral parallels Cooper's dual vision of history and myth and Hawthorne's dual vision of conservatism and democracy, and all three writers structure their themes through the use of the architectural metaphor. Most importantly, Melville, in confronting the ambiguities of synchronic and diachronic time, falls fully within the tradition of ironic allegory.

Because of his treatment of the dual aspects of time, Melville can be more closely associated with Hawthorne than with Cooper; nevertheless, Melville's use of the terms "horological" (earthly time) and "chronometrical" (heavenly time) suggests a possible connection to Cooper. A chronometricals and horologicals conceit, for instance, embodies the central theme of Cooper's sea novel Jack Tier (published

four years prior to Pierre). This conceit illustrates “clearly the relation between moral absolutes and practical expedients that must be understood if one is to survive the perils of this life” (Jones 57). In the novel, Cooper delineates a moral continuum from complete self-reliance to complete reliance on the benevolence of providence. At one end of the spectrum is Captain Stephen Spike. Perhaps a predecessor of Melville’s Ahab, he is one of those people who live “without any communication with their Creator through long lives of apathy to his existence and laws, thinking only of the present time, and daily, hourly sacrificing principles and duty to the narrow interests of the moment” (qtd. in Jones, 60).

While Captain Spike is entirely horologic, immersed in earthly expedients, Rose Budd is entirely chronometric, attuned only to moral absolutes. Just as Captain Spike’s demise confirms the terrible consequences of total pragmatism, so does the drowning of Rose Budd reveal the dangers of blind faith. Indeed, the two characters would make ideal subjects for Plinlimmon’s pamphlet on horologicals and chronometricals. On the other hand, Harry Mulford, Cooper’s hero, learns the “limitations of self-reliance unsupported by virtuous intent and humble faith in divine mercy.” He comes to realize that the formula for survival is “practical expediency informed and guided by moral purpose” (Jones 57). This theme, central in many of Cooper’s novels, is reinforced by the nautical metaphor. In Jack Tier, the dual principles of time are flushed out as Mulford attempts to explain to Rose Budd the difference between Greenwich time and local time. Confused, Rose

Budd can only protest, "A watch is a watch . . . and time is time" (qtd. in Jones, 58).

As Jones suggests, Melville seems to adapt Cooper's chronometricals and horologicals conceit in the pamphlet of Plotinus Plinlimmon. In Melville's "chronometrical conceit" (Melville 247), the chronometrical soul relates to absolute idealism and the horological soul relates to practical expediency. Plinlimmon argues in his pamphlet that man can never be a true chronometer, for "if he seek to regulate his own daily conduct by it, he will but array all men's earthly time-keepers against him, and thereby work himself woe and death" (Melville 246). With mortal men, "the absolute effort to live in this world according to the strict letter of the chronometricals is, somehow, apt to involve those inferior beings eventually in strange, unique follies and sins, unimagined before" (Melville 246). Plinlimmon concludes that only through "a sort of suicide as to the practical things of this world" can a man "hope to regulate his earthly conduct" (Melville 247).

Plinlimmon's chronometrical conceit presents us with the central irony of the novel: the irreconcilable contradiction between earthly and heavenly time. As with Hawthorne, Melville's irony takes the form of demystification. At first, Pierre fools himself into believing that he can overcome his own horological nature and become a true chronometer through self-renunciation. At the moment of his Fall, however, he realizes that self-renunciation only leads to isolation and unhappiness. In the end, unable to reconcile his earthly and heavenly concerns, he

commits the ultimate act of self-renunciation: suicide. Thus, Pierre's death becomes a sort of self-crucifixion that transmits him from earthly time to heavenly time, just as Judge Pyncheon's death transmits him from present time to grand time. The obvious difference here is that Pierre chooses the moment of his death, whereas Judge Pyncheon does not.

In his self-sacrificing efforts to achieve absolute idealism, Pierre is somewhat heroic, but his ultimate imprisonment reveals the defects of his heroism. He is a doomed and undistinguished hero characterized by a "diminished understanding of freedom" and an "excessive feeling for necessity." He has a central imbalance that makes him a "godlike or childlike explorer who is distinctly ill at ease in a world of easy acceptance. Instead of being an assertive and brilliant warrior, like the epic hero, he exhibits his uneasiness through vicious struggles with the self" (Honig 163).

In portraying Pierre as a doomed hero, Melville satirizes two allegorical genre-types: the epic and the pastoral. The aims of the epic are generally historical and religious, to praise the virtues of honor and courage which have bound men in the past, and to present these patterns of behavior as codes to be followed by future generations. In the same way, the traditional pastoral "dictates an idealized behavior that is protected from disillusioning consequences in the everyday world . . . its tone and bias defy the fragmentations of everyday experience" (Honig 165).

Pierre's experiences challenge both the epic and pastoral traditions because his pursuit of traditionally heroic and Christian virtues lead to disillusioning consequences. He cannot escape the fragmentation of everyday existence. By challenging the epic and pastoral genres, Melville creates a satire that is distinctly allegorical, for as Honig points out, "When the terms of epical heroism are mocked or transformed according to other ethical ideas, the result is satire or pastoral, or both. When they are further rationalized and systematically redirected . . . the result is allegory" (171).

The key point here is that Melville's satire becomes allegory through the redirection provided by architectural metaphors. Throughout Pierre, the narrator compares the architecture of Pierre's soul with the architecture of society. For example, at one point he writes, "Now the quarry-discoverer is long before the stone-cutter; and the stone-cutter is long before the architect; and the architect is long before the temple; for the temple is the crown of the world" (Melville 293). Here, comparing the soul to a temple, the narrator expresses, through the use of stone imagery, Pierre's progression from horologic to chronometric time. This progression is marked by three central architectural milestones: Saddle Meadows, the Church of the Apostles, and the prison.

Saddle Meadows is certainly a monument of pastoral romance. Rising above the "verdant trance" of a "green and gold world" filled with "brindled kine" and "ruddy-cheeked, white-footed boys" (Melville 23) are

the “storied heights” (Melville 24) of Saddle Meadows. With his soul filled with pride, Pierre associates the house with the great deeds of his Glendinning predecessors; thus the house becomes the “background of his race” (Melville 26). Against the background of Saddle Meadows, the narrator compares other seats of “eastern patriarchalness” (Melville 31). He writes that in England, “an immense mass of state-masonry is brought to bear as a buttress in upholding the hereditary existence of certain houses” (Melville 31). The double meanings of the words “buttress” and “houses” in this passage reveal the two levels on which the discussion of architecture operate: literal and figurative.

The narrator goes on to describe two types of noble American architecture, the Southern plantation house and the Northern Dutch manor. “Such estates,” he writes, “seem to defy Time’s tooth, and by conditions which take hold of the indestructible earth seem to contemporize their fee simples with eternity” (Melville 31). In glorifying the “large estates” and “long pedigrees” of dignified American families, the narrator claims to be poetically establishing the richly aristocratic condition of Master Pierre Glendinning. Thus he sets up a symbolic relationship between Pierre and Saddle Meadows that calls to mind Judge Pyncheon. Like Judge Pyncheon, Pierre stands on a “noble pedestal” that is based on “family pride,” and as with the Judge, we wait to see “if he keeps that fine footing” (Melville 32, 33).

The second significant architectural metaphor in Pierre is the Church of the Apostles. In this passage, the most highly allegorical in

the novel, the church and its adjoining building represent a microcosm of 19<sup>th</sup> century America. The “ancient edifice” of the church stands in the old-fashioned part of town amidst “immense lofty warehouses”:

The material was grayish stone, rudely cut and masoned into walls of surprising thickness and strength; along two of which walls—the side ones—were distributed as many rows of arched and stately windows. A capacious square, and wholly unornamented tower rose in front to twice the height of the body of the church; three sides of this were pierced with small and narrow apertures. Thus far, in its external aspect, the building—now more than a century old—sufficiently attested for what purpose it had originally been founded. . . . the old Church of the Apostles had had its days of sanctification and grace; but the tide of change and progress had rolled clean through its broad-aisle and side-aisles, and swept by far the greater part of its congregation two or three miles uptown. Some . . . lingered awhile among its dusty pews, listening to the . . . faithful old pastor, who . . . still propped his half-palsied form in the worm-eaten pulpit, and occasionally pounded . . . the moth-eaten covering of its desk. (Melville 301, 302)

In this description, the church, with its unornamented tower, represents the archaic Christian values that have been swept away by progress.

The materialism and hollow idealism that replace these lost values, on the other hand, are represented by the brick adjunct to the church:

In its rear was a large and lofty plain brick structure, with its front to the rearward street, but its back presented to the back of the church, leaving a small, flagged, and quadrangular vacancy between. At the sides of this quadrangle, three stories of homely brick colonnades afforded covered communication between the ancient church, and its less elderly adjunct. A dismantled, rusted, and forlorn old railing of iron fencing in a small courtyard in front of the rearward building, seemed to hint, that the latter had usurped an unoccupied space formerly sacred as the old church's burial enclosure. . . . this new building very much exceeded the church in height. It was some seven stories; a fearful pile of Titanic bricks, lifting its tiled roof almost to a level with the top of the sacred tower. (Melville 301, 302)

It is interesting to note that the adjunct, after usurping the sacred space of the church, faces away from the church, leaving nothing between them but a "small vacancy" and "covered communication." It is also interesting that the building rises from a graveyard and reaches nearly as high as the sacred tower. The lawyers and merchants filling the massive structure seem to be defiling sacred ground even as they challenge God Himself—Commerce and the Law, America's new secular religions.

Eventually the “gregarious” lawyers and merchants find it unprofitable to maintain stores and offices on the upper floors of the attached edifice, so they settle into the basement and lower stories. The temporary vacancy of the upper floors affords the narrator an easy comparison between the building and its inhabitants: “alas! full purses and empty heads!” (Melville 303). This vacancy is quickly filled by “scores of those miscellaneous, bread-and-cheese adventurers, and ambiguously professional nondescripts . . . and unaccountable foreign-looking fellows” (Melville 303). These new inhabitants, mostly artists, teachers, or “indigent philosophers” (Melville 304), nest in the lofty floors like talking magpies, only to descend for food, like pelicans with their beaks open, to the streets below.

Taken all together, the images of the Church of the Apostles form a microcosm of America, in which the antiquated and forgotten moral values of the church are overrun by the materialism of countless lawyers and merchants, while the artists, teachers, and philosophers, their ideals obsolete in the fast-paced world of scientific progress, take refuge in the prison-like lofty regions. The church and the attached edifice stand back-to-back, separated by a small gap, like two opposing symbols of chronometric and horologic time, respectively. Their inability, or unwillingness, to communicate openly foreshadows Pierre’s ultimate failure to reconcile his chronometric and horologic impulses.

In contrast to the optimistic, pastoral setting of Saddle Meadows at the beginning of Pierre’s journey, and the ambiguous Church of the

Apostles (which stands at the geographical center of the novel), the city prison stands like a mausoleum, marking Pierre's doom. Here the "cumbersome stone ceiling" is so low that it "almost rested on his brow; so that the long tiers of massive cell-galleries above seemed partly piled on him" (Melville 402). The dryness of his cheeks is compared with the trickling cheeks of the walls. This comparison serves two purposes: first, it allows for a double meaning of the word "tiers," and second, it reinforces the connection maintained throughout the novel between the architecture of Pierre's soul and that of society.

Another type of connection can be made between the prison cell's "barred arrow slit" (Melville 402) and the narrow apertures of the windows at the Apostles (Melville 301). The prison's barred arrow-slit, as well as the other features of Pierre's "granite hell" (Melville 404), invite us to explore in greater detail other instances of prison imagery in the novel. Through closer examination, we can see that the "prison comes to inscribe a general metaphorical pattern on Pierre" (Berthold 243). We recognize prison imagery, for instance, when Pierre, Isabel, and Delly are greeted, upon entering New York, with "shop-shutters being put on" and "locking, and bolting, and barring of windows" (Melville 265). We also see prison imagery in the description of their meager quarters at the Apostles, and in Pierre's dream of the Titan Enceladus, who is imprisoned within the earth. Finally, we can see a parallel between the pile of cell-galleries threatening to fall on Pierre in the city prison (Melville

402) and the “Titanic pile of bricks” that threaten to fall at the Apostles (Melville 302).

Having now completed a thorough analysis of the architectural metaphors in Pierre, we have a much better appreciation of the novel’s sophisticated structure. Each of the three central monuments (Saddle Meadows, the Church of the Apostles, and the prison) marks a distinct stage in the progress of Pierre’s soul. At each stage, Pierre struggles between opposing horological (expedient) and chronometric (idealistic) impulses. With each successive stage the burden of this struggle becomes increasingly more difficult to bear, until eventually he can withstand it no longer. Unable to escape his own conscience, he continues to act morally; unable to escape society, he continues to be punished for doing so. Thus trapped in a kind of limbo of ambiguity, his only hope for release is in death.

Perhaps the clearest instance of Pierre’s torment is when he first receives the letter from his half-sister, Isabel, requesting his assistance. Complicating the matter is the fact that Pierre is at that moment engaged to Lucy Tartan. His horologic impulse instructs him to rip up the letter, for answering it could jeopardize the engagement and threaten his inheritance. On the other hand, his chronometric impulse reminds him of his responsibility to right the wrongs of his father, while at the same time protecting his mother and preserving the family name. This moral dilemma is described in the following passage:

Pierre now seemed distinctly to feel two antagonistic agencies within him; one of which was just struggling into his consciousness, and each of which was struggling for the mastery; and between whose respective final ascendancies, he thought he could perceive, though but shadowly, that he himself was to be the only umpire. (Melville 88)

Here the “antagonistic agencies” are parodied by the appearance of the good angel and bad angel. At first Pierre is tempted to follow the urgings of the bad angel, especially when he learns that Delly Ulver, Isabel’s friend, recently delivered an illegitimate baby (which has since passed away) and is also in need of rescuing. Eventually, though, Pierre—ignoring (or perhaps ignorant of) the social consequences of his decision—sides with the good angel. He moves in with the two women, pretending that Isabel is his wife and Delly their maid. Disgraced, Pierre’s mother gives his inheritance to Glendinning Stanly, but Lucy sticks by Pierre and moves in with him as well. Thus, as a result of his high moral standards, he ironically ends up living with three women in a New York apartment. Is it any wonder that he incurs the wrath of society?

As Pierre moves from his idyllic youth at Saddle Meadows to his questionably incestuous arrangement as an “Apostle” to his ultimate imprisonment, he experiences a “wide general awaking of his profounder being” (Melville 260) and a deep awareness of the “everlasting elusiveness of Truth” (Melville 380). Through a process of demystification, he

confronts the one great irony of life—that reconciliation is unattainable between the individual soul and the world. Realizing this, he abandons all notions of virtue and vice and concludes that his only remaining choice is between two hells. And so, his last willful act is to kill himself before he can be executed. Following his lead, Lucy and Isabel swallow poison and thus end their lives as well. Such is the madness of allegorical desire in its blackest form.

## EPILOGUE

*There are sermons in stones.*

Hawthorne

In our final analysis, we can say that ironic allegory, as a uniquely American genre born out of the American Renaissance, occupies a central position in American literary history. Preceded by the rationalists and Romantics—and followed by the realists, naturalists, and modernists—the dark romantics of the mid-nineteenth century such as Hawthorne, Melville, and Poe (and to some extent Cooper) remained skeptical of excessively subjective and objective experience. Their ideological stance was profoundly ambivalent, and so it is not surprising that they preferred oblique rather than conventional literary forms.

Hawthorne, especially, rejected the “one-eyed” visions of Classicism and Romanticism, as well as the Transcendental promise of painless purification. Recognizing that the alternative to tragedy is damnation, he was thus drawn to the dual promise of Puritan allegory and the thematic ambiguity of Gothic fiction. With clarity of technique, he worked Gothic and Puritan elements into his own art, until, by applying the dignity of his moral imagination and the beauty of his tragic vision, he was able to create from the old forms a powerful new genre. With its exploration of the truth of the human heart and its pervading theme of moral

transformation, this genre, ironic allegory, can be called the art of truth—and Hawthorne, its originator, can be called the artist of truth.

Ironic allegory can best be understood by looking at each of its components separately. The two fundamental properties of allegory are motion and opposition. Elements within an allegory are not static, as is commonly believed, but are instead dynamic, vacillating between opposing thematic poles. In contrast to this “motion,” we often speak of a “moment” of irony, for its effect is quick and explosive. Irony generally interrupts the flow of the narrative with thematic accents. The seemingly paradoxical qualities of irony and allegory, finally, are structured by chains of metaphors. Architectural metaphors are particularly useful for two essential reasons. First, they function spatially to provide concrete “places” for ironic moments to occur. Second, as products of time, they help develop the themes of mystification and demystification.

Today our understanding and appreciation of allegory are jeopardized by the consensus among many critics that it is an archaic and artificial form, stiff and excessively moralistic. Partly responsible for this misconception is Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who believed that man, through symbolic art, grows independent of nature (in the form in time) and that this independence arises from the tendency of symbols to disengage art from the regulative rule of moral inscription. Symbolism made it possible for Coleridge and other Romantics to create their own ideals, and thereby escape simple reflection or translation of a predetermined morality. The subjective, poetic qualities that the

Romantics assigned to the symbolic mode are indeed attractive, for they seem to free the artist from external concerns and to encourage art for art's sake.

The liberating quality of symbolism, as presented by the Romantics, explains why so many artists consider allegory, in contrast, to be restrictive—and why so many critics consider allegorists to be artistically limited. As Paul de Man observes:

The supremacy of the symbol, conceived as an expression of unity between the representative and the semantic function of language, becomes a commonplace that underlies literary taste, literary criticism, and literary history. . . allegory is frequently considered an anachronism and dismissed as non-poetic. (BI 189, 190)

This view of allegory as anachronism is expressed by Richard Chase in his analysis of Hawthorne and Melville. To Chase, allegory is a product of rationalistic fancy rather than artistic imagination. In writing allegory, Chase asserts, Hawthorne felt no impulse to transmute his inherited Calvinism into a new view of life; he was content to let it relax into harmony with the dualism and common sense of eighteenth-century thought (81). In Chase's final determination, then, Hawthorne's writing is stiffened by "aloof, contemplative skepticism" (90).

As with Chase, Charles Feidelson's appreciation of Hawthorne is diminished by his interpretation that allegory "was the brake that Hawthorne applied to his sensibility." For Hawthorne, writes Feidelson,

**“allegory *was* analytic: allegory was safe . . . because it depended on a conventional order whose point of arrangement was easily defined.”** Overestimating Hawthorne’s eighteenth-century sensibility, and perhaps confusing the author himself with the narrators he employed in his fiction, Feidelson complains that Hawthorne’s allegorical technique imposes a “pat moral” and “simplified character,” whereas “symbolism leads to an inconclusive luxuriance of meaning” (14-16). A clearer instance of the critical bias against allegory would be hard to find.

Further reading of Feidelson reveals that at the heart of his objection to allegory is a fundamentally existentialistic distaste for the notion of truth altogether. For him and other modernists, truth is a cosmic killjoy, spoiling our childish play with all the coolness of a stern taskmaster. Particularly frustrating is the inescapable paradox of experience and knowledge that dominates the parallel traditions of Western philosophy and allegory. When this paradox is confronted honestly, the doubleness of the human condition becomes apparent. Feidelson, though, denies that man is fallen. The problem, as he sees it, lies in our false assumption that there even is an objective reality to be represented; the remedy, therefore, is liberation, through symbolic language, from the shackles of allegory. As Feidelson explains:

**The philosophy of symbolism . . . is an attempt to find a point of departure outside the premises of dualism—not so much an attempt to solve the old “problem of knowledge” as an effort to redefine the process of knowing in such a**

manner that the problem never rises. . . . The new starting point, both philosophic and literary, is designed to recapture the unity of a world artificially divided. (50, 51)

Once the notion of truth is erased, writes Feidelson, the search for meaning becomes a simple activity of creating our own patterns. This attempt to establish internal coherence at the expense of external reality, though, is as much a mystification as Romantic idealism.

Through denial, then, Feidelson is able to claim that symbolism achieves absolute unity, yet as he himself admits, this is but an illusion. When we say that symbols in isolation are but illusions, we mean that the figurative nature of language makes reconciliation between mind and nature impossible; thus the belief that symbols are complete within themselves is a mystification. The essential difference between symbol and allegory is that symbol seeks an illusory synthesis between mind and nature, while allegory breaks the illusion by revealing the tragedy of human existence. In this sense, at least, allegory is truer than symbol, for whereas symbolism retreats from ontological speculation, allegory never surrenders the correspondence to external truth.

For Coleridge, and critics such as Chase, Feidelson, Mathiessen, and others, allegory pays too high a ransom for its moral profundity, becoming in the end mechanical and non-poetic, while symbol remains organic and poetic. Critics who equate allegory with simplistic and mechanical fabulism, however, miss the point that ironic allegory, in remaining true to the fallen nature of mankind and the doubleness of the

human heart, is not by default unpoetic; indeed, truth and beauty are not opposed. By challenging the notion that allegory is an anachronism, therefore, it has been our intention throughout our discussion to foster a renewed awareness and appreciation of nineteenth-century American allegory. As we have seen, Hawthorne, Melville, and Cooper incorporate architectural metaphors into allegorical structures that are not only poetic, but also dynamic and deeply ironic.

Hawthorne's The House of the Seven Gables provides an effective model of how architectural metaphors function within the context of ironic allgory. Central to the novel is the Pyncheon House, which stands as a towering monument of family pride. Abnormal attachment to the edifice constitutes a major mystification, for as possession of the home passes from generation to generation, the Pyncheons fall under the illusion of permanence within time. This creates shocks of recognition when the illusion is broken. One such shock of recognition is when Gervayse realizes that in trying to expand the family's possessions, he has lost his daughter. Another of the book's ironies is that after stealing Maule's land and commissioning the construction of the house, the Colonel dies before he can occupy it; his body grows "cold," in fact, during the house "warming." Similarly, a high point of irony is when the Judge, the last of the family patriarchs, passes away while winding his pocket watch. The final shock of recognition, though, is when the missing deed is found, and the remaining Pyncheons realize that their ancestors forfeited vast riches.

Working in conjunction with the architectural metaphor, ghost imagery reveals the insubstantiality of a family too long isolated. At the moment of Jaffrey's death, for instance, he joins in a procession of spectral ancestors. The two primary ghosts, however, are Hepzibah and Clifford, whose abnormal attachment for each other as well as to the house leaves them cut off from the world. Hepzibah's point of reentry is the shop door, while for Clifford it is the arched window. Here the interior and exterior of the house symbolize feminine investment and masculine speculation, respectively. For brother and sister, the shock of recognition comes when, at the end of their flight from home, they observe a dilapidated church and farmhouse. At this moment they find redemption as their proper relations to time and to humanity are restored. Balancing the moral transformation of Hepzibah and Clifford is the maturation of Phoebe and Holgrave. Here the union of young lovers revives the tragic Eden myth, with its dual promise of salvation and damnation. Related to this, Hawthorne's dual vision of conservatism and democracy is represented by the book's final architectural metaphor, in which exterior and interior spaces symbolize the relationship between past and present.

Like Hawthorne, Cooper also explores the interrelatedness of past and present, though he articulates his dual vision in terms of history and myth, civilization and wilderness. As we have already discussed, Cooper probably cannot be justifiably classified as a true dark romantic, ironist, or allegorist, but in his Templeton trilogy he does indeed employ

allegorical elements. In using architectural metaphors, Cooper, a dreamer of houses, dramatizes allegorical desire as the search for a lasting home. Crises of possession drive the plots of the trilogy, and the primary opposition is between God's natural architecture and man's artificial architecture. Fire is an important symbol throughout the trilogy signifying divine condemnation of human arrogance and hubris.

Each novel in the Templeton trilogy represents a stage of civilization. The Deerslayer represents the savage age, The Pioneers the pastoral, and Home as Found the middle, with the hope for the final age expressed at the end. In The Deerslayer, first of all, Tom Hutter experiences a crisis of possession as he is forced to defend Muskrat Castle from the surrounding Indians. The primary architectural metaphor is the castle itself, which, in opposition to the Indian huts, stands like a fortress of Harry's individual and family pride. A second crisis of possession involves the issue of authority. Here, in The Pioneers, Marmaduke Temple's questionable land acquisition is legitimized when his daughter, Elizabeth, marries Oliver Edwards, a descendant of the previous owner. Edwards has been unofficially adopted by Indians, so any potential conflict with the native inhabitants is conveniently averted. The delicate pastoral balance in the novel is symbolized by the Temple house, an architectural disaster, and Natty's simple hut.

In Home as Found, finally, this balance is lost. Beginning as a tour book of New York architecture, the novel eventually centers on the

Temple house, now called the Wigwam. As the Effinghams defend the legitimacy of their possessions against men such as Aristabulus Bragg and Steadfast Dodge during the Three Mile controversy, their family's prideful isolation becomes apparent; and the irony of their position is fully revealed during the incestuous marriage of the first cousins, Paul and Eve. The Effinghams, like the Pyncheons, risk familial suicide in attempting to remain pure. Thus the double wedding of Effinghams and Templemores confirms Cooper's ambivalence toward American democracy.

A common bond between Hawthorne and Cooper is that at the heart of their artistic sensibilities lies a foundational faith in divine mercy; consequently, they each articulate allegorical desire as a hope of heaven. According to them, the process of moral transformation is essentially a positive endeavor, for even though the search for worldly meaning leads to ambiguity, there is always the expectation of reconciliation in the next world. Melville, on the other hand, did not share this faith. Nevertheless, he never abandoned the correspondence of external truth. In the words of Hawthorne, he could "neither believe, nor be comfortable in his unbelief" and he was "too honest and courageous not to try to do one or the other" (qtd. in Thompson xxi). At his most cynical moments, Melville does at times abandon irony for satire. This diminishes his moral force, for irony cuts deeper than satire, affecting the soul instead of the intellect. At his best, though, Melville is

powerfully ironic, unflinching in his Promethean struggle for self-definition.

Melville's allegorical novel Pierre follows a three-part structure anchored by the three central architectural metaphors: Saddle Meadows, the Church of the Apostles, and prison. These edifices develop the central opposition between epic and pastoral as they mark the stages of Pierre's moral transformation from chronometric idealism, to horologic expediency, to ultimate despair. Unlike Cooper's hero of Jack Tier, Harry Mulford, who learns that self-reliance must be balanced by virtuous intent and humble faith in divine mercy, Pierre loses faith in divine mercy altogether. He becomes, in the end, a doomed hero—heroic because he refuses to surrender either self-reliance or virtuous intent, and doomed because without the hope for heaven, his demystification drives him mad. In Melville's Pierre, then, we see the tragic vanity of trying to live by Christian principles without faith in the actual Christ.

Following Hawthorne and Melville, American literary history is marked by a general turn away from the themes of ambiguity, irony, and tragedy. "Recent literature," as R.W. B. Lewis notes, "has lost the profound tragic understanding—paradoxically bred out of cheerfulness—of a Hawthorne or Melville" (9). Indeed, "the American as Adam has been replaced by the American as Laocoon; the Emersonian figure—the plain old Adam, the simple genuine self—has been frowned quite out of existence. . . . irony has withered into mere mordant skepticism" (Lewis 195, 196). Future study of ironic allegory as an American genre could

trace this general decline of irony. A fruitful place to start in such a review would of course be Edgar Allan Poe's "The Masque of the Red Death," in which architectural metaphors develop the themes of time, pride, and irony. A useful analysis could then be made of the incest theme and the collapsing house in "The Fall of the House of Usher."

Building on the theme of the collapsing house are George Washington Cable's "Belles Demoiselles Plantation" and William Dean Howells' The Rise of Silas Lapham. These works, however, lack the moral force of irony. Cable's work does at least anticipate Faulkner's powerfully tragic novels of the fallen South. In the conception of the Civil War as our nation's Fall from innocence lies the most fruitful ground for a study of architectural metaphors within the framework of ironic allegory. Indeed, the plantation house, built by the black man's toil, becomes a profound monument of the white man's arrogance as it peels, cracks, crumbles, and sinks into the swamp. In William Faulkner's Absalom! Absalom! and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man, especially, we witness the legacy of Hawthorne, and the powerful resurgence of irony and the tragic sensibility.

Continued study of American ironic allegory will reveal a tradition which, in working "to deal successfully with opposites, naturally leads to a great sensitivity about time's double features of duration and arrest, of eternity and the immediate moment" (Hansen 22). This tradition began in the nineteenth century as an amalgam of poetry and fiction, imagination and tragedy. Hawthorne, Melville, and Cooper employed

allegory to achieve “thematically charged art” (Fletcher 267). In The House of the Seven Gables, Pierre, and the Templeton Trilogy, for example, the process of interaction between genre and other elements is unified by the controlling ideal of time and mortared into a cohesive whole by architectural metaphors.

Hawthorne, especially, embraced the obliqueness of allegory, for he found symbolic modes static, whereas with allegory “the concern is always with process, with the way in which various elements of an imaginative or intellectual system interact” (Clifford 11). As mankind’s most honest literary response to the doubleness of fallen human nature, finally, ironic allegory appeals to the sensibility keenly tuned to the aesthetics of tragedy; dynamic yet paradoxically grounded, nineteenth century American allegory uncompromisingly demands an appreciation of art with a moral foundation and of beauty edified by truth.

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