Lourdes Arizpe

Culture, Diversity and Heritage: Major Studies

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As a sustainable world will only become possible through scientific knowledge and international agreements, this book is dedicated to all those who work towards this end, even in very difficult times.

Keynote Speaker at the ICH Congress in Zacatecas. *Source* Photo by Edith Pérez Flores

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- Lourdes Arizpe, Cristina Amescua: *Anthropological Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage.* Springer Briefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace, vol. 6 (Cham–Heidelberg–Dordrecht–London–New York: Springer-Verlag, 2013).

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Giving back photos to Amusgos in Tlacoachistlahuaca (2008). *Source* Photo by Edith Pérez Flores

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Lourdes Arizpe. *Source* Photo by Rogelio Cuellar (2005) who granted permission to use it

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Culture, Diversity and Heritage

Culture has become a symbol of freedom, cooperation and autonomy in this new century. Yet it is also associated with fundamentalism, sexism, ethnicism and many other divisive trends that cause cultural and religious clashes. The 'cultural turn' of the last decades has given rise to many different perspectives on culture as policy instrument, as scientific analytical perspective, and as heuristic in public debates in a globalizing world. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, culture was chosen as a key issue in building political and social arrangements for the new worlding.[1] As an anthropologist concerned with 'cultural and social sustainability' (see Arizpe 2014a: 31–42), as I called it in 1989, I was pulled into this process while participating at the same time in field research, institutional decision-making in international programmes for culture, and advocacy for cultural freedom. This book, the third in the series published by Springer, brings together texts I wrote in the first decade of the twenty-first century together with a text written in 1988. I believe they illustrate a path of questioning and discovery along which these different perspectives on culture were analysed, debated and negotiated, and as such they also have a testimonial value.

1.1 Culture Is Good for Thinking About Human Relationships[2]

The last chapter in this book, 'Culture and Development: A Comparative Study of Beliefs in a Mexican Community', was, in fact, my first step in trying to find anthropological tools to analyse culture in contemporary communities in a way that would lead beyond the fragmented ethnographies I had conducted previously.

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[1] I use 'worlding' for 'mondialisation', in the sense proposed by Philip Descola, that is, as a broader concept that takes account of the way different societies have conceived humans and their place in the natural environment.

[2] Paraphrasing Claude Lévi-Strauss, who proposed that 'totemism' is good for thinking about social structure.

I presented the findings of this study at the World Congress of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Studies (IUAES) in Zagreb, Yugoslavia, in 1988. A few days later, it turned out that I was elected President of the IUAES and in this capacity I was invited to stand next to Slobodan Milošević, then President of Yugoslavia, to watch a fantastic (with all the connotations this term may have) parade in which all the major ethnic groups in that country displayed their wonderful heritage in a show of political harmony. It was this extraordinary experience, needless to say, that launched me head and heart into trying to understand culture and to foster creativity at a world scale.

Perceiving the complexities I had witnessed in my previous fieldwork, both in defining 'culture' and in managing its social and political consequences, I continued to carry out field research on women, migration and development, as well as on social perceptions of deforestation; key texts were published in volumes 10 and 11 of the present series *Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice* (Arizpe 2014a, b, c).

A few years later, in 1992, participating in the UN World Commission on Culture and Development, I had the privilege of working with very distinguished world intellectual leaders in trying to build a structured and internationally viable policy discourse in this field. At this time, for many reasons that are explained in the chapters of this book, interest in culture was increasing rapidly and I soon found myself trying to establish channels of communication between anthropologists and social scientists, cultural activists and government diplomats, and grappling with the challenge of unifying criteria for understanding culture while at the same time making sure that sustainable human development and cultural freedom remained the central policy aim of UN institutions and governments.

In this book, the texts written between 2000 and 2013 are divided into the following four sections:

Section 1.1, 'Culture, Knowledge and Diversity', includes anthropological research papers on arbitration, the value of ritual, culture and science, culture and development institutions, and cultural diversity. One of the international projects I have been most involved with is the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage,[3] and this led me to begin a long-term field project to create an Intangible Cultural Heritage Archive at the Regional Multidisciplinary Research Center (CRIM) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The texts written on this theme are included in Sect. 1.2, 'Reconfiguring Intangible Cultural Heritage', and the development was marked by a conference to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of UNESCO's 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Chengdu, China, in June 2013.

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[3] My involvement began after I had been Director of the National Museum of Popular Cultures in Mexico (1985–1988) and then, as Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO, and later on as an advisor, helped to create an international convention on intangible cultural heritage.

During this same period, as an anthropologist participating in international scientific projects, among them the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (HDGEC) and the UNDP Human Development Report, and as Vice-President and then President of the International Social Science Council (ISSC), I had the responsibility of trying to offset political trends that reified culture or tried to impose political biases on it in an attempt, as Paul Wolfowitz would put it at the World Bank, to "create their own reality". My presentations at this time, including my speech as a member of the Eminent Persons for the Dialogue of Civilizations at the United Nations and at other international meetings, are included in Sect. 1.3, 'Influencing International Social and Cultural Policy'.

Finally, Sect. 1.4, 'Exploring Research Tools to Analyse Culture', includes my early text, mentioned above, on 'Culture and Development: A Comparative Study of Beliefs in a Mexican Community'. A very brief sketch of all these texts is given in the next few pages.

1.2   Arbitrating Collective Dreams

In 2013, I was invited to deliver the Raymond Firth lecture at the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, twenty years after I had organized the same Congress in Mexico City in 1993. Using the observations and knowledge I had gathered while acting as a 'decision-making participant' of how tumultuous and highly conflictive debates at the United Nations could be compressed into precisely-worded resolutions, and the fieldwork data I had just gathered on how practitioners of intangible cultural heritage reconfigure their practices, I explored the mechanisms of 'social arbitration' as a tool for anthropology. It seems to me vital that we now develop new anthropological tools to contribute to the new worlding that is leading towards a cosmopolis. Culture had been called a 'site of contestation' and for many years I had argued that it would be more appropriate to consider it a 'site of negotiation'. Now, in this paper, I went further, in saying that culture is, indeed, a 'site of arbitration'.

It is this arbitration that creates history in the sense of a point of inflexion after which there is a point where possible futures diverge. I mention the remark of a cultural practitioner: "Who, then, will write history? What are we going to write in this history?…Here is the knowledge. A people who don't know where they come from cannot recognize where they are going. It is this simple".[4]

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[4] "¿A quién le toca escribir la historia? ¿Qué vamos a escribir en esa historia? ¿Qué vamos a poner que valga la pena y que sirva de guía a las futuras generaciones? ¿Qué? A mi me prepararon mis abuelos y me dejaron muchas cosas para enseñar. Aquí está este conocimiento. Un pueblo que no sabe de dónde viene, no puede reconocer hacia dónde va. Es así de simple".

With Mexican President Zedillo and Director-General Federico Mayor in UNESCO in 1998. *Source* Personal Photo collection of the Author

In this chapter I also refer to the new worlding, which takes into account the way different societies have conceived of the relationship between human beings, animals, and plants, as well as their location within the constructed natural environment—constructed through culture and, centrally, through the rituals of culture.

Chapter 3 was written after a seminar at the Bellagio Study Center on the question of value in art, ritual, and economics. In this paper I point out that, in our contemporary world, as markets have become the dominant organizing principle, a multiplicity of cultural movements has emerged. In many cases such movements become visible through resignified rituals or the invention of new ones. What is the value of such rituals for people? Why are Mexican migrants now celebrating the ritual of the Day of the Dead—which they celebrated back in their villages in Mexico—in their neighbourhoods in Chicago? Why have highly mobile Caribbean migrants recreated a Rastafarian musical culture steeped in Ethiopian history and culture? Why are middle-class professional Europeans enthusiastically reinventing Celtic culture and rituals? I argue that beyond identity politics, religious revivals, nationalistic ceremonies, more than a fearful return to old traditions or revalorizing intangible cultural heritage, something else is happening. Fieldwork data on the ritual of the Day of the Dead in several villages is analysed to show that there is a strict protocol of who receives, escorts, and chats with people in the homes that have offerings, and in the

rites in the cemetery. By closely participating in this protocol, children grow into this embodied knowledge as they grow into their bodies.

In the chapter on 'Cultural Diversity and Global Knowledge Networks' I take up the question of the international management of knowledge, since the question of 'whose knowledge counts?' constantly comes up in the setting up of development projects. In discussing diversity, however, the overall objective is not to deepen differences for their own sake (a move which will only lead to perennial cultural conflicts) but rather to give recognition to social networks within national or macro-regional contexts. I highlight the importance of stating explicitly that diversity is not external to a community but also means recognizing different groups within a given cultural community. Instead of culture as political philosophy, culture is placed in terms of one of the liberties that must be guaranteed for human development.

Academic Palmes of France presented in the Mexican Embassy in Paris in 2011. *Source* Photo Mexican Embassy in Paris

At the meeting on 'The Cultural Values of Science' held at the Vatican in November, 1978, I began my paper by stating that one of the problems in dealing with these 'two cultures', as C. P. Snow had called them, was that the concept of culture has variously been placed *above* science, *in opposition* to science and *within* science. It is this polyvalence in meaning that turns 'culture' into such a sensitive, valued, yet sometimes contentious idea. In the paper I included my own working definition of culture at the time: "Culture is the continuous flow of meanings that

people create, blend and exchange. It enables us to build cultural legacies and to live with their memory. It allows us to recognize our bonds with kin, community, language groups and nation-states, not to speak of humanity itself. It helps us live a thoughtful existence. Yet culture can also lead us to transform our differences into banners of war and extremism. So it should never be taken for granted, but must be carefully shaped into forms of positive achievement. Culture is never at a standstill: every individual contributes works and images that blend into the rivers of history".

The more culture was singled out as a primary force for achieving human development, the more the concern that globalization would blow away all cultural traditions raised an outcry of alarm around the world. In 'Cultural Diversity for Globalization' I asked whether globalization would take us down the road of diminishing returns as uniformity dries up *Our Creative Diversity* (the title of Report of the United Nations Commission on Culture and Development; UNESCO 1996) or whether, on the contrary, it would give us greater "freedom to create" (the phrase I used to summarized the conclusions of the 1998 Stockholm Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development). My answer was that we lose sight of the many, many examples in history in which groups have not just tolerated others but have based their reciprocal relationships on saying 'I respect you and I am open to learning from you and our interactions'. Cultural diversity, in many quarters, is now beginning to be perceived as a kind of solution for a monotonic market, as we noted in the 2000 UNESCO World Culture Report on 'Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism'. We stressed that cultures must be understood as a constantly flowing process, like a multicoloured river in which no current is pure, all currents have intermingled, and yet, at any given point in time, every current may be perceived as a different strand (UNESCO 2000: 24–46). In detaching people from their geographical territories, their historical places, or their semantic self-adscription frameworks, cultural representations may lose substance. In one sense they are resemanticized as 'folkloric' in a new global framework in which the cultures that structure the media and the Internet are the cosmopolitan frames of reference.

The section on 'Reconfiguring Intangible Culture Heritage', brings together texts written between 2010 and 2013 and based on fieldwork carried out, as mentioned above, for the Archive of Intangible Cultural Heritage at the Regional Multidisciplinary Research Centre (CRIM) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). At the 2013 conference to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the 2003 International Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage held in Chengdu, China, I asked: "Are cultural practitioners really 'safeguarding' their cultural practices? No, I believe they are reconfiguring their intangible cultural heritage practices". The following points are made in this text:

Firstly, time must be reinserted into the concept of these practices by conceptualizing them as a 'moment of time' in a continuous flow of meaning and interaction. Secondly, the proper scale and plurality of living cultural practices must be further explored. Intangible cultural heritage practices are not unique; they are singular performances within webs of plurality. Thirdly, a basic assumption must be changed. Differences between ethnic groups do not give rise to different practices in

intangible cultural heritage; rather, differences between the artefacts, art and performance of such practices 'are useful for thinking' (as Claude Levi-Strauss would have said) about the relationships between groups of cultural practitioners living within a territory.[5] Intangible cultural heritage practices in fact provide a metonymy for cultural pluralism and, in a sense, they are constantly drawing a map of symbolic relationships between groups of cultural practitioners. Fourthly, linking intangible cultural heritage to sustainability requires resemanticizing and reconceptualizing human involvement in ecosystemic relations. The important question to ask is, 'how will intangible cultural heritage contribute to the new worlding of a human sustainable future?'

The World Bank was also drawn into the international policy debate 'Culture Counts' (Wolfensohn/Dini/Facco-Bonetti/Johnson/Martin-Brown 2000). James Wolfensohn, then Director of the World Bank, and I were walking along a sinuous narrow street in the beautiful city of Fez in Morocco and we compared the views of the World Bank on 'cultural property' and 'cultural assets' with UNESCO's perspective on cultural heritage, as achievements of humanity and culture as the means for solidarity and cooperation. Ismail Serageldin, the Vice-President of the Bank for socially and environmentally sustainable development and now Director of the Library of Alexandria in Egypt,[6] and Michael Cernea had already begun innovative projects on cultural properties and development at the Bank. In 'Cultural Endowments at Risk in Induced Development' I mention a few of the projects financed by that institution.

1.3   Influencing International Social and Cultural Policy

As President of the International Social Science Council (2002–2006) I was often invited to discussions of policies pertaining to the fields of social science. The paper on 'Culture, Governance and Globalization', delivered at a joint meeting of the International Labour Organization and UNESCO held in Paris in 2006, strongly stressed that if narrow economic globalization continued to undermine social structures, the political and economic costs of social unrest would soon outstrip the benefits of economic growth, especially for the poorest groups. The safety nets for poor people were being undermined by the growth of economic inequality, increased outmigration, transnational organized crime, social exclusion, and gender

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[5] A first step in analysing these connections is proposed in Arizpe (2013: 17–37).

[6] As a member of the Board of Trustees of the Library of Alexandria, I participated in many initiatives on cultural dialogue and research launched by the Library.

violence in many developing countries.[7] In such a setting it would be ever more difficult to advance in the reform of the State and in the consolidation of democracy.

I was also invited to speak at universities and intergovernmental organisations. In 2002, the Student Association of the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I had studied, invited me to speak; this intervention is the chapter 'Freedom of Choice, Democracy and the Zapatistas'. Since I had carried out field-work on deforestation in the Lacandón rainforest starting in 1990 my research team and I had been well aware of the increasing clandestine political mobilizations in the region (Arizpe/Paz/Velázquez 1996). We published our book in Spanish at the end of 1993 and the Zapatistas declared war on the Mexican state on 1 January 1994.

Suddenly, the Zapatistas had inspired a movement of hope that mobilized startling global support. By global I mean it spurred actions in many countries and has been endorsed by groups from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Given this complex situation, in an article published in 1994 I expressed the view that the concerns about injustice, poverty and exclusion that the Zapatistas splashed in the media all over the world are indeed legitimate (Arizpe 1994: 19–32). However, I cautioned that the strategy of declaring war on the Mexican state and mobilizing in the way they did in the unstable depths of the Lacandón rain-forest, which was also being reclaimed for conservation by environmentalists the world over, might not bring benefits to their communities of militants.

As globalization threw peoples into working with a constantly changing inter-pretation of reality, with a greater number of voices demanding participation and with experimental new tools for communication, I pointed out that culture was turning into a new geostrategic instrument. As part of this process, culture was being pulled into the political vacuum left by the disorganization of political phi-losophies and, as it became more and more reified, it was in fact becoming highly ideologized.

Cultural conflicts and wars would continue to proliferate as religious funda-mentalism and intolerant ethnic ideologies replaced political philosophies as instruments for negotiating conflicts of power. To counterbalance such trends it was important to set down the arguments about the new 'equality of vulnerability' brought about by globalized terrorism and wars. Shocked by the attacks on the Twin Towers, a few of us, members of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Dialogue of Civilizations (Natalie Gordimer, Hans Küng, Kamal Aboul-Magd and others) were invited to speak before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 November 2011. The speech I gave was a summary of 'Equality of Vulnerability and Opportunity'. I said that new ideas and debates on the political perspectives for the world based on research were urgently needed. Without this, people would find no contending ideas they could debate, reject or adopt and that would give them a

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[7] I was especially worried about Mexico. By 2012, after two neoconservative governments, Mexico had low indicators in economic growth and education, and one of the highest levels of growth of economic inequality, unemployment, feminicides (women murdered by husbands or male kin), poverty, and criminality; and more than 100,000 deaths due to the 'war on drug dealers'.

feeling that they had a say in constructing new meanings to their changed lives or in influencing economic and political events. This would lead to disenchantment in their desire to forge their own futures.

To focus the debate on developing a new and concrete principle, I posited that environmental sustainability could not be achieved without 'conviviability'.[8] People cannot manage the natural environment rationally if the 'way they live together' pushes them to be hungry, greedy or destructive, I repeated again and again. We need a new model of human relationships for sustainable development. Governance, social and gender structures are rapidly changing as a result of globalization and of the rise of social and cultural movements that cut across borders. This is transforming the way in which individuals handle multiple allegiances related to their languages, cultures, and national identities.

It seemed to me that this attitude and this kind of relationship required a name and so I proposed the name 'conviviability'. This is, of course, not an existing word in the English lexicon, but it is one which, in my view, should exist. The long yet invisible periods of no wars in the world and the extraordinary philosophies of altruism and cooperation invented by human beings all over the world show that conviviality is an attainable ideal. Yet we must turn this into a principle that requires purposeful action, in the same way that sustainability does. Thus, I define this term as the ability to create convivial relations—convivi-ability—a principle of development for a global civil society inhabiting a finite planet. This constitutes a problem if people no longer have the confidence or the audience to continue to produce original meanings and images. Or the actual physical and cultural environments that previously enabled them to create. A culturally monotonic world would mean the end of creativity. Fostering creativity, then, becomes a priority; freedom to create, a priority for development policies.

Hence the short text 'Convivencia: The Goal of Conviviability'. Such a concept, I believe, is useful as a performance marker both for government policy and for civil society actions.

UNESCO held a major Conference on 'Cultural Policies for Development' in Stockholm, Sweden, in March, 1998, which I had the responsibility for coordinating. I proposed a tripartite structure with a Conference of governments, a Forum of artists and cultural practitioners, and a Forum of researchers in the field of culture. My speech at this Conference entitled 'Freedom to Create' is the last text in the section. I began by saying: "One message, simple yet complex, coming from diverse peoples and unifying us, has come out of this Conference and it is: we need freedom to create. Cultural policies may become the means that will allow this creative freedom around the world. Then we are no longer talking only of objects but of people. Of artists and writers and everyday people creating a history or writing songs or performing a play. How do you protect this in people? Through the rights, copyrights, resources, and conditions of work".

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[8] I first proposed this term in 1998 in a meeting on 'Civil Society' at the OECD Development Centre in Paris.

I went on to say "…each individual, man or woman, young or old, may make choices to regroup around a traditional culture or nationalism or religion and, as the World Commission stated, their choice must be respected, as long as they themselves respect the choice others may make not to identify or belong to their chosen community. This must be placed in a democratic system because without democracy, conflict lines along cultural boundaries may lead to war. In this new century we must stop trench wars, that horror that left a scar of death across the face of Europe in the twentieth century; trench wars in culture at the birth of a new millennium that will leave a scar of young deaths across the world, for minds also die and the saddest thing we can witness and which ends up in terrorist bombs, is the death of young minds stuck in cultural trenches".

1.4 The Search for Tools for Analysing Culture in Anthropological Studies

This paper was presented at the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences held in Zagreb, Yugoslavia, in 1988.[9] In the nineteen-eighties, after conducting several ethnographic studies in indigenous communities in Mexico (Arizpe 2014a, b, c), I decided to explore other sociological tools for analysing culture at the local level. So I used Theodor Adorno's questionnaire on the 'Authoritarian Personality' to assess how a very conservative Catholic community was coping with the changes brought about by the expansion of agribusiness and by other cultural transformations. The conclusion of this paper reads "…it is not possible to confront a world of pluralisms—ethnic, religious, political and social—with dogmatic or authoritarian beliefs. [The study] also showed that a violent process of impoverishment cannot be confronted by turning a blind eye toward social inequality or by trying to reimpose antiquated codes of repression, to put a stop to openness, knowledge, women's advancement, and greater political democracy".[10]

In sum, the discourse on culture as a policy concern has been highly politicized and ethnicized in the last few decades, as can be seen in the chapters of this book. From my plea for pluralism—as opposite to the ethnicism implicit in multiculturalism—in the 1988 study, to my insistence for arbitration in 2013, I have pointed to the priority that must be given to understanding culture in order to build a world capable of reasoning its way out of the present path towards environmental disasters.

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[9] The complete study was published the following year in Spanish (Arizpe 1989). It won the 'Fray Bernardino de Sahagún' award of the National Institute of Anthropology and History in 1990 for the best PhD thesis.

[10] At that time in a town very near Zamora, Marcial Maciel, recently condemned by the Vatican for child sexual abuse and corruption, was expanding the school for young boys of the Legionnaires of Christ.

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With Maurice Godelier and Fredric Barth at IUAES Anthropology Congress (1993). *Source* Personal Photo Collection of the Author

With students during fieldwork project in Yautepec (2005). *Source* Personal Photo Collection of the Author

Part I
Culture, Knowledge and Diversity

As President of the International social Science Council in Beijing (2004). *Source* Personal photo collection of the author

Bilingual Report on Research Planning Meeting in 2012 in Cuernavaca and Yautepec, Morelos, Mexico. Available at www.crim-unam.mex

Chapter 2
Arbitrating Collective Dreams: Anthropology and the New Worlding

2.1 Introduction

From his earliest ethnographic research in Tikopia, Raymond Firth was interested in process, that is, in adjustments made within the framework of social structure.[1] One of his major contributions to anthropology, in fact, was to distinguish social structure and social organization. He observed, for example, that people in Tikopia would behave differently towards collateral and agnatic relatives while using the same kinship term to speak about them. At the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I first met Professor Raymond Firth, although he no longer lectured at the time I was there, I learned that in ethnography the starting point was to identify social structure while trying to re-introduce process through various methods. This could be done, for example, through situational analysis, or through Max Gluckman's dictum of "closed systems, open minds". Another aspect of Firth's work also interested me: his participation as a signatory of the *Second Humanist Manifesto*. I will comment on both these aspects in my discussion.

Several decades later however, in today's runaway world, social structures have rapidly become elusive as global trends chip away at traditional institutions and open paths towards warp-speed transformations. In my own research, I remember I always ran into this difficulty, mainly because I was always dealing with processes: the migration of indigenous peoples, the transformation of women's roles, the social perception of environmental change, the challenges of development and redistribution, the setting up of guidelines for international cultural policy and, in recent years, with the reconfiguring of intangible cultural heritage. I remember how surprised I was at finding that very homogeneous groups had, in fact, a great diversity of norms, some of them conflictive, and how these could be juggled so as

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[1] This paper was delivered as the 'Raymond Firth Lecture' of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the United Kingdom (ASA), at the International Congress of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences held at the University of Manchester, Manchester, 10–16 August 2013. Unpublished.

to apply them to diverse settings. Then, I became fascinated by how the most tumultuous and conflictive debates could be suddenly compressed into precisely worded resolutions and world reports that achieved consensus. I was able to see this from the inside as I became what I have called a 'decision-making participant' when in the United Nations World Commission on Culture and Development and as Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO. Similarly, in my recent anthropological research I wanted to see how cultural practitioners of intangible cultural heritage manifestations reconfigure their practices and move on to new organizational and ritual grounds.

In this chapter I will refer to the core mechanism of such processes as 'social arbitration' and I would like to explore this concept as a tool that could be very useful at present for anthropology. Culture has been called a 'site of contestation' and for many years I have been referring to it as a 'site of negotiation'. Now I would like to argue here that culture is, indeed, a 'site of arbitration'.

Arbitration is defined in the *Webster's Online Dictionary* as: "The hearing and determination of a cause between parties in controversy, by a person or persons chosen by the parties".[2] Thus, while the terms of 'exchange', which is central to anthropology, and 'negotiation', so often used, for example, in policy anthropology, open up rounds of reciprocity which may be endless, the concept of arbitration focuses on a specific point in debates where a decision must be taken that leads to the resolution of the dispute and steps may be taken, hopefully, to a way forward.

Such arbitration, it seems to me, is particularly relevant to build the new 'worlding' to encompass our evolving humanity and emerging worlds in our contemporary times. I use this term 'worlding' with reference to postcolonial studies, in which authors such as Spivak (1987) have spoken of the way in which colonialism created a history and anthropology of the world for the 'peoples without history', as Eric Wolf would have said. However, 'worlding' as 'mondialisation', in the sense proposed by Philip Descola, is a broader concept which takes into account the way different societies have conceived of the relationship between human beings, animals and plants, as well as their location within the constructed natural environment. This, I believe, will be the new foundation on which to build a new narrative about the world.

In historical terms, the narrative that anthropology has used to describe the world has been primarily based on the concept of culture. However, "…the notion of culture as a massive system of classification which forms a grid for cognition", as Maurice Bloch has recently defined it (Bloch 2012: 165), has already been challenged by anthropologists for several decades. In fact, in my own international experience I was very surprised to find that at the same moment that anthropologists wanted to throw out the concept of culture, let alone that of 'civilization', the political world took up these terms and instrumentalized them in policy applications. I have written on this in previously.

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[2] Webster's Online Dictionary, available at: <http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?action=search&resource=Webster%27s&word=Arbitration&quicksearch=on> (accessed 20 April 2014).

At present, I agree with Bloch (who was one of the best teachers I have ever had) when he suggests that active internal debate and the continuous debate between people engaged in a social exchange of inferences are the most interesting aspects for anthropology. Having said that, I would add that the traditional terms of 'exchange' and 'negotiation' have limited use as analytical terms in understanding how cultural practitioners and organizations actually **move** to new arenas in their thoughts and actions. I believe that something else is going on which anthropology should take up. This is the mechanism of social arbitration.

In this chapter I will take up three examples to explore this mechanism. Firstly, Raymond Firth's participation in the *Second Humanist Manifesto* published in 1973.[3] Secondly, my own participation as a member and supervisor of the writing of the Report *Our Creative Diversity* by the United Nations World Commission on Culture and Development (UNESCO 1996). Lastly, I will present the ethnographic data delivered by the cultural practitioners of the Aztec Dance of Central Mexico, to show how the 'Captains' of the dance take decisions for their group as they go along, in the context of rapidly changing social and political conditions in the regions in which they perform their ritual dance. In all three examples, it seems to me that leaders and participants have actually been 'arbitrating' collective dreams. They are doing so as they try to give social meaning and social organization to new rapidly emerging processes. In a sense, in all three cases, even though the procedures are carried out at different levels of magnitude, the international and the local, the same search is present, the attempt to synchronize ideas, performances, actions and performance, both to influence and to fit into the new worlding.

2.2 Arbitrating International Visions: The Humanist Manifesto II

Raymond Firth was one of the original signatories of the *Second Humanist Manifesto* published in 1973 (see footnote 3). At that time, allow me to say, I was a student at LSE, and having attended some of Firth's informal talks, since he was no longer teaching there, I actually signed the Manifesto, together with many of my classmates.

The *Second Humanist Manifesto* was published in *The Humanist* of September–October 1973. It was signed by scientists and writers such as Francis Crick, H. J. Eysenck, Julian Huxley and Margaret Knight from the UK, as well as Isaac Asimov, Betty Friedan, Irving Horowitz, B. F. Skinner, Andrei Sakharov and Jean-François Revel. It asked for a more 'hardheaded and realistic approach' in its seventeen-point statement, which was much longer and more elaborate than the *First Humanist Manifesto*. It was 'a statement reaching for vision in a time that

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[3] Humanist Manifesto II, at: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanist_Manifesto_II> (accessed 13 July 2013).

needs direction' (see footnote 3). Importantly for us anthropologists, the Manifesto was a social analysis in an effort at consensus. Similarly to the Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, it was 'a design for a secular society on a planetary scale'.

Many of the proposals in the document such as opposition to racism and weapons of mass destruction and support of strong human rights are now part of the international policy discourse, and its prescriptions that divorce and birth control become legal are now a reality in a majority of countries. However, various controversial stances were also strongly supported, notably the right to abortion, in addition to its rejection of religion. One of the oft-quoted lines of this manifesto is, "No deity will save us; we must save ourselves" (see footnote 3). This surely applies today to the urgency of achieving sustainability.

Interestingly, in its twelfth point, the Manifesto looked towards "the development of a system of world law and a world order based upon transnational federal government. This would appreciate cultural pluralism and diversity. It would not exclude pride in national origins and accomplishments nor the handling of regional problems on a regional basis. Human progress, however, can no longer be achieved by focusing on one section of the world, Western or Eastern, developed or underdeveloped. For the first time in human history, no part of humankind can be isolated from any other. Each person's future is in some way linked to all. We thus reaffirm a commitment to the building of world community, at the same time recognizing that this commits us to some hard choices" (see footnote 3).

With great foresight, the Manifesto emphasized that "the planet earth must be considered a single ecosystem. Ecological damage, resource depletion, and excessive population growth must be checked by international concord". In its fifteenth clause it read "World poverty must cease. Hence extreme disproportions in wealth, income, and economic growth should be reduced on a worldwide basis". It considered technology a vital key to human progress and development, yet cautioned that "We would resist any moves to censor basic scientific research on moral, political, or social grounds. Technology must, however, be carefully judged by the consequences of its use; harmful and destructive changes should be avoided. We are particularly disturbed when technology and bureaucracy control, manipulate, or modify human beings without their consent" (see footnote 3). This was written in 1973.

In closing, the signatories of the Manifesto stated: "We urge that parochial loyalties and inflexible moral and religious ideologies be transcended. We, the undersigned, while not necessarily endorsing every detail of the above, pledge our general support to Humanist Manifesto II for the future of humankind. These affirmations are not a final credo or dogma but an expression of a living and growing faith" (see footnote 3).

Importantly for the topic of this chapter, the signatories indicated that not all of them endorsed every detail of the *Second Humanist Manifesto*. That is, they were arbitrating between competing ideologies and goals, not to create a new final credo or dogma, but to engage in a living and evolving process—one which, in my view, has more to do with arbitration, that is, deciding which ideas and goals are discarded, which are left in the margins, and which ones are highlighted.

It is worth mentioning, very briefly, how this blueprint for the world contrasts with the Millennium Development Goals which we have been hotly but subtly debating at the United Nations. In assessing the previous Millennium Development Goals, we at the Committee on Development Policy of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations have argued that the very practical focus of the previous goals, i.e. focusing narrowly on poverty, potable water, maternal mortality —a goal which, incidentally could have been easily achieved yet where there has been little progress—or education, among others, had left out broader yet vital goals.[4] These, we argued, should emphasize inclusive growth, promoting sustainable patterns of production and consumption, developing open and accountable institutions, and forging global partnerships. In this international arena, arbitration is based on geopolitical considerations that go through countless rounds of lobbying and political negotiation until a consensus is reached. Using Maurice Bloch's terms, what is interesting in such negotiations is that one is continuously 'reading the minds' of diplomats and politicians as they waver in their decisions according to constantly shifting agreements, disagreements and alliances. Actors are constantly rereading the intentions and words in discourses and then arbitrating decisions in order to obtain the best possible outcome in resolutions and policy actions.

2.3 Harvesting Culture Around the World: The World Commission on Culture and Development

A second example of arbitration at the international level is the Report *Our Creative Diversity* produced by the World Commission on Culture and Development. As explained in a previous publication (Arizpe 2004), the concept of culture began to be coupled with the term 'development' in the fifties and became a political emblem for decolonizing and developing countries in the sixties and seventies. The 1982 Intergovernmental Conference on Culture and Development, *Mondiacult*, gave a broader, more anthropological definition of culture for policy initiatives. In 1987 the Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries, was successful in having the General Assembly of the United Nations set up a 'Decade for Cultural Development', with UNESCO as the lead agency. This programme fell into my hands when I arrived at UNESCO in 1994 as Assistant Director-General for Culture. The general opinion of this Decade was that it had dissipated itself into hundreds of folklore and art events and music festivals but had not generated new guidelines for international policies linking culture and development. To fill this gap, the World Commission on Culture and Development (WCCD) was established (1992–1995). This independent Commission was chaired by former Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Pérez de Cuellar, and included among its forty members four Nobel laureates and three

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[4] UN MDG, at: <http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2013).

anthropologists: Claude Levi-Strauss, Tchie Nakane and me. In 1994, as I had already accepted the invitation to be Assistant Director-General of UNESCO, I was asked to be in charge of the Secretariat that wrote the Commission's Report. In November 1995 the Commission presented its report *Our Creative Diversity* at the General Conference, where there were delegations from 182 countries. Let me very quickly go through the Commission's perspective.

The first key message is that development embraces not only access to goods and services, but also the opportunity to choose a full, satisfying, valuable and valued way of living together in society. Culture, for its part, cannot be reduced—as is generally the case—to a subsidiary position as a mere promoter of economic growth. Its role is not to be the servant of material ends but the social basis of the ends themselves. In other words, culture is both a means to material progress, and the end of development seen as the flourishing of human existence in all its forms and as a whole.

The second key idea is that issues of development cannot be divorced from questions of ethics. Views about employment, social policy, the distribution of income and wealth, people's participation, gender inequalities, the environment and much else are inevitably based on ethical values. The Commission also saw that the intense cultural interaction caused by globalization can be a source of conflict, just as it simultaneously opens new spaces for cultural exchange, borrowing, and lending. People position themselves in these spaces by turning to the most immediate, familiar, collectively shared instrument at hand that they can mobilize: *inherited culture*.

At the head of its concerns, then, the Commission placed the notion of a *global ethics* that needs to emerge from a worldwide quest for shared values that can bring people and cultures together rather than drive them apart. It then explored the challenges of *cultural pluralism,* reaffirming a commitment to fostering coexistence in diversity both nationally and internationally. But we added a caveat: *that only cultures that have values of respect for other cultures should be respected.* In other words, intolerance and cultural domination could not be respected under the guise of respecting cultural pluralism.

In other chapters, the Report takes up the challenge of stimulating human *creativity* and the world *media* scene. The Commission also addressed the cultural paradoxes of *gender*, as development transforms the relationships between men and women and globalization impacts both positively and negatively on women's rights. It looked at the growing importance of *cultural heritage* as a social and economic resource and built on the groundwork laid by the Brundtland Commission to explore the complex relationship between cultural diversity and biodiversity, between cultural values and environmental sustainability.

The path forward proposed by the Commission, then, was to create new systems of cultural allegiances in the setting of civic communities. The Commission viewed culture as "the foundation spring of remembrance and identity, as the major source of energy for creating new senses of belonging as well as new ways of living together…" (UNESCO 1996).

Within the Commission, as in the *Second Humanist Manifesto*, there was, of course, dissension. I would say a World Commission is the site of a great battle, and of great arbitration. In such a setting, the skill of diplomats such as Javier Pérez de Cuellar in reading the Commissioners' minds and then forcefully taking a decision is a crucial element of the success. For example, some members of the Commission wanted the Report to focus primarily on a commitment to cultural pluralism, but many of us opposed this view and insisted that the broader commonalities among peoples should be addressed. It was just at that time that Samuel Huntington was publishing several articles as well as his book on *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993, 1996). To counter his view, which has had such a disempowering effect on the West, we decided that the first chapter of the Report should focus on a global ethic and on the commonalities that bind humanity in the search for sustainability.

At this point, I would like to say a few words about the role of an anthropologist in these international debates. Both Tchie Nakane and I, as well as Henryk Ole Magga, the leader of the Sami People of Norway, spent most of our time trying to stop the reification of the concept of culture as set out in the text of the Report. Yet when I became Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO I could understand the difference in using concepts in scientific and in political discourse. The analytic quality, the precision and subtleties an anthropologist introduces into a political document are extremely useful. At the same time, our training in rapidly recognizing patterns in cultural and political relationships is very helpful in managing debates and in lobbying for a useful outcome. At the same time, there are moments when, as a 'decision-making participant', one must give way, as Max Weber would have said, to 'responsibility and efficiency'.

The following example may illustrate this. Every time UNESCO staff (among whom, at that time, I must say there were excellent scientists and intellectuals) wrote a speech for me specifying that there were 6,000 languages in the world, I struck it out and inserted a vague statement that there were 'thousands of languages and variants'. Such vagueness, I soon found out, was totally useless in trying to get government delegates to support a good project to safeguard local peoples' languages. Clearly, the political has to be based on assertions that will convince an audience. Stretching as far as feasible the precision and rigour of scientific discourse whilst still trying to make an impact on a political audience, then, becomes the 'art of the possible' for a social scientist.

Coming back to my argument in this chapter, I would say that the work of the World Commission on Culture and Development is an example of the fine-tuning of arbitration at the highest international level. After nine meetings on all continents, and after more than 200 papers written by scientists, cultural functionaries, artists and activists, there came a moment when a decisive carving out of core ideas was placed on the table. And then it was the various skills of the Commissioners and especially of the Chair of the Commission which led to a minimal consensus in which all of us commissioners won some points but also lost some points. But the purpose of arbitration, as I see it, is to set a fixed point that becomes a referent towards which different positions can then be explicitly stated.

This is the core mechanism that I believe anthropology should look at more carefully, and for which the cognitive sciences now give us more precise tools. To advance farther along this path, we have to change our notion of 'the ethnographic'.

2.4 The Mind-Reading Anthropologist

'The path towards seeing the ethnographic as the product of active psychological beings' is the subtitle in one of the chapters of Maurice Bloch's book *Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge* (Bloch 2012: 146). Maurice Bloch cites Edmund Leach (who was a student of Raymond Firth) with reference to the dangers of anthropologists considering explicit states as the foundation of cognition. The example he gave was that Australian aborigines could have interpreted the dogma of the virgin birth as evidence that Europeans did not think that a masculine contribution is necessary for the woman to fall pregnant. What we observe from the outside, he goes on to say, "…is merely the outward superficial manifestation of the complex activity of the bodies and minds of naturally existing human beings" (Bloch 2012: 145). We now have the tools to overcome this false realism, as Maurice Bloch calls it, of studying 'culture' as an independent self-contained phenomenon, derived from the harmful nature/culture dichotomy.

In a sense, a cultural practice becomes a 'moment in time' or, as I like to paraphrase Virginia Woolf, a 'moment of cultural being'. Viewed through this theoretical lens, the most important aspects of a cultural practice to analyze are the decisions taken by actors that have reconfigured that practice to its present form. Such decisions are a form of arbitration since they open and close possibilities of action.

Explaining such decisions, as an anthropological task, is very complicated. The individual herself, as has been frequently remarked, may not have a conscious view of her decision. We must then, as Maurice Bloch argues, 'read people's minds'. I would like to apply this method to the present form of the Aztec Dance, as briefly described in the following pages.

2.5 Reading the Mind of an Aztec Dancer

The ethnographic example I will use to illustrate this proposition is the recently reconstructed 'Aztec Dance' in villages of the state of Morelos in Mexico. In carrying out a large project for the safeguarding of what is now called 'intangible cultural heritage' in central Mexico, I was struck by the successive reorganization of a neo-indigenous dance, originally called the Conchero Dance, which has now ramified into different organizations and styles of dance, one of which is called the Aztec Dance.

In my own research I literally bumped into a group of Conchero Dancers during my early research on the Mazahua Indian migrants in Mexico. As I was carrying out a household survey I suddenly saw a group of men and women, dressed in purportedly Aztec attire and with magnificent headdresses, walking in single file along the narrow earth boundaries between *milpa* cornfield lands in Dotejiare. Such an apparition, I soon learned, was due to the fact that two of the Mazahua migrants of Dotejiare had become dancers in this group while living in Mexico City and they had now invited the whole troupe to come and dance in their community of origin.

At that time two of my teachers, Guillermo Bonfil and Arturo Warman, had just carried out research into this newly visible Conchero Dance. They filmed a most interesting video which can now be seen on YouTube. After conferring with Guillermo and Arturo, I interpreted this Dance as a new urban phenomenon that was drawing migrants from different ethnic groups who were feeling the loss of the ritual networks they had had in their communities of origin.

So imagine my surprise, so many decades later, when I began to find different variants of this Conchero Dance in another region, Morelos, to the south of Mexico City, not in cities but in rural communities. The cultural practitioners of these different Dances then told me their story. The generic form of Conchero Dance has continuously evolved since the 1950s in synchronicity with the actual livelihoods and ways of life of its dancers, most of whom emigrated from their villages to large cities where they met with other indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and began to reinvent a new kind of dance. Originally called the Dance of the Concheros, with a mythical beginning in the state of Querétaro, most groups of this Dance were living in Mexico City. As social and political settings diversified, so did the motivations, costumes, choreographies, music and verbal discourse of such groups, to such an extent that there are now groups which separately identify themselves as 'Concheros de Tradición' (Traditional Concheros), 'Concheros de Conquista' (Concheros of Conquest) and 'Aztecas' (Aztecs) all over central Mexico. Interestingly, many of these urban migrants then went back to their communities but brought with them this new Dance, which had by now become 'traditional'.

In the words of Martha Oliveros, Captain General of the Aztec dance in the state of Morelos, the history of the dance is as follows: "there was first the time of 'Concherismo' (the Conchero Dance) but very closely related to the Catholic question; then came the 'Aztequization' (the Aztec Dance) with the rebel chiefs of the Dance but far from settling on whether you are Conchero and I am Aztec, it has to be understood as a historical-cultural process which we have been taking in, precisely to take into our own hands all the knowledge and greatness of our culture".[5]

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[5] "Vino una etapa del Concherismo pero apegada muy a la cuestión católica; luego vino la Aztequización con los jefes rebeldes de la danza…, pero lejos de quedarnos en que si tu eres Conchero y yo soy Azteca, hay que entenderlo como ese proceso cultural histórico que hemos tenido que ir tomando todos, precisamente para retomar en nuestras manos todo el conocimiento y grandeza de nuestra cultura".

The co-evolution of such groups can be analyzed in terms of a constant synchronization of intention and meaning in response to contemporary social and political events. Martha explains this further: "So we are at the Aztequization of the fifties to 1992, more or less, a new process begins for those of us in the dance, and this is 'nativization'. It is a planetary movement; it is no longer from Mexican to Conchero, to Nahuaca (a follower of the Nahua–Aztec–tradition) to 'Aztequita'.[6] It goes beyond this…on the thirteenth of March the Mexica (Aztec) year began, but nothing ended and nothing is going to end. We simply have to renovate, and what's it all about now? About unconditional love, unconditional solidarity, respect for our Earth, Air, for all that is our culture and to feel proud".[7]

It is also important to note that, since the nineties, one of the most significant changes has been the establishing of groups of Aztec dancers in the United States. Like other such extensions of Mexican intangible heritage groups, for example the Mariachis and the Jaraneros, Aztec Dance groups have been set up by migrants from villages where such dances are performed. Most of them also attract American-born descendants of Mexican and Latino migrants, as well as other Americans. Among other events, one group from San Francisco, comes every year to the May 15 Festival in Chalma, a sanctuary which existed before the arrival of the Europeans.

2.6 The Social Structure of the Mexica Dance

The internal structure follows a strict hierarchical order which has many similarities with ancient indigenous Meso-Americans. Herminio Martínez explains it thus: "In the (Conchero) Dance, everything is set by levels. There is a chief, there is a command, there is a hierarchical organization…as to the ritual, that's it, the Concheros in the ceremony, all we do is for God, the 'Giver of Life',[8] the one, as many chiefs say, who is father and mother at the same time, God, firstly, or whatever he be called. Then, the honouring is for different images, as in our case for

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[6] Reverential term for Aztec.

[7] "Quedamos en la Aztequización de los años 50 a 1992, más o menos, y empieza un proceso nuevo para las gentes que estamos en la danza: la Nativización. Es un movimiento planetario, ya no es de mexicano a conchero a nahuaca, a aztequita, eso va mas allá…hoy estamos, el 13 de marzo empezó el año nuevo mexica, pero no se acabo nada, ni se va a acabar. Simplemente nos tenemos que renovar, ¿y de que se trata ahora? Del amor incondicional, de la solidaridad incondicional, del respeto a nuestra tierra, al aire, a todo lo que es nuestra cultura y sentirnos orgullosos".

[8] A literal translation of the concept of God in the ancient Meso-American Nahuatl language.

the Señor de Sacromonte, we do the *festividad*, the ceremony, the sacrifice, this is in second place. Then for the 'ánimas' (spirits of the dead), for all the chiefs who died before us and through the years and centuries have left us this tradition".[9]

The terms used for the hierarchical organization vary from group to group, but the name of the officials all come from military orders: the 'soldiers' are allowed to play a musical instrument and to dance and obey instructions; 'sergeants of mesas (groups)', organize the followers according to the captain's orders; 'field sergeants' are entrusted with carrying the musical instruments, flower insignias and other artefacts when the group marches out to dance in other venues; 'alferez' (an old colonial term which translates as second lieutenant) carry the standard-insignia of the 'mesa' (group); 'colonels' take on decision-making responsibilities when the 'captain' is not present. Women are the 'sahumadoras'; they perform the function of 'opening up the four cardinal points' and the cleansing of the path they are taking and of all artefacts with smoke. For this they use a 'copal' burner, which burns an aromatic tree resin; they are led by the 'Reina Malinche', the Malinche Queen.

The leader of the group is a Captain, who directs all activities of the group and is responsible for collecting the funds to feed all the dancers and for travel and food along the way. 'Generals' have several groups under their charge but when they lose their groups, meaning that people no longer want to dance under their leadership, they become 'caudillos reales' (royal caudillo), an old Spanish colonial name for a military or political leader, or 'cacique general' (general cacique), again, an old name for indigenous nobles under colonial Spanish law. Significantly, Ernesto said, "you never lose your rank, you may lose your people but they continue to recognize you. You may lose your people if you are a drunkard, a womanizer, a thief, or if you are irresponsible, whatever you like or command, but everyone knows you were a general." This position, then, is structural, even if the individual transgresses the responsibilities of this position. Again, we find that social organization adapts to specific behaviours but leaves the core structure intact.

The programmatic structure of the all-encompassing Conchero Dance is described as 'Union, Conformity and Conquest', a phrase that is written in almost all standard-insignias. However, Ernesto cautions that "…sometimes this phrase is as false as it gets",[10] and he goes on "Yes, we are united because in the end (of all stories[11]) we are here" and he pointed to the ground. "Conformity", he went on, "is

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[9] "La Danza tiene, todo está por niveles. Hay una cabeza, hay un mando, hay una organización jerárquica…en cuanto al culto, así es, los danzantes Concheros, en la ceremonia, todo lo que hacemos es para Dios, para el "Dador de la Vida", como dicen muchos jefes, el que es padre y madre a la vez, Dios, primeramente o como se le llame. Después, la honra es a las diferentes imágenes, como en nuestro caso, al Señor Sacromonte, es para él la festividad, la ceremonia, el sacrificio, eso en segundo lugar. Luego, en tercer lugar, para las ánimas, las de los jefes que murieron antes que nosotros, que, a lo largo de los años y los siglos, fueron dejando esta tradición".

[10] "…Unión, Conformidad y Conquista es una frase que traen la mayoría de los estandartes, que a veces es de lo más falso que hay".

[11] 'A final de cuentas' is a familiar expression in Spanish meaning 'at the end of accounts'. I highlight it because of the importance of the word 'cuentas', which may be translated into English

because we have to come to an agreement about everything that we do yet we are incapable of stating when we do not agree". Finally, he added "Conquest refers to the conquest of ourselves as a people, as human beings. The first thing we have to conquer is your own body, because you may be tired, in the night-long vigils you want to go to bed, so you are told, no, you came here to dance, not to drink, you came here to the Dance because you put yourself up to it. The moment you put yourself up to it, you are stuck because you have to assent to whatever the chiefs tell you to do"[12].

2.7 Constructing the Self

Taking up the cognitive challenge that Maurice Bloch speaks about, the expression of Aztec dancers as to their intentionality and feelings in dancing opens up a different dimension. Few dancers are able to put into words such feelings as Mariana Xoxotla is able to do. What is the dance about, I asked. Mariana, a dancer of the Concheros de Conquista Dance said: "In itself it is a war of conquest…first you conquer yourself, your strength, your fatigue, the heat, you go along conquering yourself. Then you conquer others, you say to them, here we are. Even if we are 'mesticitos' [endearing term for 'mestizo', a culturally mixed person] and even if we wear jeans every day, and even if we have cell phones, and all that, we're still Mexicans and we are still that indigenous part that gives us sustenance. In many places it is still like that, people don't realize it, but in their heart, in their inner self, they are still maintaining this (indigenous) part. What is happening is that the world today is very overwhelming. The more you lose your identity, the better it is for them, right? So then, it is a war of conquest, you have to conquer yourself, you have to conquer the hearts and minds of those who see you and of yourself".[13]

(Footnote 11 continued)

as 'counts' as in counting peanuts, or 'accounts' as in giving an explanation or an interpretation of an event; but it is also close to the word 'cuentos' which, in masculine form, as opposed to cuentas which is feminine, means 'stories'.

[12] "Sí, estamos unidos porque a final de cuentas estamos aquí… Conformidad porque se supone que estamos de acuerdo con todo lo que hacemos aunque tampoco seamos capaces de decir cuando no estemos de acuerdo". "Conquista se refiere a la conquista de nosotros mismos, como seres humanos. Primero conquistas a tu cuerpo porque puedes estar muy cansado. En las noches de vigilia te quieres ir a dormir, pero te dicen que no, que viniste a danzar y no a beber, viniste a la danza porque así lo quisiste. En el momento que lo decides ya te amolaste, porque debes asentir a lo que te dicen los guías".

[13] "En sí es una guerra de conquista…primero te conquistas a ti mismo, tu fuerza, tu cansancio, el calor. Te vas conquistando, luego conquistas a otro, le dices, aquí estamos. Aunque seamos mesticitos y aunque vistamos de mezclilla todos los días y aunque tengamos celulares y todo, seguimos siendo mexicanos y seguimos siendo esa parte indígena que nos da sustento. En muchos lugares así es, la gente no se da cuenta pero en el corazón, y en el interior, sigue manteniendo esa parte. Lo que pasa es que el mundo es muy avasallador, el mundo actual. Entre más te

In her discourse, two phases are clearly marked. The first refers to how you construct your inner self, by 'conquering' your own impulses in response to sustained efforts, to prolonged physical discomfort, to constantly looking after others. Then, once you have constructed yourself, you are able to 'conquer' others. To win over their hearts and minds. Importantly, there is a third phase that she also tries to put in words: "In the end, for me, I feel connected to something beyond my own self".[14]

2.8 Why Do They Dance?

When asked why they do the Mexica Dance, Ernesto Solares answers: "At times because the people asked you to do it, but now it is your conscience that demands it of you. We are here because of something, in first place because we like it, even though you spend a lot of money. In second place because we want to, sometimes without too much success, we try to preserve the tradition. We know it is not like it was before but we try to do it. Another question is to make it known, because otherwise, what a laugh, I die and I take all the knowledge with me and that's it. So, no, one has to evolve and teach the others and now with electronic media, with Facebook and YouTube, now you open sites and you are going to find millions of opinions, all different, and what I say is…let's create many points of encounter, I think this is best".[15]

2.9 The Dynamics of Social Arbitration

This chapter has dealt with the dynamics of arbitration in the case of an International Commission, and that of the cultural practitioners of the Aztec Dance in central Mexico. The main point I wish to highlight is that, in the endless rounds of

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(Footnote 13 continued)

'desidentifiques' para ellos es mejor, ¿no? Entonces, pues es una guerra de conquista, tienes que conquistar los corazones, tienes que conquistar la mente de los que te ven y de ti mismo".

[14] "Al final de cuentas para mí, para mí, es, pues es un goce particular en el sentido de que yo me siento conectada a algo más allá de mí misma".

[15] "A veces porque la gente te lo pide lo haces, pero ahora ya es tu consciencia la que te lo exige. Estamos aquí por algo. En primer lugar porque nos gusta, aunque te gastas mucho dinero. En segundo lugar, porque queremos, aunque a veces sin mucho éxito, pero queremos preservar la tradición. Sabemos que no es como antes, pero tratamos de hacerlo. Otro punto es para darlo a conocer, porque si no, qué risa, me muero y me llevo todo el conocimiento y se acabó. Pues no, uno tiene que evolucionar y enseñar a otros, y ahora con los medios electrónicos, con Facebook y con YouTube, ahora abres una página web y vas a encontrar millones de opiniones, todas diferentes, y por eso es que yo digo… creemos muchos puntos de encuentro, creo que es lo mejor".

communication, discussion, negotiation and exchange, arbitration becomes necessary to allow groups to set a reference point to go forward as groups adapt to changing social, political, and environmental conditions.

Explaining arbitration is a task that we can only get at with great difficulty, for reading people's minds is enmeshed in subjectivity. The narrative that Martha Oliveros, the Captain General of the Aztec Dance, has given allows us to reconstruct the actions and reactions, the fission and fusion, the frictions and fractions which, through her arbitration, has kept up the social meaning and the cohesion of the Aztec dancers amidst changing conditions. At the same time, that particular group of Aztec dancers is active within the wider framework of the more general Conchero Dance tradition, which has also undergone a process of arbitration. In this wider framework each individual in different rural communities is free to cross over the thresholds which separate Dance Groups from each other. Yet all of these groups retain a broader historical and ethnographic metonymy with other pre-Hispanic Meso-American indigenous rituals.

Just as practitioners of ritual dances, as in this example, create decision-making structures that allow ritual leaders to arbitrate between the differing interpretations of the Conchero Dance, it seems to me that, in a sense, we anthropologists pursue a similar endeavour. Anthropological tradition creates the intellectual and scientific codes and metonymies that allow us, first, to identify and classify the diversity of cultural practitioners' versions of their own social practices, and then, to arbitrate between them as we construct the best possible narrative of such practices. Tracing the construction of such practices through one informant's interpretation over time gives one the possibility of accessing the continuous cognitive perceptions and arbitration in such processes, but we need to develop much finer tools to do so.

Before ending, I would like to say that this chapter has been a celebration of anthropology and its analytic power, and a tribute to teachers like Raymond Firth, Guillermo Bonfil and Arturo Warman, who give meaning, continuity, and purpose to our science.

I would like to end with Martha Solares, who summarizes the intentionality of all the arbitration in cultural processes. She asks, in carefully worded sentences: "Who, then, will write history? What are we going to write in this history? What are we going to write that is worthwhile that may give guidance to future generations, what? I, myself, was prepared by my grandparents and they left me many things to teach. Here is the knowledge. A people who don't know where they come from cannot recognize where they are going. It is this simple".[16]

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[16] "¿A quién le toca escribir la historia? ¿Qué vamos a escribir en esa historia? ¿Qué vamos a poner que valga la pena y que sirva de guía a las futuras generaciones? ¿Qué? A mí me prepararon mis abuelos y me dejaron muchas cosas para enseñar. Aquí está este conocimiento. Un pueblo que no sabe de dónde viene, no puede reconocer hacia dónde va, simple".

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
The Intangible Cultural Heritage of Mexico (2006)

Chapter 3
The Ritual and the Promise: Why People Value Social Ritual

3.1 Introduction

Anthropology and economics have very different approaches to the question of value.[1] While economists look for methods of evaluation in transactions on the basis of what is being exchanged, anthropologists have always given attention to the way agents think about value in the whole range of transactions they are involved in, but at another level they look for the value of underlying structures for society Exchanges are basic to society but anthropology has shown that there are other mechanisms also at work—descent, affinity, memorialization, among others —in organizing collective life. Psychoanalytic, structuralist, semiological, and anthropological interpretive theories have shown how elusive and mysterious questions of value are in different societies. The notion of value in terms of underlying structures of societies is far from the simplistic rendering of this notion as narrow moral rules in current political discussions. It is also much broader than the notion of value as equivalence in economizing exchanges.

It is quite significant that in the contemporary world in which markets have become the dominant organizing principle in liberalized economies, there has been simultaneously the emergence of a multiplicity of cultural movements. In many cases, such movements become visible through resignified rituals or the invention of new ones. What is the value of such rituals for people? Why are Mexican migrants now revitalizing the ritual of the Day of the Dead, which they celebrated back in their villages in Mexico, in their neighborhoods in Chicago; why have highly mobile Caribbean migrants created a new musical culture, Rastafarianism,

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steeped in Ethiopian history and culture? A frequent explanation is that they are reclaiming an identity in foreign lands. But then, why are nonmigrant Islamists reverting to strict observance of Islamic ritual dispositions? Why are Hindus celebrating their *puja* ritual in the Internet site they created for that purpose? The easy answer is that there is a religious revival. But then, why are nonreligious, New Age spiritual and environmental rituals proliferating? Why are Americans resignifying Thanksgiving as a major national ceremony? Why are Ugandans reinvesting animistic rituals with power? It is said to have to do with the rise of environmentalism, the renewal of nationalism, and the breakdown of the state and the society in some countries. This may be true, but then why are middle-class professional Europeans enthusiastically reinventing Celtic culture and rituals? Why are middle-class urban Mexicans dancing a reinvented Aztec ritual to welcome the spring equinox atop the Pyramid of the Sun in the archaeological site of Teotihuacán? Something beyond identity politics, beyond religious revivals, beyond nationalistic political mechanisms, beyond a fearful return to old traditions, beyond revalorizing intangible cultural heritage is happening in our contemporary world.

In this chapter I contend that the imperceptible worlds that are lit up; by being involved in a ritual reflect the promise of all those touched by it to be together and act together in a world of increasing uncertainties and insecurity. In this chapter I will analyze an institution, the ritual of the Day of the Dead in Mexico, to show how the value of such an institution connects to so many other aspects of people's lives that it cannot be understood merely in terms of its exchange-value or individual maximizing behavior. Rituals, among other centripetal cultural practices, are reactivating the potential of commitment to provide identity, shelter, and common purpose. When people become involved in rituals they may give and receive large amounts of money, work, emotional connections, aesthetic pleasure, and psychological support. I argue that there is a broader principle involved, overarching these particular gains, that is the representation of the *commitment* that cultural agents make visible in participating in such rituals. It is the promise, the potentiality of commitment, that is most important in ritual, as opposed to simple participation in festive occasions or sports events. To begin, I discuss in the following section the way ideas about value evolved in anthropology through the twentieth century.

3.2 Anthropological Theories of Value

It is appropriate to begin with the work of Bronislaw Malinowski, who took up the question of value in his famous study of the Kula Ring whereby Trobrianders exchanged shell bracelets and necklaces between islands (Malinowski 1922). This extremely elaborate system of exchange, he argued, was not trade because it was public and ceremonial, had permanent partners, was not done out of need, and was based on credit. Although the actual exchange between 'big men' was highly competitive in its equivalence, Malinoswki considered that the value of the exchange system was sociological. His argument, however, was addressed to the

narrow reading of Adam Smith in which social and political contexts of economic sentiments were left aside, to highlight only the maximizing of gains as the natural behavioral inclination of men, including primitive men.[2] Malinowski argued against this position by pointing out that the value of the Kula exchange derived from the human skills that were involved in carving the necklaces and bracelets and in organizing the elaborate ceremonies in which the exchanges took place. Never-theless, it could be argued that since such skills were not plentiful, this would not necessarily contradict the economic view that it is scarcity, the exercise of pref-erences, and the multiplicity of ends that create value. Indeed, as Firth (1946) said a few years later in his study of Malay fishermen, when a man chooses social gains rather than economic gains he is still choosing between alternative ends. The fact that the observer would have done it differently does not make his behavior non-economic. These first functionalist explanations of value were not conclusive, but they did establish the ground for the substantivist-formalist debate of later years discussed further below.

It is worth mentioning that in the United States in the 1940s Clyde Kluckhorn did attempt to place values at the center of anthropological theory. His central assumption was that values are "conceptions of the desirable" that play a role in influencing choices people make or more specifically what they *ought* to want.[3] However, his Rimrock study, which looked at the "value orientations" of five different groups, failed in that it ended up reporting values that were highly idiosyncratic, making a systematic comparison impossible. The lack of results, in the words of David Graeber "was all the more frustrating because Kluckhorn saw his project in many ways (as) a last ditch effort to rescue American anthropology from what almost everyone perceived as the theoretical doldrums (2001: 4)."

Polanyi's (1944) classic book *Great Transformation* then set the new terms of the debate on 'forms of integration' in society, focusing on values, motives, and policy. He gave his famous two definitions of economy: One, *substantive,* refers to the relationship between human and nature, to material needs; the other, *formal,* is related to the logic of rational action, to a mechanism of the mind. Formal analysis, he stated, works for price-making market systems of Western economies because all goods and services have a price. The empirical economy is an 'instituted process' that encompasses ecological, technological, and social concepts enmeshed in institutions. The recurrence in the process leads to three different forms of integration: reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange. Only the latter needs markets, while in the first two, social institutions fix the rate of exchange, not the market. Further distinction was then made between 'gift' and 'commodity' economies.

Polyani's ideas set the terms of reference of the debate in anthropology between substantivists (Raymond Firth, George Dalton, Paul Bohannan) and formalists

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[2] In recent years a new reading of Adam Smith by several authors, among them Rothschild (2001), highlights the implications of Smith's mention of sentiments and freedoms in economic decision making as embedded in social and political contexts.

[3] The discussion of Clyde Kluckhorn's Rimrock study is taken from the excellent summary by Graeber (2001).

(Robbins Burling, Scott Cook). For substantivists, economic motivations were trumped by social priorities in assigning value and exchange mechanisms, and their ethnographies provided evidence for this. For formalists, on the other hand, exchanges were still based on issues of scarcity and choice of alternatives, and goods exchanged could be considered a form of capital. The debate, which went on in the fifties and sixties, was laid to rest when it became evident that goods that are meaningful always have a quantifiable value—even if this is expressed in social or ritual terms—but that anything that has a price will have variations in its price according to the meaning attached to it. Nevertheless the main issues were never resolved but were reconceptualized in other discursive debates.

Introducing power into the discussion, Sahlins (1965) showed that chiefs and priests did not acquire prestige by consuming but by distributing surplus and that social inequality is brought about by economic roles rather than by differential accumulated wealth. A similar point was being made in the 1960s and 1970s in Mexican anthropology in relation to the 'cargo system', a structure of hierarchical positions—topil, mayordomo, fiscal, and so on—through which surplus was redistributed in local village economies. The value of this system, I noticed in my own fieldwork, was that it allowed a redistribution not only of surplus but also of labor and balance of gender in residency among families within the community. In other communities, in which the subsistence economy slowly shifted toward cash crops, as in Amilcingo, the cargo system has become an institution that finances the cultural and religious life, fulfilling the symbolic needs of the community.

'Symbolic capital' was Bourdieu's (1979) contribution to the debate. In societies that do not have self-regulating markets, such as the Kabyle of Algeria, symbolic capital consists of norms of honor, gossip, embodied codes, and other forms of cultural language. Bourdieu insisted that symbolic capital is much more important than economic capital, in spite of the fact that economic calculation extends to all these material goods as well.

According to Graeber (2001: 26), the debates in anthropology were mainly about exchange in the 1960s, about production in the 1970s, and about consumption in the 1980s. He sets these shifts in the context of the dissolution of the vast social movements in the 1960s (except for feminism), the political rout of the Left beginning in the early 1980s, and the global rise of neoliberal ideologies. The emphasis on consumption during the 1980s drew attention to objects, to things as repositories of value, and fostered a new wave of 'material culture studies'. Inquiry then focused on the way objects become invested with what Weiner (1994) called 'dense' sociocultural meaning and value. Appadurai (1986) suggested that part of this value was given not only by Marx's idea that the labor invested in commodities gave them their essential value but also by the degree of desire that a person has for the object. This 'politics of value' breaks down the gift/commodity opposition, since such a multiple value is to be found in things circulating in all societies irrespective of their economic regime. Value is to be found, then, in the 'biography of things'. However, it may also be subject to 'slippage', as Myers argues (2001: 5): "Indeed, the contrast between value as produced in organizations of difference ('qualitative' value) and value as a measure of relative price in transaction

('quantitative' value) may underlie significant dynamics within structures of social action." He goes on to analyze the value of art, which he considers has been situated in the West as a category of redemptive value, distinct from money and discrete from other sociocultural values. In parallel to the deconstruction of the gift/commodity opposition, the nonmonetary concept of art has been particularly visible, Myers argues, in the arena of cultural politics and class hierarchy within the West and may also be extended to regions beyond the West. "Clearly, the complexities of a global economy are shattering the conceit of art's autonomy from other spheres of social life" and of political values (2001: 8). He concludes that, particularly at present, because of the rapidity with which objects move through space and time, value is never simply defined but is always involved in global as well as local circuits of exchange, display, and storage.

By the end of the 1980s, anthropological perspectives had shifted to understanding the circulation of objects in multiple and broader systems of exchange pertaining to other domains. The value of things being exchanged, Weiner (1992) went on, far from depending solely on calculations of equivalence, was also related to 'keeping-while-giving'. That is, as an object was kept out of circulation, it accumulated higher desire for its possession and therefore increased in value. Strathern (1992), on the other hand, focused on the way in which societies construct the importance or meaning ascribed to objects, particularly those used in ritual. As this author mentions, taking further Lisette Josephides's point that the value of objects includes the background labor of all those involved producing it, mainly women, she argued that value in nonindividualistic societies, such as those in Melanesia, is perceived as deriving from social relationships. The identity and value of objects and of persons are seen to arise from the way others in that society perceive them and build meaning collectively.

How do they build the meanings that give value? In answering this question, Munn (1986) broke new ground, overcoming problems of structuralist interpretation. She argued that value is always transformational, always a potential that is realized through actions. Instead of only looking at the way objects circulate in systems of exchange, she defined 'levels of value' that allow those who participate an increase in degree of control over 'intersubjective time' in social relations. The value is not captured in the object that is exchanged but in the 'act of giving' an object. The latter is only the artifact through which those engaged in giving achieve their creative potentiality.

Structure in this sense is not a set of static principles but the way in which change is patterned, or, as Frederik Barth, Victor Turner, and other anthropologists would put it, the "invariable principles that regulate a system of transformations" (Graeber 2001: 259). Graeber proposes a dialectical approach to defining things not in terms of what one imagines them to be in a certain abstract moment outside time, but partly by what they have the potential to become, a potential that they can only realize within a larger social whole. He contrasts this perspective with market theory, which starts out with the assumption that we are all unique individuals who have unlimited desires. The key move in market ideology, he states, is to extract all the most fundamental questions of desire from society so that it is possible to

conceive of happiness largely as one's relations with objects, or, at best, people one treats as objects. Apparently, consumption becomes a solitary pleasure of consuming by oneself. In the model he proposes, consumption is the outcome of creativity in coordination with others. Only thus, he insists, do potentials turn into value.

To summarize, debates on value in anthropology have been grounded in the attempt to explain why societies differ in the ways they value different things and practices. In developing models to explain such diversity, the debates with economics have been particularly useful but inconclusive. The new perspectives in anthropology, especially those of Marilyn Strathern, Nancy Munn, and David Graeber, have shifted attention to the social webs in which transactions occur, as realizations of creative potentialities.

3.3 Performing Rituals

We turn now to the central concern of this chapter—rituals and how they are valued. Ritual has been an important concern for anthropologists, mainly as one component of larger sets of behavior. I refer to ritual as a discrete cluster of actions performed for explicit ends related to biological, social, or religious events. These observable actions have been interpreted as a psychological and social mechanism to ease the human fear of the unknown (Malinowski) or as external symbolizations of collective ideas that periodically reinforce social cohesion (Durkheim). Ritual is declarative (Leach): it states something, thus distinguishing it from technical ceremonies, which do not state anything. Rites of passage, a classical theme of analysis, are a specific form of ritual that have been found to conform to remarkably similar patterns among widely dispersed cultures in ceremonies performed at birth, puberty, marriage, and death.[4] Each ceremony has a specific protective, propitiatory, acquisitive, purificatory, productive, or predictive purpose.

A ritual, in fact, makes beliefs, values, and sentiments visible, audible, and tangible, according to Turner (1967), one of the most influential authors in contemporary analysis of ritual. Seen in this light, all physical movements and ritual objects used in the ritual are carriers, embodiments of ideas that constantly recreate symbols. The most important dimension of ritual, Turner argues, is the effect on the actor, the exegetical interpretation of a set of symbols that are 'storage units' of knowledge. Rituals can then be seen as 'Forests of Symbols', the title of his pioneering study looking for hidden symbolic meanings in ritual practices that could be interpreted by identifying patterns of color, gender, and body movements. Other authors have given primacy to the effect of rituals on social behavior. For example, Gluckman (1962) used it in this sense when he proposed that ritual serves to differentiate roles in multiplex social relationships. The greater the multiplicity of

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[4] The basic study on this topic is Van Gennep (1960).

undifferentiated roles, the more rituals are used to distinguish among them.[5] In the end, he emphasizes the role of rituals in social etiquette, in regulating different forms of behavior outside the ritual space.

All these authors were intent on explaining ritual by referring to its functions and to the metaphorical meaning of their symbols. Structuralists focused instead on the messages conveyed by rituals at the deeper level of unconscious structures. Basic mental structures, according to Lévi-Strauss (1963, 1975), could be discovered in all cultural manifestations, be they language, marriage rules, or rituals, since they are all forms of communication. For him the symbol is universal only because of its syntagmatic position, not its metaphorical sense. Other structuralist interpretations, such as those of Dumont (1966), focused on structures related to political status, territory, ceremonial status, or gender roles.

Geertz (1973) proposed a more interpretive approach by looking at three components of rituals or feasts: their immediate dramatic shape, their metaphoric content, and their social context. He used the term *cultural performances,* considering them as 'art forms' that generate and regenerate the subjectivity they pretend only to display. "Quartets, still lifes, and cockfights are not merely reflections of a preexisting sensibility analogically represented. They are positive agents in the creation and maintenance of such a sensibility" (Geertz 1973: 451). Having said that, he could see he had touched upon an irresolvable dilemma, and so he added the following footnote to the previous statement:

All this coupling of the occidental great with the oriental lowly (the Balinese cockfight) will doubtless disturb certain sorts of aestheticians as the earlier efforts of anthropologists to speak of Christianity and totemism in the same breath disturbed certain sorts of theologians… In any case, the attempt to deprovincialize the concept of art is but part of the general anthropological conspiracy to deprovincialize all important social concepts… and though this is a threat to aesthetic theories which regard certain works of art as beyond the reach of sociological analysis, it is no threat to the conviction, for which Robert Graves claims to have been reprimanded at his Cambridge tripos, that some poems are better than others (Geertz 1973: 451).

This dilemma has cropped up ever since in discussions on the value of cultures in development. In the 2000 *World Culture Report* we took the view that while not all components in cultures may be valuable and worth conserving, all cultures have something that is of value (UNESCO 2000).

At present, ritual is discussed mainly as performance, as embodied actions that create communication among performers and public. But Graeber (2001: 259) argues that ritual-patterned actions are elusive "because social performance is usually considered truly artful and accomplished… largely to the extent that it can make those structures—the templates, or schemas, or whatever you wish to call

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[5] Rites of solidarity were widely associated with clans and other segmentary descent groups, one of whose multifunctions was to identify group members and set one group off from another. See Harris (1971).

them—… that lie behind it disappear." He claims that a ritual performance creates a kind of power, a "ghostly reflection of one's own potential for action." These forms of imaginary totalities, made up of "creative potentialities," he says, "tend to end up inscribed in a series of objects that, insofar as they become media of value, also become objects of desire." He goes on to say that this potential cannot realize itself, at least, not in any particularly significant way, except in coordination with others. "It is only thus that powers turn into value."

As the discussion in the previous pages has shown, the richness of anthropological contributions to the understanding of value and ritual makes it difficult to narrow down the focus with which to analyze the case to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. I will therefore center my analysis in ritual as a constantly evolving art form whose total meaning cannot be apprehended, either by insiders or by outsiders, although both have access to different 'levels of value' of the ritual. I will also make the assumption that the value of the ritual must be sought in the relations it creates among those involved in it, rather than uniquely in its objects and displays, and in the meaning that is created collectively.

3.4 The Day of the Dead

The case I will analyze is the valorization that local people give to the ritual of the Day of the Dead in Amilcingo, a rural village 2 h away from Mexico City, located on the slope of the Popocatépetl volcano. Old people in the village still speak Nahuatl, the Aztec language, and the community still reveres Emiliano Zapata, the peasant leader who lived in a nearby region. The ritual, which has Aztec and Catholic roots, has evolved into a Mexican ritual that is now observed by all social groups and even by Mexican migrants in the United States. Rural villages in the region of Amilcingo, however, have a special night a week earlier than the Day of the Dead, called the Day of the Slain (Día de los Matados). On this day, October 28, starting at 12 am, the families who have lost one of their members during that year as a result of murder, or in some cases an accident, set up an arch of reed and flowers at the entrance of their home and receive visitors carrying an offering (*ofrenda*). Usually the younger women of the household or nieces step out to the arch and receive the vase and bid the newcomer welcome, then they both enter the room where the altar has been set up. The kind of offering given is strictly prescribed by degree of kinship or ritual friendship (godfathers and godmothers, or godchildren), but also by the income level of the giver. The former give a pitcher with all the flowers and a candle. Those further away in kinship or friendship give only flowers and candles and no pitcher. People are expected to give a quantity equivalent to their economic status, but it is regarded as very bad for people to give too much, since this is taken to mean that they are showing off, a fault that is doubly disapproved in the context of relations with the dead. If a young child or teenager gives the *ofrenda,* a clear message of detachment is sent; if instead the elders of the family give the *ofrenda,* it is a sign of great deference. The offerings consist of

earthenware vases filled with marigolds (*cempoalxochitl,* which means 'twenty-flower' in Nahuatl), flowers of a deep orange and yellow, or flowers of dark, gnarled mauve; white gladiolus flowers; and light green stems with tiny white flowers aptly called 'clouds' (*nube*). Women are responsible for arranging and placing the flowers in the home, taking care to create a harmony in the colors, in the placement of the candles, and in the display of foodstuffs and fruits.

The preparations for setting up the altars in the houses, however, begin the night before. In families that are relatively affluent, many kinspeople and friends are invited to join in the making of the tamales (maize bread)—the women—and in cutting up the meat—the men. The children rush about on errands, or work at small tasks, or play. The evening goes far into the night and its products, tamales and other savories, are piled up on the altar. Altars have a strict code of display, which may be enriched by the quality of items presented in each space. Colored cutout paper may frame the altar, which has, at the highest and most central spot, the photograph of the *difunto.* The closest equivalent of this term in English is 'departed'. In Spanish, the word *muerto* means 'dead', but it refers indistinctly to all who have died; it is generic and implies nonexistence. *Difunto,* instead, refers to an entity that continues to exist after it has died. People speak of the Difunta Emiliana or Difunto Pedro as someone who still has a personality, who is still active in family affairs. A woman stunned by the recent death of her husband simply spoke about him as if he were still there, and during the night at the cemetery she was laughing with others in joking about how he would become angry at the songs they were singing. When I visited her a year later, on the Day of the Dead, it was only then that you could see she had finally come to terms with his death. And, again, she was encircled by the members of her extended family.

The person receiving the offering takes the visitor into the main room, where the altar is, and turns to speak to the dead person saying, "*Mira Pedro* [the name of the dead person], *aquí te trae Lencha* [the name of the person offering the flowers] *estas flores*" ("Pedro, here Lencha brings you some flowers"), or alternatively tamales, or loaves of the special Day of the Dead bread, or other foodstuffs or candles. Among the people in the household there is a strict protocol of who receives, escorts, and chats with the visitors. By gender and age groups they have specific roles to play. Girls run around inside doing chores; boys run around outside doing errands. They watch closely and slowly learn the protocol. By moving up into the vertical templates that mark their conduct at every age, they grow into the society as they grow into their bodies. The protocols give form to the progressive embodiment of the ritual in their own lives, giving them a sense of who they are, what is expected of them, and who everybody else is. The conduct of every person during those days of ritual becomes a mirror for everybody else—a mirror of the potential help, solidarity, and commitment, or, to the contrary, of detachment and indifference, that can be expected of them.

The visitors stay for a moment, speak to members of the household, then leave. If they are next of kin they are expected to stay longer, sometimes just sitting in the room, without saying a word. And they expect to be offered a special kind of tamale without any other foodstuffs. All actions and attitudes are clearly codified.

This goes on the whole day. The same scene is repeated 3 days later beginning on November 1, the night of the 'Tiny Dead' (*Los Muertos Chiquitos*), that is, the children who died. At 12 am families who have lost a child to illness or whatever other cause set up the altar in their houses and may receive offerings. The same scenario is repeated on November 2, the night of the adult dead.

The photograph of the *difunta* or *difunto* is a new feature of the altars. So are cigarettes or Pepsi or tequila bottles, that is, anything the *difunta* or *difunto* liked. Their favorite dishes are also cooked and placed in the second tier of the altar; it is said that the *difuntos* eat the dishes through the aroma and vapor they send out.

The altar is itself called an *ofrenda* to the *difunto.* The bereaved speak of the beauty of their altar with great pride, as a symbol of how much they loved the person. But those from outside the household also judge the beauty of the *ofrenda* in relation to the relative wealth of the family. Poorer families will have more modest *ofrendas.* But this is where the commitment of the extended families and kin comes in. If a person was greatly admired or loved in the community, offerings will be plentiful. In this case money is used to express feelings for the departed or solidarity with the family.

When I asked a question that I knew was both indiscreet and out of order, that is, how much money the *ofrenda* for the *difuntos* had cost, people were confounded. They are not accustomed to thinking in terms of adding up toward total costs of anything, much less a ceremony dedicated to a higher purpose. Yet, at the same time, they are keen on judging the *ofrendas.* Relatives and neighbors visit several *ofrendas* during 4 days and are able to rank them clearly. The ranking is expressed in aesthetic terms: *la del difunto Pedro quedo muy bonita* ("the one of the *difunto* Pedro is very pretty") or *la mas bonita, pero bonita deveras, fue la de los Sánchez* ("the prettiest, but, really, the most beautiful, was that of the Sánchez"). The term *bonito* ('pretty') is actually a blanket term to cover many valuations: of the aesthetic quality, the money invested, the number of offerings, the care that went into preparing the altar, the special touches put into it. The assessment will clearly contribute to the family's social standing, their political status, and perhaps their economic level. But most of all, the relative 'prettiness' of an altar reflects the number of people willing to contribute and so reflects the potential commitment that that family, or that person who died, could call on. This is what gives power and standing and prestige to a family.

On November 2, the Day of the Dead itself, people take offerings to a house and stay on into the afternoon. Drinks are passed around, and talk about the *difunto* or community matters goes on for hours. Teenagers come and go; children disrupt constantly. As the sun sets and night begins to fall, the more people in the house the better. Munn (1992) would say it shows the whole village the breadth of their control over the intersubjective time of a large number of people. This becomes very visible because they all go in procession to the cemetery. Each person takes two or three vases of flowers and slowly walks toward the cemetery behind the 'godparents of the cross' (*los padrinos de la Cruz*), who must pay for a brand new cross for the tomb every year. As dusk falls, processions cross through the village, candles all lighted, silently, with only the shuffling of feet to be heard, watched by

everyone out in the street. Again, the amount of information carried in these processions is enormous: who is loved and who is not, who is loyal to what family, which daughters or sons walk with their parents, and, very importantly, who is missing and why. As they go by, everybody assesses the number of people and of offerings; in effect they are assessing the degree of commitment of those in the procession and the degree of prestige of the family concerned.

At the entrance of the cemetery there is a big, bright fair, contrasting with the solemnity of the processions. Teenage boys stand in one corner, eyeing the girls and defying traditions with their stuck-up gelled hair and their American rap shirts bought by their brothers in the United States. All processions enter through the flowered arches of the cemetery walkway, which ends at a centrally placed simple altar. Then they break out toward the tombs of the *difuntos*. The tombs have been cleaned of weeds—except a significant few—so the *padrinos de la Cruz* set about arranging the flowered vases in agreeable patterns on the tombs. Then they light the honey-colored candles and the cemetery becomes enchanted. The suffused lights are caught in the dense orange petals of the *cempoalxochitl* and the wisps of white as shadowy figures move around the tombs. One enters into a state of otherness, away from the reality of colors into a softer, somberly lighted almost otherworld. Yet, there are so many people. Children race around the tombstones, make Halloween masks with the clay pots, and light fires, and no one minds. Elderly women sit on tiny chairs, with infants taking turns to sit on their laps. Chatting creates a constant hum, broken when the mariachis encircle a tomb and sing for the departed. In one tomb, with only one flowered pitcher, a lonely woman sits, with a daughter lying in the dust. As one walks around, suddenly among the tombs there is a darkened space with tangled weeds where no one is chatting with the departed. "Those are the tombs of the brothers, of those who have separated," a woman explains matter-of-factly. She is referring to the Evangelists, whose numbers have grown in recent years in the village and who deliberately stay away from villages' rituals and fiestas.

3.5 Interpreting the Ritual's Value

A monetary estimate of the value of the Day of the Dead ritual can certainly be made in terms of the quantity and quality of the materials used. It is my contention, however, that the value of the *ofrenda* is more appropriately assessed in terms of the *commitment* of people making the offering. This special 'level of value' reflects, on the one hand, the free will—*la voluntad*—of members of the extended family to ensure that the altar, the *ofrenda,* the setting of the *ofrenda* in the tomb, are aesthetically beautiful and reflect their economic standing. It means that the sisters, daughters, nieces, cousins, and women friends with the help of the children have given extra care in framing and displaying the *ofrenda,* and that the men have pitched into pay for the immediate families' *ofrendas* and meals. Significantly, neither the widow nor the widower partakes in the work involved but is expected,

nevertheless, to greet and receive the condolences of all those who arrive. It also includes the labor put in by kin, ritual kin, friends, and neighbors, mainly in spending the previous night preparing the food, as a sign of commitment toward the family.

When the family is poor, people may comment that "*está pobrecita la ofrenda*" ("the offering is poor") but will refrain from further criticism. However, if it is considered that the family does have enough money, especially the sons and daughters, to pay for a better *ofrenda* and that they did not, then criticism falls harshly, because this indicates a failure of will. When I asked an elderly woman why she thought the *ofrenda* in a house was not beautiful enough, she replied: "*Es falta de voluntad, es egoísmo, y Dios los va a castigar. Porque Dios le da a quien da y le quita a quien no da*" ("It is a failure of commitment; it is selfishness and God will punish them. Because God gives to him who gives and takes away from him who does not give").

Commitment is also expected from the extended families linked through affinity or ritual kinship and from other families in the village linked through ritual kinship, favors (such as help given in difficult times), and debts. The degree of popularity or of love and affection for the *difunta* or *difunto* is also important, but close observation shows that this person-to-person commitment adds only a minimal variation to the overall level of value of the family's *ofrenda*.[6] In a society that emphasizes collectivity rather than individualism, it can be said that it is the family's standing rather than the personality of the *difunta* or *difunto* that is assessed in the ranking of the *ofrenda*.[7]

The question of commitment also extends to the aesthetic dimension of the entire ritual. Beauty is deliberately sought, in the framing of the ritual, in the forms of display, in the combination of colors, in the softness of speech, in the music, in the serenity of sitting, in the ceaseless movement of children. "What do you think of this fiesta?" I asked during the long shadowy vigil at the cemetery. "Oh, this year it is very beautiful, more than last year," a woman answered, "because people all brought much flowers and much candles; look how pretty they look. And there is much music." Another woman interjected, "Yes, this year there was more money." But the point is that people could have used that money alternatively.

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[6] They choose the colours of the cutout paper, the flowers, the napkins, the plates, and the vases that are set on the altar. In the case of new *difuntos*, all items have to be new. The *ofrenda* is framed in a certain way by placing it against a wall or in the corner inside the main room of the house, which may also be the main bedroom, or in an outside terrace. They first place the vases and the candle holders in strategic ways. Then they are careful to display the items in a certain order, i.e., first the food, then the bottles of liquor or soft drinks, then specific things the *difunta* or *difunto* liked, such as cigarettes of their preferred brand. Then they set the new mats on the floor, on which they, the women of the house and only they, place the *ofrendas* to be given by kin and friends.

[7] Analysis could be extended on this point but for the purposes of this chapter suffice it to say that there are basically three forms of prestige for individuals and families in the village. The highest value is given to social prestige, which is earned through giving service to the village, creating an intense web of giving and receiving by the male head of the family based on the social connectivity and labor of the women in his household. Second, prestige is usually also connected with political standing, when local and municipal office is held. The third way of gaining prestige is with wealth.

The long biography of rituals in anthropology and my analysis of the ritual of the Day of the Dead in Amilcingo now lead me to reverse the initial question in this chapter. Asking why people value rituals is to reify both people and rituals as if they exist independently of each other. This is, I believe, a basic flaw in economic thinking, which always takes 'people' or 'individuals' as a given without asking how they came to be constituted. Anthropology, instead, starts out by asking how they come into existence as 'individuals' or 'people.' That question also reifies value as something that can be placed on something rather than as something that is created through thought, performance, or action. Thus I would now restate the question: How do rituals create value that makes people think of themselves as individuals or collectivities? I contend that a collection of persons cannot think of themselves either as individuals or as a collectivity unless they feel they belong and have reciprocal loyalty and commitment toward others in their immediate and larger group of reference. Realizing this potential loyalty and commitment is possible only by participating in social practices such as ritual. This would explain the sudden proliferation of rituals of all kinds in a globalizing world in which lone individuals, supposedly happy with consuming more and more, are rushing toward reconstructing identities and social ties. A ritual such as that of the Day of the Dead structures intersubjectivity so that sentiments of belonging and loyalty are reinforced, making each individual renew his or her commitment to the networks of kin and community by performing expected roles and, very importantly, sustaining the promise that such loyalty will continue in the future. But I would also say that if you exchange the word *loyalty* for the word *love,* you will be closer to what actually is exchanged in such rituals. In the case of the rituals of the Day of the Dead the added dimension is the iteration of narratives about death and the 'beyond' (*el más allá*).

The preceding analysis suggests, as Strathern (1992: 190) posited, that value is always transactional. The ritual of the Day of the Dead is ephemeral. If you walk around the cemetery a few weeks later, you brush against dusty dried flowers and crushed pots, but the strengthening of ties is still there and is extremely important in lessening intracommunity conflict, facilitating conflict resolution, and alleviating bereavement. This is why changes to it that may seem inauthentic to an outsider are not important. I witnessed a spirited debate between two 15-year-old girls who were participating in a contest of decorated altars organized by the school. One argued heatedly that the altars had to be decorated "as the ancients did them, and Pepsi-Cola did not exist at the time of the Aztecs."[8] And the other replied, "But people today put Pepsis in their altars and if this is what they drink, this is what they drink." As I asked other adults about this, they simply did not think it made a difference, as long as the major components (the special flowers, vases, and candles) were there.

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[8] "Se tiene que hacer como lo hacían los antiguos y en el tiempo de los Aztecas, voy a creer que había Pepsis". "Pero ahora ya la gente les pone Pepsis y si eso es lo que toman, eso es lo que toman. Tampoco les ponían cigarros". "¡Pero sí tenían tabaco, habría que ponerles hojas de tabaco!".

Outsiders are now taking a greater interest in this ritual because the loss of inter subjective forms of relating in a market-driven urban society, which people usually refer to as 'loss of culture or tradition', produces a nostalgia that sends people in search of seemingly authentic cultures. Authenticity is becoming important because of the financial intentions of outsiders, especially the media and some transnational companies. People in the Mexican communities now know that a video of their rituals and celebrations can earn millions in the media or in commercial advertisements, and they are very angry about it. To that must be added cultural tourism, which creates a dilemma: Impoverished villagers or cultural groups need the revenues from tourism, but tourists want something that looks nice and not poor, authentic and uncontaminated. So the rituals are, in a sense, cleaned up. Those used for such purposes are now acquiring a value that is tied to what outsiders want to consume.

So the Day of the Dead ritual will have, at the very least, four different 'levels of value'. First there is the basic value of the ritual as a realization of the promise of commitment for members of a village or community. Second, it has a value as an icon of Mexican culture that is being revitalized as a representational emblem in the context of globalization. Third, the ritual has a commercial value as entertainment for tourists or as events that can be sponsored by, say, beer or soft-drink companies to further the selling of their products and their hold on culture as image. The fourth level has just been inaugurated by the inclusion of the Day of Dead in the UNESCO list of Masterpieces of Oral Traditions and Intangible Heritage, where it has acquired a new metonymic value alongside other masterpieces of all regions of the world.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the differences between anthropological and economic interpretations of value and has explored alternative approaches to the valuation of ritual in the context of the Day of the Dead ritual in Amilcingo, Mexico. In one sense the contrast between the cultural and the economic value of this ritual might be seen in the way in which people either construct a value for their own purpose or flatten the ritual into an image that has value in the market. But my contention is that the cultural value of the ritual could be recognized in something that I would call *interaction value*, defined as the creation of value through the interaction between individuals or communities that creates or reinforces commitment, understanding, and tolerance. As such, it is not instrumental in that it is not geared toward achieving a particular goal. It is the interaction itself that is the goal, understood as the basic substance that society is made of. Nor is it strictly an exchange since there is not necessarily a give and take; rather it might simply consist of listening or talking, or just being there but together. Rituals have been called "meditations on a difficult reality" (Graeber 2001). I would then call the Mexican ritual of the Day of the Dead a 'meditation on life and death'.

Thus, to put it succinctly, the attempt of economics to comprehend the value of culture is futile because there is so much more in culture that lies outside the realm of

exchange and valuation. If economics is about doing business, and art is about doing society, I would say that culture is about doing life: that is, how life, in a social sense, is created and sustained and, therefore, how living persons are constituted.

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Lourdes Arizpe meeting with Pope John Paul II in 2002 at a Pontifical Science Academy meeting.
Source Courtesy of the Vatican

Chapter 4
Culture and Science

4.1 Introduction

The concept of culture, in its current use, has been placed, in different periods and disciplines, *above* science, *in opposition* to science and *within* science.[1] It is this polyvalence in meaning that turns 'culture' into such a sensitive, valued, yet sometimes contentious idea.

It is worth noting that the word 'cultures', in the plural, as currently used in a restricted sense to refer to contemporary groups of bearers of given cultural traditions, acquires in my view a particular meaning. *My own definition*, *in this sense*, *is that cultures are*, *simply*, *philosophies of life.* I also gave a more policy-oriented definition in the Culture Sector brochure presented at the UNESCO 1998 General Conference:

> Culture is the continuous flow of meanings that people create, blend and exchange. It enables us to build cultural legacies and live with their memory. It permits us to recognize our bonds with kin, community, language groups and nation-states, not to speak of humanity itself. It helps us live a thoughtful existence. Yet culture can also lead us to transform our differences into banners of war and extremism. So it should never be taken for granted, but carefully shaped into the form of positive achievement. Culture is never at a standstill: every individual contributes works and images that blend into the rivers of history.

At the end of the nineteenth century, in the initial stages of scientific anthropological discovery, the term culture was used to establish a basic epistemological distinction between natural events and human experience. Culture, in this very broad sense, was defined as 'everything that human beings have created'. This definition would *ipso facto* include science as well as all other belief systems and institutions of human society. Such a viewpoint locates culture *above* science, the

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[1] This paper was delivered at the Plenary Session on "The Cultural Values of Science" held at the Pontifical Academy of Science, Vatican City, 8–11 November 2002. Unpublished.

latter being understood as one kind of human activity dedicated to explaining the natural world through specific methods of observation and experimentation.

On the basis of this definition, a heuristic opposition was established between 'nature' and 'culture', which separated the natural sciences from the social sciences. It led to C.P. Snow's well-known 'two cultures' dichotomy, referring specifically to the difficulties of bringing together the intellectual discourse and methods of these two domains in order to advance towards an integrated and comprehensive understanding of a world made up of both natural and social phenomena.

4.2 Nature or Culture?

In the second half of the twentieth century the old debate about whether nature (basically genetics, anatomy and morphology) or culture determines human behaviour has been all but resolved. Several arguments have been slowly accumulating to this end. For example, the historically confirmed cases of 'wolf children', that is, children who for some reason grew up in the wild, isolated from all human contact, has shown that such children could develop only a few basic skills such as tool-making, refuge building and perhaps some form of primary linguistic communication. It seems they were unable to advance further in manual or conceptual sophistication. That is, they had lost what it was assumed they had initially, that is, genetically transmitted potentialities for acquiring knowledge and developing manual skills and complex social abilities *at whichever age they began to learn such capabilities*. Instead, cases of children who grow up in modern urban contexts but who, for some reason, are deprived of constant and caring exchange with other human beings also demonstrates that once past the age of 7 or 8 they are no longer capable of learning such skills. Research into the neurosciences has recently provided evidence that it is the growth of neuron connections that determines this capacity for learning. Thus, the current accepted idea is that genetic inheritance does provide a basic neuro-anatomical template of development possibilities for specific individuals, but it is the social and cultural environment that either helps develop them to their highest degree or, on the other hand, stunts this development from an early age.

A more recent discovery which has confirmed these results is provided by studies of the order of birth of siblings. Recent studies in anthropology and sociology have shown that, even if their genetic make-up is practically identical, the psychosocial traits, capabilities, social and even political attitudes that each sibling develops may be very different. This has to do with the role that each sibling is assigned according to their gender and birth order. This is why in many cultures there are different terminological concepts to distinguish siblings in this respect. For example, 'primogeniture' in Indo-European cultures or 'xocoyotl', the youngest son, in the Meso-American Nahua cultures.

Schematically, the eldest son or daughter is expected to give continuity to family traditions, to be an example of respect, responsibility and emotional stability towards their younger siblings and so, studies show, tends to be a stable, conservative citizen and to reject changes. The youngest siblings, in contrast, tend to be less disciplined, freer to explore emotional and imaginative experiences and so, in society, they tend to be artists and rebels.

Interestingly, a significant correlation has been found showing that 80 % of gold-medal Olympic athletes are first-born. Clearly, the physical investment of the mother in the first-born, assuming it is at its optimum, would give such children a greater physical endowment. But it is highly probable that, psychologically, the first-born may also benefit, if we may so presume, from the early harmonious stages of marriages.

4.3 Culture: Sparks in the Brain

Based on such evidence, one could say that nature, through genetic inheritance, *proposes* many potentialities but that societies and cultures *realize* such potentialities. Clearly, the vibrancy and vitality of people's lives, barring disasters in the natural environment, will depend on how they interact with other people. It would still mean that social relationships are decisive in allowing or not allowing people to achieve the development encapsulated as a promise in their genes or the spiritual aspirations of their belief systems. In other words, to paraphrase T.S. Eliot, between the physical and the metaphysical falls… the social. Not, as the poet deemed it, as a shadow but as the 'lightness of being' that could fulfil the promise of sustainability for the human world. For, as I have argued elsewhere, it is not the natural world that will ensure the sustainability of our own world. Instead, social relationships are the crucial element that will lead people to care for the life-sustaining ecosystems of the planet and stop the anthropogenic destruction of the planet.

4.4 Layers of Neurons and Complexity

It is fascinating to find how well this perspective fits in with the latest discoveries in neurology. As Professor Wolf Singer so clearly explained at the plenary session of our meeting at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, the more the layers of neurons in the cerebral cortex are able to connect in complex ways, as he expressed it, the greater the possibility humans have of developing higher consciousness. The intensity of connections between neurons, he went on to say, is fuelled by the stimuli coming from outside the body. It goes without saying that most of those stimuli, in the case of babies, surely come from their immediate surroundings of

family and kin. A small child surrounded by a great number of adults or children going about their sound and fury will receive countless opportunities of receiving and processing such stimuli. Granted that it is the quality of such stimuli rather than simply the number of them that makes a difference, any social scientist would say that *primary social interactions are responsible for producing the sparks in the brain that lead to full human development*. After that, a "sparked" individual will be able to interact with the world in its full richness and mystery.

4.5 Culture as a Heuristic Tool for Science

A different use of the concept of culture has been placed *within* science when it becomes a heuristic tool for research, especially in anthropology and sociology. *Culture* was coined as a heuristic concept at the end of the nineteenth century by Edward Tylor, in his seminal book bearing that title. He proposed a 'holistic' definition of culture as a methodological instrument to be applied to societies understood as totalities. At that time he was reacting against the school of thought, most evident in James Frazer's classic study *The Golden Bough*, in which Frazer carefully selected beliefs, myths and rituals reported from many different societies to piece together apparent regularities in the way in which human beings thought about the world and about themselves. Instead of extracting specific elements of a given culture to compare with those taken from other cultures, Tylor insisted they should be analyzed as a coherent set of norms within the culture the people had created to organize their social relationships and institutions.

Since that time, the concept of culture has undergone an evolution as rich as that of human phylogeny but in a speck of time. As early as 1948, Kroeber published his famous article listing more than 200 different definitions of the term 'culture' (1948 [1923]). In ensuing years, through the work of anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz, semiologists such as Umberto Eco, and critical theorists, the definition of culture has gone through a string of specifications as norms, texts—pretexts and subtexts—, interpretations, signs, emblems and identities within an enlarged field of meanings.

Since the 1990s, the concept of culture has been dissolved, discarded and raised to the pinnacle of international development and world realpolitik, all at the same time.

The critiques of the concept of culture in anthropology piled up so high that in 1999 *Current Anthropology* thought it necessary to publish an article by Christopher Brumann entitled 'Culture: why a successful concept should not be discarded' (Brumann 1999). Nonetheless, the term is still much in use in 'cultural studies', critical theory, the study of cultural diversity and pluralism, and, interestingly, in the 'culture wars' in some countries, such as the United States. Culture, then, is very much within science but, lately, has been brought into play in a very bellicose way.

This reflects what seems to be a paradox in the use of the concept of culture. While it is under interrogation and facing possible effacement in scientific discourse, 'culture' has emerged as the term to address many very different political and social issues in current world development. This is why, in this article, I have chosen to briefly describe the intricate web of meanings and interests behind the use of this concept in current international debates on development.

4.6 Cultural Challenges in a Globalized World

The cultural challenges to humanity in a world in transition give the curious impression that they advance through contradiction. The more globalization spreads, the more fragmentation into particular cultures is on the rise. The more communications expand, the more individuals seem to live isolated lives. The more consumption for pleasure increases, the more people lose the meaning in their lives and turn towards drugs, alcohol, obesity, crime or Prozac. The more poverty increases, the more people dream of becoming media celebrities. The more democracy takes root, the less people seem to make sense of their political world and out of fear retrench into intolerant attitudes.

Are these temporary phenomena, a passing phase of maladjustments on the way to improved standards of living for all? Or will unprecedented levels of inequality portend a future of perennial conflict? In any case, the deepening of several different kinds of impoverishment, other than economic, must also be given urgent attention.

In fighting against poverty, international agencies and national governments are only beginning to understand the very grave consequences of social and cultural impoverishment. The monotonic encouragement of competition as the only and most desirable value is leading to the highest levels of economic inequality in the history of capitalism. In a world context of deregulation, it has fostered greater corruption in both the public and the private sectors, political clientelism and favouritism, discrimination against women and minorities, and, most importantly, the destruction of the capacity to cooperate among all people. This social impoverishment is very difficult to stem once distrust and violent competition are put into play. Police and military action may stop the worst delinquent behaviour but will not root out the source of the frustration and hatred. It may, in fact, push violent behaviour further towards terrorism.

Cultural impoverishment, however, is undeniably the loss that is most irreversible of all. Knowledge that has been accumulated for millennia by many, many peoples around the world is being wiped out in a few years. Why is this diversity of cultural knowledge necessary in today's world? There is no doubt in my mind, as an anthropologist, that we need this vast reservoir of alternative knowledge to continue to find the best options for the future by exploring a diversity of solutions in every sphere.

Culture, science and society have always advanced by contrasting alternative ways of thinking and doing. Every aboriginal group survived in difficult ecosystems by evolving tools and ideas through trial and error. Every historical epoch presents humanity with unprecedented challenges that it must overcome by trying out different strategies. In fact, the genius of the West has been its ability to systematize and to apply knowledge by taking over other peoples' knowledge. Granted, the extraordinary scientific and technological advances the West has propagated in the last four centuries, and which the West has shared, has made such an endeavour beneficial to all of humanity. This is why curbing the open availability of science for all peoples is a very worrying trend.

4.7 Culture as the Soul of Development

Since the eighties, as more and more of these millennia-old cultures have been splintered by the various forces of current globalization, the United Nations, UNESCO and many international organizations have taken up the challenge of mobilizing world opinion towards a new vision of culture for international development.

As I explained in a recent paper for the World Bank on the Intellectual History of Culture and Development Institutions (Arizpe 2004; see this chapter), the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe led economists to try to apply the same economic development model to 'underdeveloped' and decolonizing countries. This model was based on the implicit assumption that social, cultural and religious factors need not be taken into account when applying capitalist development policies. Consequently, in the next few decades studies constantly showed a discrepancy between the expected outcomes of the application of such policies and the actual results of their implementation. Since the sixties, then, culture has been singled out as possibly one of the main reasons for unexpected deviations in economic outcomes. For social scientists this is due to the fact that social variables were left out of development models.

By the eighties, it was clear that the notion of development itself had to be broadened, as people realized that economic criteria alone could not provide a successful outcome in terms of governance, solidarity and well-being for all. The search for other criteria led the United Nations Development Programme to create the concept of *human development* as 'a process of enlarging people's choices'. The Human Development Index measures development in relation to a broad array of capabilities, ranging from political, economic and social freedom to individual opportunities for being healthy, educated, productive, creative and enjoying self-respect and human rights. Culture is implied in this notion and, indeed, it was taken into account in our discussions about human development. At the same time it was increasingly brought into discussions of international development by highly

influential groups such as the Brandt Commission, the South Commission, the World Commission on Environment and Development and the Commission on Global Governance. Bringing culture into development strategies, as well as innovating towards more effective practical agendas, had to be the next step in rethinking development. In this context, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to create the World Commission on Culture and Development.

This independent Commission was established jointly by UNESCO and the United Nations in December 1992. Chaired by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Commission was composed of distinguished specialists from all parts of the world. Among its honorary members were four Nobel laureates. Between March 1993 and September 1995, the Commission held nine meetings in different regions. On each occasion, scholars, policymakers, artists and NGO activists presented specific regional perspectives and concerns. These exchanges allowed the Commission to test its own questions and working hypotheses. It explored different lines of enquiry, consolidating some, abandoning others, and opening up paths not originally envisaged.

The first key message from the Commission was that development embraces not only access to goods and services, but also the opportunity to choose a full, satisfying, valuable and valued way of living together in society. Culture, for its part, cannot be reduced, as is generally the case, to a subsidiary position as a mere promoter of economic growth. Its role is not to be the servant of material ends but to be the social basis of the ends themselves. In other words, culture is both a means to material progress and the end of development seen as the flourishing of human existence in all its forms and as a whole.

This is why the Commission was also convinced, and this is a second key idea, that issues of development cannot be divorced from questions of ethics. Views about employment, social policy, the distribution of income and wealth, people's participation, gender inequalities, the environment and much else are inevitably influenced by ethical values. What is true for development is true with even greater force for cultural issues. None of the important questions concerning culture and development could be addressed in an ethical vacuum. Values are always present, either implicitly or explicitly.

In its report *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1996), the Commission placed at the head of its concerns the notion of a *global ethics* that needs to emerge from a worldwide quest for shared cultural values that can bring people together rather than drive them apart. It then explored the challenges of *cultural pluralism*, reaffirming a commitment to respect all cultures that have values of respect for human rights and for other cultures. It took up the challenge of stimulating human *creativity*, in order to inspire as well as empower people, in the arts, in the field of science and technology, and in the practice of governance. It explored the cultural implications of the world *media* scene, focusing on whether the principles of diversity, competition, standards of decency and the balance between equity and efficiency, often applied *nationally*, can be applied *internationally*. The Commission also addressed the cultural

paradoxes of *gender*, as development transforms the relationships between men and women and globalization impacts both positively and negatively on women's rights. It was deeply concerned by the potential needs of *children and young people* and sought ways to bolster their aspiration to a world more attuned to multicultural values and to intercultural communication. It cast a fresh eye on the growing importance of *cultural heritage* as a social and economic resource and also built on the groundwork laid by the Brundtland Commission to explore the complex relationship between cultural diversity and biodiversity, between cultural values and environmental sustainability. Finally, it set out a research agenda for interdisciplinary analysis of the key intersections between various aspects of culture and development issues.

4.8 Towards a New Global Ethics

In the World Commission on Culture and Development we emphasized the profound need for new global cultural values. Our future will be increasingly shaped by the awareness of interdependence between cultures and societies, thus making it essential to build bridges between them and to promote what I have called 'cultural conviviability', based on the Spanish word *convivencia*, which literally means experiencing the world together. It refers to new social and political pacts, negotiated in the innovative framework of a global ethics.

The role cultures may play in the search for a global ethics is complex and often widely misunderstood. Cultures are often regarded as unified systems of ideas and beliefs, with sharply delineated boundaries. Nevertheless, cultures have always overlapped. Basic ideas may, and do, recur in cultures which may have common roots or build on similar human experiences. Cultures, without exception, in the course of history, have often learned from one another. However, cultures usually do not speak with one voice on religious, ethical, social or political matters and other aspects of people's lives. The meaning of a particular idea or tradition or the conduct it may enjoin is always subject to interpretation. This applies with particular force in a rapidly changing world. What a culture actually 'says' in a new context will be open to discussion and occasionally to profound disagreement, even among its own members.

Finally, cultures do not commonly form homogeneous units. Within what is conventionally considered a culture, numerous differences may exist along gender, class, religion, language, or other lines. At the same time, ideas and clusters of beliefs may be shared by people of the same gender and of similar ethnic origin or class *across* cultural boundaries, serving as bases for solidarity and alliances between them.

What about recurrent themes that appear in nearly all cultural traditions? Could they serve as building blocks for a global ethics? The first such source, in the

opinion of the Commission, is the idea of human vulnerability and the impulse to alleviate suffering wherever possible. This idea is found in the moral views of all cultures. Similarly, it is part of the fundamental moral teachings of each of the great traditions that one should treat others as one would want to be treated oneself. Some version of Kant's 'Golden Rule' is expressed in practically all cultures and faiths.

Many different sets of values would have to be brought to a common ground. It is not necessary to agree with all such values or to give them equal weight, yet a minimum set of core beliefs would appear to be essential. This minimum set constitutes a point of departure, not a final destination, and the Commission believed that it is possible, and greatly to be hoped, that this common ground will expand in the coming decades.

The Commission identified five ethical pillars: (1) human rights and responsibilities, as the set of universal rights which establishes a standard against which international conduct can be judged; (2) protection of minorities and vulnerable groups such as women and children; (3) democracy and the elements of civil society whereby in the political arena, democratic processes should prevail, so that people's needs and wishes are taken into account in determining how collective life is organized; (4) equity within generations and between generations to ensure that all those living today are entitled to the basic necessities for a decent life, and that those who come after us will inherit a world of equal or greater choices and opportunities; and finally (5) commitment to peaceful conflict resolution and fair negotiation.

4.9 Diverse Cultures, Equal Vulnerability

Scientists meeting at the World Science Organization Open Conference on the Challenges of a Changing Earth at Amsterdam in July 2001 confirmed that global warming will have a decisive impact on the life of every inhabitant of the planet. Environmental global change thus creates an *equality in vulnerability* which deepens human interdependence in one single world economic system.

In the international Group of Eminent Persons for the Dialogue among Civilizations, when we spoke at the UN General Assembly and in our report Crossing the Divide (2002), we strongly emphasized that the real answer to equality in vulnerability is adherence to accepted forms of common behaviour by more and more actors on the international scene. Equality in vulnerability heightens the need for a broader, more political dialogue between cultures and civilizations and must lead to equality of opportunities. This requires, as the report says:

> …an act of decision by each individual member of the international community, no matter how small….Perhaps what we are really talking about is no longer individual enemies for individual countries but a multifaceted enemy for all. The spreading of contagious disease, weapons of mass destruction, unrestricted dissemination of small weapons, poverty, all

represent different faces of an 'enemy' for the entire human race…If the enemy is common, it follows that fighting against it requires unanimity (Group of Eminent Persons for the Dialogue among Civilizations 2002).

4.10 Cultural Values in a Global Era: The Rainbow River

At present, globalization, telecommunications and telematics are changing the way in which people identify and perceive cultural values. People still have the tendency to think of the world as a 'mosaic of cultures', but this metaphor is no longer adapted to today's world. As mentioned above, cultures are no longer fixed, crystallized containers but have diasporic, planetary representations exchanged instantly around the world through the mass media and the Internet. As we stated in the second UNESCO World Culture Report, the metaphor that best describes current cultural processes is that of a 'Rainbow River' (Arizpe/Jelin/Rao/Streeten 2001). We took Nelson Mandela's image when he referred to South Africa as a Rainbow Nation, and applied it to cultural diversity around the world. Cultural currents may mix or may be distinct for a while but they are all exchanging, following, teaching and learning, all at the same time. A very rich Rainbow River, indeed.

To go back to the opening paragraph of this paper, the complex history of the relationships between science and culture (in the singular) and cultures (in the plural) explains the different ways in which they are debated in our contemporary world. The ambiguities in the definition of culture and the implicit assumptions about culture in economic development models lead to culturally blind rather than culturally sensitive development policies and programmes and to generally well-intentioned yet frequently unsubstantial institutional responses, both nationally and internationally. Given the problems of globalization, the main challenge for this new century, as stated in the first section of the 2001 World Culture Report, is to find strategies so that "…nations and the global community [may] prevent and remedy the deepening of inequality, especially along fault lines, new and old, that coincide with cultural diversity" (Arizpe/Jelin/Rao/Streeten 2001: 23). Such a future will only be possible if science and culture work together to understand and to move the world.

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Anthropological Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage

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Chapter 5
The Intellectual History of Culture and Development Institutions

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the intellectual debates on culture that have influenced development institutions and programs.[1] A first word of caution is warranted in that culture, the concept of many meanings, is used not only to describe certain kinds of empirical phenomena but also to evoke sentiments of ancestry, political loyalty and emotional attachment. Culture then becomes a very sensitive issue in politics and policy debates, as anyone who has dealt with develop programs will know. This helps explain the polarized views on culture expressed in the past fifty years that see it alternately as a positive or as a negative driving force in development.

Part of the perplexity in dealing with development has come from the failure to make a distinction between the constitutive, the functional and the instrumental aspects of cultural narratives. As the report of the United Nations Commission on Culture and Development explicitly stated: it is not culture that is embedded in development; it is development that is embedded in culture.

The concept of culture, as defined and used by anthropology for more than a century, derived from the need of science to find order in its increasing knowledge of immensely varied human ways of life. Yet culture, as understood in the Western world of art and intellect, refers more narrowly to a universal longing for meaning and quality in human existence. Both connotations have been constantly entwined and confused in discussions on culture and development.

In the last three decades, policies and actions about culture are becoming ever more urgent as intellectual 'cultural wars' and military 'ethnic cleansing' conflicts

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have intensified, the former in developed countries and the latter in some countries in transition or developing ones. Most of the 160 wars held around the world since 1945 have taken place within nations, and since the end of the Cold War, a very great number are driven by ethnic, religious or cultural interests. Is the underlying cause of such conflicts the unequal development that has favoured some cultural minorities or ethnic groups at the expense of others? Or is it the other way around: do such cleavages exacerbate the inequality in development by pushing culturally distinct peoples into power, wealth or poverty? This, as I will endeavour to demonstrate in this chapter, is the unresolved debate that began even as the pillars of the United Nations were put in place. At that time, in 1945, horrified by the devastation brought about by the Nazi belief in their cultural and religious supremacy, war-torn nations set forth the foundation for the international concern for culture by recognizing in the UNESCO Constitution that "…wars begin in the minds of men".

The politics of culture, in terms of war and peace, were then subsumed under the two opposing political philosophies of the Cold War which were dealt with in the political bodies of the United Nations. At the same time, international development policies began to be applied in developing and decolonising regions, strictly in terms of fostering economic growth, with the implicit assumption that it would be accompanied by appropriate cultural change.

The constant intellectual ambiguity in the use of the concept of culture, international geopolitical negotiations in setting up international institutions, then led to a splintering of culture and development programs among different United Nations agencies, separate national ministries and single issue international and non-governmental development organizations.

Such an approach is no longer adapted to a globalized world. As the report of the United Nations World Commission on Culture and Development explicitly stated: it is not culture that is embedded in development; it is development that is embedded in culture. As Mahatma Gandhi once explained it, we need "…a recognition that economic activity, at every stage of technical development, has no value except as a contribution to a social aim" (Meynaud 1963: 8).

A different process is making cultures, in the plural, vital for a new geopolitical understanding of a globalized civil and political society. Relations between people having different cultures, now that trade, telecommunications, electronic interconnectivity and migrations make them confront others having different cultures every day, need to be recodified and reconstructed.

My work on research on culture and development and my recent experiences in negotiating international cultural policies leads me to believe that a cultural transition is underway in our globalized world. A threshold is perceptible, created by the new scale and intensity of certain cultural phenomena, but more precisely by the synergy among them. This cultural transition requires developing new concepts and new intellectual frameworks to reflect changing reality. In what follows I trace the major intellectual debates and the most relevant issues on culture and development

thinking and the corresponding response of international institutions in the last half century that have culminated in a notable increase of attention to culture since the nineties.

5.2 Defining Culture as a Human Right

As the devastation wrought by the Second World War came to an end, several ideas went down in the rubble. First among them was the linear evolutionist paradigm, which had already been questioned by anthropologists, in which 'civilization' represented the apex of political, intellectual and moral achievement. The second was the German Romantic ideal of the superiority of sentimental attachment to a community over the search of universality based on reason. The nation which had most highly held aloft the values of sentimentalised 'culture', and which had considered itself one of the most 'civilized' in the world, had perpetrated the most deliberate planned genocide in history against many of its own and other citizens in the name of racial and religious identity.

   The foundations for peace were set in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 which states that every individual "…is entitled…to the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable to his dignity and the free development of his personality" (UN 1949). It also states that everyone is entitled to freely participate in the cultural life of the community and to have protection as an author of literary or artistic works.

5.3 The Splintering of Culture in the United Nations Institutions

During this same period, the Marshall Plan applied to the reconstruction in war devastated Western Europe, became the blueprint for economists at the United Nations to begin to create development thinking 'ahead of the curve' (Emmerij/Jolly/Weiss 2001: 19). One of its aims was the formulation of economic development policies for 'underdeveloped' nations, many of which were already on the path to decolonisation. However, intrinsic to this economic model was the implicit assumption that the cultural structures of Western European societies in terms of values, ethical and political checks and balances, symbolic representations and civil society traditional organization could be found everywhere or would arise mechanically through the application of economic policies. All the pioneering UN reports on development of the beginning of the fifties referred to measures for international economic stability and growth, while culture was subsumed under the heading of 'social development' and was perceived as being related mainly to

education and to civil rights—promoted by the Western powers—or social rights—championed by the socialist bloc.

A different set of assumptions intervened in the creation of UNESCO as the UN institution explicitly charged with preventing 'wars that begin in the minds of men'. In the publication of the first UNESCO Conferences of 1946, its organizer, Stephen Spender set forth the question "can a world organization such as UNESCO contribute to aiding development in education, science and culture around the world" to provide "the certainty of peace?" (UNESCO 1947: 2).

The Conferences, in fact, bear witness to the "immense menacing shadows" in words of André Malraux, which European intellectuals felt were falling across Europe as the atomic bomb raised the spectre of another World War in which "the end of the world is possible" (UNESCO 1947: 73). In such a setting, Malraux affirmed that "…whatever the particular form of a culture, however far it may be from us, it touches us exclusively through its supreme form". He ended by saying "we are confronted by the heritage of a European humanism. How does this heritage appear to us? First, as the bond with a permanent rationalism, with an idea of progress…" (UNESCO 1947: 80).

It wasn't until 1948 that a Programme under the rubric of 'Culture' was approved at the Second UNESCO General Conference held in Mexico City. Under Chapter II on 'Free Flow of Ideas', a major section addressed the theme of 'Interchange between Cultures' which read: "Channels for the free flow of ideas cannot and should not be used to promote a uniform world culture. UNESCO's goal is rather unity-in-diversity; to aid in using these channels so that one culture can be interpreted to other cultures; so that men can learn first those common elements in the other culture that can serve as the basis for common thought and action; but, of equal importance, that they may learn respect for other divergent elements" (UNESCO 1948: 15).

UNESCO programs on culture, given the intellectual climate, were oriented towards the conservation of cultural heritage, support for artists, promotion of the arts and 'folk' arts, and questions of copyright. In parallel, decolonisation became an exclusively political question, linked to development understood only in economic terms and both concerns were addressed at United Nations headquarters, while financial planning was assigned to the Bretton Woods institutions. In this way, the academic structuring of knowledge between disciplines became the architectural blueprint for the organizational structure of international institutions. In consequence, the international discourse on development was constructed exclusively in terms of economic growth, while the discourse on culture followed the more restricted definition of this term, with reference to the arts and the 'supreme forms' of cultural heritage.

5.4   Culture in Development Theories

As other chapters of this book explain, in the fifties, emerging development theories, among which Sir Arthur Lewis's *The Theory of Economic Growth* set the pace, were concerned were primarily economic growth, employment, capital-intensive technology and productivity.[2] A few authors, such as Rostow (1960), did refer to concerns related to culture stressing that, for development to be successful, associated changes must be made in local institutions and values. Hoggart's (1957) influential book, *The Uses of Literacy*, argued that all modernizing societies had gone through a linear process of increasing urbanization, literacy, mass media exposure and participation.

While consensus theories were based on the assumption that values and attitudes were part of the necessary components for harmonizing the development of societies, a different school of thought, derived from Marxism considered conflict, albeit class, not cultural or ethnic conflict, as inherent to the development of societies.[3] His ambivalent definitions of culture led many left-wing intellectuals, especially in developing countries, to reject the use of the term culture as an analytic category for social research. It was only much later, when the work of Antonio Gramsci was brought to light, and British scholars such as Perry Anderson, that culture began to emerge as a legitimate field of analysis in Marxist studies.

One historical study that has had considerable intellectual influence in the fifties was Polanyi's 1944 book, *The Great Transformation*. He provided historical evidence to establish that, "…previously to our time no economy ever existed that, even in principle, was controlled by markets…" (Polanyi 1944: 43). Insisting that "…economic motives spring from the context of social life", he considered, instead, "reciprocity and redistribution, the basic principles of organization of economies and societies" (Polanyi 1944: 47).

A different perspective began to be built by looking at how rural villages were, in fact, being incorporated into expanding capitalist structures in developing countries. A decade earlier, Robert Redfield, an anthropologist, had defined 'progress' as a 'folk-urban continuum' as a linear process through which peasants in agrarian societies went from isolation and homogeneity, to "disorganization of culture, secularization and individualization" (Redfield 1941: 339). The title of one of his most influential books, published in 1950, *Chan Kom*: *a Village that chose Progress* marks this new perspective which became highly influential in development thinking and policies in developing countries.

In the fifties, Mexican anthropologist Beltrán (1961) and Wolf (1966) converged in arguing that rural 'closed corporate communities' that had been isolated were

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[2] For an excellent history of UN development ideas see Emmerij/Jolly/Weiss (2001).

[3] Karl Marx, however, used the term culture with different connotations. In the *Grundrisse* he referred to culture as the 'superstructure' of society, tied to changes determined by shifts in the structure of the relations of production. In other writings, instead, he implied that culture was the 'cement' or 'glue' that was necessary to bind social institutions (Marx/Engels 1985).

now increasingly subject to exploitation through centre-periphery relations that constant drained economic resources from their communities.

It was at that time that anthropologists also began to study some of the effects of development in urban settings. Lewis (1964) had revisited Tepoztlán, Redfield's original site of study and had followed Tepoztecan migrants to Mexico City, to look at the urban side of the 'folk-urban continuum'.

5.5 The 'Subculture of Poverty'

Oscar Lewis' himself was surprised at how the phrase he originally coined in his 1959 book, *Five Families: A Mexican Case Study in the Culture of Poverty*, had become "…a catchy one and has become used and misused" (Lewis 1964: 67). In intensive fieldwork studies which he later continued with the urban poor in Cuba and Puerto Rico, Lewis dealt with poverty not as a 'culture' but, more accurately, as he himself defined it later on, as a 'subculture'.

He described this 'subculture of poverty' in terms of some seventy interrelated social, economic, and psychological traits. Among the traits he describes are chronic unemployment and underemployment leading to low income, lack of property ownership, absence of savings and a chronic shortage of cash. He emphasized that the poor lack effective participation and integration in the major institutions of the larger society; high illiteracy rates and levels of education; lack of participation in national welfare agencies, labour unions or political parties. As a result, they have a critical attitude toward some of the basic institutions of the dominant classes, hatred of the police, mistrust of government and those in high position, and a cynicism which extends even to the church; they live in poor housing conditions, crowding, gregariousness with a minimum of organization beyond the level of the nuclear and extended family. He notes, however, that there may also be a sense of community and 'esprit de corps' in urban slums and in slum neighbourhoods (Lewis 1964: 71). As defined by the traits he describes, the sub-culture of poverty is a statistical profile in which traits fall into a number of clusters and are functionally related to each other.

In Lewis' thinking, the subculture of poverty is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society. It represents "…an effort to cope with feeling of hopelessness and despair which develop from the realization of the improbability of achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger society" (Lewis 1964: 69).

Less well-known than his famous phrase and his important contributions to anthropological knowledge, is the difference he perceives in kinds of poverty. In another essay, he explains that the poverty of peasant communities "…seemed a natural and integral part of the whole way of life, intimately related to the poor technology and poor resources or both. In fact, many anthropologists have taken it upon themselves to defend and perpetuate this way of life against the inroads of

civilization. But poverty in modern nations is a different matter. It suggests class antagonism, social problems and the need for change; and often it is so interpreted by the subjects of the study" (Lewis 1964: 427).

5.6 'When Is a Culture not a Culture?'[4]

The notion of 'culture of poverty' spread like a '*llamarada de petate*'—the flame of a straw mat as we say in Mexico. It was quickly picked up in antipoverty public debates in the United States through Harrington's (1962) book *The Other America*. It also meshed with E. Franklin Frazer's negative views of 'lower-class culture' later on taken up by Daniel Moynihan, especially in relation to African-American family life. It was strongly opposed, though, by other authors, especially anthropologists. Already in 1966 at a meeting of the American Anthropological Association the notion of 'culture of poverty' was deemed to distort the reality of life among the poor, prejudice our understanding of that life and encourage policies which tended to perpetuate the disadvantages associated with poverty (Harrington 1962: 17).

Charles Valentine, in his influential book *Culture and Poverty* attacked this concept on two counts. Firstly, he argued, the culture-of-poverty notion and related ideas contradict all important positive aspects of the culture concept, establishing that "…these formulations support the long-established rationalization of blaming poverty on the poor" (Valentine 1969: 15). Secondly, the essence of poverty being inequality, he affirmed the thesis that many of the distinctive traits that Lewis identified as culture patterns, rather than cultural creations of a subculture of poverty, were, in fact, "…externally imposed conditions or unavoidable matters of situational expediency" (Valentine 1969: 129).

In a 1972 book on selected readings of poverty the concept of 'culture of poverty' it was dismissed for its 'hazy descriptive value' and 'lack of explanatory significance' (Roach/Roach 1972). According to Ron Dore, that material deprivation may produce similar cultural traits in different societies was accepted by 'structuralists' in development studies, mainly neoclassical economists and Marxists, but that cultural traits could have an independent influence in perpetuating the condition of poverty was considered inadmissible (Dore 1976: 3).

Robert Wade, in 1976, added that, while identifying 'the poor' as an analytical category by defining them in terms of statistical income distributions could be acceptable for purely descriptive purposes it could not be useful to explain the systematic nature of poverty (Wade 1976). The 'current orthodoxy' at the time, he explained, across the academic and political spectrum, from Marxian scholars to neo-classical economists and social anthropologists, the critical factors were the

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[4] Title of a chapter in Valentine, Charles A., 1969: *Culture and Poverty*: *Critique and Counter-Proposals* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

distribution of resources and power and the material and physical constraints. He made the point that "…concepts such as 'utility' and 'leisure preference' in neo-classical economics, 'false consciousness' and even 'exploitation' in Marxian analysis, are used as question-stopping devices, to insulate the paradigm, to justify ending the enquiry before entering the realm of culture" (Wade 1976: 5).

5.7 'Cultural Readjustment' in Economic Development

A parallel discussion was being held in development thinking in the sixties on the need to take into account 'cultural readjustment' in economic development planning. In the field, resistance had been encountered "…in attempts to introduce technical improvement in communities governed by principles which run counter to such improvements…but the problem is now becoming a live issue, owing to the reper-cussion of the desire for independence (in developing countries) and the eagerness for development" (Meynaud 1963: 4–5). The author, Jean Meynaud, writing in 1963 in a UNESCO publication, then suggested that "the study of cultural models helps us to situate the individual again in his social context" (Meynaud 1963: 6). Regarded in this way, he goes on to say, economic and technical changes represent no more than one particular aspect of the general theme of 'cultural readjustment'.

A decade later, Kennedy (1976) explained that the inability of capitalist enter-prises to keep their workers in the case of the Ghana was partly linked to each of them the workers' desire to 'be your own boss' a trait which was valued in the traditional culture, as well as from the demands of kinship and community which could effectively weaken the capacity of entrepreneurs to accumulate capital. He concluded that constraints to development are:

> …partly structural ones of a kind which economists conventionally handle, but partly stem from the particular culturally conditioned behavioural dispositions of the people with whom they have to deal. But the latter, too are not just traditional legacies. They can be modified –and reinforced– by features of the economic structure characteristic of the dependent economies of the Third World (Kennedy 1976: 21).

In spite of a widening interest in culture in development studies, in the seventies, according to Dore (1976), there was a 'flight from culture' in intellectual terms. One element of this flight, he wrote, was the scientific desire to deal with hard, quan-tifiable, 'structural' data. "Perhaps, he queried, there is an element of machismo involved…in the sense that a model of man activated exclusively by motives of material self-interest may be taken as an actual picture of reality" (Dore 1976: 1). Moreover, he noted that the flight from culture could also stem from white man's guilt. "The underlying ethnocentrism and exclusion of realities of control of international monetary and trading systems by powerful countries of economic development models" was rightly opposed by Third World social scientists on the rise; "…Peru's sociologists or Senegal's or Tunisia's, were not so happy to have their country's troubles diagnosed as basically laziness or narrow-mindedness,

however jargonised the diagnosis might be in terms of achievement-orientation scores or empathy ratings" (Dore 1976: 2).

5.8 Culture and Internal Colonialism

Indeed, as a new generation of intellectuals in developing countries began to examine the failures and uneven effects of foreign-assisted modernization in their countries, many turned to culture as an intellectual tool way to emphasize 'endogenous' development.

Building on Aguirre Beltrán and Eric Wolf's thesis of center-periphery relationships, Rodolfo Stavenhagen went further to define the concept of 'internal colonialism' to refer to the condition of autochthonous peoples in Third World countries. Later on he proposed 'ethnodevelopment' as a policy that would allow such peoples to incorporate capitalism to their lives in their own terms.[5]

By then Indians were no longer conceptualized as holders of dying traditions, but as peoples who had gone through a passage from tribal Indian to generic Indian, following Ribeiro (1970). Still, the category of 'Indian' is a colonial category, Bonfil (1985) argued, part of the oppression the *México Profundo* that must be revitalized. Furthermore, Indians were seen as holders of a 'negative identity', according to Friedlander (1975). Independently of the content of the villagers' culture, they were defined by that fact that they continued to lack what the elite continued to acquire.

My 1978 study of why Indian families were poorer than *mestizo* families although they had received equal amounts of land under the Agrarian Reform in the 1930s also gave some answers (Arizpe 1978a). The stigma attached to indianness was used by *mestizo* families to monopolize jobs and business opportunities of moderate economic growth for their own children. Yet Indians themselves also told me they refused to send their children to school to learn the necessary Spanish because they did not want to lose their language and way of life (Stavenhagen 1970; Arizpe 1978b; Matos 1968; Báez/Rivera 1983).

The same dilemmas of conserving traditional cultures while eradicating internal colonialism were pervasive in countries of Asia and Africa. In the latter, particularly, apartheid represented the most brutal continuation of colonial oppression, justified, predominantly on the basis of culture. The extent to which it fostered great mistrust for cultural explanations and for ethnic motivations among development thinkers and practitioners cannot be minimized. Indeed, the policy of apartheid was based on the recognition of cultural difference and the desire of every cultural group to live separately—a fact too often forgotten in contemporary discussions—and was

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[5] Rodolfo Stavenhagen's writings on Indian peoples is vast. His earliest work was Stavenhagen (1968), his latest is Stavenhagen (2001).

used to legitimise the exclusion of the African population from South African development.

African intellectuals reacted, on the contrary, by invoking to attack colonialism and to rally support among their communities for national liberation. Frantz Fanon was one of the first writers to denounce the colonialist experience as one of trying to impose 'white masks on black faces'. The widespread 'Negritude' movement led by poet Leopold Senghor and later President, of Senegal, and by writers such as Aimé Césaire in the Caribbean, vindicated black African cultures and their many artistic achievements. In his 1970 speech on 'National Liberation and Culture' Amilcar Cabral expressed their view as follows.

The experience of colonial domination shows that, in the effort to perpetuate exploitation, the colonizers not only create a system to repress the cultural life of the colonized people; they also provoke and develop the cultural alienation of a part of the population, either by so-called assimilation of indigenous people or by creating a social gap between the indigenous elites and the popular masses (Cabral cited in Rahnema Majid/Bawtree 1997: 171).

In Asia, debates on culture and development took a different turn. The Congress Party of India, followers of the enlightened path of Ghandi, opposed the violent riots brought about by culturally and religiously defined 'communalisms' and embarked on locally-driven development. The Bandung Conference of 1955 set the stage for the subsequent debate on the 'Asian values' of filial piety, honesty, loyalty and diligence in work. They were highlighted in the eighties as the reason for the success of economic development in East Asia, only to be recast a decade later part of the reasons for the economic crisis in that region, having to do with nepotism, cronyism and passivity.

5.9 Women, Culture and Development

Ester Boserup's pioneering study Women's Role in Economic Development, published in 1970, though it did not explicitly deal with culture in analysing women's labour force participation, nevertheless opened a new intellectual domain in development (Boserup 1970). It reflected the new knowledge on population and contraception, and the impact of feminism and civil rights movements in placing women prominently in the social and political development agenda. ILO and some governments, for example, the Indian government, began to sponsor studies and seminars on women's economic participation (Indian Ministry of Labour 1964; Indian Council for Social Science Research 1977; Ahmad/Loutfi 1980; Savané 1981). Other studies, especially in Latin American, showed that women were indeed predominant in what were perceived as the three main imbalances in development in the region: tertiarization, rural-urban migration and the growth of the informal sector (Arizpe 1975; Saffioti 1978; Hewitt 1979; Arizpe/Aranda 1981).

Cultural factors were implicit in the heuristic concept of the sexual division of labour, which created distinctive gender patterns in urbanization, industrialization, and labour force participation (Safa/Leacock 1981; Deere/León 1981).

The impact of cultural patterns was evident especially in comparative studies of women's labour force participation in different developing regions. For example, it showed the influence of cultural and religious factors in Islamic countries, where economic growth had had little effect in increasing women's labour force participation. Or in India, where women outnumbered men in migration only in those regions, like Kerala, which had a majority of non-Hindu population.

5.10   Cultural Policies in the Eighties

The idea of cultural policies had first been proposed in a 1969 UNESCO preliminary study in which criteria were formally recommended to define this concept and to link culture to the fulfilment of personality and to economic and social development (UNESCO 1969). Policy guidelines were suggested in the UNESCO 1977-82 Medium Term Plan which consolidated a 'Programme on Culture' having the following aims: (1) promotion of the appreciation and respect for the cultural identity of individuals, groups, nations and regions; (2) promotion of cultural identity as a means to achieve independence and solidarity; (3) promotion of cultural identity in the framework of a global development strategy; and (4) promotion of respect for the cultural identity of individuals and groups, particularly those who are marginalised in developed and developing countries (UNESCO 1977).

The most important, and successful cultural programmes in UNESCO, however, have promoted the conservation of cultural heritage. The 1972 Convention for the Protection of Natural and Cultural Heritage which created the World Heritage List, is the second most ratified international conventions of the UN, after the Convention of the Child.

The challenge of relating 'culture' to 'development' was taken up for the first time by governments at the World Conference on Cultural Policies held in Mexico City in 1982. Mondiacult, as it came to be known, established an international working concept based on a broader, anthropological definition of culture (UNESCO 1982: 42):

> … the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.

The Mexico City Declaration highlighted the cultural dimension of development, stating that (UNESCO 1982: 42):

> balanced development can only be insured by making cultural factors an integral part of the strategies designed to achieve it; consequently, these strategies should always be devised in the light of the historical, social and cultural context of each society.

By the mid-eighties, social and cultural factors were beginning to be taken into account in development planning in other UN institutions, especially UNDP in the areas of indigenous peoples, women and development, and community development. The same occurred at the World Bank, although as Michael Cernea expressed it, too slowly. Pioneering such studies in the World Bank, he explained that such variables were now being taken up because of the inconsistencies or failures of many development programs (Cernea 1995). A major obstacle, Cernea pointed out, was the lack of a comprehensive theory on *induced development* making it difficult to convince economists who were resistant to incorporating cultural values into their development models of the importance of social and cultural variables.

In 1987 the Group of 77 representing a majority of Third World countries, with the support of key European countries, passed a resolution declaring 1988–1997 a 'Decade for Culture and Development'. In a Decade sponsored publication entitled *Culture*: *Hostage of Development?* its contributing authors warned that the opposition of the two concepts reveals itself to be a simplification "…since the assumptions of development themselves are the expression of a culture" (Rist 1994: 12). For example, the Western assumption that social change is determined, everywhere, by the search of maximisation of profits or accumulation of goods, Emmanuel Dione noted, it is not even uniformly shared in Western societies (Rist 1994: 65). Hassan Zaoual, another of the authors, points out that through development "…the Third World is simply (being) decultured: it no longer believes its own myths (except in their fundamentalist forms) and they are offered only simulacra to nurture their imaginaries" (Rist 1994: 58–59).

5.11 Cultural Diversity and Modernization

As growing environmental concerns made sustainability the central strategy for development at the end of the eighties, in my 1989 article 'On Cultural and Social Sustainability' I insisted that these two processes necessarily had to be a component of general sustainability (Arizpe 1989). I described four analytically different processes evident at that time: (1) cultural groups that consciously and willingly tried to stay out of modernizing development, (2) cultural groups that were retrenching because they were being marginalized from development, (3) cultural groups that were using culture to fight for political advantages, and (4) groups that were using culture to protect their own national markets. All four trends, it seems to me, have increased notably in recent times.

A few years later, the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of an alternative political philosophy, far from ending history, opened the door to the resurgence of traditional ethnic and religious groups and to explorations into spiritual and environmental New Age philosophies. Amid the diversity, three major currents are having an impact in development thinking related to: the relations between so-called 'cultures' and 'civilizations', cultural studies and multiculturalism, and the discursive deconstruction of the ideas of development.

What began in the seventies as an argument for 'ethnodevelopment', that is, development which incorporates local cultural differences, was elevated in the nineties to a large-scale 'clash of civilizations' couched in cultural terms but strictly political in its oversimplification and confusion of terms.

Samuel Huntington, in his 1993 article on the 'Clash of Civilizations' brought forth a most confusing international debate that has fostered retrenchment into ill-defined cultural and religious categorizations (Huntington 1993). This happened because, instead of using the broader, more inclusive term of Western civilization—since many of its achievements were based on those of other civilizations—, or that of Middle Eastern civilization—which would have allowed the generosity of reference to the primary cultural foundations provided by Egypt, Greece and Byzantium—he narrowed the terms to religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In fact, by ignoring science and political philosophy as the most important driving-force of the hegemony of Western Multiculture—my term—he demeans it to the position of one religion among many. Subsequently, in his 1996 book, he distinguishes modernization from Westernization, arguing that any civilization can benefit from the economic and technological advances of the former without having to Westernize, and warns that China—which, it must be pointed out, is a secular 'civilization'—may become the potential dominant power in East and Southeast Asia. As could be expected, his perspective has been very useful to extremist religious political leaders, among them Ossama Bin Laden, to speak in the name of a 'war of religion'.

A fascinating counterpoint is that, precisely during this same period, critical anthropologists were intellectually redefining culture as a 'site of contestation'. As Stuart Hall argued "We are living through the proliferation of the sites of power and antagonism in modern society" (Hall 2002: 233). Cultural studies shifted attention to urban, multicultural, multiracial neo-cultures that were becoming the most pervasive form of culture in a world where millions of peoples are migrating to cities.

A different picture emerges in relation to autochthonous peoples. The movement of Zapatistas in Mexico became internationally emblematic as a political movement which put forth the demands of autochthonous peoples against discrimination within the Mexican State and in globalization. International organizations had already given prominence to issues of indigenous people, the World Bank in terms of their dam and economic development projects in indigenous regions (WB 1982), ILO with respect to self-determination and UNESCO, in terms of the conservation of their cultures and the arts.

In the quest for culturally pluralistic models in the nineties, the concept of 'transnationalism' has been used to describe the diasporic creation of cultural communities (Gosh 1989; González/McCommon 1994; Lomnitz 1998). Massive outmigration both disrupts and renovates the social fabric of rural communities. It also accelerates cultural change in urban groups, especially among the poor.[6] Such

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[6] The first comprehensive discussion of this field of studies can be found in Basch/Glick/Szanton (1994); a useful reader is Vertovec/Cohen (1999).

fluidity and uneven integration of migrants having different cultures in urban contexts would make it practically impossible to abstract a single pattern of a 'subculture of poverty' for analytical purposes.

The intellectual challenge posed by this deterritorialization of cultures and creation of these new transnational cultural spaces cannot be minimized (Kearney 1995). The new patterns of 'segmented assimilation' (Zhou 1999), separation of community and culture through an alternative 'demotic discourse' (Baumann 1996) and re-ethnicisation of many immigrant communities in developed countries point towards a diversity of cultural attitudes after the first generation of immigrants in what may be called 'minority cultures of mobility' (Smith 1998).

5.12 The Evanescence of Culture: The Debates of the Nineties

At the end of the seventies, Edward Said's book, Orientalism, had cracked open the black box of cultural discourse by examining the intellectual construct of 'Orientalism' as "…the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient: dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it…" (Said 1979). Influenced by Foucault and other French post-modern analysts, Said opened a new critical trend, couched in terms of deconstructing regimes of discourse and representation, applied to cultural development. In the eighties, several authors in developing countries, for example, Mundimbe (1988) in *The Invention of Africa* and Chandra Mohanty, used the same intellectual tools to challenge the concepts and narratives of prevailing development thinking (Manzo 1991). Post-colonial studies also challenged such narratives, by reading them as colonial discourse, whose predominant strategic function, in words of Bhaba (1990) is "…the creation of a space for a 'subject peoples' through the production of knowledge in terms of which surveillance is exercised…" (Bhaba cited in Escobar 1995: 9).

Arturo Escobar, in his book *Encountering Development*: *the Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (1995) also emphasized that the corpus of rational techniques of the development discourse organizes both forms of knowledge and types of power applied to bring under control peoples in developing regions. "Development, he argues, is at the same time self-destructing and being unmade by social action, even as it continues to destroy people and nature" (Escobar 1995: 217). Such social action by local communities may develop more creative and autonomous practices conducive to renegotiating class, gender and ethnic relations at the local and regional levels. He calls for a post-development cultural politics that is critical engaged in neutralizing the dominant economic discourse (Rahnema/Bawtree 2001).

In parallel, the development of interpretive and textual-analysis methodologies initiated in the eighties in anthropology led to a general intellectual questioning of

the term 'culture' itself in anthropology. For many years, this concept had been critiqued because it creates hierarchy, it tends to homogenize cultural patterns and to flatten levels of cultural understanding. Others, such as Christopher Brumann argued instead that that even in highly fluid situations, cultural patterns form valleys and mountains that create landscapes or, as Arjun Appadurai would term them, 'ethnoscapes' which give people a sense of identity and a certain understanding of the world (Brumann 1999).

While such debates raged in university and art circles, however, international organizations began to react to pressure from member states to develop policies and actions to deal with three rising cultural trends. The main ones were perceived to be: the rapid loss of cultural traditions associated with globalization, the re-emergence of cultural clashes and religious fundamentalisms as state and secular political philosophies lost strength, and the need to protect conditions for continued cultural production in countries as the telecoms and the mass media flooded cultural spaces with non-national cultural contents. It was then that the independent UN World Commission on Culture and Development carried out its important work.

5.13   The UN World Commission on Culture and Development

The United Nations independent World Commission on Culture and Development, established by the General Assembly of the UN in December 1992 and chaired by former UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, included 13 international respected figures and six honorary members.[7] After some thirty-one months of work, on November 1995, the Commission presented its report, Our Creative Diversity, both to UNESCO General Conference and to the United Nations General Assembly.

The all-pervasive message emerging from the Report of the Commission, entitled *Our Creative Diversity* (1995), its underlining argument, is that development embraces not only access to goods and services, but also the opportunity to choose a full, satisfying, valuable and valued way of living together. Looking at development as a process that enhances the effective freedom of people everywhere

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[7] Among them Keith Griffin, Niki Goulandris, Yoro K. Fall, Celso Furtado, Elizabeth Jelin, Mahbub ul Haq, Nikita Mikhalkov, Leila Takla; honorary members: Claude Lévi-Strauss, Aung Sang Suu Kyi, Elie Wiesel. Lourdes Arizpe, also a member of the Commission and, at that time, UNESCO Assistant-Director General for Culture, was in charge of the Secretariat for the Commission. Raj Isar was Secretary to the Commission. The Commission adopted an active international approach holding *nine* regional meetings around the world. At each one, local experts, social scientists, policy-makers, artists, cultural policy, and development experts and NGO activists presented their own concerns and ideas. Drawing from these contributions, and from commissioned papers, the Commission has tested its own questions and explored a series of 'lines of inquiry' consolidating some, abandoning others, and opening up paths not originally envisaged.

to create cultural expressions and to exchange them broadens the widely accepted notion of human development. Culture's role is not to serve the ends but constitutes, in fact, the social basis of the ends themselves. In other words, culture is not a means to material progress: it is the end and aim of 'development' seen as the flourishing of human existence in all its forms and as a whole.

In *Our Creative Diversity* (1995), the Commission placed, firstly, the notion of a *global ethics* that needs to emerge from a worldwide quest for shared values that can bring people and cultures together rather than drive them apart. It then explored the challenges of *cultural pluralism*, reaffirming a commitment to fostering coexistence in diversity both nationally and internationally. *Creativity* was recognized as a lever of development in relation to technology, new political and social forms, empowerment, and artistic production. The Report explored the cultural implications of the world *media* scene, focusing on whether the principles of diversity, competition, standards of decency and the balance between equity and efficiency, often applied *nationally*, could be applied *internationally*.

The Commission also addressed the many processes that are changing the cultural perceptions of *women*'*s* life cycles and social participation. It proposed to broaden the discussion and propose strategies to encompass fundamental changes in women's roles in societies all over the world and to develop agendas against intolerant cultures which deny women their basic human rights. Redistribution of income, assets and power from men to women requires the consolidation of a political base, empowerment and cultural change.

Tangible and intangible cultural heritage, the Report went on, embody the collective memory of communities across the world. This heritage is made up not only of sites and monuments but also of a multitude of arts and crafts objects, documents and manuscripts, oral traditions and expressive culture in all its forms, including the performance arts. Safeguarding these creations of our ancestors must go in hand in hand with fostering the creation of our contemporaries.

The Commission also recognized that the *cultural dimensions of environmental management* should be considered in relation to indigenous knowledge, the built environment, urban culture, population growth, poverty, economic growth and the biosphere, sustainability and cultural diversity. New *culturally-sensitive development strategies* were proposed to fully take into the human factor of development.

Several of the Commission's recommendations had immediate results. UNESCO began to publish the World Culture Reports. The Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development was held in Stockholm in 1998; its Plan of Action emphasized cultural policies, creativity, respect for cultural diversity and the use of the new communications and information technologies for cultural programs. The UN Volunteer Services for assistance in the conservation of cultural heritage sites received an enthusiastic response all over the world.

5.14 The World Culture Reports

To support and inform the development of new policies, the Commission put forth the publication of an independent World Culture Report as a vehicle for exploring, clarifying and updating key world issues. The first UNESCO World Culture Report published in 1998, explored the themes of culture, markets, and creativity.[8] It gave more precise definitions of culture and explored strategies to create statistical indicators on culture and development. All available data and statistics on culture were aggregated for world, regions, and sub-regions. The work on indicators on culture and development was continued at a seminar held during the World Bank meeting 'Culture Counts' that took place in Florence in October 1999.

The Second World Culture Report dealt with cultural diversity, conflict, and pluralism (UNESCO 2000). Its first section set forth that diversity—including that not only that related culture but also to gender, race, and sexual preference—need not threaten stability, as long as citizens are able to adhere to values and cultural practices sufficient to secure general compliance and support for the institutions of governance. The economic aspects of cultural heritage, conservation, and the construction of knowledge through new information and communication technologies were also explored in this issue.

In terms of cultural conflicts, Paul Streeten pointed out that, whereas income inequalities can be divided in different proportions and are therefore easier to negotiate and to compromise, other decisions that are subject to an either/or choices are on the rise (UNESCO 2000: 54). Ethnic, linguistic, religious and gender divisions, and disagreements on voting rights, give rise to non-divisible conflicts. It is significant that most of these are commonly grouped together as issues related to culture. Hence the perception that cultural problems are non-negotiable and unyielding.

5.15 The Cultural Transition

Cultures are philosophies of life that hold together all the social practices that build and maintain a capable, creative human being. Cultures also function as primary regulating systems that help to keep people's passions within the bounds of humanly acceptable or institutionally suitable behaviour. Neglect of these constitutive and integrative aspects of cultures brings about imbalances in individual behaviour and, hence, dysfunctional social behaviours. One example is that culturally unregulated greed has led to corruption in public as well as in private

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[8] A Scientific Committee supervised the making of the *World Culture Reports*: Chair, Lourdes Arizpe. Members: Louis Emmerj, Keith Griffin, Yoro K. Fall, Elizabeth Jelin, Mohan Rao, Paul Streeten, David Throsby. Executive Director: Ann-Belinda S. Preis. Researchers: Paula Leoncini and Isabelle Vinson.

institutions, and to unfair trade and financial practices, which have contributed to deepening inequality in development as never before.

Political philosophies, a modern form of culture, have also been weakened by many factors, including the lack of resources for intellectual research and basic social research at university level. All of this has contributed to making instrumentalized cultures and religions into perceptible political devices used to defend or impose particular interests to gain advantages in the rocky advances of globalization. Such a setting requires different intellectual and methodological frameworks so that we can understand the relationship of culture to development.

In this respect, the first issue that must be raised is the inability of mainstream development models to incorporate the constitutive function of culture. Economics, the discipline that currently dominates development models, has no theory about how human beings become functional members of societies. It only deals with how already constituted members exchange things and intangibles. Therefore, the practices that are needed to keep human beings in good mental, emotional and physical balance at individual level are left out. Importantly, by definition, all such practices are social in nature, that is, they depend on the familial, conjugal, amiable and community relationships established by individuals. By leaving such practices out of development models and policies, even in post-industrial societies, the expansion of markets has been at the expense of functional societies.

It must be stressed that the loss of social integration is not just a question of values but of the systemic nature of cultural belonging, reciprocity and responsibility that it seems human beings need to be enveloped into make sense of their lives, even as they participate in markets. These integrative social practices cannot be reintroduced into society through fragmentary political strategies or through religious interventions. Neither will be successful, for reasons that cannot be explained here.

The second important issue that needs to be raised is the rapid loss of cultural diversity. Normally discussed in relation to ethnicity, gender, race and sexual preference, this concern is now being mentioned even in terms of a loss of diversity in technology. A 2001 research article in The Economist warned that "For all its single-minded predictability, technology has always flourished on a diversity of opinion and an unerring ability to invent alternative solutions".[9] Industrial concentration, the high cost of developing high-tech products, and the trend toward globalization, the article argued, are limiting the search for alternative solutions. For different reasons, discussed throughout the text, cultures are losing millennial-old ways of life, learnt technologies, and political philosophies.

This supports my contention that we are living through a Cultural Transition, that we are at the end of a historical epoch. It was an epoch of forever expecting alternative designs, knowledge and art to exist out there, in many other cultures, to be brought into enrich Western intellectual productions and markets, or to be used as a mirror to think about ourselves.

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[9] "The Loss of Diversity", in: *The Economist*, 8 December 2001: 3.

Now this diversity or at least the boundaries of major cultural clusters as we knew them are breaking down.

This will constitute a problem if people no longer have the confidence or the audience to continue to produce original meanings and images. The same applies to the actual physical and cultural environments that previously enabled them to create. A culturally monotonic world would mean the end of creativity. Fostering creativity, then, becomes a priority; freedom to create, a priority for development policies.

Cultural diversity, in many quarters, is now beginning to be perceived as a kind of solution for a monotonic market. Cultures must be understood as a constantly flowing process, like a multicoloured river in which no current is pure, all have intermingled, and yet, at any given point in time every current may be perceived as a different strand (UNESCO 2000: 24–46). In detaching people from their geographical territories, their historical places or their semantic self-adscription frameworks, cultural representations may lose substance. In one sense they are resemanticized as 'folkloric' in a new global framework in which the cultures that structure the media and the Internet are the cosmopolitan frames of reference. For example, Indonesian Gamelan music, even if mixed with Western music, must continue to sound like Gamelan music in order to keep its niche in the market of world music (UNESCO 1998: 204–210). In another sense, they are the seeds for constructing hybrid cultural forms, better adapted to pluralistic globalized settings. After years of trying to expand a homogeneous 'techno-culture' or 'business culture' around the world so that economies and corporations could function in a seamless economic globality, the first signs of the cultural infertility of such a world are beginning to be perceived. Against them, there is a new trend towards multigendered and multi-ethnic staff in business corporations which may be interpreted as an attempt at keeping up the creative spirit that comes only from contrasting and confronting alternative ways of doing things. If this is already happening in corporate culture, why hasn't it as yet permeated the economic development models of international economic institutions?

Culture and development issues are also evolving in new directions. On indigenous peoples, June Nash captures the key process of "Pluricultural Survival in the Global Ecumene" as no longer the task "…of salvaging waning traditions, but of catching up with the frontiers in global integration now being forged by indigenous social movements" (Nash 2001: 219–220).

Culture and development issues are evolving in new directions, as other chapters in this book show. I will only mention those that are currently vital issues in the debates I have described in this chapter. The World Bank, in its study *Voices of the Poor*,[10] now recognizes that poverty comprises many more dimensions than lack of income. It includes, besides those mentioned by Lewis (1959, 1964), increasingly

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[10] World Bank 'Voices of the Poor' study; at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20622514~menuPK:336998~pagePK: 148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html> (accessed 1 April 2014).

those such as discrimination against women, environmental degradation of the soil, water, forests and climate, insecurity, violation of human rights, and lack of voice in cultural expressions.

New themes have also appeared. In the nineties, as many developing countries tried to cope with cultural pluralism in the setting of democratization, attention has shifted to the interaction between culture and democracy (Przeworski 1998; Lins 2000). The economics of cultural heritage, cultural industries, and aspects of intellectual property generally and in particular that of indigenous cultures are also at the forefront of the international agenda (UNESCO 2001).

By far the greatest intellectual challenge for culture, however, arises from the unprecedented cultural interaction in the world today brought about by the transmission of images and texts in the blink of an eye. As part of the Cultural Transition it is leading to a different way of constructing one's cultural life-world and must lead to reorganized ethical and institutional arrangements.

Sen (1998) brings together the different strands in this debate by affirming that social identities are important, so that there are reasons to reject the view of individuals merely as self-concerned islands. Further, he goes straight to the heart of the matter by stating that it is people who must decide whether to sacrifice material goods for the preservation of a culture or to sacrifice certain cultural features for greater prosperity. He says: "In the freedom-oriented perspective the liberty of all to participate in deciding what traditions to observe cannot be ruled out by the national or local 'guardians'—neither by the ayatollahs (or other religious authorities), nor by political rulers (or governmental dictators), nor by cultural 'experts' (domestic or foreign)" (Sen 1998: 45).

In conclusion I would say that research and policy experiences in culture and development, in spite of their richness in the past fifty years, have not been reflected in the reform of existing institutions dealing with this field, neither at the national and international levels nor in the creation of new institutions better equipped to help governments and civil societies deal with the multivariate phenomena related to culture and development.

The ambiguities in the definition of culture and the implicit assumptions about culture in economic development models have led to culturally blind rather than culturally sensitive development policies and programmes, and to generally well-intentioned albeit frequently unsubstantial institutional responses, both nationally and internationally. Given the problems of globalization, the main challenge for this new century, as stated in the first section of the 2001 World Culture Report, is to find strategies so that "…nations and the global community (may) prevent and remedy the deepening of inequality, especially along fault lines, new and old, that coincide with cultural diversity" (Arizpe/Jelin/Rao/Streeten 2001: 23).

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Chapter 6
Cultural Diversity as a Source of Creativity for Globalization

6.1 Introduction

Diversity is the source of the human capacity to develop: we think by associating different images; we identify by contrasting ways of living; we choose from an array of options; we grow by rebuilding our confidence again and again through dialogue.[1] In this new beginning, to cope with the momentous challenges of sustainability, governance and conviviability in a global era, we need all the creativity we can summon from around the world.

Will globalization take us down a road of diminishing returns as uniformity dries up *Our creative diversity*, as the Report of the United Nations Commission on Culture and Development was entitled, or, on the contrary, will it give us greater *freedom to create*—the phrase I used to summarize the conclusions of the Stockholm Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development? The answer to this question will weave the texture of the twenty-first century and take us even further towards the horizon of the next millennium.

There is a sense of urgency in this, which I share. This question is being asked everywhere, as we have found in the ongoing work of UNESCO's World Culture Report—and rather belligerently, to the surprise of many, at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in November 1999. Fortunately, there are voices that have been listening to this question, rather unexpectedly in the case of some institutions: James Wolfensohn, director of the World Bank, was one of the first to speak of the need to 'humanize globalization'.

What is happening, then, with cultural diversity in a world where trade and investments are fostering an increased interdependence among nation-states and peoples, not to mention information and communication technologies (ICTs)? To begin with, the importance of national cultures has been eroded in parallel with the loss of influence of national states in global markets. Supranational economic

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[1] This paper was delivered at the New York University seminar on 'Culture and Trade', New York, 5–10 March 2000. Unpublished.

networks are now emerging—with a call from many quarters, however, for greater coordination and standard-setting. Yet the corresponding supranational cultural networking and standardization is nowhere on the horizon. Indeed, in my view, this is the broader issue which contextualizes the debate about the 'cultural exception' in trade and investment negotiations.

To put it simply, as globalization tears down trade barriers, cultural fences seem to be going up everywhere. Are they fences or are they road signs? In fact, I believe the main problem is that we still have no road map to understand how major cultural trends are constantly shifting, intertwined with the processes of globalization. Cultural mobilizations by minorities, indigenous peoples and migrants to keep and develop their cultural legacies; market strategies by multinational corporations, governments, and local cultural industries that are shaping the market in cultural-content commodities; cultural critiques and demands on television, film and multimedia production by artists, entrepreneurs, and consumers; and the exciting creations of young people experimenting with new ICTs in a virtually seamless world.

Yes, virtually seamless but realistically full of seams. Witness the fact that one of the fastest-growing parts of the Internet is pages addressed to ethnically or culturally affiliated groups. This is true for the United States of America and for all other regions of the world besides. Interesting, is it not? We open, but we enclose. Human beings, as sociology and anthropology have endlessly proved, need an immediate 'reference group', a 'cultural home', as I call it. One that is wider than the residential home. One that nests our hearts.

If people need to carve out cultural homes in the vast spaces of global society, then, this assumption frames the question asked above in a different way. It is no longer a matter of globalization allowing cultural diversity to continue to develop; it is cultural diversity as a condition without which globalization cannot continue. It is its human capacity, its human need as a source of creativity.

The key question today seems to me to be: how can a situation perceived as one of winners and losers be turned into a win-win situation in which everyone gains?

The first step is to clearly define what is meant by culture, by cultural diversity, and by cultural pluralism, and to provide the general principles and guidelines for thinking about these cultural challenges. The United Nations Commission on Culture and Development in its Report *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1996) set the foundations for such general principles and guidelines. Among other ideas it strongly advocated a global ethics based on human rights, democracy and equity, as well as respect and commitment to cultural pluralism.

However, as debates over cultures have intensified in the last five years, new concepts must be added and specific indicators of culture and development must be constructed to provide the tools for policy formulation at national and international level. This is the contribution that UNESCO's World Culture Report has been making to the policy debate in this field. The first issue took up the topics of *Culture, Markets and Creativity* (UNESCO 1998). The second issue dealt with *Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism* (UNESCO 2000). The section on Current Debates took up the issues of culture and trade, culture and poverty, and cultural injustice.

Recent world events show how central the question of culture has become for trade and investment negotiations. At the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in November 1999, debates on the special treatment of cultural content commodities were inconclusive. Thirty-five ministers of culture presented a document asking that goods having cultural content be given special treatment in trade and investment agreements. This topic was also brought up in discussions on globalization at the Global Economic Forum in Davos and the UNCTAD session in Bangkok. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) of the OECD was left aside, in part given the strong positions taken against it because of the issue of 'cultural exception'.

In this short paper, I discuss the recent debates on the analytical concepts applied to cultural diversity and the dynamics of such diversity in the international arena.

6.2 Cultural Diversity, Justice and Recognition

People in different regions of the world are greatly concerned with the intense cultural interaction they have to cope with in their everyday lives through television and films as well as through migration, business, and tourism. Such interaction is reflected in political events as governments are confronted with increased intra-state conflicts, many of them based on cultural demands by secessionist groups, warlords or guerrillas, some linked to borderless mafias and drug traffickers. Cultural and ethnic issues have also been prominent in wars of ethnic cleansing, as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo, or in extreme right government policies, such as those of Jörg Haider in Austria, which seek to exclude, ban or exile those having different cultures or religions.

In other cases, groups are demanding cultural protectionism which may take many forms. One of its most extreme forms is the attempt to close borders to outside communications, for example parabolic antennas, as in Singapore and Iran –this against most of their own citizens' wishes, as a reformist vote showed. Another form of protectionism is cultural fundamentalism. It is vital that cultural differences are not discussed if cultural canons imply metaphysical conditions of being which are in principle opposed to cultural negotiation. In such cases, as Verena Stolcke explains: "…national identity and belonging interpreted as cultural singularity become an insurmountable barrier to doing what comes naturally to humans, in principle, namely, communicating" (Stolcke 2000: 32).

The first section of the 2000 UNESCO World Culture Report describes the paradox whereby ethnic and cultural demands in today's globalized world have emerged out of a context of widespread acceptance of the principles that individuals and groups have equal rights, a right to dignity and to a social order that satisfies them, all of them principles of the Enlightenment (Arizpe/Jelin/Rao/Streeten 2000). Without this background, it is unlikely that ethnic groups would be able to articulate their demands as they are doing today.

Cultural conflicts, however, are always embedded in national or international contexts. They are part of greater struggles over political power, economic resources, and alternative visions of the social good. We live in a time of increasing disparities of income and wealth and variable access to information and the media. Economic inequalities among nations have increased in the past two decades. Moreover, this period has yielded new trends of increasing inequality within many rich and poor countries alike.

Every identity is relational. This means that identities imply an affirmation of difference and possibly an antagonism. This basic distinction pervades and is inherent to statements of belonging. Peoples and cultures define and construct the notions of 'us' and 'them' as part of their historical and cultural interrelationships. Who is on which side of the divide and what attitude one category exhibits towards the other is variable and depends upon historical and local circumstances.

Such perceptions and categorizations of differences have been the basis of domination. Within societies, there are class, gender, and age hierarchies. There are also ethnically defined hierarchies leading to domination and discrimination. Ideologies of patriarchy and racial superiority have been used to justify these practices. Also, ideologies of racial and cultural superiority across societies have been used for domination, enslavement, and annihilation. Only gradually, and not universally, has the view of the essential equality of human beings come to be accepted as codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Cultural opposition against what is perceived as homogenizing global cultural trends has accelerated just as the means for the institutional redress of unequal access to economic resources has weakened or is attacked as ineffectual. The growing shifts of power have thus coincided with growing cultural pressures.

In this context, it has become imperative that we find the conceptual tools with which to understand cultural conflict, cultural inequalities and injustices as part of a larger reality of growing inequalities and injustices in economic, social and political dimensions. In this larger arena the issues at stake are income inequalities, lack of political power, and lack of social recognition and respect.

Respect and reciprocity cannot, of course, be decided by law or institutionalized although disrespect and hierarchy can be and often are. Nevertheless, they may be promoted through a general principle of *conviviability*, the term I am proposing to give coherence to actions towards respect and recognition. Minimizing inequality in social primary goods in Rawls's sense—not just rights and liberties but also powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—is not only the most effective instrument in this regard but can also be institutionalized. Decreasing inequality, and not just absolute poverty, opens up the possibility of equal and effective participation and, thereby, of conviviability and genuine cultural pluralism.

6.3 One Global Culture or Many?

In studies of World Systems Theory, Immanuel Wallerstein contends that global processes operate according to the single logic of global capitalism. In terms of culture this implies that one culture is in the making worldwide (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989; Hopkins/Wallerstein 1982). Most authors, however, argue that globalization operates according to several different dynamics and see many new cultures being constructed (Featherstone 1990; Escobar 1999; Arizpe/Alonso 2000). Featherstone fuelled the debate by noting that "the varieties of response to the globalization process clearly suggest that there is little prospect of a unified global culture, rather there are several global cultures in the plural" (Featherstone 1990: 10). Some authors attribute these emerging differences to locally specified patterns of consumption (Sahlins 1985; Featherstone 1990; Miller 1995; Barber/ Waterman 1995), others to the fact that commodities, ideas, media images, technologies and so on circulate according to quite different criteria (Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1992). The view which seems to me to bridge the two positions is that of Barrie Ashford. He believes it:

> …highly unlikely that these flows and signs, whether in mass communications or in tourism, will produce 'a' global culture, given the diversity of their reception and use by local audiences. However, because they permit forms of social interaction not tied to place or limited in time, it is proper to see them as contexts or frames of reference with which new identities may be formed, and new understandings of the world fashioned (Ashford 1995: 157).

6.4 Cultural Content Commodities

Today, the international economy is characterized by changing patterns of production, consumption and trade of goods, services, and assets. In this changing landscape, cultural goods are changing shape and content. The pre-eminence of the market in driving development has accelerated the commoditization of cultural objects and services that hitherto were considered as following a non-economic rationality. For example, copyright is now being sought for Inuit art and for Australian aboriginal designs, to protect their markets (Arizpe/Alonso 2000).

World trade in cultural goods has grown exponentially in the last two decades. Between 1980 and 1991, world trade in printed matter, literature, music, visual arts, cinema, photographic goods, and radio and television equipment almost tripled from US$67 to US$200 billion (UNESCO 1998: 432). International sales of software and entertainment products in the USA totalled US $60.2 billion in 1996.[2] Also, cultural industries provide jobs and are an important source of revenue from

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[2] "The World Welcomes America's Cultural Invasion", in: *International Herald Tribune*, 26 October 1998: cover page.

international trade. For example, from 1994 to 1995, the culture sector in Canada contributed over US$20 billion to GDP, employing over 600,000 people (Canadian Ministry of Industry 1997).

Importantly, cultural industries have become the most important export sector in the US after aerospace and defence. Its film industry reaches every market in the world. In less than a year, *Titanic* grossed almost US$1.8 billion worldwide. Hollywood today gets half of its revenues from overseas, compared to just 30 % in 1980.

One aspect of this imbalance is reflected in Europe's audiovisual trade deficit, which grew from US$4.8 to US$5.6 billion between 1995 and 1996.[3] Although it is true that audiovisual businesses, especially television conglomerates, are becoming increasingly multinational, the scale of North America's role in global media, both as exporter and investor, remains unique. Indeed, other countries are big producers of cultural products: India, for instance, makes more films each year than the US does. But multinational companies based in North America—Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting, Walt Disney/Capital Cities/ABC and Viacom/Paramount—dominate cultural export markets and lead joint ventures which are creating new audiovisual businesses around the world.

Finally, and taking into consideration trends in the consumption of cultural goods, there is certainly an increasing demand for cultural products. For instance, in EU countries, the level of expenditure on audiovisual and multimedia goods and services has been growing in the nineties at a faster rate than GDP and overall consumption expenditure. These few figures speak eloquently of how culture industries are taking over the traditional forms of production and circulation of culture, turning the culture sector into one of the most promising emerging productive sectors.

6.5 Cultural Debates and Repositioning in Markets

In recent years there have been major differences between governments with regard to culture and trade, representative not only of an ideological debate, but also of their own comparative advantages in the world market for cultural goods.

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[3] These figures are even more striking compared to those of 1992, when the EU-12 had an audiovisual trade deficit with the USA of US$860 million in cinema, US$1,716 million in television programmes and US$1,153 million in video films (Council of Europe 1997: 328). European broadcasters have become huge markets for imported television programmes. Some European governments therefore advocate quotas on the proportion of foreign programming that national channels can show. After a long debate, the European Union agreed in 1997 to a 'Television without Frontiers' directive, aimed at setting quotas for domestic television programmes. However, intense opposition, led by Britain, added to the directive 'where practicable', rendering the provision ineffectual.

As the herald of free market principles and with strong economic interests in exports in the culture sector, US strategy is to place cultural and economic goods and services on the same playing field as other exports, so that they receive exactly the same treatment. Culture is viewed as an industry like any other, subject to market laws, and benefiting from all the advantages of free trade. As Mike Marando, spokesperson for the California Trade and Commerce Agency said, "We do not see it as cultural imperialism. We see it as a marketplace issue" (Crothers 2007: 111). Closely aligned with the United States of America are countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, most of whom are also large exporters and importers of cultural goods, apart from audiovisuals.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, we find the French doctrine of 'Cultural Exception', based on the principle that cultural goods have an intrinsic value of their own that it is essential to maintain and protect, not only for artistic production and diversity, but also for national identity and cultural sovereignty.[4] As the French Minister of Culture Catherine Trautmann stated in 1997:

> Pluralism and openness are at the core of the principle of cultural exception…Necessary for keeping our sovereignty in the area of culture, both nationally and at the European level… Culture touches upon what is most essential for an individual: access to knowledge, to a plural vision of the world…It is linked to identity and citizenship; it is what makes a group of people decide to live together in the same territory with common rules. I am against culture dissolving in an international economic system, leading to uniformization.[5]

Close to the French position is Canada, with less emphasis on public subsidies, but which supports measures to help domestic companies to retain an element of choice in their cultural markets (Canadian Ministry of Industry 1997). Canada also claims special treatment for cultural products and services in trade forums in order to ensure respect for cultural concerns of equality of access, diversity of content, and the rights of the creator within the global information society.

History reveals many instances where groups have not just tolerated others but have based their mutual relationship on respect or even a shared closeness. The basis for such closeness is practices that accord dignity to the other while maintaining a creative openness. 'I respect you and I am open to learning from you and our interactions'. This attitude and this relation deserve a name; I would like to call it *conviviability*. The long yet invisible periods of no wars in the world and the extraordinary philosophies of altruism and cooperation invented by human beings show that conviviality is an attainable ideal. The challenge facing us today is how to deal with conflict, domination and cultural injustice in ways that will foster conviviality. We must make the ability to create convivial relations—*conviviability*—a principle of development in global civil society.

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[4] "*Un livre n'est pas, pour l'auteur, une marchandise, un objet de commerce; c'est un usage de ses forces qu'il peut concéder à d'autres, mais qu'il ne peut jamais aliéner*". Document by the French delegation to UNESCO, 2004.

[5] Debate on *L'exception générale pour la culture, l'audiovisuel et l'exclusion de la propriété littéraire artistique dans les accords A.M.I.: une question de survie*, organized by the Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (SACD), held at UNESCO in 1997.

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
Civic Intangible Cultural Rights (2011)

The cultural dimensions of global change

▶ An anthropological approach

Edited by Lourdes Arizpe

Part II
Reconfiguring Intangible Cultural Heritage

With Cherif Khaznadar at the International Intangible Cultural Heritage Meeting in Oaxaca (2002). *Source* Photo Edith Pérez Flores who granted permission

Cultural Challenges in Mexico (2004)

Chapter 7
How to Reconceptualize Intangible Cultural Heritage

It is a pleasure to be with you at this Meeting for the Tenth Anniversary of the 2003 Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) held in Chengdu, capital of Sichuan, in China.[1] Only a decade after the Convention was adopted by a record number of member states, we can be impressed by the enthusiasm that the Convention has generated in every region of the world, fully represented here by more than 300 delegates to this gathering of experiences, ideas and projects to go forward.

This is a tribute to all the people who, for several decades now, have worked in creating such a complex yet accessible Convention to fill an urgent need in the world: that of preserving our cultural legacies while opening up to new conditions and new challenges in rebuilding the sensorial, psychological, social, and political relationships between human beings. Irina Bokova is to be commended in bringing to us at this meeting the good news that culture is now, finally, being discussed at the United Nations in the broad consultations to recast the Millennium Development Goals.

Given the rapidity with which the ICH Convention was successfully launched in many countries, it is also time to rethink the outlook and experiences that have driven its expansive force in so many countries. In what follows, I will summarize the main points we need to consider to prepare for the challenges that await intangible cultural heritage and societies around the world.

Firstly, the question must be asked: are cultural practitioners really 'safeguarding' their cultural practices? No, I believe they are *reconfiguring* their intangible cultural heritage practices. They are reconfiguring them because they now perceive the new valorization their practices have for their own practitioners, stakeholders, governments, and international societies. This 'pride of the few' which now becomes the 'pride of all'—a feeling I first understood when speaking with a

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[1] Remarks delivered at the Panel "Open Questions and Future Directions" at the Meeting for the Tenth Anniversary of the 2003 Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage, Chengdu, China, 14–16 June 2013. Unpublished.

Filipino cultural official at the Manila meeting of the World Commission on Culture and Development (Arizpe 2000)—may very possibly enhance positive attitudes towards people's intangible cultural heritage practices, producing not only a stronger wish to safeguard them, but also a renewed interest in placing them in the light and transmitting them to their children.

We have witnessed this transformation in our own work with local cultural practitioners in creating the Archive on Intangible Cultural Heritage at the Multi-disciplinary Research Center (CRIM) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) from 2004 onwards.[2] For example, in Yautepec, Morelos, Mexico, the local organizing committee recently invented a 'Children's Parade of *Chinelo* Dancers', which takes place the day before the main parade, so as to make children feel they are protagonists in this cultural manifestation. In the *Chinelo* Dance every '*barrio*' (neighbourhood) of the town sponsors a troop of dancers wearing a very elaborate, richly embroidered robe and headdress, who dance all day in a long parade. By keeping the children alert and interested in their own parade they ensure that they may become practitioners of the *Chinelo* Dance in the future.

Secondly, we need a timeline for intangible cultural heritage. What is to be safeguarded is not the event, the sudden coming together of thoughts, acts, and behaviours, but a 'moment of time' in a continuous flow of meaning and interaction. In a sense, following Virginia Woolf's insight for literature, a living cultural practice is a 'moment of being' of a community. From its inception, the International Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage has taken this into account, but it needs to be made more explicit, because candidatures for Lists tend to focus mainly on the more visible aspects of heritage, say, a dance or a festivity. Of course it is the material, the tangible that catches the eye, the costumes, the headdress, the musical instruments, the choreography, etc. Yet let us remember that the real targets of safeguarding must be the human bonding, the covenants and the promises, all those intangibles in which people engage in order to make their lives worth living by sharing them with others. It is these invisible bonds that are enacted in intangible cultural heritage.[3]

Thirdly, the proper scale and plurality of living cultural practices must be further explored. Intangible cultural heritage practices are not unique: they are singular performances within webs of plurality. Rarely are such practices exclusive to a single village, or to one ethnic group in a geographical or culturally bounded region. Instead, most cultural practices are constellations of 'culturemes' that groups have acquired and exchanged by interacting with other cultural clusters. This is why singling out one practice to place on the Lists of the Conventions constantly brings up the question of

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[2] International research has been carried out through the UNESCO/UNITWIN. Chair for Research on Intangible Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity at CRIM–UNAM, as well as through the Commission on Intangible Cultural Heritage of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences.

[3] I understood this while analyzing the festivity of the Day of the Dead, a ceremony inscribed in the Representative List, in Mexican villages. See Arizpe (2007) reprinted as Chap. 2 'The Ritual and the Promise' of this book.

why that particular group was chosen. And if the counterclaim of this practice is authentic, the other isn't. Or the question of why only one country is claiming to be the place where this practice originated. Clearly, extracting a cultural practice from a broader cultural territory also tends to isolate it, since so many forms of cultural heritage are embedded in micro-regional identity politics.

In our present culturally whirling world, much like Turkish dervishes, the cultural plurality of the world cannot be represented simply as a pastiche of narrowly defined singular groups, each having claims and entitlements of their own. Multiculturalism, as recently stated by both Angela Merkel and David Cameron, is dead. In the World Commission on Culture and Development we have already stated that a global ethic of human rights, democracy, equity, accountability, and sustainability must supersede the ever narrower cultural interests.

Therefore, a basic assumption about intangible cultural heritage must be changed: it is not that that different ethnic groups give rise to different practices in intangible cultural heritage, but rather that the differences in intangible cultural heritage practices 'are useful for thinking' (as Claude Lévi-Strauss would have said) concerning the relationships between groups of cultural practitioners living within a territory.[4] This means that intangible cultural heritage practices in fact provide a metonymy for cultural pluralism. In a sense, then, intangible cultural heritage has always been a map of symbolic relationships between groups of cultural practitioners. Now, using the 2003 Convention, cultural practitioners and governments are adding a new layer to global cultural-political relationships.

Fourthly, linking intangible cultural heritage to sustainability requires resemanticizing and reconceptualizing human involvement in ecosystemic relations. At the preparatory Piemonte meeting in 2000 to create a blueprint for the Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage, I proposed a domain for intangible cultural heritage of 'Beliefs about Nature'. I believe the formulation of such a domain is now superseded, both conceptually and because it yielded few results. It was mostly reported in terms of the listing of indigenous cosmovisions, ethnobotanical and ethnozoological knowledge, native meteorological systems and so on.

Now it is important to rethink this domain in terms of the conceptual framework in which intangible cultural heritage has been placed. As Phillipe Descola, the French anthropologist, has shown, the conceptual separation of 'Nature' and 'culture' in Western cultures is a cultural construct that must now be superseded. In contrast, a majority of historical cultures have conceptualized the attributes and identities of humans as embedded in eco-socio-systems. More specifically, many non-human animals and even plants are frequently cast as protagonists in intangible cultural heritage practices at several scales of symbolic representation. As the boundaries of 'humanness' are now being redrawn, a broader concept of embedding bio-cultural practices must be developed so that the concept of 'intangible cultural heritage' will not be left behind from the rapidly evolving new paradigm of a world in which science, beliefs, and cultural practices are conceived as connected processes.

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[4] A first step in analyzing these connections is proposed in Arizpe (2013).

While this broader philosophical agenda is in the making, we may think about this in the current narrow terms of sustainability and intangible cultural heritage as two different concerns. The first is how to make intangible cultural heritage practices sustainable, both in terms of ensuring that the actual use of resources, references, and actions of such practices do not deplete or harm ecosystems, and of making certain that there is a social sustainability to such practices. The second is how to reconfigure intangible cultural heritage practices so that they will converge with other new human activities towards the sustainability of the world as we know it.

In this sense, the important question to ask is how intangible cultural heritage will contribute to the new 'worlding'[5] of a human sustainable future.

Framed in this way, a new panorama opens up: of course intangible cultural heritage has an enormous contribution to make to this sustainable future. In a world hurtling towards high risks, the past will not tell us what to do, but it may give us the organizational know-how, shared emotional ties, and philosophical approaches that will allow us to reconfigure or to create cultures which are in tune with a sustainable and technological future. To do this we must confront the conservatism that may ensue in trying to safeguard the past. When you put something alive into a glass cage and turn it into an exhibit or a show, it dies. When you give fundamentalist and intolerant cultures or religions a baton to claim entitlement in power relations, human forward-looking endeavours will come to a halt. Cultural and religious gatekeepers will always want to conserve their power base. We had already said as much in the World Commission on Culture and Development: respect must be given to cultures only if, in turn, they respect other cultures. Assassinating people, oppressing women, discriminating against autochthonous or marginal groups will not lead to social or political sustainability. Safeguarding, then, is not enough. Cultural practitioners, in fact, have now gone further than that in reconfiguring their intangible cultural heritage.

The new wording of the goal for the 2003 Convention must be changed from 'keeping an intangible cultural heritage practice from the past' to 'reconfiguring a past practice as a source of meaning, creativity, and know-how for the future'. Meaning gives selfhood, creativity breeds innovation, and know-how provides the hands to work on shared agreements together. Thus, intangible cultural heritage programmes are no longer an end point of practices of the past but the starting point for cultural innovations in plural societies.

The interest fostered by the International Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage has taken very concrete forms. In Mexico, when we anthropologists want to begin a season of fieldwork in towns and villages, we now check YouTube. There, we usually find several videos of these festivities and ceremonies, blurred and shaky, since most have been filmed by young people with their mobile phones and tablets. They do this because they now know that there is

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[5] See Chap. 1 'Arbitrating Collective Dreams: Anthropology and the New Worlding' of this book.

something called 'intangible cultural heritage' and that it has gained worldwide recognition and support through UNESCO. But there is more.

This has to do with the receptivity mentioned by Koichiro Matsuura and, I would add, a willingness to participate in some way so that such rituals and festivities may continue. And let me emphasize that these multimedia images are being taken by a generation of young people steeped in communication technology. Clearly, they do not want to forget or leave out or ignore what gives them meaning. I will call this a most important factor for the 2003 Convention, that is, the active willingness of stakeholders to help safeguard and reconfigure intangible cultural heritage. They are young, they have tasted a borderless and cultureless world, and, in spite of that, they want a sense of history, a shared feeling, an aesthetics of joy, all bottled up in an 'intangible cultural heritage moment of being'. A 'cultural moment' which, incidentally, can be placed online and sent out as an offering to friends on social media and, very importantly, as a friendly gesture to everyone in the world.

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
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Chapter 8
The Genealogy of Intangible Cultural Heritage

8.1 Introduction

In this new century, barriers are falling, customs are changing and yet there is a core of meaning, of affect, of memory that people refuse to give up. In this flowing and foaming world, people rush towards the new, at the same time as they want to cling to meanings and shared experiences with others. Why? Because this sharing gives them a sense of self and of identity in an open world.[1] The loss of such references is keenly felt, psychologically and politically, as is very evident in the world today.

It was concern about this loss in the turmoil of globalization that led member states to give UNESCO the mandate to generate actions for the protection of living culture. This was indeed a tall order and one which led to fascinating intellectual and political meanders. At the beginning of the nineties, the 'cultural turn' in world politics and the rise of representational claims had led to new ways of understanding cultural flows in terms of 'worlding', heritage and emblems of identity. People in nations, cultural enclaves, ethnic groups, diasporas and cultural groups that had recently emerged began to mobilize in order to position themselves differently in the new world order. Through a very complicated process, the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage was successful in proposing a new concept for the recasting of relationships between nation-states, culture-bearers, creators and stakeholders.

Until two decades ago, the past was enshrined mainly in the built environment, pyramids, monuments, perennial landscapes. Cultural heritage seemed to be fixed in stone, while living heritage changed with the movement of the sun. In today's world, the past is present in the performance of a dance in the morning while the future is another group's performance of the same dance in the afternoon. Indeed, the present seems to occupy an ever-narrower slice of time as new technologies and globalization compress the timeline between creation and transformation.

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[1] This paper was delivered at the Meeting of the *Centre National du Patrimoine Culturel Immatériel*, Vitré, France, 25 September 2013 and is unpublished.

As the present thins out, it becomes evident as never before that the notion of 'cultural heritage' is a moment in time, captured in heuristic trappings that are given legitimacy because they have been agreed on by a collectivity. The collectivities that create a given practice of intangible cultural heritage may be a small ethnic group in the Himalayas, or the Rastafarian diaspora, or an international community of Mexican '*fandango*' practitioners in Los Angeles, Chicago or Paris. Since the key process in living cultural heritage is that it may shift from today to tomorrow, it follows that its definition and the modes of safeguarding it must go through intense intellectual, heuristic and political negotiations within the plurality of collectivities that practise it, and with the government and international agencies that frame their recognition.

In a recent publication, physical cultural heritage placed on the World Heritage List was defined as having the attributes of singularity, uniqueness, universality, interconnectedness and international cooperation (UNESCO 2012). In contrast, I would say that intangible cultural heritage has as its main attribute the dynamics of performance and of exchange. Consequently, the normative and operational procedures of the 2003 Convention have increasingly had to deal with the dynamics of singularity and plurality (as different cultural groups lay claim to a given practice), uniqueness (as cultural groups clash over the territorial, cultural or ontological origins of a practice), and locality and universality (as some local groups cry out that their practice is being expropriated by involving it in macro-territorial international operations). There is no 'interconnectedness' in intangible cultural heritage, as if cultures were entities fixed in stone. Rather, there is an 'interculturality' of deep, recurrent cultural exchanges.

Additionally, intangible cultural heritage has two other aspects that are distinctive. One is territorial, and has to do with the immigrant status of numerous cultural groups in the geopolitical grid of nation-states. The second is the *mise-en-scène* of a cultural practice, that is, whether it is performed in the place traditionally sanctioned as the only legitimate context in which to perform such a practice. Say, for example, if the storytelling and acrobatics we see at the Djemaa el-Fnaa square of Marrakesh are transferred to a theatre stage in Rabat or in Paris, are they still the same practice?

All these questions were present at the very beginning of recurrent debates about intangible cultural heritage in UNESCO, in 1972, 1973, 1989 and 1995. The decision we had to deal with at UNESCO in the nineties was whether an international convention based on an extremely complex constellation of living practices, previously termed 'folklore', 'cultural traditions', 'customs' could be 'captured' in a juridically formidable normative international convention. At the time, as Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO, I decided that work towards this convention should go ahead, with all the misgivings that I, as a social anthropologist, had always had towards such an endeavour, as I explain below. Part of my concern arose from the tension I could see rising between the increasing instrumentalization of the idea of culture as it had begun to be taken up in the policy debates on multiculturalism and the 'clash of civilizations', and the perception, shared by many of us social scientists, which Georges Balandier summarizes incomparably:

Les contemporains, les surmodernes habitent de moins en moins des pays, des espaces physiques, et de plus en plus des univers issus des savoirs nouveaux, de la créativité, des entreprises transformatrices, et génératrices de milieux et de cadres artificiels où l'existence humaine ne cesse de se techniciser (Balandier 2001).[2]

In this chapter, I will analyze the genesis of the concept of intangible cultural heritage as the creation of a *chantier* in which we must continue to carve and sculpt a term with which to understand human living performances. As best explained in French, a *chantier* is where an emerging perception about human creativity is still being negotiated in terms of old scientific and political viewpoints. And the balance which must be found is that between the basic need to keep selfhood while at the same time reconstructing power relations, opposing new oppressions, and gazing anew at a world that has become unfamiliar.

The 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage created a new, internationally legitimized concept for the recasting of cultural relationships between nation-states, culture-bearers, creators and cultural stakeholders. In the following pages, I will describe the different strands that influenced this, as I had the privilege to be a 'decision-making' participant in this process, as well as a participant in subsequent meetings held in the course of setting up the 2003 Convention.[3]

As a starting point, I will say that intangible cultural heritage will continue to carry with it the heritage it has received from the concept of culture, that is, its polysemy. This is the story of how it came about.

8.2 Depths and Curves of Imagination and Politics

At the end of the nineteenth century, as industrial capitalism grew in Western Europe and subsequently in North America, Japan, and elsewhere, different combinations of economic development and the rearrangement of historical cultures set the stage for a first worlding (*mondiation*[4]), that is, a world narrative about peoples bearing different cultures. In its nineteenth-century version, this narrative, sustained by linear evolutionary schemes, pointed towards the convergence of all the different

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[2] "Our contemporaries, the *surmodernes*, inhabit less and less countries and physical spaces and increasingly universes of new knowledge, creativity, and transformative enterprises, generating worlds and artificial settings where human existence does not cease to become technified" (my translation).

[3] I was a member of the UN World Commission on Culture and Development (1992–1996), Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO (1994–1998), and participated in the meetings held in the course of setting up the International Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage (1999–2002).

[4] I use '*mondiation*' in the sense in which Philipe Descola uses it, not to refer to postcolonial discourse but rather to the creation of a world view which then becomes prevalent in a society in a given historical period.

historical and regional cultures towards a single cultural outcome. To put it very schematically, the cultural option at that time reflected the choice which industrialized societies themselves were facing, between creating liberal democratic societies based on science or retaining their attachment to distinctive regional communities of language and culture. I mention this here because some of the arguments raised in these historical debates are now being heard, with other words and framed in other discourses, around the *chantier* of intangible cultural heritage.

In the first half of the twentieth century the clash between these two political philosophies, 'civilization' and *Kultur*, came to a head in the Second World War, with Nazism committing atrocities in the name of defending their own '*Volk*', in which they perceived a singularity and uniqueness that would lead them to political supremacy and to the annihilation of unwanted other cultures and religions. The clash of these two philosophies in the Second World War, needless to say, gave an unprecedented salience to culture in the war's aftermath. Thus, to end 'the wars that begin in the minds of men', UNESCO was created, to place imaginaries and cultures on the open stage of international political scrutiny.

André Malraux gave this new outlook a discursive form when he stated that "…in the last 25 years, pluralism was born; and the old idea of civilization—which was that of progress in sentiments, in social attitudes, in customs and in the arts—was substituted for the new idea of cultures, that is, the idea that each particular civilization had created its own system of values, that these systems of values were not the same, that they did not follow each other necessarily…" (UNESCO 1947: 80). With these elements, he invented a new worlding for a decolonizing world in the 1950s.

During that decade, as 'economic development' became the blueprint for the future in the United Nations, culture was alternatively conceptualized as an instrument for 'cultural readjustment' or as an obstacle to development, given the 'culture of poverty'. It is important to note that the original meaning of this concept, coined by Oscar Lewis, an anthropologist who followed Mexican migrants to the city, was that of the 'subculture of poverty', which he explained was an outgrowth of industrialization and urbanization (Arizpe 2008). In this sense, in thinking about intangible cultural heritage, attention must be paid to whether the cultural practices under scrutiny are historically derived practices or have been invented more recently by groups placed in positions of marginalization and poverty in economic environments.

In the second half of the twentieth century, anthropology and ethnology drove ethnographic studies that carefully documented the creativity of local peoples, especially autochthonous and indigenous peoples. In developing countries, as modernization began to detach local cultures from their atavistic frameworks, programmes to offset this process began to emerge. In Mexico, for example, a country which had had a social revolution early in the century, state-sponsored research and cultural policies pioneered archaeological and anthropological programmes. Specifically, a programme of Ethnographic Rescue was set in place to try to protect the extraordinary cultures of indigenous peoples by placing them in museums. Such cultural institutions and policies were made known to the incipient UNESCO constituency in 1948, when the UNESCO Second General Conference was held in Mexico City. I would say that this era of trying to preserve the diversity

of cultures by placing them in museums came to an end in 1995. At the time, at the UNESCO Executive Board meeting in Rabat, Morocco, delegation after delegation from developing countries asked me, as the newly arrived Assistant Director for Culture, to stop creating museums or uninhabited historical city centres and to do something for 'living cultures'.

Three other processes placed culture at the centre of international attention. The first was the well-attested fact that, as I put it in many of my speeches, "the globalization of cultural communications is advancing at a more rapid pace than economic globalization", while we anthropologists have not had, and continue not to have, the tools to analyze it or to influence its course. The second was the rise of the New Right, as studied in Britain and expanded also in other countries, which had the intent of redefining and appropriating the terms 'culture', 'nation' and 'race' for its particular ends (Seidel 1985).

As a third process, many developing countries, coming from histories of anti-apartheid and national liberation struggles as well as attempts to weld together culturally diverse regions, considered culture as an important card to play in putting forward their demands for specific adaptations of structural adjustment and neo-liberal economic policies as well as for greater political participation and equality in international development.

With such divergent viewpoints, it was understandable that the dialogue on culture in UNESCO between governments, civil society organizations, international cultural programme officers and, in the midst of them all, anthropologists, was fraught with difficulties. Yet they all agreed that the challenge was to create cultural guidelines and programmes as fast as possible, to help people shoot the rapids of cultural transformations in new frames of reference in space and time. Anthropology must continue to be very active in this process, but it must go beyond narrow advocacy towards a new active reflexivity about the nature of the web of meanings in the emerging international cultural space.

In the nineties, culture became a major instrument of international policy in the new political project for world capitalism and played a minimal role in the state. Paradoxically, this happened just at the time when anthropologists were questioning the concept and even proposing it be shelved. Interpretive anthropology had buried the term 'culture' under that of 'interpretations of interpretations' (Geertz 1973). Interpretive theories led the way towards postmodern approaches that emphasized meaning and subjectivity. Ethnomethodology, semiology and postmodern studies dissolved culture into textual analysis, and postcolonial studies revealed the Foucaldian power structures behind classic anthropological inquiry.

More precisely, cultures could no longer be seen as bounded, fixed entities, in contexts of "dislocated histories and hybridized ethnicities", as people flowed into pluricultural urban settings (Hall 1993: 356). Culture was redefined, then, as a 'site of contestation' (Cohen 1985). The 'cultural turn' in many disciplines not only pulled culture out of its ethnographically rooted methods, but dissolved it in the impossibility of believing in grand narratives. Such was the scepticism around this concept that in 1998 Christopher Brumann published an article on why the useful concept of culture should not be discarded (Brumann 1999).

It would be worth conducting a study to try and find out why it was that, at a time when academic disciplines were ever more sceptical of the heuristic usefulness of the concept of culture in the nineties, it was accorded pre-eminence as a concept in the politics of development.

8.3 When Cultural Loss Becomes Visible, Culture Becomes Political

Although 'cultural development' was mentioned as one of the goals of the United Nations in the First General Conference in 1946, the idea was given international recognition only in the 1969 UNESCO document *Cultural Policy: a Preliminary Study* (UNESCO 1969). Criteria were formally recommended for defining this concept and linking culture to the fulfilment of personality and economic and social development, especially literacy programmes. The document ended by restating that one of the main guidelines should be that literacy programmes and 'cultural development' should be considered as 'an indivisible whole'. This preliminary proposal was followed by the first Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies held in Venice in 1970, and by a series of publications on cultural policies in the next decade.

International activities in this area culminated in the 1982 Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies (Mondiacult) held in Mexico, at which the basic guidelines for cultural policies were drawn up. At the meeting, although France had held the leadership in developing national cultural policies since the fifties, developing countries were very active in setting up cultural policies as a way of enhancing 'endogenous development' based on 'social pluralism'.[5] Claims to national and local cultural identities after decolonization, as well as rapid modernization in some developing countries, led the Group of 77 to propose the 'World Decade for Culture and Development 1988–1997', with UNESCO as its lead agency. Activities organized during the Decade, however, while valuable in many cases in encouraging ethnographic studies and creating national archives for folklore and folk art, mainly reiterated celebrations and festivities, with little reference to development concerns.

The 1989 Recommendation on the Protection of Traditional Cultures and Folklore had set the stage for bringing this new issue on to the international stage, but had not added momentum to the discussion on culture and development. As a result, in 1992 member states of the United Nations, under the leadership of Sweden and the Nordic countries, proposed that a World Commission on Culture and Development be created. When I was invited to become a member of the Commission, I had two

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[5] This idea influenced several generations of Latin American scholars. At that time, as a post-doctoral student, I was active in the emerging Indian organizations in Mexico and had written on Indian ethnicities and the protection of their cultures. See Arizpe (2014a, b).

decades of policy analysis of culture in my background.[6] In 1979 Rodolfo Staven-hagen, with a group of anthropologists and writers, had created a pioneering gov-ernment programme in Mexico for the safeguarding of local cultures, including urban cultures, in which I participated as a postdoctoral student. In a country that had given prominence to safeguarding archaeological and ethnographic materials, and had strongly supported artisanal handicrafts, we argued that attention should be shifted to the producers of such materials and handicrafts, and that their local cultures should be respected and promoted. In 1985 (to my surprise) I was then designated Director of the National Museum of Popular Cultures. Most exhibits engaged with indigenous and urban cultural practitioners in setting up graphic and visual displays of their cultures and performances, through a new kind of museography. In fact, specialists came from many countries of the world to see these exhibits. The aim was to have practitioners and stakeholders valorize such cultures and to influence government policies in this direction, and to rescue cultural or work traditions that were dying. In 1988 I left the Museum to become President of the International Union of Anthro-pological and Ethnological Sciences. In 1992 I was invited to become a member of the World Commission on Culture and Development and in 1994 I was designated Assistant Director-General of the Culture Sector of UNESCO.

8.4 Laying the Groundwork for Intangible Cultural Heritage

The work of the United Nations Commission on Culture and Development in 1992–1995, with its nine consultations in different regions of the world, brought a wealth of ideas, philosophies and political undercurrents to the international debate which, astonishingly, we were able to bring together in the report *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1995).[7] At UNESCO, in the follow-up to *Our Creative Diversity*, five meetings were held to try to define indicators and indices for culture and development, as a complement to the human development index that had been created at the United Nations Development Programme. To my mind, the concepts discussed at these meetings, indicators of 'cultural development', 'cultural freedom', 'cultural diversity' and others, gave important insights for recasting UNESCO's heritage programmes in terms of 'living' and 'meaningful' practices that had to be recognized, safeguarded and reinvented in the context of development. In the end, however, culture escaped from all the conceptual traps we had laid for it because of its polysemy and other unfathomables.

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[6] In 1979 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, with a group of anthropologists and writers, had created a pioneering government programme for the safeguarding of local cultures, including urban cultures. It took us several years to carve out a policy concept for 'culturas populares'. In 1993 the National Museum of Popular Cultures was created.

[7] I was a member of the Commission, then placed in charge of the Secretariat of the Commission. At that time, I was also Assistant Director-General for Culture in UNESCO, 1994–1998.

Although 'traditional cultures' and 'folklore' had been the main terms present in most debates and international programmes, that of 'cultural heritage' had been coined for the 1972 international *Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage* (UNESCO 1972). The term 'intangible culture' had surfaced in meetings and in UNESCO documents. Noriko Aikawa-Faure, as programme officer at UNESCO, had carried out several projects and set up seminars and international meetings with world anthropologists, especially George Condominas, to develop a more robust normative instrument in this field. When she came to see me in 1995, as I was settling into my role as Assistant Director General for Culture at UNESCO, and asked me, as an ethnologist, to help develop an international instrument in the field of traditional cultures, I readily agreed.

We set up a project to hold five meetings in this thematic area in different countries in the next programme of the Culture Sector. At that time, I was immersed in setting up the follow-up to the Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development and we were very interested in creating indicators for culture and development, or perhaps even an index along the same lines as the Human Development Index.[8] I remember a meeting we organized in 1996 about indicators for cultural and development at which we also experimented with several terms to denote living cultural heritage. Those of us who were anthropologists proposed 'expressive culture', but other suggestions were 'creative heritage' 'philosophical heritage', 'intellectual heritage', 'self-expressive cultural heritage' and other, wilder ones which were soon discarded. The discussion ran along two axes: the 'physical-intangible' attributes which would allow for a connection to be made with the cultural heritage of the World Heritage List; and the 'formalized-expressive' attributes, in an attempt to capture the structural versus the transformational nature of the practices to be described. The lexical differences of terms in different languages were also discussed.

It was finally in the staff meetings with Noriko Aikawa and programme officers of the culture sector that the decision was taken to take 'intangible cultural heritage' as the official term for the work that UNESCO would develop in this area. We were all aware that it was not precise enough, that 'intangible' added a polysemy to the already very complex polysemy of the word 'culture', and that 'heritage' was a term that might even not exist in many languages. Nevertheless, it provided a heuristic to encompass the creativity implicit in the flow of thoughts and practices, the link to physical cultural heritage, the collective recognition of worth and the shared human capability to imagine and to invent culture.

The concept of intangible cultural heritage did not entirely denote all that needed to be captured, but we hoped the connotations it offered were broad enough to allow for the inclusion of the depth and breadth of all languages and cultures. We also considered that subsequent work would allow a more precise denotation, on the

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[8] Mahbub ul Haq, one of the major theorists of the Human Development Index, was a member of the Commission, and I myself had also worked with researchers in developing the Index at the United Nations Programme for Development.

basis of more theoretical and methodological work. As it turned out, once the term was coined for the Convention it was sequestered into a political glass cage and its ambivalences and contradictions have been managed exclusively through political and organizational procedures.

As far as I am concerned, the meetings on cultural indicators and on intangible cultural heritage allowed me to consolidate the shift in the perspective on culture which I had envisaged for the cultural programmes at UNESCO. Thus, in the brochure of the Culture Sector for the 1998 General Conference, I stated my own definition of culture as follows:

Culture is the continuous flow of meanings that people create, blend and exchange. It enables us to build cultural legacies and live in their memory. It permits us to recognize our bonds with kin, community, language groups and nation-states, as well as humanity itself. It helps us live a thoughtful existence. Yet culture can also lead us to transform our differences into banners of war and extremism. So it should never be taken for granted, but carefully shaped into forms of positive achievement…today, as peoples of all cultures come into closer contact than ever before, they see each other and ask the same question: how can we preserve our heritage? How can our multiple cultures coexist in an interactive world? (UNESCO 1997).

The brochure had a section on 'Forms of self-expression: the intangible heritage' assembled by Noriko Aikawa-Faure, which explained that:

> …the world's cultural heritage also comprises its oral traditions, languages, music, dance and performing arts, crafts and customs…UNESCO has long given its attention to the preservation of these constantly changing forms of cultural expression. However, a renewed momentum is provided in this expanded programme… (UNESCO 1997: 10).

8.5 Working Definitions of Intangible Cultural Heritage: Human Rights, Cultural Domains and Local Agency

Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO (2000–2006), soon after his arrival made the international Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage one of his flagship projects. In his first year, he called for an 'International Round Table on Intangible Culture Heritage–Working Definitions' (which was held in Turin, Italy) to define the scope of intangible cultural heritage and those elements of it that were to be protected by an international legal instrument. I was asked to give the keynote paper at that meeting.

In my presentation in Turin, I forcibly stressed that the notion of heritage is constituted of meanings shaped by people's perceptions related to objects, knowledge or practices. I explained that enactment is an essential and defining aspect of intangible heritage, which sets it apart from physical heritage, in the sense that this heritage exists and is sustained through people's actions. On this basis, I argued, intangible cultural heritage should be understood as a process of creation,

comprising skills, enabling factors, products, meanings, impacts and economic value, each of which I explained. Instruments to safeguard intangible cultural heritage should then focus on protecting this process of creation, which has handed down very valuable enactments from the past and which must be sustained so that societies can continue to create their own futures.

In answering the question of why a legal instrument to safeguard intangible cultural heritage was necessary, I provided the following answers:

1. to conserve human creations that may disappear forever, on the assumption that (a) human creations are to be valued, and (b) the diversity of human creations is important for humanity;
2. to give world recognition to certain kinds of intangible cultural heritage, on the assumption that (a) all world inhabitants have a stake in conserving such heritage, and (b) that nations and groups gain from world recognition of their heritage, and as such, "the pride of the few becomes the pride of everyone"[9];
3. to strengthen identities, including local, ethnic, cultural and national;
4. to enable social cooperation in an era where the market and consumerism are emphasizing individualism;
5. to provide historical continuity in addressing the psychological need for people to feel that they belong to some historical tradition;
6. to foster enjoyment.

In my presentation, as domains of intangible cultural heritage that UNESCO could address on a sound theoretical basis and with a specific comparative advantage vis-à-vis other national and international institutions in developing a new international legal instrument,[10] I proposed: (1) social practices of cohesion, (2) oral traditions, (3) festivities, and (4) beliefs about nature and the cosmos.

At the Turin meeting, an American anthropologist, Peter Seitel, stressed the centrality of traditional custodians as full partners and experts in the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage, thus highlighting the agency of tradition-holders who, as creators with the expertise and conscious intention of transmitting their traditions, should be given greater recognition. He also gave broader scope to this concept by calling attention to the fact that intangible cultural heritage could be hybrid and creole, and based on other criteria such as occupation, or related to women's activities.

It is worth mentioning here that this last theme was subsequently taken up in another UNESCO meeting on 'Women and Intangible Cultural Heritage'. Calling attention again to how women's participation in cultural processes had been rendered invisible, by then many anthropological studies had shown that they were

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[9] This was my perception in Manila, Philippines, when as ADG for Culture I was taken to see the culture heritage sites.

[10] As ADG for Culture I had been in charge of relations with other international institutions which had just recently begun programmes related to culture, especially the World Bank, WIPO and WTO, who began to define culture in terms of property. As could be expected, many conceptual and institutional boundary discussions ensued.

central, especially in social practices and rituals. In her influential book *The Gender of the Gift*, Strathern (1989) had explained how women's labour and extensive networks were crucial to the performance of ritual and to the building of the value of objects and other forms of intangible cultural heritage through social relations. Women are not passive 'tradition-holders' and do not merely operate as a function of 'transmission' of intangible cultural heritage. Yet they face a 'crucial paradox', as Adriana González Mateos termed it in the paper she presented at this meeting: "in the process of freeing themselves from traditional constraints (she said), they regard modernization as a liberating option… while a subtler strategy to keep them under such constraints is to stress the role of women as keepers of tradition" (González 2003).

The Turin meeting was followed by a meeting in Brazil, where participants also brought to bear the importance of establishing safeguarding programmes discussed with local communities, and situating them in the context of development policies.

Opening the discussion at the Expert Meeting on Terminology held in Paris on 10–12 June 2002, I gave an overview of the context in which intangible cultural heritage had to be defined. I said we had to compress a century of debates in the social sciences on culture and on political changes as a context for the Convention. As main issues I stressed that priority be given to culture-bearing communities and local agency, and that safeguarding should ensure conditions that would allow people to continue to create and recreate cultural heritage in time, with attention being given to the social interactions involved in enactments, including the urgent need of ensuring political and religious tolerance. As an anthropologist, I concurred with my colleagues from the Smithsonian Institution who had held a meeting in Washington, that our foremost priority was to preclude the reification of culture by emphasizing human agency. Authenticity, then, took on a different emphasis from that attributed previously to physical cultural heritage, as Chiara Bortolotto, also present at that meeting, cogently argued (Bortolotto 2010).

At that meeting, Antonio Augusto Arantes insisted that intangible cultural heritage is primarily a resource for people's lives, not just something that can be registered for other purposes and, therefore, it should be the people in the community themselves who should decide which heritage to safeguard and how to develop it. Several of us were, indeed, already worried about the potential for appropriation of the cultural resources of local communities by outsiders, as was already happening in the case of some indigenous communities, especially in Latin America.

Susan Wright again brought up a major question that was repeatedly discussed in subsequent UNESCO meetings: who should have the power to define intangible cultural heritage in specific cases? This reflected discussions in anthropology generally about cultural 'gatekeepers', that is, community-appointed or self-appointed leaders who could play either a positive or a negative role in safeguarding or in repressing change in local cultures. We all agreed, then, that any international legal instrument must ensure that the cultural practitioners themselves should be involved in such decision-making.

Accordingly, in establishing a Glossary, anthropologists at that meeting argued that 'culture' as a fixed, out-of-nowhere, self-justified abstract entity should be replaced by more specific terms, namely, 'culture-bearers' as 'members of a community who actively reproduce, transmit, transform, create and form culture…'. In other words, people should be considered dynamic 'creators', 'practitioners' and 'custodians' of the practices of heritage.

How could the relationship of such 'creators' and 'practitioners' to cultural communities be defined? In the Glossary 'community' was then defined as 'people who share a self-ascribed sense of connectedness'. Importantly, all of us at the meeting, and especially anthropologists, in agreement with UNESCO's 'multiple allegiances' perspective, insisted on specifying that individuals can belong to more than one community at the same time—a perspective which in subsequent years would be negated by those who advocate a narrow political view of single ad-scription in multiculturalism.

'Cultural community' was then defined as one "that distinguishes itself from other communities by its own culture or cultural design, or by a variant of the generic culture". And, giving closure to a debate that has arisen at every turn of the discussions on culture at UNESCO since the mid-nineties, it was specified that "among other possible extensions, a nation can be a cultural community", thus precluding the monopoly of intangible cultural heritage exclusively by minorities. A welcome clarification stated that 'indigenous communities' were defined as "a community whose members consider themselves to have originated in a certain territory" though the definition also specified that "this does not exclude the existence of more than one indigenous community in the same territory". The latter was a consideration welcomed by many developing countries such as Indonesia, India, China and Mexico where different autochthonous populations share the same territory.

Another important distinction, distilled from many previous debates as to whether the same instruments that had been applied to physical heritage could be used for intangible heritage, was given legal precision by Paul Kuruk at the meeting. Instead of 'conservation' or 'protection', on a legal basis, the term 'safeguarding' was preferred for the Convention. It meant giving salience to "adopting measures to ensure the viability of intangible cultural heritage, including the identification, documentation, protection, promotion, transmission and revitalization of aspects of this heritage". This crucial distinction recognizes that intangible cultural heritage is enacted and performed in order to constantly restore its symbols and meaning. Setting it aside from physical heritage, this defined intangible cultural heritage as a living heritage.

After all these deliberations, the following definition of intangible cultural heritage and its constitutive domains was approved at that meeting (UNESCO 2003: 21–23):

(i) For the purposes of the present Convention, intangible cultural heritage means the practices and representations—together with their necessary knowledge, skills, instruments, objects, artefacts and places—that are recognized by communities and individuals as their intangible cultural heritage, and are consistent with

universally accepted principles of human rights, equity, sustainability and mutual respect between cultural communities. This intangible cultural heritage is constantly recreated by communities in response to their environment and historical conditions of existence, and provides them with a sense of continuity and identity, thus promoting cultural diversity and the creativity of humankind. (ii) Intangible cultural heritage, as defined in paragraph (i) above, covers the following domains: (1) Oral expressions, (2) Performing arts, (3) Social practices, rituals and festive events, and (4) Knowledge and practices about nature.

Still, at the meeting, two key issues stirred great controversy. One was the inclusion of human rights as a filter for all proposals for inclusion in the Lists of the 2003 Convention. All of us anthropologists strongly insisted it must be part of the definition of intangible cultural heritage since we could see the ethnicists and religious fundamentalists rising all around to argue that female genital mutilation, the cutting off of hands or other similar mutilation for misdemeanours, lapidation and even female infanticide could be justified on the grounds of cultures having to be respected. It is worth noting that, already in *Our Creative Diversity*, in 1995, the World Commission on Culture and Development had explicitly stated that intolerant cultures could not use the argument of respect for cultures to further their own intolerance.

The other key issue that caused controversy was the inclusion of languages in the Convention. I argued strongly against this, since I knew from my own fieldwork experience—and had also been asked by ambassadors from countries where more than 100 languages are spoken—to oppose this measure. A few years earlier, at an international African meeting on language policy, I had surprised some African friends, ambassadors and UNESCO staff and dismayed others by presenting arguments in favour of a trilingual language policy. This proposal was rapidly stamped upon by global powers, nationalistic governments and even ethnic groups, all of whom still insist that only their own languages should be used. In terms of the Convention on intangible cultural heritage, although the Turin meeting did not include languages in the first list of items to be safeguarded, they were reinstated in subsequent Convention meetings.

In spite of the care with which these definitions were handled, the Glossary, although it circulated as a preliminary document within UNESCO, was never formally issued to delegations from member states, even after a prolonged discussion between the rapporteur of the meeting, anthropologist Wim Wenders of the Netherlands, and UNESCO staff.

8.6 Constant Challenges

The International Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted at the UNESCO General Conference in November 2003 by an unprecedentedly high number of countries: 145. This great success was possible thanks to the support of Koichiro Matsuura and the relentless work of Noriko

Aikawa. The Convention itself represents a very important and interesting shift in the geopolitical balance at UNESCO, with East Asian and other emerging countries having greater agency in creating Conventions, and a vital recognition that local peoples must now take an active role in building a more balanced world. However, the unresolved ambiguities left in the words and the spirit of the Convention have haunted its implementation and operation since the beginning.

After the Terminology Meeting, interested UNESCO member states demanded that all experts attending meetings related to setting up the Convention on intangible cultural heritage be appointed exclusively by governments as members of their delegations. This decision, together with others taken for the Convention, altered the way in which international conventions had always been created in UNESCO since the 1950s. Scientists, philosophers and scholars of all cultural traditions had always been involved in the processes of setting up and operating Conventions. As I look back at this process, it seems to me that an attempt at creating a 'deregulated' Convention was under way. As in so many other areas of public life at the beginning of this century, science was generally disparaged, experts were criticized, and the social sciences were deliberately excluded from policy debates. As I heard it from delegates at a meeting in 2002 at the Maison des Cultures du Monde, some particularly active government delegates wanted neither 'standards' nor 'norms' for the Convention on intangible cultural heritage. Yet for every regulatory norm that was set aside in the Convention a new imbalance filtered into its operations in the following years.

The great irony of this procedure was that 'cultural groups' were constantly referred to in the discourse as the agents of the Convention yet few were seen speaking at debates and experts who probably knew such groups much more intimately than government bureaucrats were left out of the debates. Furthermore, a decade later, we all know what, in many countries, deregulation has meant in practice: self-serving operations by enthroned intermediaries who actually reinstate vertical practices of cultural expropriation in their own countries. Strong scientific organizations could have provided a balance or could have helped build complex procedures for fair negotiations, as they had done for 50 years at UNESCO. Instead, neither the constant reorganizing of the operational bodies of the 2003 Convention nor the patchwork voting on specifics of the criteria and operations of the Convention have solved problems of theory, method or procedure.

Many challenges have been noted in the operationalization of the 2003 Convention, as Khaznadar (2009) has carefully noted. Anthropologists have recently highlighted major theoretical problems (ISSC ICH Commission 2012). The First Researchers' Forum on intangible cultural heritage held at the Maison des Cultures du Monde in Paris has discussed research and operational questions related to the ICH Convention.

Cultural imprisonment leads to blindness, as Augé (1998) has pointed out, or to threats of *Les identités meurtrières* (murderous identities), as the book by Malouf (2001) of the French Academy has called them. This is not the place to examine such risks, but many people are keenly aware of the problems of unspecified 'representativeness', as well as of the rise of new kinds of intermediaries in the

negotiating of candidatures which leave out local agents and generate unregulated hierarchization of groups who influence these decisions both within countries and in the entities of the Convention. As a result, there is perplexity about the coherence of the Representative List and of the proper balance it is to have with other Lists.

8.7 Conclusions

I will conclude by saying that the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, for all its uneven edges, has been, in my view, the most important and successful initiative in creating a platform in which different agents have been able to state and negotiate their concerns over the loss and the transformation of their expressive culture and to embark on specific actions to safeguard it. That this initiative is far from having overcome major conceptual and action-related issues goes without saying. Indeed, very worrying concerns have emerged from its application. Yet the enthusiasm and dedication which it has sparked among so many different peoples shows that culture and cultural heritage are perhaps the most binding notion in our present troubled world.

Creating this platform for world deliberation on intangible cultural heritage was a fascinating process which must go on as a '*travail de chantier*' (construction site), one in which cultural practitioners, cultural stakeholders, governments, scientists and UNESCO staff must share the responsibility—and recognition—in ensuring rigour, legitimacy and efficiency in the work of the Convention. This also means providing the necessary support for the work demanded of UNESCO staff.

UNESCO staff cannot act solely as programme technicians, as some governments have been insisting in recent years. If this happens then the subtle negotiations, the magical appearance of the exact phrases that create consensus, all of them invisible, are no longer there in the documents. Instead, they spill into the spaces of negotiation between delegations, bringing with them shadow conflicts, illusory consensus, and unfinished decisions.

For their part, anthropologists and ethnologists should now leave their outsiders' cloak outside and step into an involved participant observation of the substantive and operational areas in the field of intangible cultural heritage. Why do I say this? Because never has the need for a deeper understanding of the flow of ideas and the strategies for taking decisions on a world scale been more pressing. On the basis of my own experience in 'participant decision-making' I would point to a first task: that of understanding anthropology's allocentric discursive proclivity in the increasingly non-hierarchical—or hierarchically altered—patterns of intellectual and political influence in the new global spaces. The important question is: how can we anthropologists situate the knowledge we produce in today's shifting global spaces?

Anthropology's capacity for reflexivity in the last decades has allowed us to rapidly transform our own theories and methods and thus makes us primary partners in reconceptualizing time and space in the new cosmopolitan context. More than

that, in a world that is not going well and in which culture and its avatars can easily ignite, it seems to me that anthropologists must develop an active reflexivity in order to take part in constructing new cultural and social realities for our unprecedented age. In sum, anthropology is vital in maintaining an open perspective against cultural blindness and imprisonment and a cosmopolitan vision that emphasizes not difference but rather common destiny.

As with any new venture, it will take time to consolidate the ideas and actions concerning intangible cultural heritage, even more so in a world that is constantly on the move. It is worth noting that the most salient feature in the process of deliberation to create the 2003 Convention was the commonality of will of so many governments, officials, researchers and culture-bearers, a commonality of will that drove such a diverse collection of agents to agree to set up the Convention. And the most salient feature today of the application of the Convention to protect intangible cultural heritage is the tremendous enthusiasm which it has fostered in many regions, even in the farthest corners of the world.

Perhaps the theoretical and political inconsistencies of the Convention were the price to be paid for actually getting it approved in only a few years. Perhaps UNESCO had to emulate the practices which would soon be made conventional by information and communications technology. That is, faced with an infinite number of possibilities of contestation, operation, conflict and so on, with the urgent need to do something immediately to save living cultural practices, the only way to move forward was to set up the Convention and then let it be remade, reinvented, and refined by the thousands of people who wanted to get involved. Perhaps we could adopt the new term now spreading from electronic video games to the virtual world: radiance. When one is intent on doing something today, now, immediately, and the intellectual and technological means are far from ready, it is best to launch the boat and then try to continue to rebuild it while weathering all storms.

Whatever may be said of the concept of intangible cultural heritage and of the 2003 Convention, the richness of debates it has generated within and between cultural groups, inside and outside academic circles, inside and outside government ministries of culture already demonstrates that the world was, indeed, ready for such a debate.

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Chapter 9
Cultural Endowments at Risk in Induced Development

9.1 Introduction

Great cultures have lived together for millennia, at times in conflict, at times in harmony.[1] History reminds us that great works of ancient architecture, like the Lighthouse of Alexandria or the Coliseum of Rome, remain universal even if lost. And much cultural heritage still lies under the sea, so many seas, to be rediscovered and remembered.

We need many lighthouses and amphitheatres today as people recreate, recycle and remix cultures to try to shape new lives in a world where everything is moving. Amartya Sen is right, the illusion of destiny leads to immobility, yet it is the unique prerogative of men and women to be able to shape their own futures. This is not an easy task, however.

Changing one's culture is like changing a speech in the midst of delivering it. Difficult. In the same way, social science has to be recast just at a time when the intellectual tools with which we think about social science are changing. Difficult.

In fact, the whole edifice of knowledge with which we think about human nature, the biosphere and the world, is changing. One way to facilitate and understand this change is to analyse continually, as frequently as possible, the results of social science thinking in specific fields. In this paper I will review the concepts, approaches and programmes applied to the field of cultural heritage in the last ten to fifteen years, and to the risks and threats of destruction it is facing. The irresponsible destruction of precious cultural heritage, particularly when caused by infrastructure development and urbanization, must be defined as an unacceptable pathology of induced development. However, this pathology can be prevented or substantially mitigated, provided a correct frame of mind governs the crafting and

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[1] This paper is based on a Conference on 'Cultural Heritage and Development' and was delivered at the Library of Alexandria, Egypt, 25 April 2009. Unpublished. I am greatly indebted to Michael Cernea, who had a leadership role in cultural heritage and development programmes at the World Bank, for his valuable suggestions for this paper.

implementation of programmes of induced development. The theoretical rationale for doing so exists, and international conventions and national policies have been crafted and must be further developed towards achieving this goal. We will address in this paper some of the major conceptual, policy and practical issues in rethinking the ways of protecting culture heritage endowments, particularly in formerly underdeveloped countries.

Why has culture become such an important challenge in induced development?

As will be seen in the next sections, the disappearance of cultural symbols and contents has always been a continuous process in history, together with their creation; the difference today is the scale and geographical spread of such threats and the fact that in many cases induced development undermines the conditions through which people can continue to create cultural meanings and practices. In other words, without culture, people become voiceless to themselves and others.

Equally important, and far less understood in my view, is the weakening of political and social structures and regulating systems based on cultural understandings and allegiances. These structures and systems have been methodically undermined by economic theoretical reductionism in neo-liberal models of induced development. Only in recent years have they begun to recognize that such 'social capital', 'cooperative cultures', 'governance rituals', and other such social and cultural institutions are crucial for development. While social scientists' voices warning of this loss are being dimmed or marginalized, people themselves have made it clear that they are against this loss. They have organized themselves in a vast array of movements all over the world, and in some places this has even led to political extremism. Importantly, these shifts in cultural structures and systems also signal a shift of power in a market context in terms of access to trade, to new governance structures, to cultural goods and to intellectual property protection. A better understanding of how people and organizations perceive, protect or choose to discard their cultural endowments is therefore a priority issue in induced development today.

9.2 Cultural Heritage: Tangible and Intangible

Cultures are philosophies of life. As such, they can become practically anything that people want them to be: symbolic imaginaries, mirror-identities, historical remembrances, aesthetic forms, social assets, economic enterprises, political emblems, market logos and policy programmes. The intrinsic and enduring value of culture is precisely its polysemy, because it presents an extremely rich array of possibilities to its bearers. Today, the proliferation of debates over culture and cultures is a sign of the need to use cultural resources to reorganize a globalizing world. This can only be done if this valuable resource can continue to be remembered and recreated by those who have reason to want to keep it.

In a globalizing world, among other rapidly changing scenarios, the conditions that formerly ensured the mirror-representation of identities and the capacity for reproducing their norms and practices have been altered significantly. With the

deepening of economic inequalities, political insecurity, and the weakening of the State's mandate to support the welfare of its citizens, people are turning to cultures and religions in search of certainties.

At the same time, cultural monuments and traditional cultural practices are under threat, as they have been throughout history, but today more urgently than ever, partly because of the scale and rapidity with which changes are occurring and partly because some changes mean a shift in power, in access and/or in cognitive and psychological self-representation. This has made cultural endowments very valuable resources. The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,[2] for example, widely known for its World Heritage List, is the second most ratified international convention in the world, second only to that of the Child.

Out of cultural endowments, people draw three kinds of cultural heritage, among other forms of representation, to carve out their place in the flow towards a new global world. These are: the physical; the tangible; and the intangible.

Physical cultural heritage comprises monuments, sites and cultural landscapes. Moveable cultural heritage may include instruments, furniture, machinery and all such objects. More recently, intangible cultural heritage comprises, as defined in the international Convention (UNESCO 2003):

> …the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills –as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces associated therewith– that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage.

At the same time performed cultural practices and performances are revitalized for many different reasons, among them, to foster internal cohesion in a group, community or nation, or to sharpen capabilities and political advantages in an acutely competitive world. It is of great concern that such trends have been allowed to reinforce extremism. Given the dearth of new ideas and debates that would have kept political and social institutional change moving at the same pace as economic and technological change, and largely because of under-funding and under-prioritization of social science research as well as of higher education in developing countries, fundamentalist cultural and religious groups have been allowed to configure themselves as mayor players on the world stage. This has fostered terrorism, religious wars, and the sudden surge in attacks on cultural heritage deemed to represent 'enemy culture': for example, the obliteration of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Serb attacks against Dubrovnik, the destruction of the Sarajevo Library and the Bridge at Mostar by Croatian forces, and more recently the bombing of churches and synagogues in several countries. The Bamiyan-kind of religiously inspired hatred and terrorist oppression of cultural and religious minorities has not stopped, despite global protest. A recent copycat repetition was reported from Timbuktu, Mali, where Islamic Salafist militias are destroying, in a fundamentalist rampage, not just Christian monuments but also Islamic cultural

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[2] See at: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/> (8 August 2014).

monuments of groups that they do not consider 'Islamic enough'. In July 2012, a commentator for the Wall Street Journal described this destruction and wrote, "The recent spate of attacks on Muslim historic and religious sites in the ancient city of Timbuktu calls to mind the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan over a decade ago. The Taliban, of course, were obliterating the icons of a rival religion, as they saw it. The Salafist militias that have lately overrun Timbuktu and Mali are obliterating a rival tradition within their own faith".[3]

Encouragingly, many other achievements demonstrate that the majority of people are opposed to such destruction: one of the most symbolic of such events was the reopening of the new bridge at Mostar, destroyed during religious warfare but rebuilt by UNESCO and an international coalition of governments, business and civil society (UNESCO 2003; Serageldin/Shluger/Martin-Brown 2001).

Cultural heritage, then, has been taken up since the sixties, mainly by UNESCO Conventions in policies to conserve, protect and safeguard such heritage, with subsequent actions increasingly focusing on the field of intangible cultural heritage.[4] UNESCO's 2001 *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* acknowledged that cultural heritage is the wellspring of creativity and the source of inspiration and dialogue between cultures. At the 2005 UNESCO General Conference a new Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was also adopted.

9.3   The 'Public Goods' of the Cultural Sector

Within the United Nations, through the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), significant support for cultural heritage arrived at the same time as the World Bank's projects on cultural property in development, in the shape of both theoretical and policy contributions. Perhaps the most important product of the UNDP initiative was the fostering of public discussion about cultural heritage endowment as *public goods*, a discussion manifested among other things in a substantial book on the topic (Kaul 2003). The book argued correctly that cultural patrimony assets are public goods that provide benefits that are "nonrival and nonexcludable … they provide unsubstitutable cultural and economic services and generate both intra- and inter-generational benefits".

Current studies, argued Kaul and her associates, are looking into whether cultural heritage is also a global public good; it may be recognized that not all cultural heritage has universal significance but it depends on how you define 'cultural

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[3] "Radical Islamists Wage Muslim Civil War in Africa", by Melik Kaylan, in: *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 July 2012, at: <http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/hexagon.htm> (6 August 2014): A13.

[4] See "Intangible Heritage", in: Museum International (October 2004), at: <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=21739&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> (8 August 2014).

heritage' and 'universal'. Many penetrating questions were being asked about the 'globalness' of goods, which can be understood as a dimension of 'publicness'. The discussion pointed out that "the clamor against globalization could be interpreted as a call for better provision of global public goods," and that analysis confirms that reforming the public policy-making process is crucial to the better management of globalization (Kaul 2003).

These conceptual and policy debates have led to renewed interdisciplinary studies and discussions in the social sciences on the 'value' of culture and its place in induced development.

9.4 Social Science for Cultural Safeguarding

Contrary to what is commonly believed, debates about culture in globalization are hardly new. One need only peruse the history of the arrival of Europeans in populated areas of the Americas to see that it has been a central issue since the sixteenth century. Many of the current problems in globalization and induced development, which are then reflected in relationships between cultural groups and in attitudes towards cultural heritage, have been among the classical themes of research in the social sciences. As Jolly (2003: 82–92) put it succinctly:

> … the new forces of globalization are being played out on a battlefield that is far from new. Trade and conquest are its antecedents, empire and colonialism its earlier forms, inequalities in power and relationships part of the ongoing saga. The need for a level playing field is widely accepted today, but at such a general level that the phrase means quite different things to different parties. The rich and powerful argue that it will be achieved by extending the rule of law and competition, the poor and weaker argue for conscious international action and regulation to offset inherited inequalities and to provide special support and advantages to poorer and weaker countries.

Further, the Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004: 14) indicated that the income gap between developed and developing countries tripled between 1960–1962 and 2000–2002. Only 16 developing countries grew more than 3 % between 1985 and 2000, while 55 of them grew at less than 2 % per year and of these, 23 presented negative growth (WCSDG 2004: 40). Significantly, it is social indicators that show the most markedly negative trends, even in some developed countries. The breakdown of community life (and in some places family structures), rising corruption, violence and organized crime, addiction to legal and illegal drugs, an increase in depression and other psychological illnesses, and the cultural alienation of youth, all point at the lack of attention to social and cultural aspects in induced development. At the twenty-fifth anniversary of the OECD, I presented a paper pointing to these trends and arguing that 'social and cultural sustainability' must take its place alongside other concepts of sustainability in formulating policy (Arizpe 1989). Nothing changed, however, in the intervening years. In February 2005, at the UN Economic and Social Commission sessions to review the follow-up of the Copenhagen 1995 Social Summit,

as President of the International Social Science Council I had to ask why, given that economies were growing and societies collapsing, social risks were never mentioned alongside economic and environmental risks in induced development.

The complex reasons for this deterioration preclude simplistic answers and make it urgent that social science research be taken into account in formulating, implementing, and defending social safeguard policies in induced development. The lack of support for social science institutions, research and networking has undoubtedly helped gut public debates of significance in many countries. In developing countries, what had been steady growth in social science teaching, research and capacity-building has been deliberately left aside by national research councils that give almost exclusive support to management and administration studies.

It is, indeed, short-sighted to assume that management and administration require no understanding of deeper social and cultural trends. Just to give an example: under Mexico's president Vicente Fox, and with support from the IMF's recommendations, the administration not only slashed the overall budget for education, science and culture, but also promoted anti-university policies and did its utmost to do away with the social sciences and humanities, even abruptly cutting off the scholarships of students who were midway through their doctoral studies in the social sciences.

Importantly, support and funding for expanding research and disseminating the social sciences is especially necessary in this period of expanding global capitalism. It is worth remembering that after the transition from philosophy to social science, broadly from 1750 to 1850 (Wagner 1999), social science became a major instrument in dealing with the 'social question' in early industrial capitalism. Major policy changes were addressed publicly on the basis of such research and through political debates. It seems that, a century later, the 'social question' is back, after some three or four decades of policies where it was generally left out of models of induced development.

The social sciences will remain indispensable in generating the knowledge and social policy alternatives needed to correct the present imbalances and pathologies of induced development and globalization. However, if neo-liberal policies insist that social science research fund itself through the market, an even greater imbalance will be created. The knowledge produced at some universities or private institutions at the behest of wealthy donors who seek to influence it to their advantages will be sometimes selective: it may produce results that would increase their own advantages, but it will not redress present inequalities, remedy pathological distortions, or advance social and cultural adaptations to new realities.

To put it simply, if this continues, only the rich and the powerful institutions and enterprises will have access to social science knowledge. The more vulnerable groups—the unemployed, the unskilled, the poor—will have no possibility of financing social science research that will equip them with the tools to understand their poverty and to find better ways of overcoming it. Economic deprivation will become compounded with knowledge deprivation. No amount of information overload or entertainment will offset this. On the contrary: it will deepen this lack of knowledge and know-how and thus foster a sense of vulnerability, and extremists will use this sense of vulnerability to recruit people and to create conflicts based on

metaphysical claims that cannot be negotiated. The feelings of exclusion, vulnerability and inadequacy that affect the poor, the indigenous peoples, and unskilled workers, and especially the women in these groups who bear the brunt of unemployment and economic crises, especially if governments restrict social services—these feelings are often expressed through cultural means.

The knowledge of social scientists, of archaeologists, and of cultural specialists is today able to identify cultural remains of great significance ahead of such industrial constructions and make recommendations that would either help protect and salvage the cultural good, or find alternative locations for the relevant industries. But such knowledge is not summoned in time by the governments and agencies that are responsible for such programmes, or by the private sector corporations, whose industrial and resource-extraction projects increasingly leave very large footprints. Damage to old buildings, monuments, archaeological remains, is also perpetrated through air and water pollution. In fact, however, there should not be incompatibility between development and the protection of cultural endowment. If the need for doing both is taken into account in a timely manner by governments and private sector corporations, the wanton destruction and loss of precious cultural endowment could be prevented.

The flip side of this concern is how much civil society, that is, rank-and-file citizens and other stakeholders, are willing to contribute to avert the destruction of cultural heritage endowments, regardless of the immediate cause of such destruction. A cultural monument or performance may be important and appreciated but nobody may be willing to pay for it from their own pockets. In a pilot survey conducted by the World Bank on how much residents and tourists were willing to pay to safeguard the medina of Fez, results showed that the willingness to fund such rehabilitation projects was there. But would the funding be adequate? Who is to administer the projects? An appropriate steering combination must be devised that involves cooperation between cultural agents, the private sector and civil society, under state leadership. This is not always easy to achieve, especially in societies under great economic pressure.

9.5 The Changing Boundaries of Cultures

Since the beginning of the nineties, as was made vividly explicit in the nine consultations in different regions by the World Commission on Culture and Development, awareness of the impact of globalization on contemporary cultures has had several consequences. Firstly, it has led many communities to actively work to conserve their cultural heritage, and this has led to a variety of conflicts that have often reconfigured political, social or intellectual arrangements in different cultural communities in nation-states or in international relations. A slightly different emphasis has been applied in other cultural communities, by fostering new kinds of creativity that would both preserve previous forms of cultural expression while at the same time generating new meanings and social practices better adapted to changing contemporary situations.

A welcome development in these international debates and policy recommendations has been an increasing public interest in 'cultural affairs' and a rapid proliferation of studies that provide concrete and reliable data on cultural transformations. Among them, the most salient, because they are also the most clearly understood, are studies of endangered languages.

At the meeting in Florence on 'Culture Counts: Financing, Resources and the Economics of Culture in Sustainable Development', participants identified the following objectives: (a) to promote the expansion of the economic analysis of, and resources available for, culture in sustainable development programmes; (b) to expand the range of institutions and actors involved in culture from the standpoint of development; (c) to increase the instruments to be used in these programmes (Cernea 2000). An effort to preserve and enhance cultural assets and expressions can also provide substantial economic returns and opportunities for greater social cohesion. Investments in culture, besides generating tourist flows, can help poor communities grow out of poverty and encourage local development by strengthening social capital and expanding opportunities for education.

One major challenge in understanding intangible cultural heritage is that most often a monument or festivity is associated with a single culture, but in many cases this is not an accurate picture of cultural realities. Societies build 'representations' of themselves as a cultural, ethnic or religious group, and of their myths and history. Normally, these representations set boundaries between the cultural claims of one group and those of others. This is why it is frequently said that the world is a 'mosaic of cultures'. In fact, the cultural competences of groups around the world are part of a continuum that is carved out into discrete 'cultures' at specific times in terms of a mirror image of 'other' cultures. This is especially the case with Africa, Eurasia and the Americas since the sixteenth century, but it is even more so in our contemporary world of trade interdependency, flowing communications and constant travel. This is the reason why in the second UNESCO World Culture Report we proposed a new metaphor, a 'Rainbow River',[5] to describe the continuous yet fragmented evolution of world cultures. In what seems a paradoxical trend, cultural heritage today frequently takes the form of national monuments that were in fact built by other cultures, for example, the Taj Mahal in India or the Alhambra in Spain. In many cases several countries or cultural groups may claim ownership of a monument or cultural performance, for example, the Diablo dance of Chile and Bolivia.

Importantly, with only rare exceptions, usually island peoples or small countries, practically all cultural communities in the world have a multicultural heritage. For example, Egyptian Copts, Bengali Muslims, Amerindian Catholics, Indian Zoroastrians, Chinese Canadians, Brazilian Japanese, African-Americans, or African-Jamaicans, among whom culture, race, geography and history are present in a hybrid form. New combinations are continually emerging such as Chicanos in the US or Jamaican Rastafarians. 'Hyphenated' people, as they are now termed, are, in fact, among the most active cultural groups and diasporas in globalization. These cultures can only be

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[5] This was taken from Nelson Mandela's image of the 'Rainbow Nation' for South Africa.

termed 'borderline' if borders are artificially imposed on cultural flows that are permeable, indefinable by anthropological standards, and shift in almost every generation. One example of the difficulty of such definitions is the recently dampened discussion of whether Islamic culture should be considered a part of the West.

This brings up an interesting point: the larger the cultural or religious group in terms of boundaries, the greater the diversity within that boundary. For example, the cultural diversity and religious divisions within Christianity or Islam raise the question of whether such large demarcations actually refer to reality. Of course, politically, such a meaning can be claimed and attempts can be made to give it new content, but the fact remains that such 'representations' are always deliberately generated for specific purposes at specific historical times.

9.6   Cultural Overload and Multi-tiered Loyalties

In the intensely interactive world of today, the unrelenting day-to-day contact between people bearing different cultures is producing a cultural overload, in some ways similar to the information overload created by the new technologies. Cultural overload, however, is more likely to create personal anxiety, since cultures provide the nucleus of individuals' personalities and behavioural norms. Cowen (2003) argues that such a range of cultural choice provides people with a new freedom to escape 'the tyranny of place' by offering them more cultural 'menus'. In contrast, Kwame Anthony Appiah warns of the 'new tyrannies' in the form of newly asserted identities that can tyrannize by eliminating the claims of other identities which we may also have reason to accept and respect. Appiah (2004) says "… in policing this imperialism of identity … it is crucial to remember always that we are not simply black or white or yellow or brown, gay or straight or bisexual, Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhist or Confucian, but that we are also brothers and sisters, parents and children, liberals, conservatives and leftists, teachers and lawyers and automakers and gardeners … let us not let our racial identities subject us to new tyrannies".

Given this multiplicity, as Sen (2006: 30) argues, "the person may have to decide on the relative significance of the different affiliations, which could vary depending on the context… In fact, we are all constantly making choices, if only implicitly, about priorities to be attached to our different affiliations and associations". Taking into account such theoretical considerations, then, a different understanding of cultural endowments and cultural heritage is needed in today's globalized world.

To build this new perspective, we must first be aware of the multi-tiered nature of the system of cultural loyalties that has been constructed in the contemporary world, that is, the different scales of allegiances and identities, national, cultural, ethnic, religious, professional, and so on, that build up in each person's life and organize his or her position within society. These multiple allegiances do not operate and nor are they performed on the same plane. To think in this way is to fall into what I have called the 'flat culture' view of the world.

Instead, one of the more interesting processes in our contemporary times is the shifting weight and scale of the cultural stratifications that were put in place from at least the 1600s. The multi-tiered system of primary cultural affiliations is now in the process of being challenged and reconstructed. Its vertical axis is set by a person having, first, *place-based identities* of locality, micro-region, autochthonous or indigenous entities, which may coincide with or be superseded by language, cultural or religious identities. Secondly, *national identities,* which only in relatively recently times have expanded to encompass all territories of the world, as well as islands. Thirdly, *regional identities*, such as those being built by the European Union and the South American Mercosur/Comunidad Andina. Fourthly, *subcontinental identities* such as sub-Saharan Africa. Fifthly, *macro-continental identities*, such as the West, and more vaguely in cultural terms, Islam. In a more fragmented way, a sixth level would be formed by diasporas that have more or less consistency and bonding strength: the original Jewish diaspora but more recently the African diaspora or the Chinese diaspora.

The horizontal axis of this world cultural stratification is, of course, that of nation-states. Contrary to what the neo-liberal and postmodern discourses claim, nation-based identities are nowhere near disappearing, least of all in the core industrialized nations where such discourses were actually fabricated. In fact, it is the kind of political science and sociological models that emphasize 'modernization' that have left both national and local cultures off the policy map (Robertson 1992: 5). New macro-regional identities will only override national identities if the political union expands democratic rights to citizens of all countries in that bloc, as is the unique case of the European Union at present. Otherwise, cultural diversity will continue over the coming years, and foster a multi-tiered system of local, national and international 'nationalities', cultural identities, religious affiliations and a variety of forms of loyalties.

The challenge for induced development policies is that individuals and societies must be enabled to re-present and to negotiate their cultural location within this new *multi-tiered cultural cosmopolis*. This repositioning is very important in terms of social capital but also because it allows for organized political negotiation rather than violent confrontation.

The second step towards redefining a perspective on cultural endowments and cultural heritage is to acknowledge that, given that the clustering of cultural traits into a discrete unit can operate on ever-smaller scales, any community or lineage could presumably call for political autonomy. Therefore, the new perspective must avoid the crumbling of human coexistence into "… a League of Nations with ten thousand fractious and anxious expansion teams…" as Carol Breckenridge expresses it, which she rightly says "… is not a good way to organize human life" (Breckenridge/Pollock/Bhabha/Chakrabarty 2002: 3). Indeed, to counter this trend, induced development must leave behind economic reductionism and include a new political philosophy of world cosmopolitanism. Steps have already been taken in this direction by many organizations. It must include a 'global ethic' based on democracy, equity (including gender equity), human rights, accountability and sustainability, as proposed in *Our Creative Diversity*, the report of the World

Commission for Culture and Development (UNESCO 1995). It must quickly implement policy coherence between United Nations institutions, leaving behind the economic reductionism of the Bretton Woods institutions that have created the present imbalances in globalization, as demanded by the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization.

Having established this global framework of shifting systems of cultural relations and induced development, in this next section we will analyse cultural endowments and the international policies that have been developed to safeguard cultural heritage.

9.7 Language Loss and Language Policies

Language is, indeed, a major bone of contention as the multi-tiered world cultural system shifts. There are two urgent issues at present. The first is the imminent disappearance of languages and the second, language policies.

UNESCO's 1994 Red Book of the World's Endangered Languages maps out several hundred languages which may disappear in the next ten to twenty years. For example, in Africa, out of approximately 1,400 (or more) languages, 500–600 endangered languages is not an unrealistic estimate. One of the regions with the greatest number of endangered languages is the Amazon and the Andes in South America. Even in Canada, where cultural policies have recognized its 'First Nations', only 6 out of 121 Amerindian languages are still fully functioning (UNESCO 1994).

As difficult as it has been to estimate the process of linguistic loss in the world, great progress has been made in monitoring this cultural change through cooperation between research, policy and advocacy institutions. Stephen Wurm, editor of the Red Book, now called Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, notes the "unprecedented activity and growing interest in the field of language endangerment and threatened languages that would have been unthinkable a decade ago" (UNESCO 2001: 5). Major data banks of world languages have been created and UNESCO is publishing a series of Red Books on threatened languages.

We need to consider that in the course of history, countless languages have disappeared and as many new ones have been created. It is known that small human groups stranded in islands have been able to practically invent new languages in the short span of one or two generations. What makes the disappearance of languages at the beginning of this new century so momentous is the sheer scale of the loss—of the approximately 6,000 existing languages,[6] more than 2,000 are considered to be in danger of disappearing—and the fact that these languages are disappearing simultaneously. By any standard, languages carry important knowledge, and in the case of indigenous languages, which constitute the majority of the endangered ones,

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[6] Exact figures concerning languages are always controversial since they will vary enormously according to whether a language is classified as such or as a sub-variant of another.

valuable knowledge about ecosystems, marine life and so on. Languages are also the primary vehicle for cultural identities and allegiances.

At the same time, new research shows that cognitive functioning is enhanced when children are exposed to several languages in their early years. Studies have also found a positive association between bilingualism and better academic performance, as Alejandro Portes and his colleagues have shown. One study showed that, without exception, fluent bilinguals outperformed limited bilinguals and English-only students in standardized tests and grade point averages, even after statistically controlling for parental status and other variables (Portes 2002).

In terms of language policy, for several decades heated debates have been raging over how governments should deal with vernacular, national and international languages. In Latin America, some countries such as Mexico opted to provide instruction in indigenous languages in the first two years of schooling and subsequently instruction in Spanish, the national language, with the option of English and other international languages at the level of secondary education. In sub-Saharan Africa, after decolonization, some countries, like Tanzania, opted for education in vernacular languages only to discover, years later, that people could not communicate with people from neighbouring regions in the same country where another language was spoken. Other alternatives are equally difficult to implement, as South Africa found after it assigned official language status to eleven vernacular languages. Nor is this a problem only for developing nations. The European Union now spends millions of euros on the interpreting and translation of its more than fifteen official languages, plus the upcoming demands of regions such as the Basque country and Catalonia that their own languages also be recognized. In the United States the silent invasion of Spanish, as Latino migrants move into all spheres of the society, has led to an 'English-only' backlash. Official US policy, however, is still to support minorities' cultural claims against government impositions.

Defining language policy is obviously a complex matter. As Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO in the nineties, I advocated a language policy based on a three-tiered system. In today's culturally interactive world, a person should be able to speak their own vernacular language, the official or national language of the country, and an international language, increasingly English, but also French, Chinese or Arabic. Needless to say, such a policy was opposed by countries who wanted to expand the reach of their own international languages as well as by nationalistic governments who wanted to encourage neither international nor vernacular languages. In the long term, however, a language policy based on the option of trilingualism seems to me the only rational path to the future.

9.8 Physical and Intangible Cultural Heritage

With the rise of the nation-state and the Westphalian order, culture and cultural heritage became a major aspect of the consolidation of national identity and power. In Europe, monumental heritage such as palaces and cathedrals was resignified to

represent national levels of historical continuity, social cohesion and achievement. Accordingly, the State was made guarantor of the conservation of this cultural heritage. This notion of heritage was extended to Roman, Greek and Egyptian 'antiquities' insofar as they were defined as the root civilizations of Western European cultures.

Cultural heritage was treated differently in other regions, as this schematic summary will show. In the New World, settlers in the United States destroyed Indian cultures and looked to the future rather than the past, proclaiming each individual's right to create her or his own contribution to a new way of life. In Latin America, Amerindian high civilizations and cultures were also brutally destroyed and forcibly assimilated into a new culture and a new faith. It was only in the twentieth century that Mexico's social revolution prompted a reassessment of pre-Columbian cultural heritage as legitimate and as a compelling source of pride and prestige. Such a process was under way in other countries such as Peru, yet in others, while pre-Columbian physical cultural heritage is now seen as a valuable asset, especially for tourism, governments still have ambiguous policies towards indigenous peoples. The most noticeable contemporary process in this region is the rise of indigenous movements that not only demand recognition and revitalization of their history and cultural heritage, but have successfully taken over governments, as is the case with Evo Morales' administration in Bolivia. This turn of events might have palpable political repercussions in other countries with large indigenous populations.

Asia is a continent so vast and complex in its history that it is pointless to generalize about the history of its cultural heritage. Great empires built great monuments which have been resignified as representations of nations only in the twentieth century. In culturally unified countries such as Japan and Thailand, the historical physical heritage was resignified as national, and intangible cultural heritage such as the Noh Theatre in Japan and the Music of the Royal Court of Thailand are currently in the process of being recognized as masterpieces by UNESCO.

Africa, on the other hand, has a history and perception of heritage. Expressive culture rather than built culture has prevailed in many of its regions, especially in sub-Saharan countries; this might also have to do with the dearth of physical material resources for building.[7] Magnificent palaces and fortresses, built in sand or perishable materials, of which only the scantiest remnants can still be seen, have disappeared into deserts and rainforests. In contrast, Africa's intangible cultural heritage is vibrant and effervescent, kept alive by travelling historians, the 'griots', in West Africa, or by artists and storytellers throughout Africa and the Middle East, a tradition which can be vividly witnessed at the D'Jama El Fna Plaza in Marrakech.

This very brief cartography of cultural heritage in different continents shows how extraordinary it is that all member states of UNESCO were able to agree on the

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[7] One can only imagine the extraordinary monuments and palaces built with sand or wood that have been destroyed over history.

international conventions to protect cultural heritage. How international concepts and policies towards cultural heritage have evolved is a fascinating story, one which should be taken into account in induced development. Since it is a long story, it cannot be told here. However, the enormous interest stirred up by the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage makes it worth describing in relation to induced development.

9.9   International Programmes for Protecting Heritage

In the mid-1990s, the UNESCO expert group that reviewed the World Heritage List, which includes only physical and natural heritage, noted that "... the idea of cultural heritage had been embodied in and confined to architectural monuments ... [which is] a static view of human cultures".[8] Rather than concentrating on single monuments in isolation, the experts proposed a new perspective "considering cultural groupings that were complex and multidimensional, which demonstrated in spatial terms the social structures, ways of life, beliefs, systems of knowledge, representations of different past and present cultures in the entire world" and that paid attention to the reciprocal relationship that the cultural grouping had with its physical and non-physical environment (Munjeri 2004: 7). Soon after, in the report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, *Our Creative Diversity*, we warned that "defining a building as being of historical and cultural value meant placing it at a certain distance from everyday life" (UNESCO 1995).

The considerable amount of groundwork put in by UNESCO towards crafting an international legal instrument for conserving the non-physical cultural heritage led to the 1989 UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore. Building a new intellectual foundation for the concept of cultural heritage required the involvement of anthropologists, cultural policymakers and practitioners. The terms had to be changed: 'tradition' obscured contemporary practices that respond more to current contexts than to 'traditional' ones, and the concept of 'folklore' itemized cultural practices out of recognition by omitting the contextual environment in which objects and ritual and festive activities acquired significance. Also, it situated such practices as somehow extrinsic or inferior to others performed in the society.

A few nations launched ambitious government efforts in this field. Pakistan created a large national archive of music, dance and other local cultural practices. In Mexico, the inclusion of indigenous cultures in the National Museum of Anthropology and History, built as far back as 1963, created an important international precedent by associating the rich, present-day 'ethnographic' cultures with archaeological collections.

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[8] See Blake (2001).

The most important initiative in this field, however, came from the national programmes of South Korea and Japan. In the eighties, these countries developed the 'Living Treasures' programmes to preserve the skills and teaching of great masters so that their knowledge, their skills and their crafts would not be forgotten.

Defining the basic concepts and domains to be included as Intangible cultural heritage was not easy. Several international meetings were held (UNESCO 2000), among them the UNESCO Turin Round Table in March 2001, which stressed the importance of taking into account the entire range of activities encompassed in a given practice or event, and the dynamics of creating, re-creating and transmitting intangible cultural heritage.

The meeting defined four domains in which intangible cultural heritage manifests itself, namely oral traditions and expressions, performing arts, social practices, and knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe. A fifth domain was added in the Convention, that of language.

Subsequent work developed a glossary, which focused the Convention on cultural 'practitioners' and on promoting living practices at the same time as they are safeguarded. Even so, from a legal perspective there may be flaws in the definitions and in the 2003 Convention text, especially as regards property rights legislation which is based one-sidedly on the rights of individuals. The Convention itself must be seen as a work in progress. It still requires much more precision in its concepts, methods and policy guidelines. Many questions relating to the operation of the Convention are still to be taken up by the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and in technical manuals on procedures and operations that are still to be prepared.

In a world of rapidly moving trade, cross-border movements, and changing cultures, new international mechanisms and guidelines as well as new national policies and legislation are needed, firstly to link these mechanisms and guidelines to development, and secondly to provide a way of sustainably safeguarding cultural endowments. Nations are repositioning themselves in the world system, and they are finding that whatever is distinctive in their cultures may give them a unique form of representation. Yet this must be negotiated with the diversity of cultures that make up most nation-states, and now also with important diaspora communities. Culture has to remain a priority issue in development, international politics and people's daily lives.

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With friends and anthropologists at the cemetery on the night of the Dead in Amilcingo (2004). *Source* Photo collection of the author

Part III
Influencing International Social and Cultural Policy

Balance de la Antropología en América Latina y el Caribe

Lourdes Arizpe
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Compiladores

CRIM

Chapter 10
Culture, Governance and Globalization

10.1 Introduction

Debates on governance in globalization have focused mainly on the power relations on a vertical scale between states, regional blocs, and nation states.[1] Yet the rise in concerns and conflicts arising out of social or cultural imbalances indicates how important it is to give attention to the horizontal relations between the different agents and groups that are shifting their positions in the new global context.

It is no coincidence that ideas and culture are now central to the agenda on governance reform. While realists and neo-realists continue to analyse interactions between states as driven mainly by power relationships, constructivists such as Wendt (1999) argue that international relations imply a social process, through which non-state agents and groups construct its relevant practices. It is in this sense that I have argued in previous writings that 'social sustainability' must take its place alongside other concepts of sustainability in building policy for the future.

The World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization (WCSDG) points to the growing imbalance between the economy, society and polity in globalization in its 2004 Report *Towards a Fair Globalization: Opportunities for All*.[2] In terms of global governance, it argues that global norms are unbalanced, as the multilateral system is not effective in ensuring coherence between economic, financial, commercial, environmental, and social policies to promote human development and social progress.

The statistics in the Report show that there was a threefold increase in the income gap between developed and developing countries between 1960–1962 and 2000–2002 (WCSDG: 41). Only sixteen developing countries grew at a rate of

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[1] Keynote address delivered at the UNESCO International Labour Organization Meeting on Social Development, held at UNESCO, Paris, France, 9 September 2004. Unpublished.

[2] Sponsored by the International Labour Organization, the World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization was headed jointly by the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, and the President of Tanzania, William Mkapa, with very distinguished participating members.

more than three per cent between 1985 and 2000, while 55 of them grew at less than 2 % per year and of these, 23 showed negative growth (WCSDG: 40). Among those most vulnerable to the lack of appropriate policies and concerted international action are women, indigenous peoples and the poorest unskilled workers with no resources. Furthermore, women, more than men, have had to bear the weight of the numerous financial crises brought about by globalization, and they are the ones who have suffered more directly from the cuts in social policies.

10.2 Even in Affluence

Statistics also show that even in some rich countries such as the United States of America and Britain income inequality has increased, leading to what, in Britain, once so admired for its deeply ingrained sense of civility, is now being termed 'uncivil society' in sociological studies. Surely this is related to Thatcher's famous phrase that "…there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women…".[3] As could be expected, discussion of social, cultural and lifestyle concerns is also on the rise in public journals. Very tellingly, a new magazine called 'Intelligent Life … Trends for Smarter Living' just published in the summer by *The Economist*. The editorial begins by deploring the fact that "innocent individuals are facing heightened threats of terrorism, waves of financial scandals and bankruptcies, unleashed by the crashing markets that have wiped out jobs, pensions and invest-ment states galore". The editorial then states that "inevitably, it is the social changes wrought by all this turmoil that will be most pernicious" (Micklethwait 2006). Among those mentioned in the editorial is the end of 'social compacts', that is, employment contracts, corporate pensions, health care plans, public education and welfare schemes.

The next essay in the publication, by Alain de Botton, goes on to ask "why we can have so much, yet still feel so lacking?" One would think, then, that the message that human relationships and social interactions must be taken into account in government policies would have reached this high temple of economic thinking but this does not seem to be the case. Instead, the editorial ends by warning that "whether we like it or not, we are all becoming free agents, forced to manage our personal lives as we might an enterprise".[4]

The commoditization of personal relationships and the destruction of social structures, however, are undermining people's capacity to cope with the conse-quences of globalization. Managing one's life as if it were a cost-benefit enterprise, however, does not lead to the caring, loving environment that individuals,

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[3] Keay, Douglas, "Margaret Tatcher: Interview for Woman's Own", at: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689> (03.03.14).

[4] De Botton, Alain, "Enough is enough", available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/2762809> (03.03.14).

especially children, need in order to function as psychologically sound family members, workers and citizens. So much so that, for example, in the United States, the values of 'caring', 'compassion', and family have had to be reinforced via a neo-conservative political discourse while at the same time economic policies are maintained that undermine these values every single day. In terms of the issues of concern in this article the question then is the following: in terms of neo-liberal policies will governance become the instrument to offset the family and social fragmentation wrought by the unfettered commoditization of personal lives? If social policies become increasingly important, however, this will run counter to neo-liberal demands for the retreat of the state in all areas.

The question of how governance will cope with social and cultural disjunctures becomes even more urgent in many developing countries. A case in point is Mexico where, added to the damage inflicted by financial crises, unemployment, and increased inequality, is the destruction of the social fabric of many rural areas with the outmigration of men and now of young men and women. Worse still, studies have just recently confirmed that as many as 80,000 children travel *alone* on the migration routes through Mexico. One can only imagine the very high costs of such disintegration in terms of social policies, health and education problems, juridical and police measures and so on that governments will have to tackle. Will a weakened state be able to cope with such needs? Will any kind of democracy be able to contain the numerous 'pernicious'—as The Economist has called them—social problems that will flare up?

The point I would like to emphasize is that if narrow economic globalization continues to undermine social structures, the political and economic costs of a post-social world will soon outstrip any benefits of economic growth, especially for the poorest. Social unrest which manifests itself as political unrest affecting governance will most probably continue to grow. A recent United Nations report on Democracy in Latin America (UNDP 2004) has shown that a majority of people are disappointed with democracy mainly because of its failure to stem inequalities, poverty and unemployment. But also, I would argue, because in cultures that lay strong emphasis on extended family relationships, solidarity and social harmony, the social dislocations which are the consequence of unemployment and poverty have become intolerable. Latin American anthropologists long ago showed that extended family relations and solidarity were the safety net for poor people in the region. Now these are being undermined by increased economic outmigration, transnational organized crime, social exclusion and gender violence. 'Dumbing down' the media and banalizing political debates do not help either. If anything, they exacerbate people's rage. In such a setting it becomes ever more difficult to achieve advances in the reform of the state and the consolidation of democracy.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, as migration to the United States becomes a form of permanent interaction between countries and towards the United States, any discussion of governance must take into account these cross-border movements. This is another topic that the World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization has taken up in its Report.

10.3 Cross-Border Movements and Development

Already, in the 1995 Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, *Our Creative Diversity*, we had insisted that creativity had fallen behind in building new social and political institutions compatible with different cultural settings.[5] Now, the World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization goes further in analysing this trend and in proposing policy alternatives. It emphasizes, rightly, that the economy has become more global but that social and political institutions fundamentally only have a local, national or regional reach.

To redress these imbalances, they propose, international institutions must adapt to the new era and mobilize the energy and creativity of many non-governmental networks that are already participating in globalization, including companies and civil society. Greater policy coherence is needed between multilateral organizations, and this must be based on countries recognizing their common interest. Any reform of the multilateral system must make its institutions more democratic, more participative, more transparent and more responsible.

Among the salient points made in the Report, it mentions that global markets lack the institutions that can exercise public control, which in many countries is part of the legitimacy and stability needed for national markets. At the same time, the present process is creating a vigorous public opinion that is now pressuring these political institutions; however, there is now a growing distrust of the decision-making process at the global level. The Commission's proposal on this point is very important in terms of mobilizing the vast networks of civil society in organizations and enterprises. But this can only be achieved through a new commitment to international multilateralism.

The Commission makes specific recommendations, among them: building a multilateral framework for trans-border movements of people; emphasizing the social responsibility of companies towards a fairer globalization; an international investment framework that balances rights and responsibilities, both of national and international investors and of countries, and takes into account the social impacts of investments. Policies and programmes are also needed to strengthen social protection in the global economy, and also to take into account gender differentials. Training and capacity-building in information technologies would help close the digital divide, especially between developed and developing countries.

Knowledge will be a key element in achieving a more balanced development in different regions. The Commission points out that this will require new forms of research and knowledge distribution.

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[5] The United Nations World Commission for Culture and Development, organized by UNESCO and headed by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, presented its Report *Our Creative Diversity* in 1995 (UNESCO 1995). Lourdes Arizpe, author of this chapter, was a member of the Commission and in charge of its Secretariat.

10.4 Knowledge, Research and Self-correction

Given these trends, it is all the more surprising that the non-economic social sciences are not being called on to provide more knowledge and greater precision in understanding these phenomena and in contributing to their alleviation. On the contrary, funding for social science research has dwindled and universities and research centres are finding it more and more difficult to carry out research and publish their results. In many developing countries, this has become almost impossible.

As President of the International Social Science Council, I would like to go further into the questions of the politics of knowledge. Particularly since at times it is not a question of not having the knowledge, it is a question of knowledge not being applied to forecast problems or to remedy imbalances, and this leads us to the whole question of the politics of knowledge. Many of the social problems that are on the rise, such as homelessness, family disintegration, violence against women, and crime are not new to the history of industrial capitalism. Which is one of the reasons why the social sciences were created. Between 1750 and 1850, intellectual developments have been described as a transition from political philosophy to social science (Wagner 1999). In the twentieth century there was a 'globalization' of the social sciences which in recent decades has turned into a 'pluralization' of their paradigms and practices. It is time, then, to rethink the relationship between governance, political philosophy, and the social sciences.

The social sciences must contribute to generating knowledge and policy alternatives to redress the present imbalances in globalizations. However, if it is expected that research in the social sciences is also to be funded through the market, there is another imbalance that will be created. Evidence shows that unequal access to quality education may result from the broader economic inequality that is becoming prevalent in globalization. In the same way, unequal access to research results in the social sciences is also growing. The more vulnerable groups of the unemployed, the unskilled, the poor, have no possibility of financing social science research that will provide them with the tools to understand and to find ways of overcoming their poverty and of empowering them to negotiate with the larger entities on which their livelihoods depend. Economic deprivation then becomes compounded with knowledge deprivation.

The knowledge produced at universities, in response only to the entities that are able to fund such research in seeking advantages in the market, will be selective and will produce results that may enhance their advantages but will not conform to a real understanding of reality. Policy decisions based on such knowledge may then exacerbate already existing imbalances. It means that those vulnerable and poor groups that are unable to pay for knowledge to be produced will be doubly excluded.

10.5 Cultural Imbalances

Finally, a few thoughts on the cultural imbalances in globalization. As the World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization rightly points out, cross-border migration is changing the social and also the cultural composition of every country. One must add that it is shifting the cultural *layers and clusters* that have built up in every corner of the planet. As people carry their identities with them, moving around the world, cultural boundaries are also being relocated, as are the relational definitions of identities. A good example of this is the proliferation of terms used to denote Mexicans in the United States. We seem to have acquired split-level identities, all highly differentiated, with different political import, as 'Mexican-Americans', 'Chicanos', 'Hispanics', or 'Latinos'. Each identity may be displayed or performed alternatively in different settings or even in the same setting. In spite of this variability, a core cultural reference is still discernible. To maintain the cultural distinctiveness which they choose to retain, Mexican migrants and their descendants have reinvigorated their intangible cultural heritage through creative or syncretic new practices, for example, techno-norteña music, mexiperformance art, and re-gendered historico-cultural imaginaries.

This process of cultural relocation allows migrants and their descendants to recognize their insertion into a transnational macro-identity based on keeping a core set of norms of behaviour, values, symbols, and elements of lifestyle taken from their national or indigenous culture of origin. Re-territorialized, discursive and place-based identities are all in the process of being experimented with in this culturally interactive world. At the same time people can maintain a certain *cultural coherence* in the midst of the free flow of cultural goods and lifestyles in which they live their everyday lives. I believe a certain amount of cultural coherence is necessary for psychological well-being, but this does not limit the choice that individuals have to fully participate in other cultures in different realms of their lives.

In summary, my main argument in this article is that governance is increasingly influence by social, cultural and knowledge imbalances in globalization. It is necessary to challenge restrictive notions of governance as related exclusively to political relationships between political actors. A constructivist viewpoint of relationships, between states at an international level as well as between political, social and cultural actors within states, gives a more open perspective with which to analyse current affairs. Much more research is needed in the social sciences to understand the new practices which arise in response to global transformations, but it must work with political philosophy in particular in devising new intellectual frameworks to understand the overlapping processes of political, social, and cultural unrest. A worrying trend is that, if research priorities are dictated only through market forces, the poor, the unemployed and the most vulnerable groups such as women or indigenous people have no possibility of either funding or influencing such priorities in ways that would be useful in helping them overcome their marginalization. In a globalized world of an unceasing flow of goods and cultural change, selective knowledge production will only exacerbate already increasing

economic imbalances. Greater coherence in global governance, as the World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization has stated, must also be reflected in greater coherence in national governance, encompassing economic, social and cultural policies.

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With the very young 'Malinche' dancers. September 2014. *Source* Photo of author's collection

Chapter 11
Freedom of Choice, Democracy and the Zapatistas

11.1 Introduction

The Zapatistas have inspired a movement of hope that has had startling global support.[1] By global I mean that it has spurred actions in many countries and has been endorsed by groups from both the left and right of the political spectrum. As with any uncharted political movement, but even more so with the infinite possibilities for communication offered by the information and communication technologies (ICTs) of today's world, it is a movement fraught with dangers.

The Zapatistas have captured the imagination of a broad international coalition because, in their discourse, they have put together a position related to ethnicity, democracy and anti-globalization. Each of these issues, however, is much more complex than it appears in the images of the Zapatistas disseminated around the world by the mass media.

Perhaps because of the wide array of issues they touch upon, there have been wild speculations about the hidden agendas behind their surprising success. The political outcome of the march they will soon carry out will become clearer in the effect they have on democracy in Mexico. Will they help form a new political party based on a broad coalition of the left and centre? Or will they make declarations that ring round the world and return to the rainforest with only a promise of autonomy for their region? Or will they blend into a right-wing strategy emphasizing tradition and a return to corporate communitarianism? In my own view, one of the best outcomes of their movement would be to drive their experience towards effectively combating poverty and inequality, especially in developing countries.

Previously, as I was conducting research with a large group of young anthropologists and ecologists on the social perceptions of deforestation from 1990 to 1993, we were able to perceive the rumblings of political events in the Lacandón rainforest (Arizpe/Paz/Velázquez 1996; Arizpe 2014b). In fact, our National

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[1] This paper was submitted to a student meeting at the London School of Economics and Political Science which I was unable to attend, 26 February 2002. Unpublished.

Autonomous University of Mexico team was visited by the state government and by every contending political group in the region. My strategy was to be totally open about our research activities while protecting the identity of all informants. In our travelling around the region we could trace the zones where groups were being mobilized, on all sides. In our survey, the imminent appearance of such movements showed up clearly, since the answer to the question 'What is the greatest danger today in the world?' was, with a very high frequency, 'War'. In interpreting the data, I thought that it would be irresponsible to jump to a conclusion, namely, that a guerrilla movement was about to erupt in the Lacandón rainforest, when publishing such a fact could bring dire consequences to the people who had trusted us with their views. Since in a few interviews people had also mentioned Desert Storm, the war in Kuwait, it seemed to me safer to give this war, being seen on television at the time, as the reason for this answer. It was a moral choice, the correct one for anthropologists it seems to me. We were also driven by the fact that in our conversations with local *mestizo* and indigenous groups, we could see that some were in favour of the Zapatista mobilization and others were not.

Another factor influenced this strategy. The greatest grievance among the settlers of the Lacandón rainforest at the time we were carrying out fieldwork (1990–1993) was focused on the question of land distribution, the change of government policy from an opening up of agricultural lands in rainforest regions by the Alliance for Progress to a policy of rainforest conservation policy, and ecologists' harsh criticisms of the destruction brought about by agricultural settlers. Hence, the local political mobilization, both of indigenous and *mestizo* settlers, was driven by political motives, including the influence of socialist left-wing guerrillas in neighbouring Central American countries, indignation against the shift in environmental government policy, the poverty of their communities, and, among the *mestizo*, illfeeling because the National Indianist Institute was directly helping the Lacandón Indian communities as well as those of indigenous settlers—Tzeltal, Tojolabal, Chinantec, and others—but not the non-indigenous communities.[2] It is these concerns that were foremost in the First Lacandón Declaration, after the Zapatista movement first made its appearance on 1 January 1994. Concerns over ethnicity became consolidated some time later, following specific pressures.

Given this complex situation, in an article published in 1994, I expressed my own view that the concerns over injustice, poverty, and exclusion that the Zapatistas splashed in the media all over the world are indeed legitimate (Arizpe 1994). However, I cautioned that the strategy of declaring war on the Mexican state and mobilizing in the way they did might not bring benefits to their communities of militants.

Overall, one must begin by saying that, whatever happens, the Zapatista movement has already had many important repercussions. As I listened, last week, to local campesino men and women in Tepoztlán participate in a debate about autonomy, it clearly showed that, within Mexico, they have mobilized and brought

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[2] As one *mestizo* settler asked me point-blank: "Miss, could you please tell me why we (*mestizos*) are second-class citizens in our own country?" In fact, their communities were just as poor.

into the mainstream debate the fate of people who had been left out of Mexican development since the 1930s, when President Lázaro Cárdenas placed campesinos centre stage in the political process. I could not help thinking that in seven years the Zapatistas had achieved what the writings of so many Mexican anthropologists, including those of my generation, had not been able to do in fifty years, that is, to bring the plight of Indians to the centre of national attention. Yet let us not be reductionist in thinking that it is only the mass media and ICTs who have achieved this. There is now a political will to do this, linked to the globalization process.

11.2 The Zapatistas as a Global Movement

The other important impact the Zapatistas have had is that they have set a vital international precedent. In the Pinochet case, a precedent was established for internationally judging atrocities committed in a given country. At the opposite end of the spectrum, international support for the Zapatista movement has legitimized global support for poor, marginalized peoples. In this sense they have helped activate a commitment to a global ethics that many of us who identify as global citizens are clamouring for.

It is worth noting that, among other international initiatives, establishing a global ethics was the first proposal of the World Commission on Culture and Development in its report *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1995). Such a global ethics, it stated, must be based on democracy, human rights, equity, gender equality and sustainability and, more pointedly, respect for cultures. Not all cultures, however—only those that also have respect and tolerance for other cultures.

In my view, part of the international success of the Zapatistas is also associated with the fact that sustainable development is now understood not as a linear process but as a transition towards sustainability that consists of many uneven local and global events (Board on Sustainable Development 1999). Globalization has been recognized as driven not only by trade and finance but also by human development, including political choices, relationships based social capital and cultural allegiances (UNESCO 2000; Harrison/Huntington 2001; Wolfensohn/Dini/Facco-Bonetti/Johnson/Martin-Brown 2000).

The failures of globalization in terms of alleviating poverty, averting financial crises, stemming the tides of economic and environmental refugees and advancing towards sustainability goals are increasingly strengthening calls for more integrated development models and a new international development architecture. A vital part of this new architecture, I contend, is a cultural reordering, closely enmeshed with a transition in governance.

11.3 Culture as a New Development Banner

Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatistas have clearly understood that there is a growing consensus that local and regional initiatives around the world are shaping the future of sustainability and of globalization. Taking the perspective set out in the book *Our Common Journey: a Transition toward Sustainability*, it may be said that any successful quest for new structures of governance and cultural freedom will be "… a collective, uncertain and adaptive endeavour in which society's discovering of where it wants to go is intertwined with how it might try to get there" (Board on Sustainable Development 1999). As explained in the book, the pathways to sustainability, of which governance and culture are central aspects, cannot be charted fully in advance; instead, they will have to be navigated in an adaptive way, at many scales and in many places.

Working with a constantly changing interpretation of reality, with a greater number of voices demanding participation and with experimental new tools for communication, has made culture into a new geostrategic tool. As part of this process, however, culture has been pulled into the political vacuum left from the minimizing of political philosophies and, by becoming reified, it is becoming, in fact, ideologized.

The case of the Zapatistas is a very relevant example of why culture has been taken up as a banner by so many political movements. Although the ideology of the Mexican Revolution exalted the pre-Columbian cultural heritage, it deliberately did not give political recognition to the ethnicity of 'Indians'—a misnomer if ever there was one. This was part of the intellectual and political heritage of the social revolution in Mexico in 1910–1917. As in other nation-states at the time, forging a national culture out of the diversity of peoples who had settled in Mexican territory meant assimilating Indian as well as immigrant European and African groups. This policy followed the United States' idea of the 'melting-pot' of native and immigrant cultures but also emphasized the dominant roles of the State in this monocultural model.

Without going further into its history, in the 1940s the Mexican government consolidated a set of policies to help indigenous communities raise their living standards through education and economic development through the policy of '*indigenismo*' (indigenism). In many regions this meant protecting the Indian communities from exploitation by the dominant '*criollo*' (creole) class. As well as this, in the Mexican Agrarian Reform Programme the specificity of Indian communities having a different social and cultural way of life was acknowledged and accepted by the creation of the juridical recognition of the '*comunidad indigena*' (indigenous community) as a collective owner of lands given to such communities. This had, in fact, been one of the demands of the indigenous communities that supported the Revolution, notably the army of Emiliano Zapata in central Mexico. The social development component of this agrarian right was the policy of *indigenismo*. Specific attention to indigenous communities, however, did not alter the assimilationist view on education and culture. Conserving the richness of such cultures did become a high priority in anthropological research from the 1940s

onwards and fostered a wide array of experimental and highly successful museological practices starting with the inauguration of the National Museum of Anthropology in 1963. Since 1975 when the First National Congress of Indians was held (Arizpe 1978, 2014a), however, in a sequence of rapidly changing policy perceptions and applications, the policy of *indigenismo* has been changed to 'indigenismo participativo' (participative indigenism), then ethnodevelopment, then discoursive pluriculturalism.

This is no longer considered enough by the Zapatistas who now demand 'Indian rights' and 'autonomy'. The debate is spurring what in my view is a very important political debate in Mexico. However, it is being imprisoned in a frame of reference which is far from the wider analysis needed about the place of such demands in the context of the evolving political structures in the new global interdependence. The debate also touches just marginally on what seems to me the greatest challenge to the neo-liberal international order being put in place, that is, poverty.

11.4 And When We Woke Up, Poverty Was Still There

This title paraphrases a famous 'shortest story ever told' by a Guatemalan-Mexican writer, Tito Monterroso, which reads "When I woke up, the dinosaur was still there". That is the whole story. It serves my purpose here to argue that, 500 years later, after the nightmare of the so-called 'Conquista', poverty in Mexico is still here; 190 years later, after independence, it is still here and 83 years after the Mexican Revolution, it is still here; finally and inexcusably, 19 years later, after the swing towards neo-liberal market policies, poverty is not only here, it is growing! In fact, Mexico is one of the only two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in which poverty did not decrease in the nineties.

Furthermore, in terms of the topic of this paper, poverty became worse in Indian regions. Statistics show an appalling situation. According to the Mexican census of 2000,[3] the estimated Indian population in Mexico is 8,701,688, equivalent to 10.7 % of the total population. This figure includes the number of people over four years old who said they speak an Indian language. On the basis of this figure, it was estimated that 33.3 % of Mexican '*municipios*' (municipalities; the smallest administrative unit) have 30 % or more Indian population but only 8.4 % of municipalities have more than 70 % Indian population. This immediately highlights the problem in giving autonomy to Indian groups demanding it in municipalities where most of the local population is *mestizo* or of several ethnic groups. In some municipalities in central Mexico, in fact, up to five different native languages are spoken, as well as Spanish.

One interesting fact is that the general Mexican census of 1990 included a question asking respondents to self-define their cultural identity even if they did not speak an Indian language. Significantly, this indigenous self-adscription ('*auto-adscripción*

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[3] Mexican General Census 2000, INEGI (National Institute for Geography and Statistics), at: <http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/consulta.asp?c=10252&p=14048&s=est> (3 April 2014).

indígena') increased the number of Indians in the Mexican population by 10 %![4]
Interesting in that, as my own fieldwork data have shown, many Mexican *mestizos*
identify themselves as 'Indians' even though they may be far removed from being
actual descendants of native populations. In the general Mexican census of 2000,
however, this question was omitted.

Most data now being repeatedly spelled out in the mass media to underline the
marginalized status of Indians refers simplistically to income and wage differentials.
A recent study by Mercedes Pedrero, a distinguished demographer, discovered
something different. Based on data from the National Employment Survey of 1997 and
the National Survey of Indian Zones, she showed that in Indian regions, *34.2 % of all
workers receive no wages at all*—they work in family agricultural activities. This figure
becomes even more dramatic if disaggregated by gender. *More than half of women
workers, 53.4 %, do not receive wages*; the equivalent for men is 25 % (Pedrero 2001).

As to wages, while the average income of workers in urban areas is $2002.35, in
Indian regions it is $507.56. This cannot be explained, as is sometimes argued, by
saying that workers in Indian regions work fewer hours, since Pedrero (2001)
shows that working hours are 44 h for urban workers and 39 h for workers in Indian
regions. Worse still, the average income per hour for urban workers is $11.21 and
for those in Indian regions it is $3.05 per hour. It is not surprising then that nine out
of every ten workers in Indian regions live in extreme poverty.

The crucial issue in terms of Indians, poverty and development policies is that
the above data raise the question: are Indians poor because they are Indians or are
they Indians because they are poor? These terms of debate are now coming back,
like ghosts of our academic past, in my case, quite literally. I remember how, in one
of the rooms at the London School of Economics and Political Science, working for
my PhD in the seventies, I was asked to lead off the discussion or rather, as I saw it,
smash the argument that culture produces poverty. This argument had been a
cancerous growth of Oscar Lewis's description in the fifties of the living style of
rural migrants in Mexico City.

Well, today, some people of the elite in Mexico, and, for example, in the World
Bank, are again beginning to talk of a 'culture of poverty', and of how education is
the only tool against poverty. In fact, the unofficial policy of the new Ministry for
Social Development seems to be that '*superación personal*', that is, personalized
effort, is the best way to get people out of poverty.

When I was at LSE I was so interested in this question of the relationship of
Indian identity to poverty that I included it in my thesis and actually published a
short article on it in '*Kung*', the LSE magazine (Arizpe 1972).

To show how things change to remain the same, I will very briefly summarize
the results of that fieldwork among the Mazahua Indians in the mid-seventies. I had
found that both the Mazahua and the *mestizos* had received equal plots of land in
the Agrarian Reform of the 1930s. Yet in the seventies the Mazahua were notably

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[4] Mexican General Census 1990, INEGI (National Institute for Geography and Statistics), at: <http://
www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/consulta.asp?p=16653&c=11893&s=est > (3 April 2014).

poorer than the *mestizos*, caught in the trap of '*minifundismo*' (small land holdings), cultivating plots of land of one hectare or less and, as my data showed, forced to engage in a stepwise recurrent migration of family members to Mexico City. The *mestizos*, on the contrary, had had economic mobility in each generation.

Why? Because the *mestizos* had occupied all the positions that gave access to agricultural inputs (the concessions for fertilizers and agricultural machinery) and to financial resources (banks and sources of government funding). At the same time, their children, with higher educational levels and social skills, took all the new jobs being created in the economy, especially in the service industries, such as taxi drivers, factory workers and office employees.

This marginalization of the younger generations of Mazahuas occurred because of discrimination but also, the study found out, because the parents took the deliberate decision not to send their children to school, and to shield them from learning *mestizo* social or political skills. Why? Because they wanted to keep their '*usos y costumbres*', their Mazahua way of life and community.

Would I interpret the fieldwork data differently today, in a totally new context? No, I would broaden the scope of my interpretation.

Firstly, I would say that freedom of choice must certainly be the ruling principle to be applied in all situations along the frontiers of peoples having different cultures. Many useless debates in Mexico about whether to keep or discard Indian identities would dissolve if the assumption were made that no one from the outside a cultural group, *nor anyone on the inside of it*, should impose a decision to keep or discard a way of thinking or of living. This applies very markedly for women who are forced to stay in a backward place by their male entourage. Each individual and group must be free to decide, according to the changing pressures around them, how to deal with their cultural choices. This will do away with leaders leading their followers towards forms of ethnic cleansing, or cultural fundamentalism; it will stop cultural imprisonment of the young or cultural protectionism sinking peoples or countries back into the past.

Secondly, I would say that discrimination was a very real process whereby a cultural or ethnic feature could be used by *mestizos* in competing for agricultural opportunities and scarce jobs. This leads me to say that, in a world in which there is a strong emphasis on market competition, more acute competition will inevitably lead to more acute discrimination, using any excuse: ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, skin colour, age, what have you.

Thirdly, I would say that the State can legislate against discrimination, as we have proposed just recently in our Committee on Human Rights of the Study Group for the Reform of the State, but my fieldwork has shown that discrimination works mostly though non-juridical, non-institutional means. It works through the reverse of friendship and ritual friendship (*compadrazgo*); through kinship and family networks—especially in Mexico; through neighbourhoods and sports clubs.

So much so that we need, as I have argued elsewhere, a new concept to allow us to reach and overcome such discriminatory relationships (Arizpe 1998; see Chap. 12 in this book). I have called this concept 'conviviability', an awkward term in English because there is no equivalent in this language to the much better one of

'*convivencia*' in Spanish. I argue that we need the concept of conviviability as an enabling principle for social development. I would insist that there can be no sustainability without conviviability.

Finally, I would like to say that the return of this particular discussion on the relationship of culture to poverty twenty-five years after it had been put to rest makes me ponder about the intricate reflexivity that binds research to reality. It becomes even more complex among those of us, and the many of you, researchers who study in universities in developed countries and work in developing countries. But this is another issue for another time.

11.5 The Zapatistas and Cultural Democracy

The Zapatistas have been accused by opponents of being demagogic precisely because they are cultural conservatives. Yet the fact that all major decisions are consulted about on an extended, community-by-community basis shows that they understand and put into practice the principle of letting people decide. Ironically, this accusation can actually be levelled in reverse against the hardliners in the Fox government who have spoken against the Zapatistas and who want to impose Catholic doctrine, disregarding people's right to decide what their beliefs are.

Importantly, it must be noted that it was the revolt of the Zapatista women which was the arrowhead in opening up this issue of freedom of choice in the Zapatista political programme. They objected to the traditional formulation of the defence of traditional Indian cultures by saying that they no longer accept that part of the '*usos y costumbres*', traditional ways, which imposes subordination, repression, and male violence against women. This was not a minor issue since data have shown that at least 30 %—and some claim more than half—the Zapatista militants are women, most of them young ones.

The reasons why so many young women in the south-east rainforest region in Mexico are Zapatistas is explained by the extremely limited opportunities they still have to extend their schooling, to gain access to jobs, and to have any kind of independent personal social development. And they already know about and have seen other women who have greater opportunities of participation and development elsewhere.

11.6 A Guerrilla in Search of Authors

The case of the Zapatistas is a fascinating example of how a political movement sent out messages on different themes until they found the one to which the public was most receptive. Indeed, in a recent interview Marcos himself described how they started out with a socialist ideology. They were then questioned as to why they gave themselves the right to represent and impose a socialist ideology. As they shifted messages in an intense interactive dialogue with Mexican intellectuals,

anthropologists, politicians, and civil society, they experimented with different discursive issues until they focused on that of Indian cultural rights.

A few years later, as Indian cultural rights were assailed by nationalists as unconstitutional, the concept of autonomy was introduced by anthropologists and became the key concept that could be applied beyond a strictly Indian movement. It became the key that fits all doors, a discursive concept which Marcos applied from the very beginning. In so doing, he broke with the Latin American tradition whereby guerrilla groups rallied around an ideological edifice, then organized, then fought for these ideals and, when such movements were successful in Latin America, then imposed such ideals on the society.

The Zapatistas, on the contrary, listened intently to the response of Mexican society. According to Marcos, when that society strongly rejected armed conflict, the Zapatistas declared they would not fight with arms. However, when a consultation with Mexican society on what the Zapatistas should do as a political force ended with that society asking that they become a formal political group or party, the Zapatistas stood back.

In spite of this last example of reticence, it could be said that the Zapatistas are the first guerrilla movement which readily responds to public opinion. They lay emphasis on the demands that are best accepted both by Mexican society and by the international community, and work those through the demands and feelings of their own Zapatista followers.

It is worth noting, however, that they have highlighted some demands which have faced opposition within some groups of Mexican society. The demand for women's rights and participation is one. Another, more recently, is the issue of homosexual recognition and rights, which is also linked to the rights of handicapped minorities. These are all issues which have been taken up in recent elections by left-wing parties.

Culture, then, has become a new buzzword in political discourse, not only nationally but also at an international level. One must ask the question, though, what 'culture' are we talking about?

11.7 Culture and the Reform of the State

At this time the political discussion in Mexico has closely linked culture with the reform of the State. Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, a distinguished left-wing politician, led a very large assembly of representatives of political parties, participants from civil society, intellectuals, and researchers in discussing 'Human Rights and Public Liberties' in Mexico. As Chair of the Human Rights Committee in that assembly, I was responsible for developing a set of proposals for recasting the foundations of the Mexican state and society.

Without citing all of them, we summarized major proposals to ensure human rights over all other rights, freedom of expression, of association, of belief, and we emphasized the general principles of non-discrimination, preserving secularity, guaranteeing labour rights according to international treaties, and enhancing the

equal participation of women. With respect to the topic of this paper, we adopted the following principles:

1. to include the concept of sustainability in the Constitution to ensure the continuity of the biosphere;
2. to establish the right to culture;
3. to recognize and to promote the freedom of cultural creation as a public good;
4. to establish, with clarity, the definition of the State and society in Mexico as a pluricultural nation; and
5. to establish the legal and administrative mechanisms to guarantee free circulation of people over the borders in the context of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The years to come will be a test case for Mexico: given such hopeful steps towards development and democracy, just like the Zapatistas, we will be vigilant in ensuring that such consensual agreements are implemented at all levels and sectors of Mexican society.

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Chapter 12
Equality of Vulnerability and Opportunity

12.1 Introduction

In a shrinking planet wired and webbed by the most continuous and interactive cultural contacts in history, people are constantly having to negotiate with others with different values, attitudes, and behaviours.[1] This means that the world is one but the many have not yet found their place in it. Our own nature as human beings makes us forever look at the world from a specific place, a specific time. Before, the horizon of our eyes had always been transformed into the boundary of 'our world'. What happens when we can see beyond our known physical horizon, to the other side of the world? What happens when we can see, in live time, people falling to their death? Or see the houses destroyed when the dust settles—on the other side of the world?

Could we not aspire, in this new millennium, to extending that horizon to an empathy with no boundaries, an imagination with no barriers, creativity with no limits? We can aspire to it, certainly, but the more the basic needs of so many poor people are not met, the more resentment grows, the more conflicts fall into the fault lines of cultures to erupt into wars.

As the report *Crossing the Divide*[2] states, it is the heightened degree of interdependence in the world that has transformed any 'threat' into a 'global threat' that knows no boundaries. What the recent tragedies in New York and in Afghanistan have demonstrated is that violence has acquired a new global rank. However, at the

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[1] This paper was presented at a meeting of the 'Eminent Persons for the Dialogue of Civilizations' on 20 September 2001. An extract of 8 pages of this paper was delivered at the United Nations General Assembly on 8 November 2001.

[2] The General Assembly of the United Nations declared the year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations with UNESCO having responsibility for organizing its activities. A 'Group of Eminent Persons for the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations'—including Kamal Aboulmagd, Lourdes Arizpe, Ruth Cardoso, Jacques Delors, Hans Küng, Nadime Gordimer, and Javad Sharif —were asked to write a report to be presented to the UN General Assembly; the title they chose was *Crossing the Divide: the Dialogue of Civilizations* (2002).

same time the collective will for peace, development and sustainability has informed the work of so many thousands of local social or cultural movements, as we may bear witness.

The tragic events of 2001, if anything, demonstrate how important international cooperation in matters related to culture has become on the world stage. No longer will questions of cultural identities or religious fundamentalism be considered as marginal concerns in international geopolitics or in the defence of democracy.

An initial reaction to these tragic events gives the impression that the international work carried out in previous years on the culture of peace, culture and development and on the dialogue of cultures has been insufficient. Their contribution, however, was reflected in the many statements and demonstrations, showing that the vast majority of people in the world are on the side of peace and of cultural coexistence. *Perhaps never in history has this collective will against violence been so evident and so global in its manifestations.* This, I believe, is the movement we must act upon through concerted international programmes and actions.

Since the 1980s UNESCO has correctly diagnosed both the benefits and the risks inherent in cultural movements and has carried out actions calling the world's attention to the cultural dimensions of development. At present, much more international cooperation and analytical work is needed to understand how people's economic, political, and social conditions interact with elements of cultural behaviour.

12.2 A Higher Order of Civilization

In the report *Crossing the Divide* (Group of Eminent Persons for the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations 2002), we argue that wars are constructed through discourse; yet it is the exercise of power that applies wars to relations between states or peoples. One may ask whether the recent conflict really is a 'clash of civilizations' as popularly expressed in the media (Huntington 1993, 1996). Or is this discourse intended to legitimize the use of violence between groups with particular interests? Some authors have termed it the 'crash of civilizations'.

Indeed, what kind of civilization tolerates fanatics that kill children, women and men? And, again, what kind of civilization mobilizes its armies against a whole country to punish rulers it has supported for so long and ends up killing children, women and men?

Which civilizations are these that no human being or citizen, whether a true Muslim, Jew or Christian, or of any other religion, would recognize as their own? They would not identify with them because they all recognize *a higher order of civilization*. One that has been created and nurtured by the combination of many, many strands of philosophical and theological thinking throughout human history. As eloquently expressed by Abdelaziz Belkhadem, Foreign Minister of Algeria at the session on the Dialogue of Civilizations at the UN "No one can doubt that we are witnessing the more and more extensive formation of a civilization of the

universal which is the result and the fruit of the endowments and contributions of different human civilizations since the night of time". This world civilization has already brought forth as its main tenet the principle that every individual must treat others as he or she desires to be treated, that is with respect, dignity, empathy, and tolerance. In *Crossing the Divide* (Group of Eminent Persons for the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations 2002), this is noted as the Kantian principle reflected in very similar precepts found in so many cultures and religions. Hans Küng expressed it thus: "in this dialogue the world's religions have rediscovered that their own fundamental ethical teachings support and deepen those secular ethical values which are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". For this civilized global society I propose the term *geopolis* from the Greek *geo* meaning Earth and *polis*, a community whose members willingly agree to abide by certain rules that bind them in solidarity to each other.

It is becoming more and more urgent to build this geopolis now that contemporary societies face a complexity different from everything we could learn from in history. New values and new standards must be forged and, for this, as I noted at the conclusion of UNESCO's 1998 Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development,[3] we need 'freedom to create'. Creativity and not just a return to traditions is what is needed to shape this new *geopolis.*

12.3   Cultural Diversity in the Geopolis

Freedom to create goes hand in hand with respect for and appreciation of cultural diversity. As defined by the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity proclaimed at the 2001 UNESCO General Conference, diversity is "… the source of human capability of developing: we think by associating different images; we identify by contrasting ways of living; we elect by choosing from an array of options; we grow by rebuilding our confidence again and again through dialogue".[4] In this new beginning, to cope with the momentous challenges of sustainability, governance and *convivencia* in a global era, we need cooperation on a world scale to put into play all the creativity that may be summoned from all cultures and civilizations.

As explained in the Second World Culture Report, it is no longer a matter of globalization allowing cultural diversity to continue to develop, it is cultural diversity that is a condition without which globalization cannot continue (UNESCO 1998).

Diversity must also include all the diverse sectors of societies, and especially women. Civilizations have been built by men and women, each with their

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[3] Available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001139/113935eo.pdf> (23 March 2014).

[4] Available at: <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> (23 March 2014).

respective and complementary contributions. No dialogue between civilizations could take place without the active and inventive participation of women.

Respect and reciprocity cannot be decided by law or imposed by institutions, although disrespect and hierarchy can be and often are. Minimizing inequality in the social primary goods in Rawls's sense—not just rights and liberties but also powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—is not only the most effective instrument in this regard but can also be institutionalized. Minimizing inequality, not just absolute poverty, empowers the possibility of equal and effective participation and, thereby, of *convivencia* and genuine cultural pluralism.

12.4 Negotiating the Future

In a shrinking planet wired and webbed by the most continuous and interactive cultural contacts in history, people are constantly having to negotiate with others with different values, attitudes, and behaviours. Such transactions become impossible if a cultural canon is elevated to the level of a metaphysical condition. Questions of faith, all would agree, cannot be negotiated. If so, groups defining themselves *exclusively* on the basis of religion, at best, can only negotiate coexistence and tolerance, and at worse, as Osama Bin Laden has shown, they will fight to annihilate the Other or themselves. Democracy, trade and policy-making, on the other hand, imply negotiated conciliation, as do civilized international relations. The only way to achieve this conciliation, as Umberto Eco has forcefully reminded us, is to consider that "all wars of religion that have bloodied the world for centuries have been born out of passionate adherence to simplistic oppositions: We and They, the Good and the Bad, White and Black. If Western culture has shown itself to be creative … it is because it has striven to 'dissolve' nefarious simplification with the light of critical spirit and enquiry[5]".

Simplifications of political philosophies do not generally last very long: freedom of expression and open debate lead to adjustment through accurate criticism and to negotiation between contending parties.

In a forceful statement, the European Union declared that "the right to difference and to identity is inseparable from that of the equal dignity of cultures … It is within this perspective that the European Union conceives the dialogue among civilizations. This must be carried out without taboos. We have the right to ask questions to a civilization other than our own and to pose questions to others. Others also have the right to interrogate us on the reason for certain inequalities. If the dialogue of civilization is to be lessened to meeting to congratulate ourselves, it is not a dialogue", nor, it adds, could it "…be reduced to a dialogue among religions".[6]

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[5] Umberto Eco, personal communication, UNESCO 1997.

[6] European Union ambassador, 1998, communication at meeting in New York.

The Group of Eminent Persons for the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations agreed, precisely, that the framework of international relations must change so that the Other is no longer seen as an Enemy but as a competitor in creating the best for improving the lives of all. To do this, the polis must be filled with narratives that may be criticized, dissected, remodelled and transformed into negotiated conciliation.

12.5 To See How Things Are

The times we are living in make it necessary not only to 'see' what is already occurring in relationships between individuals having diverse backgrounds, but also to question the language itself that we use, because it conditions the way we 'see'. Arturo Escobar, a leading Latin American social scientist, in his groundbreaking book *Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, has stressed that "Rather than being eliminated by development, many 'traditional cultures' survive through their transformative engagement with modernity. It becomes more appropriate to speak of popular culture as a present-oriented process of invention through complex hybridizations that cut across class, ethnic and national boundaries … If we continue to speak of tradition and modernity it is because we continually fall into the trap of not saying anything new because the language does not permit it" (Escobar 1995: 219).

Rather than talking of how things should be, many Third World scholars are looking at how things are. Minh-Ha (1991) speaks of the 'transcultural between-world reality' that requires travelling simultaneously backwards (into cultural heritage, oneself, one's social group) and forwards, cutting across social boundaries into progressive elements of other cultural formations.

In Latin America in particular, culture, in all its manifestations—artistic, festive, social, and intellectual—is rapidly becoming one of the most important areas of interactivity, where local demands are represented in the face of overwhelming global trends. As Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso remarked, "… the revolution needed, in order to face the challenges of globalization and governance—and one which is already underway in many places, fragmentary and in a confused way—is a cultural revolution". Certainly, the hope fostered by Porto Alegre's World Social Forum in opening new avenues of perception and action in a global world is one of the signs that local peoples the world over are demanding a change in the course of processes of globalization.

The first mindset we must change concerns the concept of development. The lifelong work of Amartya Sen sheds new light on this concept by stating that development is freedom. It is doing away with the unfreedoms that prevents people from pursuing what they have reasons to value.

12.6 Negotiating Cultural Pluralism

Freedom in culture goes hand in hand with respect and appreciation of cultural diversity. As defined at UNESCO's General Assembly of 2001 and framed by the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, diversity is "… the source of human capability of developing: we think by associating different images; we identify by contrasting ways of living; we elect by choosing from an array of options; we grow by rebuilding our confidence again and again through dialogue".[7] In this new beginning, to cope with the momentous challenges of sustainability, governance and *convivencia* in a global era, we need cooperation on a world scale that puts into play all the creativity that be summoned from all cultures and civilizations.

Diversity must also include all the different sectors of society. As noted by Ruth Cardoso, a distinguished Brazilian anthropologist, cultural studies and social movements of mobilized peoples of African descent, women and peoples of varied ethnic and social origins contributed greatly to the political evolution of the end of the twentieth century.[8] However, she warns of a new threat, which is "… the construction of identities so strong as to exclude the principle of multiculturalism and the fight against discrimination, restructuring values and patterns of behaviour leading to intolerant fundamentalisms".

12.7 Equality of Vulnerability

Scientists meeting at the Global Change Open Science Conference: Challenges of a Changing Earth, in July 2001 in Amsterdam, confirmed that global warming will have decisive and diverse impacts on the life of every inhabitant of the planet. Environmental global change thus creates an *equality of vulnerability* which, in turn, also deepens through increased interdependence on one single world economic system.

In the report *Crossing the Divide* (Group of Eminent Persons for the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations 2002) we put forward the view that equality in vulnerability heightens the need for a broader, more political dialogue among cultures. Thus, it stimulates dialogue—because the real answer to equality in vulnerability, leading *to equality of opportunity*, is the adherence to accepted forms of common behaviour by more and more actors on the international scene. This requires, as stated in the Report, "… an act of decision by each individual member of the international community, no matter how small".

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[7] UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, available at: <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>   (23   March 2014).

[8] Cardoso, Ruth, 2001: Speech at the United Nations Assembly, New York, 8 November.

"Perhaps what we are really talking about", the Report goes on to say, "is no longer individual enemies for individual countries but a multifaceted enemy for all. The spreading of contagious disease, weapons of mass destruction, unrestricted dissemination of small weapons, poverty, all represent different faces of an 'enemy' for the entire human race … If the enemy is common, it follows that fighting against it requires unanimity".

12.8 Global Ethics

As political philosophies are downplayed by the neo-liberal perspective of the waning state, cultural conflicts and ethnic cleansing wars proliferate. Cultural conflicts will be endless in a world where ethnic ideologies are replacing political ideologies as instruments in conflicts of power. To prevent greater proliferation of such conflicts, a new global framework is needed, and that will take time to build from the myriad initiatives of different peoples in today's world. As stated above, a first step is the need to recognize *a higher order of civilization*, one in scale with the effects that globalization is bringing to the world. It must be built through the 'global ethics' proposed by the United Nations World Commission on Culture and Development in *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1995), and be based on human rights, democracy, gender equity and sustainability.

12.9 The Need for Social Studies

Why has political and social creativity stalled so noticeably in the last two decades? At the end of the nineteenth century, the development of industrial capitalism in European countries had exacerbated social problems such as the disintegration of families and the abandonment of children; labour problems of low wages and unhealthy work conditions; problems of criminality, alcoholism and violence against women; and cultural dislocations. At that time, governments created and supported research in the social sciences out of which emerged many of the policies and programmes applied to solve the 'social question'. Today, when precisely similar effects can be perceived in vastly greater numbers in many, many countries, prevailing policies, on the contrary, are restricting funding for social science research and reflection.

One of the results of such measures is that people find no contending ideas they can debate, reject or adopt in a way that will give them a feeling that they have a say in constructing new meanings to their changed lives. They thus feel disenchanted in their desire to forge their own futures.

In many countries religions are filling this vacuum in social and political debate. Will interpretations of doctrinal texts stretch to the point where they may provide

guidelines for operating in the amazing complexity of contemporary societies? At present it is the description and analysis of unanticipated conditions that we must deal with.

12.10 A New Collective Will

We are witnessing the conscious building of a new constellation of political will around the world. It is coming from local communities, from reconstructed cultural communities, from those conscious of the need to build a global civil society, and from political constituencies that consider development, democracy and sustainability as inseparable.

An altogether different concept of the role of the United Nations is needed. As proposed in *Crossing the Divide* (Group of Eminent Persons for the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations 2002): "To those who say that the United Nations is nothing more than the sum of its members, we beg to differ. Within the framework of the United Nations, we would like to submit that an international social contract is being consummated … For the need for such a contract will become more and more self-evident, as power alone will not deliver peace any longer".

Local cultural actions I believe will provide the substance that will be linked through interactivity into a global cultural web. It is this global cultural web that will give meaning and purpose to our continuing human survival on this planet.

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Chapter 13
Convivencia: The Goal of Conviviability

Sustainability cannot be achieved without conviviability.[1] People cannot manage the natural environment rationally if the 'way they live together' pushes them to be hungry, greedy or destructive. We need a new model of human relationships for sustainable development.

New concepts are necessary now that structures of governance and social and gender structures are changing as a result of globalization and the rise of social and cultural movements that cut across borders. Nation-states are reorganizing the decision-making and participation of their various constituencies. This is transforming the way in which individuals handle multiple allegiances related to languages, cultures, and national identities. This decentring of knowledge and information also leads people to redraw the maps of understanding that bind them to the different realms of everyday life.

Governability is clearly useful as a general principle to shape this reorganization but it implies a top-down approach to societies. What happens when the political borders of units being governed do not coincide with cultural boundaries? The latter may delineate larger groups, as in the case of the Kurds in the Middle East, or smaller ones, since most countries in the world are multicultural. Religious

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boundaries are also being redrawn the world over. Will all of these be incorporated into new political philosophies? It seems to me that social and cultural dynamics must be understood and shaped with other tools, new ones that we still have not created.

Culture was defined as 'ways of living together' by the World Commission on Culture and Development. The Report of the Commission, *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1995), stated that culture is at the core of sustainable development. More than eighty per cent of phenomena that create risks for human survival as a species are anthropogenic, that is, they originate in human actions. Yet most thinking on sustainability has focused almost exclusively on the direct relationships of humans to the natural environment, while the indirect ones, of human-to-human relationships, are dealt with as a totally separate issue of governance, to be analysed and decided in models of political management.

Cooperation in human relations is a prerequisite for sustainable development. Fulfilling today's human needs while preserving and protecting the natural environment for future generations requires equitable and harmonious interactions between individuals and communities. Frequently, the debates on these issues revolve around the degree of determinacy and, hence, primacy, that should be given to either environmental concerns or human issues. A new model is needed that integrates both concerns in the same way in which they are closely interlinked in reality.

In many places, even when people are aware of and willing to protect the natural environment, they find it impossible to do so because of economic, political or cultural dislocations. Eliminating these pressures requires good governance, organizing people through democratic processes. But it also requires good conviviability or 'convivencia', that is, reorganizing cultural allegiances to enable human beings with different ideals of the good life to live together compatibly in a living biosphere. The Spanish term of *convivencia* is derived from Latin *convivere*, first used by Seneca and other Roman authors to denote bringing people together to a banquet. Additionally, in Spanish, 'vivencia' means 'experiencing the world'. Thus, convivencia means not only living side by side, but experiencing life together.

Conviviability, an awkward but useful neologism, could provide the guiding principle for the cultural transition that we must live through in the Global Age. Such a concept could be useful as a performance marker both for government policy and for civil society actions.

Reference

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1995: *Our Creative Diversity* (Paris: Culture and Development Co-ordination Office).

Freedom to create (2012)

Chapter 14
Freedom to Create

14.1 Introduction

One message, simple yet complex, coming from diverse peoples and unifying us, has come out of this Conference and it is: we need *freedom to create.*[1] Cultural policies may become the means that will allow this creative freedom all around the world. Participants in this Conference stressed that culture is the heart of the matter in art, heritage, cultural pluralism, gender, interculturalism, cultural citizenship, and global civic culture. They also constantly reiterated that culture is the driving force in media and Internet content, and is a central issue in international agreements on trade, investment and intellectual property. Governments are therefore now facing new complexities in broadening their cultural policies and in applying cultural considerations to their economic and political transformations.

Why do we need this mobilization of governments, civil society, and artists? Conference participants have endorsed the following ideas to ensure development takes account of culture:

Firstly, as Federico Mayor has emphasized, the gap should not continue to grow between those having the resources to continue to recreate their languages and culture and those that do not have them. In other words, the world must not be split between the info-poor and the info-rich. The way out of this is democracy as a *cultural* objective.

Secondly, the Conference highlighted the principle that people excluded from current developments must not be left behind in cyber-history, especially women, minorities, and indigenous peoples.

Thirdly, artists and writers need the status and the conditions to be able to continue to concentrate creativity in their minds and in their hands to produce the symbols of tomorrow, particularly in developing countries.

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[1] Keynote address delivered at the UNESCO Conference on 'Cultural Policies for Development', Stockholm, Sweden, 20 March to 2 April 1998. Unpublished.

Fourthly, 'cultural citizenship' must be expanded to allow for peaceful resolution of conflicts between culturally different peoples that live together in nation-states.

Fifthly, research and involvement is needed to explore the seemingly boundless possibilities that new forms of communication and expression place in our hands precisely at the beginning of this millennium.

Such a vision echoes the many voices we heard during the consultations held by the World Commission on Culture and Development between 1993 and 1996. Here in Stockholm we have heard them accelerated, one could say, to cybernetic speed. Culture is now an international issue exhibiting more and more complexities of scale, time and interaction, as concrete policies and actions are restructured. Already, multilateral organizations, as we heard here from the World Bank, are expanding their programmes of action in this field; also, political forces are deeply concerned to claim the concepts related to culture and to shape their priorities. Governments, judging from the unexpectedly high attendance at this meeting—850 official delegates—and from the strong leadership shown in statements in the plenary, are now aware of the power of culture. Just as this is happening, interestingly, the sessions in the fora and the Agora—also with a very high participation of over 900 representatives from all over the world—give us two important indications: they have shown the effervescence in thinking about and mobilizing culture in civil society, especially by artists, researchers and custodians of cultural heritage, and the enthusiasm that new analyses and concepts bring in when exploring culture as the site on which individuals may rebuild governance, gender and cultural allegiances.

14.2 Culture and Development

The debates of this conference have confirmed that culture has a role not only in the field of cultural heritage and creation but also in the discussion of development policies, especially of alternative propositions in development. It is quite striking that as culture becomes a topic mentioned in public spaces, it is frequently invoked to explain both the successes and the failures of development. In this respect frequent mention was made of the need for policymakers to have more and better data from a broader array of fields of culture. The statistical and analytical capacities for understanding such processes need to be developed. Many speakers support a concerted effort to develop an internationally agreed conceptual framework for cultural statistics with a broader interpretation of culture than the one currently in use. Within this framework, governments should spare no effort to fill the gaps in available information. The World Culture Report (UNESCO 1998), the first recommendation of the World Commission on Culture and Development, written by an independent team of scholars and statisticians, is now concentrating these efforts, as explained at the Agora session.

Respect for cultural diversity, a theme strongly endorsed by the World Commission on Culture and Development, was also taken up by a majority of speakers of this Conference. Most of them linked this discussion to the spread of

democratic practices everywhere in the world. Evidence suggests that democracy draws strength from certain cultural conditions. It is by building democratic institutions that a more participatory culture evolves, and this in turn strengthens democracy. The governments that have weathered recent economic crises best are democracies. A government which is not answerable to its people is not likely to have the institutions needed to impose discipline in order to overcome a financial crisis or to embark on successful long-term development.

In the presentations in over 70 countries of the Report *Our Creative Diversity*, already translated into 13 languages (UNESCO 1995), the same question has constantly come up—one that was also brought to the fore in this Conference: won't diversity make it even more difficult to sustain cooperation for development? Indeed, 'drawing the borders in blood' as *Radovan* Karadžić is quoted as saying, reflects a misapprehension of the nature of culture and of the historical evolution of history which is doomed to fail in societies that are becoming increasingly interdependent and interactive. Indigenous and culturally distinct groups, as well as ethnic, racial or religious sub-groups who demand rights to express and continue to develop their cultures, require recognition. Yet their relationships to broader political structures, nation-states and the world community in which they are embedded must also be understood.

Several speakers made the point that rights do not emanate from markets, and neither from customs nor beliefs. Rights emanate from a juridical system which is collectively legitimized and defended by freely elected bodies, that is, national governments and international organizations. Intercultural exchanges become a prime policy line of action which should be implemented according to local ways of management and organization. It is important that such negotiations be the main responsibility of municipal, departmental or state governments.

14.3 Culture as Symbol and Commodity

Objects or monuments become cultural heritage or cultural emblems because a meaning is embedded in them—a meaning individuals and collectivities can recognize. It may be a historical meaning, or a nationalist, intellectual, religious, or communal one. This may lead to situations where different nations or cultures attach different meanings to cultural products. Now that economies are interlocking in a global market, a basic question is being asked: are cultural objects commodities like any other? Are films, books, videos, to be treated like flowers or footballs in world trade? The debate on this subject, at this Conference and elsewhere, has been forceful. Two major positions have been outlined: one position states that cultural products must be exempt from rules applying generally in international trade and investment agreements; another position states that such agreements, to be a driving force for new opportunities, must apply to everything being exchanged through markets.

As directly relevant, I would like to mention a famous anthropology debate which was brought up in one of the Agora sessions. This debate centres on the fact that the basic organizing principle of all human societies is *exchange*. The debate in anthropology was prolonged because the crucial question asked was whether the objects being exchanged represented economic wealth or cultural richness. For example, it was asked whether conch shells given as gifts in Melanesia in the Pacific, a custom underpinning a macro-political structure among the islands, represented monetary values or exchanges of collective allegiances. It has taken two decades for that famous anthropological debate on whether human societies are structured through markets or through cultural exchanges to emerge as a major issue in international debates about whether culture products are only commodities in the world market or represent fundamental ways of expressing cohesion, trust, and understanding within and between political collectivities. We are back at the heart of the matter. And much more precise, rigorous, and informed knowledge is necessary to help governments finds ways to deal with this dilemma.

Time and again, in the Plenary Session, in the fora, in the Agora, you have been saying that culture cannot be produced on an assembly line. It may be assembled there, Hollywood-style, to reshape, refine and polish a product, a film, a song, but *the creative art must be there at the beginning*. Hollywood knows this and this is the reason it imports multicultural talent to create films that strike cultural codes in many countries and invade the most traditional spaces of culture.

A major point that I wish to bring to your attention is that the same meaning we may cherish in a monument, a cultural landscape or a dance is being carried around *inside living people who create it and it is there that we must also do our best to protect, nourish, and allow it to flourish*. Denying or preventing this creativity from being expressed in some groups is cultural racism, which, unfortunately, is expanding in some places in the world. Denying or preventing this freedom to create culture from flourishing in women is sexism.

14.4 Who Decides?

In a discussion at this conference, a male participant told me very frankly, 'I am worried because an alien culture is coming to my country that wants women to change'. I answered, 'Well, what do the women themselves want?' Because, as we found in the World Commission on Culture and Development, when you go to the deepest issues of culture, you are confronted with the ultimate question of *who decides?*

There is a natural tendency of wanting to preserve minority or indigenous peoples' cultures in museums but now indigenous peoples themselves are saying 'we don't want to be prisoners of a static culture!' Because every 'border drawn in blood' around cultures protects from the outside but becomes a prison on the inside: protectionism may lead to infertility. This is why, in discussing an agenda for future research and action on culture and development, it was proposed to analyse the

mechanisms whereby cultural symbols are identified, transmitted, and ascribed yet, very importantly, *are also created anew.*

Just as human development has been defined as expanding peoples' choices in development, in culture it means opening up the choices that each individual, man or woman, young or old, may make. They may choose to regroup around a traditional culture or nationalism or religion and, as the World Commission stated, their choice must be respected, *as long as they themselves respect the choice others may make not to identify with or belong to their chosen community.* This must be placed in a democratic system because without democracy, conflict lines along cultural boundaries may lead to war.

This is, also, a breakthrough by this Conference. As a speaker put it in the Non-Governmental Organisations assembly, creativity is an end but also a means. Creativity is needed in new legislation and new parliamentary debates, in discussing artistic projects through peer review, in opening the media and the Internet to exploration of forms of communicating.

Then we are no longer talking only of objects but of people. Of artists and writers and everyday people creating a history or writing songs or performing a play. How do you protect this in people? Through the rights, copyrights, resources and conditions of work that were further affirmed at the Conference on the Status of the Artist held last year at UNESCO, the reports of which have been brought to this Conference.[2]

An essential point is that protecting the physical and psychological integrity of women and men is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. To human rights, then, we must add the conditions that allow the *freedom to create*. This goes further and at the same time complements freedom of expression because it means being able to go beyond old frames of mind to explore new values and create new institutions.

UNESCO has, for many years, led the young and the old of the world in saving World Cultural Heritage. This emphasis now focuses on conservation with participation.

14.5 Cultural Policies

There was a general consensus that cultural policy should look beyond a purely national emphasis and take, in addition, a broader, inter-national, inter-regional and global perspective. New partnerships between governments, corporations, private voluntary associations, and other stakeholders should be developed.

Today, culture goes far beyond the field traditionally assigned to ministries of culture. Culture is indeed concerned with artistic creation and with ethnic and indigenous issues, yet, as stated at this Plenary, it must be directed to social integration, political democracy, and economic equity. It is relevant in designing

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[2] Available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001114/111473eo.pdf> (03 May 2014).

and implementing models of economic development, constructing stable democ-racies, ensuring that diverse cultures can live together without violent conflict or war, and providing a sense of trust, partnership, and solidarity that are necessary to any society in which people cooperate for their well-being. Such an endeavour calls for an education of world citizens who are rooted in their local cultures yet have loyalties to their identities as citizens of a nation, a region, and humankind.

Before I finish, as I am leaving UNESCO, I would like to add a personal note. In the name of the more than 150 staff working in the Culture Sector, many of whom are world experts in their fields, and in my own name, I would like to thank all of you participants at this Conference. I would like to thank you for the firm support you have given to the Culture Programme, and for the praise and the critiques, which always help in redressing and redirecting actions but, most of all, for the political will you have made visible here in Stockholm in calling world attention to the statement that culture, the heart of the matter, is what will make a difference in the way the world develops in the twenty-first century.

With great conviction I would like to say that of all world projects representing the political will to recognize cultural diversity while binding it with a common purpose, UNESCO is the most tangible demonstration that people from all cultures of the world can work together and produce what is so necessary in the world today, invisible threads of cooperation and hope in acting together. But it is, of course, a human endeavour and as all human endeavours go, it is imperfect. Yet, the magic of what you have heard, done and felt over these three days will stay with you and nurture our common dream. For this, I personally thank you.

I would like to end by asking what can only be asked at conferences such as this: who is thinking for the world? Because we no longer have a world made up of tribes, but one interconnected and interactive, rooted in an ecosystem that we are all responsible for. *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO 1995) called for a United Nations that binds governments but also gives voice to peoples: this is a new frame of mind.

To think new thoughts to fill this new frame of mind, we need freedom: freedom of expression and freedom to create. In this new century we must stop trench wars that that will leave a scar of young deaths across the world, for minds also die, and the saddest thing we can witness and which ends up in terrorist bombs is the death of young minds stuck in cultural trenches.

In the last 300 years, cultures were carved out in our minds to coincide with political borders and yet, as Galileo would have said, they are in motion; social sciences were made like square chips to fit into national borders, yet they have also moved. There are so many things happening across borders: how do we build a frame of mind that starts out from reason and equality to define cultural citizenships within and across nations in this new global polis?

Thank you.

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The author's first book published in 1973 based on fieldwork in a Nahua village

Part IV
Exploring Research Tools
to Analyse Culture

The Venera José María Morelos prize for public service presented to the author by the governor of Morelos in April 2014. *Source* Photo was taken by Hans Günter Brauch who granted permission

COMPARTIR
EL PATRIMONIO
CULTURAL INMATERIAL:
NARRATIVAS Y REPRESENTACIONES

Lourdes Arizpe
Coordinadora

Chapter 15
Culture and Development: A Comparative Study of Beliefs

15.1 Introduction

Anthropological studies build a holistic perspective about a culture by observing and collecting as much data as possible about a society.[1] This ethnographic methodology, however, does not allow for a more nuanced description of the various views held by different groups within that society. This generates a problem for the anthropologist, especially in studies of settlements larger than villages.

In the study I conducted in Zamora, a small town west of Mexico City, the social and economic differences between social classes show variations which have to be analysed as comparative beliefs. Within each social class, women and men hold different perceptions and beliefs about their culture, development, politics, religion, ethics, and other themes. In this paper, I will summarize part of the results of this study and suggest new paths to better understand how these perceptions and beliefs evolve in the complex of development.

Zamora, a small town in the state of Michoacán, is prosperous due to the strawberry agroexport business. It presents many of the contradictory processes that will help us rethink development. The concept of culture is becoming an important analytical tool for redesigning development but new concepts and methods are needed to link it to more general discussions on modernity and development.

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[1] This paper was delivered at the World Congress of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Zagreb, Croatia, 1988. Unpublished. The data analysed in this paper were collected through fieldwork and a survey of 250 people in Zamora, Mexico. See: Arizpe (1989).

15.2 The 'Anxiety' of the Zamoranos

The 'anxiety' that many Zamoranos talk about, very often linked to the phrase "customs are changing", is one of the rapid changes brought about by economic development in the region. These are transforming the context in which traditional cultural beliefs and norms are applied. This cultural gap echoes the same concern of many Mexicans about national 'loss of identity' or 'denationalization'. This is experienced very intensely in Zamora because it implies the loss of a whole social order, described by one of the interviewees as "the old Mexico"; this corresponds in western Mexico to the socio-economic structure dominated by the old landholding oligarchy and the Church. *This gap has widened Zamoran society as economic growth through the strawberry agrobusiness has been very rapid while the corresponding social and cultural development has not occurred along with it.*

Until a few decades ago, Zamora and the region surrounding it were living under an oligarchical order that had at its pinnacle, on the one hand, families that owned the large haciendas and, on the other, the hierarchy of the Church, which often incorporated the sons of those families. The rigid, ascribed social hierarchy was sustained by a system of beliefs dominated by Roman Catholic doctrine, linked to a whole cultural complex based on the trinomial of Spain-Conquest-Catholicism. This self-contained, unified cultural universe, expressed in a single system of beliefs sustained by religion, education, and a social style of urbanity, began to crumble at mid-century, and this change accelerated in the 1970s.

A new economic logic was introduced: for production, it was no longer enough to own land; now capital became necessary in order to set up the strawberry-packing plants, together with export transport and commercialization. The expansion of agriculture for trade and outmigration of peasant heads of households to the United States began to consolidate a new structure of social classes. The basis for prestige was no longer being born into the right family or being superior because of a carefully cultivated sensitivity; rather, to put it bluntly, money became the basis for prestige, giving specific individuals the buying power to acquire small planes, take their families on long shopping trips to Europe, or send their children to study in the US.

In this Catholic society, where culture looks down on profit-making, preaches charity, and exalts spiritual values over material values, a profound contradiction has arisen that different groups are trying to resolve by adjusting their values and practices. For example, there is a grudging acceptance of the economic pre-eminence of the 'new rich', while social and cultural prestige are denied to them. For the Church, this becomes an instrument in insisting that the new class of bourgeoisie should accept the old alliance the Church had had with the landed oligarchy. One example is that rich businesspeople are strongly pressured to donate money for a new altar in the Church or to fund activities in convents and monasteries. Zamora, in fact, is called 'the factory of priests' because of the large number of seminaries there producing candidates for the priesthood.

The new bourgeoisie,[2] in turn, moves ambivalently between accepting formal subordination to Catholic values in order to win the approval of the Church and the religious sector of society, and wanting to assume the role that it is destined to play in an industrial society, that is, to be the promoters of modern, liberal values based on a belief in progress. Hence the ambiguity in many of their responses to our survey.

15.3 The Responses to the Survey

In the survey, women of the bourgeoisie gave the most religious and conservative answers to questions, while the men of that same social class, as shown by all indicators in the survey, gave the most liberal and progressive answers of all the people interviewed. Does this striking contradiction create a conflict between the men and women? Our fieldwork observations and interviews showed that this is not so. On the contrary, it would seem that they establish an acknowledged dual cultural microuniverse for women and for men. Women create rigid, unyielding moral rules around the family, Church, and their close-knit social circle, while men are quite free to lead their own personal lives as they see fit and to become the spokesmen for a new liberal society of entrepreneurs, provided they support their family at their expected income level. In fact, men often have second families—'*la casa chica*' (the small house)—, arrangements which they set up for their lovers but which frequently become long-term. The women-wives in the socially visible families have a way of putting it: "as long as I am the Cathedral, I don't care if he has other chapels".

Overall, it is clear that the new bourgeoisie is not exercising its cultural leadership fully in Zamora. The money of this class, which in an industrial society would help subsidize artistic, literary, scientific and social welfare activities, ends up in this case (and also among most of the new bourgeoisie in other cities in Mexico), being squandered exclusively on ostentatious consumption. There is a lack of commitment among the Zamoran bourgeoisie to improving the educational, cultural, and artistic life of their town. In capitalist industrial societies, this is something which has helped diminish social inequality and foster cultural development, but it has not been operating here. Instead, money from rich families is channelled towards furthering the activities of the Church.

The survey also showed that people belonging to the petty bourgeoisie[3] were divided into two clearly-defined groups. The first group had very conservative beliefs, linked to traditional professions such as law, accounting, and medicine;

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[2] In the survey conducted in Zamora, the bourgeoisie was defined according to income, education, and social mobility.

[3] The petty bourgeoisie was defined mainly according to income, type of employment, and management positions at the workplace.

they exhibit a very high degree of religiosity and actively defend the old Catholic social order. The second group is, in contrast, much more open to change, to personal achievement, and to progressive thinking. This group is made up mainly of college-educated professionals who have graduated in fields such as economics, dentistry, and psychology, including a few university teachers. Within this group, if they hold Catholic beliefs, most are inclined toward the Theology of Liberation priests who are close to Marxist ideals; if they do not have such beliefs, then they clamour in a loud voice for a more modern and efficient social and political order. It is this group that is the strongest advocate for 'pulling' Zamorano life forward to leave outdated beliefs and moral rigidity behind and to combat social injustice and inequality.

The survey also showed that, among urban workers, there is a predominantly conservative group, but there is also a minority which is active in labour rights. Interestingly, among agricultural wage labourers, it is the other way around: most of them are much more demanding of labour rights and greater equality, and are against religion and very critical of politics. Finally, among peasants, a very conservative belief system still predominates, but it is based on a religiosity that is more other-worldly, and more reminiscent of ancient Meso-American beliefs than of contemporary churchgoing.

Thus, the old colonial Zamorano cultural world is gradually collapsing and the new classes have not been capable of creating new agreements, rituals, and symbols to unite their local community.

15.4 Culture and Modernity

If the results of the study are seen through the prism of modernity, it does become clear that the *modernization* (understood as a process of economic growth) that has occurred in Zamora has not been accompanied by *modernity* in terms of the adoption of a set of rationally-based, progressive values. In reality, the 'anxiety' about cultural change among Zamoranos comes from the clash between rapid modernization and a culture rooted in the Counter-Reformation, which, as Octavio Paz stated so aptly, sunk its deep colonial pillars into provincial Mexico, especially in the region of Guanajuato, León, Querétaro and parts of Jalisco and Michoacán. According to my fieldwork, in this battle of shadows Zamoranos align themselves not according with their social class position but with their political-religious ideologies.

In this region, the most Catholic and conservative groups in Mexican society constitute the nucleus of the anti-modernity position that forms the basis of support for the conservative Church and the parties on the right. Among the new, modernizing bourgeoisie, on the other hand, in spite of the fact that women of this group say they are very Catholic, while they are *socially* subordinated to the Church, in actual practice—for example, the use of contraception—they are liberal and *culturally* open

to the trends coming out of universities, the mass media, international culture and travel, among other sources.

The most progressive groups, the survey showed, are the middle class, the workers, and agricultural wage labourers. The strongest modernizing impetus is to be found in this group, who place themselves in the ideological and political vanguard in favour of modernity. They are in favour of secular civilization, technical, social and political progress, social justice and economic development. In political terms, they are are part of the grand coalition of peasant movements, agrarian socialists, nationalist liberals, and capitalist liberals that triumphed in the Mexican Revolution. Liberation Theology has now joined this group to consolidate the main modernizing movement in Mexico.

Finally, in opposition to the groups above, that is, the 'anti-modern counter-reformists' and the 'modernizing coalition', there are also the 'reticent pre-modernists'. These are the peasants, many of whom are indigenous Purépechas, and a few agricultural labourers who "fight so that nothing will change", as peasants who fought in the Mexican Revolution have been characterized; they were fighting in order to defend their age-old way of life. My own view is that they have a right to defend their own culture and way of life, and not to become 'wage slaves' as George Osborne, an English writer, expressed it when he saw how the enclosure of the commons was bringing a new capitalist order to the English countryside.

These, then, are the three major movements facing each other today in the cultural space of Zamora. Little by little the modernizing currents are gaining ground, since the dissonance between anti-modern values, pre-modern beliefs, and actual socio-economic development is not sustainable in the long term. In fact, practices have already changed, but Zamora finds itself precisely at the delicate point when these new practices have to be turned into modern beliefs: searching for this congruence in Zamora, and in Mexico as a whole, is quite a challenge for towns like Zamora.

15.5 Women and Religious Beliefs

The data from fieldwork in Zamora and the survey clearly contradict the assumption that women, for some intrinsic reason, are always more religious than men. Although women, in their responses to the survey, tended to be more religious when compared to men, among agricultural wage labourers they are not. Significantly, this is in contrast to women workers or employees in the strawberry packing plants. This suggests that wage earning in itself does not explain radical views among women but, rather, that it is the degree of poverty and the brutality of working conditions which directly influence women's views. Indeed, as these women drift with their extremely poor and deprived families from one agricultural region to another, eking out a living by picking crops or cutting cane, they live in terrible conditions, sleeping in the fields, with no schooling or medical care for their children and constant insecurity and harsh treatment. It seems, then, that the more

precarious the conditions of life and work, the more such women hold radical beliefs. They have nothing to lose. Other factors detected in interviews did show that the constant geographical mobility, the lack of stable social communities, and the discrimination they suffer in public spaces and institutions also drive their desperation about their lives and those of their children.

15.6 Knowledge and Truth

An important fact is that in spite of the variability in the degree of religious adherence and practices, there is a belief for which there was an absolute consensus among women and men in all social classes: it is the belief that there is *a single truth*. This epistemological base predisposes to dogmatic thinking, whatever the ideological content, whether Roman Catholic or Marxist or any other ideology and is at odds with pluralistic rationalism.

The survey indicated that high value is assigned to respecting what is taught by parents and ancestors and to continuing tradition. It is only the men of the bourgeoisie and some women of the petty bourgeoisie who maintain that it is necessary to change beliefs in accordance with new circumstances.

In spite of this general tendency to keep the basis of beliefs intact, all the groups (with the exception of bourgeois women and peasant women) indicated that one can learn the truth by studying. This response to the survey has a series of important implications. The first is that the Catholic Church is losing its predominance as the only intermediary that allows access to truth, since it forbids its followers to read the Bible by themselves. Secondly, it opens the door for the arrival of other beliefs through the educational system, since it is study that offers a possibility of knowledge. Thirdly, even the social classes that are most excluded from the educational system, such as workers and agricultural labourers, believe that studying is the path towards knowledge and towards personal advancement ('*superación personal*'). Therefore, the decisive influence of secular education can be seen in all of Zamorano society. A small fraction of the petty bourgeoisie stands out from the rest in firmly declaring its confidence in rational and scientific knowledge.

Because they stand out from other groups in an odd alliance, it is worthwhile to try to find out why it is the bourgeois and peasant women, at the two poles between income and social status within women, who most defend the conservation of traditional beliefs. It could be argued that peasant women feel so vulnerable because they are farthest away from educational and information systems. But this would not explain the case of bourgeois women. Why do they, with easy access to education and information, and who express beliefs that are relatively less religious than other groups, reject rationalist, scientific thinking? It can be hypothesized that this is because, already being in the highest social and economic position of society, the women of the bourgeoisie seek to preserve their situation and not to change it, as would be the case with the petty bourgeoisie.

There would therefore be a social class determination in both two cases: bourgeois women because they want to preserve their privileges at the apex of Zamoran society, and peasant women because they take refuge in an ancient lifestyle. For both, modernization is threatening because it attacks the stability in their family fortresses. It is therefore not surprising that they tend to lean towards religious-conservative politics such as the National Action Party (*Partido Acción Nacional*).

15.7 Politics and Authoritarianism

In this paper I will only discuss the most important results of the study related, firstly, to the questions of 'who governs [in Mexico]?' and 'who should govern [in Mexico]?' and, secondly, to the low level of authoritarianism expressed in beliefs, as well as the high tolerance manifested regarding social inequality.

The relative homogeneity that was found among all groups regarding beliefs in religiosity and morals contrasts with the marked differences that were evident regarding beliefs about government and about the relations between social classes. Those who answered the questionnaire agreed that at present it is the politicians who govern (especially in the opinion of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie) but there were also frequent answers to the effect that the rich govern, an answer common among agricultural labourers, peasants, and women of all social classes. On the other hand, there was a wide diversity of beliefs regarding who *should* govern. Very few people spoke in favour of having politicians govern, which indicates the level of mistrust that prevails in this regard. In contrast, the percentage of those who declared themselves to be in favour of professionals and intellectuals was high. However, support for government by priests also stood out, expressed, again, by women of the bourgeoisie and peasant women.

The diversity of answers about concrete aspects of politics showed a contrast with the homogeneity in the fixed, dogmatic expression of certain basic ideological principles when referring to political positions. There seems to be a marked distance between adherence to political *ideas* and actual political *practices* in everyday life.

As I used the questionnaire, adapted to Mexican conditions, that was developed by Theodor Adorno to assess 'the authoritarian personality' in German culture, the most salient result was *the low level of authoritarianism expressed in all groups.* Of the four indicators of beliefs which I formulated, this one is the indicator with the lowest levels when compared with the other three. The hypothesis with which I began the study posited that in a conservative culture—defined within the range of political orientations in Mexico at this time—such as that of Zamora, a higher level of authoritarianism would have been expected, which could possibly predispose to fascist tendencies in political behaviour. This was not confirmed by the data found in the survey.

The data indicated that Zamoranos appear to be much less authoritarian than Adorno's studies showed for German citizens. Also, the answers delineate a

different kind of authoritarianism. Many studies have debated how, in Germany, the Hegelian legacy and the Lutheran Protestant orientation influenced the emergence of a personality characterized by severe, unyielding moral judgments, strict discipline, and an unquestioning submission to the authority of the State. In Zamora, by contrast, a religiosity was found with a moral edge determined by two values: firstly, an *unconditional support of family members and friends*, and, secondly, *forgiveness*. The pre-eminence accorded to these two values seems to temper the rigidity of moral judgments and of disciplinary demands. Of course, these two values then lead to their own extreme, deleterious consequences: nepotism, corruption, and impunity.

Interestingly, however, a marked gender difference became evident in authoritarian beliefs. In general, women are less authoritarian than men. Among women, the least authoritarian are those of the petty bourgeoisie and agricultural labourers. In contrast, men of the bourgeoisie are also the least authoritarian group in their beliefs. The group which is comparatively the most authoritarian is that of both peasant women and men.

A specific point is worth emphasizing: respondents from the working classes, in contrast to the bourgeoisie, said they believed that what Mexico needed in political terms was a strong leader who would impose order. Other data confirmed this disposition, including the fact that several peasants, workers, and agricultural labourers interviewed said that in politics what was needed was "a man of … stature". This perception coincides with the general historical trend towards what is called 'caudillismo' in Mexico, adherence to a strong man leading a revolutionary war. This means that, in this region, politics continue to be conceived primarily in personal rather than institutional or political party terms.

Finally, a high tolerance for social inequality was evident in many of the fieldwork observations and the answers to the survey. Fully 78 % of respondents in the survey agreed that the reason people were not successful was because of their own failures or because they lacked the will to get ahead. In addition, inequalities are attributed to "God's will". Only a small group of the petty bourgeoisie insisted that inequalities were due to economic exploitation and to an imbalance in access to resources. There was also a very high consensus, 83 % of those surveyed, among those who believed that the wealthy should invest to create jobs.

15.8 Morality and Sexism

Compared with other areas, the greatest conscious resistance to change is manifested in terms of morality: "That is what should not change," were the words of one informant in Zamora. Moralism as the deliberate expression of adherence to fixed values of morality was a homogeneous response in Zamora. In terms of the study *it is the topic in which fewer differences exist between women and men, and between social classes.* Significantly, slightly less moralism was shown by the upper classes than by workers, agricultural labourers, and peasants.

Interestingly, the salient feature regarding morality in Zamora, in comparison with other topics, is the stark inconsistency between beliefs expressed in discourse and actual practice. It is not a question of an occasional or circumstantial transgression of a certain moral code, but rather of corruption or of different sexual standards for women and men. I would go as far as to say that it is an institutionalized and publicly acknowledged transgression of moral values. One example is graft in the local political system, and another, as mentioned, is the practice of Catholic men, men who are highly respectful of their families, of having a 'casa chica'—the socially acknowledged term for 'little house'—for their mistress and perhaps the man's children with her. A final example is the institutionalization of prostitution, which has thrived in the region as prosperity has risen.

The fact that the inveterate presence of these practices has not led to a change in the level of the beliefs expressed in discourse only confirms the strength with which the idea of '*el deber ser*' (what should be) still prevails in the midst of contrary practices in Zamoran society. Indeed, any transgression of moral standards is easily pardonable through confession and penitence. In my view, it is this way out of the contradiction that allows a total dissonance between beliefs and practices. Some people interpret this as the height of hypocrisy and others as the height of compassion.

The above may be interpreted as indicating that moral beliefs, in contrast to the beliefs analysed in this study, are those that are least influenced by social or historic processes. In the case of Zamora they are firmly rooted in the precepts of Roman Catholicism. It also became evident that the core of this morality is centred on women's sexual repression, since women are seen as the custodians of morality. Perhaps this is why the changes brought about by economic and social development are especially feared, in that they may lead women to shake off the constraints of traditional sexual repression. That women "are no longer as long-suffering" ("*ya no son tan sufridas*") is a value that is beginning to change the hembrismo/machismo[4] scheme that has prevailed in gender relations.

It is also evident that the field of morals continues to be a social space under the exclusive influence of the Church, in which neither the State nor the political parties have been effective in placing ethics and morality in the public sphere.

15.9 Gender Semantics

The differences in beliefs between men and women which are evident in the data suggest that gender semantics are especially differentiated in Zamora. In an earlier study, Pi-Sunyer (1973) argued that there is a high degree of divergence between

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[4] In the last 15 years women's studies and feminist debates have concluded that the famous traditional '*machismo*' is nurtured and fostered by '*hembrismo*', that is, by behaviour based on an exaggerated motherly and feminine behaviour that turns 'men' into 'machos' through education and relationships.

the world of men and that of women in Zamora. This was confirmed by my study, but I go further in interpreting this phenomena.

Usually, the high degree of gender separation in behaviour in the culture in Zamora is discussed in everyday life as a problem of '*machismo*', a well-known syndrome of behaviour in men based on insecurity and expressed in domineering traits and a predisposition to violence. As Octavio Paz, Santiago Ramirez and other writers and psychologists who have analysed these traits argue, such behaviour is rooted, in the Mexican case, in the violent dominance of Spanish men over Indian women and the identification of their sons with the mother's vulnerability and tenderness. This dichotomic psychosocial structure continues to be reproduced, on the female side, as '*hembrismo*', an exaggerated maternal possessiveness that perpetuates the cycle of men who are very attached to their mothers and do not establish deep relationships with their own wives. Towards other men, they exhibit a highly ambiguous form of very close friendships and unrelenting competition.

Throughout the study, people in Zamora constantly referred to the conflict between women and men with high social anxiety. How is this perceived by the different social classes? Survey data provided a general overview of how different the perceptions of women and men in Zamora are.

Interestingly, I found the highest number of differences in perception to be between peasant men and women, while agricultural labourers showed the lowest number. In the petty bourgeoisie the number of differences was also very high, and the interviews confirmed that this was because women are now moving towards more secular, rationalist beliefs, in many cases influenced by feminism. Significantly, there were fewer differences among the bourgeoisie and among workers, although among the latter, they were higher than those among agricultural labourers.

As the market economy transforms the social landscape, change is coming and both men and women in Zamora are perceiving it. How is this change coming about? On one hand, in the oligarchical agrarian social structure, *machismo* played an important role of aggression and defence in situations characterized by a high degree of conflict, for land, for political office, for cultural pre-eminence, and so on. On the other hand, ideological domination by the Church emphasizes even more strongly the pre-eminence of men and complementariness rather than partnership between women and men.

As the cultural structure of an agrarian society based on a social hierarchy and gender complementariness breaks down, the modern rationality of the labour market, to which at least in theory all individuals have access, has gradually imposed itself. Thus, *machismo* has lost its function of maintaining dominance through violence and is becoming a caricature that only expresses frustration and resentment against the domination of another kind of strength that is much more subtle, that of capital.

For its part, *hembrismo*, prompted in agrarian society by the need for protection by the men of the family against outside male aggression, is also declining as society is modernized. However, interviews with women in Zamora also pointed to a different phenomenon. The less *machismo* is accepted in public life, the more it

turns out it is directed towards the family as violence by men against their wives and children. In this situation, women seek the protection of the Church, which may be one of the reasons why women of all social classes tend to be more religious than the men—to little avail, since the Church has never strongly condemned the violence of men within the family. On the contrary, priests routinely tell women in confession that it is their duty to do as their husbands bid. They continue to demand submission and resignation in women, constantly reminding them that they are responsible for 'original sin' and for causing the downfall of men through sexual temptation. As feminism begins to spread, however, very different secular ideologies are now coming to Zamora so that young women are no longer willing to accept this situation.

At present, the potential for renewal that young women are developing is being wasted because, although they have increasing access to the labour market, they do not have the institutions and educational programmes that could provide them with new values and practices in the development process. In addition, so long as a constant, true dialogue is not being fostered between women and men to reconstruct values around the definitions of 'femininity' and 'masculinity', conflicts between them will continue to worsen and to be perpetuated in the new generations.

15.10 Assessing Cultural Development in Zamora

The study showed that the dislocation of culture in Zamora, as one of the effects of rapid economic growth, is increasingly creating social problems. Mainly because, *as capitalist development advances, neither ethical nor cultural habits have been generated that might serve as checks and balances to deleterious trends in Mexican development that increase social inequality, political marginalization, sexism, and cultural alienation*. To give an example, there is no public outcry in Zamora that would serve as a brake on abuses by corrupt politicians and public servants, nor demands that the bourgeoisie should contribute to the social well-being and cultural life of the city; nor are there civil spaces for discussion and organization that would counter the growing inequality between the social classes. Perhaps this is now beginning to be possible through recent political mobilizations, but this again means a subordination of civil life to political life, as the latter increasingly extends its hold on society.

15.11 Towards the Future

What are the main obstacles for creating ethical norms that would act as counter-weights to achieve more equitable and gender-balanced development? Anthropologists do not usually volunteer proposals for action, but in recent years this has become more and more urgent. And if anthropologists who have lived in the place

and have deeper knowledge of social and cultural processes do not do it, who will? In broad terms, the study showed that women tend to be more conservative than men in the case of the bourgeoisie and peasants, while women agricultural labourers and a fraction of women of the petty bourgeoisie have become even more politically radical than the men. Thus, I offer the following thoughts derived from fieldwork and from the survey of cultural perceptions and beliefs in Zamora.

Achieving a more even and equitable development in Zamora is set back by the following processes:

The prevalence of a doctrinal epistemology that gives rise to highly dogmatic beliefs (this was the indicator with the highest results in the survey) creates pressure to assume that all beliefs, including secular beliefs, are self-evident truths. Thus, even though individuals may tread a path going from Catholicism and a religious crisis to Jacobinism and Marxism, there has been no 'epistemological rupture' (to use a fashionable term) in the way that beliefs are internalized, but a mere semantic substitution, so that Marxism is often taken on with same baggage of unquestionable faith and fanaticism as Catholicism. This can become a political problem because a dogmatic basis for perceptions and beliefs does not allow the acceptance of pluralism, nor does it facilitate a negotiated convergence with different sectors of society; nor is this conducive to admitting doubts, criticism or debates, all of which are the basis for a scientific culture.

The second obstacle is the lack of understanding, in general, of the processes experienced by Zamorano society. If its doctrinary base is Catholic, everything that is resolved in the theatre of the world tends to be seen as an unending struggle between Good and Evil: it is, in any light, a moral happening. From this perspective, all transformations are understood exclusively to have to do with the loss of good behaviour ('*las buenas costumbres*') or the loss of moral values ('*la pérdida de valores morales*'). As a result, the only possible proposal for correcting any change that is happening is expressed in moral terms: to go back to Catholic values and norms or, among very conservative groups, to more extreme Catholic fundamentalism.[5] Consequently, the real world of profound changes in economic, labour and trade relationships, in technological advances, in the organization of work, family, and society is not understood. Very importantly, the irreversibility of these processes is not accepted. Faced with these formidable challenges, attempting to stop them by counterposing exegetic and dogmatic precepts is like trying to hold back a landslide with magical invocations. On the contrary, strategies to deal with such challenges must start out from a deep analysis of current trends that would allow for the creation of new ethical, political, and social strategies and goals, negotiated and shared in the new setting in which Mexico finds itself.

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[5] It may be pointed out that Zamora and the neighbouring town of Cotija were the birthplace of the movement of the Legionnaires of Christ.

Attempts by the conservative factions in the Catholic Church to recover their lost hegemony may lead to a regression, but it is very possible that they may not be able to do so by reiterating conservative interpretations and practices. In Zamora, it is clear that the new immigrant agricultural labourers prefer young priests from the Liberation Theology movement who side with them; and the middle-class and technician immigrants to Zamora also seek out priests who can talk to them about psychology and modern culture. Thus, it is possible that, with the change in the structure of social classes, the change in social and political demands may lead the Church to a new crossroads.

The lack of progress in setting up checks and balances in development is also associated with political manipulation by the municipal government and by politicians generally, who are oriented more towards achieving political control than to creating a true *polis*, that is, political coexistence. It may be that the new mobilizations of the PAN party on the right and the left-wing movement of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas may force an opening, but it will be necessary to create a whole new political culture that extends to the relationship between the State and civil society in Mexico.

The cultural policy of the Mexican government over the last five decades, of promoting art, national heritage, and recreation, based on promoting specific activities, has been prolific but insufficient. What is needed is a policy that covers the *cultural dimension* of the country's economic and social development, and that fosters a more aware, better informed, more democratic coexistence, with greater solidarity. This type of action is urgently needed in regions like Zamora.

In the context of cultural dislocations left by the processes analysed over the previous pages, it is now the mass communications media that are gaining ground in terms of cultural leadership in Zamora. Their programming, particularly that of the commercial television channels, is oriented primarily towards encouraging consumption. Unless the quality of the media's programming is improved to provide a richer, more critical content, the only cultural horizon that Zamora, and Mexico as a whole, will have in future years will be consumerism, which immediately after it has given some provisional satisfaction creates a void.

15.12 Conclusion

The study showed that it is not possible to confront a world of pluralisms—ethnic, religious, political, and social—with dogmatic or authoritarian beliefs. It also showed that a violent process of impoverishment cannot be confronted by turning a blind eye towards social inequality or by trying to reimpose antiquated codes of repression of openness, knowledge, women's advancement, and greater political democracy. What must be rebuilt is a social ethic more in accordance with the surprising and promising world that is opening up with greater knowledge and communications. Only pluralism can provide the foundations for a more democratic and equitable society.

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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)

The National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) was founded on 21 September 1551 under the name 'Royal and Pontifical University of Mexico'. It is the biggest and most important university in Mexico and in Ibero-America.

As part of the *Centennial Celebrations of Mexican Independence*, the National University was officially created on 22 September 1919. With the intention of widening educational opportunities in the country, the effort to launch the National University, though often hampered by adversity, was initially spearheaded by Congressman Justo Sierra in 1881. His vision finally materialized in 1910 with the inauguration of the *National University of Mexico* at a ceremony held in the National Preparatory School Amphitheatre, where as Secretary of Public Instruction, Sierra told the audience that the thrust of the National University's educational project was to concentrate, systematize and disseminate knowledge in order to prepare the Mexican people for the future. 100 years after the creation of the University, Justo Sierra's inaugural address still rings true: (…) *we are telling the university community today that truth is unfolding: go seek it* (…) *you have been charged with the realization of a political and social ideal which can be summed up thus: democracy and liberty.*

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The Regional Center for Multidisciplinary Research (CRIM) is an academic institution ascribed to the Coordination of Humanities at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). It is located in the City of Cuernavaca on the Morelos Campus of UNAM. Its objectives are:

1. Focus on multidisciplinary research in social sciences, humanities and other disciplines, mostly aimed at tackling specific problems at the local, regional, national and international levels, and their implications within globalization processes.
2. Contribute to the creation of knowledge in relevant and innovative arenas addressing social problems that require the convergence of different disciplines for their study.
3. Contribute to the development of a multidisciplinary approach to humanities, and focus on the development of innovative theoretical and methodological perspectives.
4. Participate in educational programs so as to contribute to the academic training of professionals in social sciences, humanities and other disciplines.
5. Disseminate by all possible means the results of CRIM's research projects.

Website: <http://www.crim.unam.mx>.

About the Author

Lourdes Arizpe is a professor at the Regional Center for Multidisciplinary Research of the National University of Mexico. She received an MA from the National School of History and Anthropology in Mexico in 1970 and a PhD in Anthropology from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, in 1975. She has pioneered anthropological studies on migration, gender, rural development, and global change and culture in Mexico, in Latin America, and in international research groups, both academic and policy-oriented. Professor Arizpe taught at Rutgers University through a Fulbright grant in 1979 and carried out research in India and Senegal with a John F. Guggenheim grant in 1981. She was director of the National Museum of Popular Cultures in Mexico 1985–1988. She was elected President of the National Association of Ethnologists of Mexico in 1986 and Secretary to the Mexican Science Academy in 1992. Professor Arizpe was Director of the Institute of Anthropological Studies at the National University of Mexico, was elected President of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in 1988, and successfully organized its World Congress in Mexico in 1993.

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See the website on this book at:
<http://afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_Arizpe.htm>

Lourdes Arizpe receiving the Venera José María Morelos Award for public service of the State of Morelos from Governor Graco Ramírez Garrido in April 2013. *Source* Photos by Hans Günter Brauch

About this Book

The texts presented in this book trace the rise of culture as a major concern for development, international diplomacy, sustainability and national politics in the past two decades. As a major participant in anthropological field research, advocacy for cultural freedom and decision-maker in international programmes on culture, the author gives a first hand account of the trade-offs, the contradictions and the management of consensus in these fields. She argues that the constitutive, functional and instrumental aspects of cultural narratives requires greater in-depth understanding of knowledge leading to cultural and social sustainability in the framework of a new worlding. Many of the texts were presented at the United Nations General Assembly and other very high level international meetings. Most of the texts are unpublished; some were first published in Spanish and are available in English for the first time.

- The author has been a major actor in international culture and social science programmes
- The "cultural turn" in science and politics has placed culture at the center of development concerns
- The texts were presented at the highest level of the United National and international science fora.

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